Slide 1: Intel Advanced Technology in the Enterprise: Best Security Practices
SF 2009 Intel Advanced Technology in the Enterprise: Best Security Practices Shiva R. Dasari Senior Software Engineer, IBM Vincent J. Zimmer Principal Engineer, Intel EFIS001
Slide 2: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 2
Slide 3: Trusted Computing Elements and Security Features in the platform
Trusted Computing Elements and Security Features in the platform Shiva R. Dasari Senior Software Engineer, IBM © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 4: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 4 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 5: Platform Security – The Problem Statement
Platform Security Platform Security – The Problem Statement Protection Against Malicious Code – Worms, patching Business Process Compliance – Regulatory requirements from EU Privacy, SarbOx, Basel II, HIPAA, GLB etc. Internal/External Access and Data Protection – Secure provisioning of Infrast
Slide 6: Dictionary Terminology
Platform Security Dictionary Terminology Trust – An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose Measurement – The process of obtaining the identity of an entity Security – “. . .1maintenance that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts o
Slide 7: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 7 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 8: Elements of trust
Platform Security Elements of trust Reliability Safety Confidentiality Integrity Availability Providing ‘Trust’ 8 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 9: Security architecture to deliver trust
Platform Security Security architecture to deliver trust App 1 App 3 App 2 Security Architecture Human User GUI Application Libraries Drivers Network SSL, IPsec, etc. OS Firmware Single layer Hardware “security” 9 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 10: Roots of trust of security architecture
Platform Security Roots of trust of security architecture Human User GUI Application Libraries Drivers Network OS Firmware Hardware Hardware and firmware are the roots of trust 10 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 11: What is the heart of Trust
Platform Security What is the heart of Trust The hardware root of trust includes – TPM – Flash – Binding of above into system TCG defines TPM’s functionality – Protected capabilities – Shielded locations Not the implementation – Vendors are free to differentiate the TPM implementation – Must s
Slide 12: SRTM for Platform Firmware
Platform Security 1 SRTM for Platform Firmware Firmware use of TPM and Measurements 12 1 Static Root of Trust for Management (SRTM) © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 13: CRTM
Platform Security CRTM What is CRTM Core root of trust for measurement Detects physical presence and initiates measurements for rest of firmware bootstrap Properties of CRTM immutable, or never changed in the field appropriate cryptographic techniques need to be employed in order to upda
Slide 14: UEFI/PI Architecture Boot Flow – Create/Evaluate Integrity List
Platform Security UEFI/PI Architecture Boot Flow – Create/Evaluate Integrity List Measure Into PCR’s Measure & Create 14 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 15: Measured items in UEFI
Platform Security Measured items in UEFI Standardized way to measure and report 15 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 16: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 16 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 17: UEFI Windows* is using SRTM
Platform Security UEFI Firmware Static PreOS All Boot Blobs Volume Blob of Unlocked Target OS unlocked TPM Init EFI Core EFI Extensions Boot manager OS loader Start OS UEFI Windows* is using SRTM 17 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 18: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 18 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 19: System X Servers
Platform Security System X Servers 19 © 2009 IBM Corporation
Slide 20: Best Practices on Building Security Features using PI-based Technology
Best Practices on Building Security Features using PI-based Technology Vincent Zimmer Principal Engineer, Intel
Slide 21: Background on Best Practices
Background on Best Practices • Many of these prescriptions covered below are already treated in various TCG documents and design guides • The intent of this section is to provide a platform and UEFI PI-focused summary of rules and practices 21
Slide 22: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 22
Slide 23: Hardware Best Practices
Human User Hardware Best Practices GUI Application Libraries Drivers Network OS Firmware Hardware • CRTM flash protection – Locking must not be controlled by any un-trusted programmable entities – Once locked within CRTM code, it must not be un-lockable without going through a system reset • Physica
Slide 24: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 24
Slide 25: UEFI PI Overview
What About Firmware Practices? UEFI PI Overview Human User GUI Application OS Libraries Pre-boot (UEFI or Tools Drivers Today’s) Network UEFI Specification OS Firmware PIWG Scope “H” Hardware Platform • UEFI 2.3 (published) specifies how Drivers firmware boots the OS loader • UEFI’s Platform Initial
Slide 26: Design Intent
Design Intent • The PI phase is under control of the Platform Manufacturer (PM) • Updates to PI phase should occur under PM authorization (PM_AUTH) • PI phase can be decomposed into compartments – SEC – PEI – DXE Methods for building PI – DXE SMM Methods of building PI impacts trust 26
Slide 27: Overall View of Boot Time Line
Overall View of Boot Time Line UEFI Startup Interfaces OS-Absent && App PEI Boudary Core for PM_AUTH UEFI Shell CPU Device, Init Bus, or Service Transient Chipset Init Driver OS Boot Loader Board Init EFI Driver Boot OS-Present Dispatcher Manager App Architectural Final OS Final OS Protocols Boot Lo
Slide 28: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 28
Slide 29: UEFI PI Best Practices
Human User GUI UEFI PI Best Practices Application Libraries Drivers Network OS • HW mis-configuration: Firmware – Appropriate set locks and other hardware configuration should be Hardware set by the PM-only PI code prior to running 3rd party code, such as UEFI drivers or operating system loaders • C
Slide 30: Agenda
Agenda • Trusted Computing Elements – Problems to solve – Firmware and trusted computing – OS usage – Platform perspective • Best practices – H/W rules – PI overview – Firmware rules • Futures 30
Slide 31: Futures - UEFI
Futures - UEFI EFI IPsec Impl (Pre-deployed SA) IPsecConfig Call SetData() -Add an SPD entry (for TRAFFIC1, Manual SA) Shell environment -Add required manual SA for this SPD entry EFI Drivers EFI_IP6_PROTOCOL TCP6 driver UDP6 driver IP6_CONFIG_PROTOCOL EFI_IPSEC_CONFIG By child By child Outbound pac
Slide 32: Firmware & Hardware security evolution
Human User GUI Application Libraries Drivers Network OS Firmware Hardware Firmware & Hardware security evolution 32
Slide 33: Summary
Summary • Security problems in the industry are real • Trust and a security architecture can address some needs, esp h/w and f/w • UEFI f/w and TCG hardware for SRTM, BitLocker usage, IBM platforms • Follow best practices on implementing hardware and firmware • UEFI and hardware security evolution 3
Slide 34: Call to action- Security Requirements
Call to action- Security Requirements • Use the TPM • Follow best practices on hardware and firmware • Get involved in UEFI and TCG forums • Get the white paper – http://download.intel.com/technology/efi/docs/pdf s/SF09_EFIS001_UEFI_PI_TCG_White_Paper.pdf 34
Slide 35: Additional resources on UEFI
Additional resources on UEFI: • Other Technical and UEFI Sessions – Next slide • Intel / IBM Security Whitepaper: http://download.intel.com/technology/efi/docs/pdfs /SF09_EFIS001_UEFI_PI_TCG_White_Paper.pdf • Visit UEFI Booth #136 • More web based info: – Specifications and Implementation sites: www
Slide 36: IDF 2009 UEFI & Other Security Sessions
IDF 2009 UEFI & Other Security Sessions ECT# Company Description Time RM D S002 Intel, Vmware Intel® Trusted Execution Technology (Intel® TXT): A More Secure Launch Environment for the Enterprise Cloud 11:15 2007 T EFI# Company Description Time RM D P001 Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft Using UEF
Slide 37: Session Presentations - PDFs
Session Presentations - PDFs The PDF for this Session presentation is available from our IDF Content Catalog at the end of the day at: intel.com/go/idfsessions 37
Slide 38: Please Fill out the Session Evaluation Form
Please Fill out the Session Evaluation Form Give the completed form to the room monitors as you exit! Thank You for your input, we use it to improve future Intel Developer Forum events 38
Slide 39: Q&A
39 Q&A IDFc002
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Slide 41: Risk Factors
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