Slide 1: Impactive Capital + Wake Up WEX
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer 2 The materials contained herein (the “Materials”) represent the opinions of Impactive Capital Master Fund LP and the other par tic ipants named in its proxy solicitation (collectively, “Impactive” or “we”) and are based on publicly available information with respect to WEX Inc. (the “Com
Slide 3: Impactive's Approach to Correcting WEX's Inaccurate and Misleading Statements
Impactive’s focus is on the facts , the numbers, and what matters to shareholders. We will leave the personal attacks and innuendos to WEX. That is why in this presentation we are not seeking to rebut every point the Company has published – but rather prioritize addressing the most egregious misrepr
Slide 4: Impactive's Campaign is Simple
Board change is needed because WEX has dramatically and persistently underperformed peers, generating bottom decile returns under the current Chair and CEO. 1 The WEX Board’s response to shareholder concerns has been insufficient. Shareholders would be better served with separate CEO & Chair roles a
Slide 5: WEX Has Dramatically Underperformed on the Only KPI That Matters: Total Shareholder Return
- 23% 64% 101% 225% 44% 422% 1 2 WEX S&P 400 Proxy Peers WEX Has Dramatically Underperformed on the Only KPI That Matters: Total Shareholder Return 5 WEX Total Shareholder Return versus Proxy Peers and Index Melissa Smith Combined CEO & Chair Tenure 2019 - 2026 Source: Bloomberg as of February 6, 20
Slide 6: Poor Long-Term Returns Are Directly Linked to Combined CEO & Chair Roles
Poor Long - Term Returns Are Directly Linked to Combined CEO & Chair Roles and Lack of Accountability and Oversight Source: Bloomberg from September 12, 2019 through February 6, 2026, the last trading day before Impactive nominated candidate s f or the WEX Board. The CEO & Chair role were combined o
Slide 7: Recent TSR Outperformance from April '25 Trough Catalyzed by Impactive's Campaign
-40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% Jan 25 Feb 25 Mar 25 Apr 25 May 25 Jun 25 Jul 25 Aug 25 Sep 25 Oct 25 Nov 25 Dec 25 Jan 26 Feb 26 WEX S&P 400 Index Recent TSR “Outperformance” from April ’25 Trough Has Been Catalyzed by Impactive’s Campaign Pressure over the Same Period 7 WEX Recent Total Shareholder
Slide 8: WEX's Business Can Generate 20%+ ROIC but Poor Capital Allocation Reduces It
25.8% 8.3% 4.2% (6.6%) (10.9%) WEX Incorrect ROIC Estimate WEX Bank Capital & Opex Other Expense Addbacks WEX Correct GAAP ROIC WEX Annualized TSR, 2014 - Present WEX’s Business has the Ability to Generate a 20%+ ROIC but Poor Capital Allocation and Execution Reduce it to Single Digits, in Line with
Slide 9: WEX Attempts to Mask Underperformance by Downplaying its Comparability to Corpay
WEX WEX Attempts to Mask Underperformance by Downplaying its Comparability to Corpay 9 CPAY’s outperformance in so - called “noncomparable” businesses is the direct result of superior capital allocation and operating decisions. Unsurprisingly, WEX underperformance versus CPAY has widened since the C
Slide 10: Companies that Perform Don't Fabricate a New Set of Performance Peers Every Year
Companies that Perform Don’t Fabricate a New Set of “Performance Peers” Every Year Source: WEX SEC filings. 10 uses a “shell game” of arbitrary and changing peers to avoid holding management accountable . uses a list of peers that is consistent with industry standards , comparing WEX shareholder ret
Slide 11: The Board Has Failed To Proactively Separate CEO/Chair Role After 'No Confidence' Vote
2025 (% of Votes) AGAINST FOR 3% 93% Nancy Altobello 1% 95% Daniel Callahan 1% 96% Aimee Cardwell 4% 86% Shikhar Ghosh 1% 96% James Groch 30% 67% Jim Neary 1% 96% Derrick Roman 32% 64% Melissa Smith (CEO & Chair) 1% 95% Stephen Smith 1% 95% Susan Sobbott 34% 57% Jack VanWoerkom 11 Worst Vote in S&P
Slide 12: WEX Ramp Conflict of Interest Critique Is a Red Herring
WEX Ramp “Conflict of Interest” Critique Is a Red Herring Source: WEX SEC filings 12 • The Form 10 - K that WEX filed on February 13, 2026, contains a comprehensive list of more than two dozen competitors … but WEX has never identified Ramp as a competitor in this filing, any prior SEC filings, or p
Slide 13: WEX Should Focus on Its Own Potential Conflicts
WEX Should Focus on Its Own Potential Conflicts 13 Susan Sobbott Daniel Callahan O wned approximately 35,000 shares of AMEX , worth $3.5 million, according to a 1/2018 Form 4 filing (which may exclude unvested shares ). Joined the WEX Board in 2018. Owned 291,000 shares of Citigroup common stock and
Slide 14: WEX's Other Criticisms of Ms. Taylor Wolfe's Candidacy Lack Merit
WEX’s Other Criticisms of Ms. Taylor Wolfe’s Candidacy Lack Merit and Only Serve to Distract from Underperformance 14 Reality WEX Board Claim x Ms. Taylor Wolfe always conducted herself with integrity and the best interest of all shareholders in mind. We have “not responded on the substance of these
Slide 15: Shareholders Will Be Better Served with Impactive's Nominees
15 WEX agrees Kurt would be a great addition because he brings experience from every direct WEX competitor that is missing in the boardroom. Ellen Alemany Lauren Taylor Wolfe Kurt Adams Shareholders Will Be Better Served with Impactive’s Nominees WEX agrees Ellen would be a great addition because sh
Slide 16: Vote the WHITE Proxy Card to Wake Up WEX
Additional Information 16 Vote the WHITE Proxy Card to Wake Up WEX PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN WEX Please visit www.WakeUpWex. com for additional materials, information and voting instructions Wake Up Wex by voting for the election of Impactive’s highly qualified director candidates – Kurt Adams, Ell
Slide 17: Appendix
Appendix
Slide 18: If WEX's Claims Were True, then Shareholders Would Have Seen Better Results
If WEX’s Claims Were True, then Shareholders Would Have Seen Better Results 18 Reality WEX Board Claims 1 x Since Ms. Smith began her tenure as CEO at the beginning of 2014, WEX has delivered 4% annual returns to shareholders. x Management’s focus on topline growth even when acquired with shareholde
Slide 19: If WEX's Claims Were True, then Shareholders Would Have Seen Better Results (cont'd)
If WEX’s Claims Were True, then Shareholders Would Have Seen Better Results (cont’d) 19 Reality WEX Board Claims 1 x If management wishes to be paid like executives at their proxy peers, they need to be judged against those peers. x The Board’s willingness to re - engineer an expanded, changing grou
Slide 20: The Case for Change
THE CASE FOR CHANGE WEX's Mobility segment is growing significantly slower than closest its peer, with organic growth of just 2.7% compared to 6.7% at Corpay. a Chronic Underperformance EXPAND + + WEX has underperformed Corpay by approximately 58% over five years, with returns lagging across 1-, 3-,