Zale Corp

Zale — Proxy Contest (May 2014)

36 slides from Zale's proxy contest presentation, May 9, 2014

  1. Slide 1: Zale: A Turnaround Story Cut Short? The Right Deal But The Wrong Price

    TIG ADVISORS, LLC Registered Investment Adviser Zale: A Turnaround Story Cut Short? The Right Deal But The Wrong Price

  2. Slide 2: Zale – A Turnaround Story Cut Short? Right Deal, Wrong Price

    Zale – A Turnaround Story Cut Short? Right Deal, Wrong Price  TIG Advisors is a 9.5% holder of Zale Corporation and intends to vote AGAINST the transaction with Signet.  Previously undisclosed* and compelling financial projections from Zale make it clear that the standalone value of Zale is worth

  3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents  Summary  Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest  Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling  Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably  A More Appropriate Structure  The Zale merger agreement “Put”  Appendix 2

  4. Slide 4: Summary

    Summary | IG ADVISORS, LLC

  5. Slide 5: Summary

    Summary  TIG Advisors, a 9.5% shareholder of Zale Corporation (“Zale”), intends to vote against the acquisition of Zale by Signet Jewelers (“Signet”) at the currently agreed upon merger terms of $21/share in an all cash transaction as we believe Zale’s standalone prospects, while previously undiscl

  6. Slide 6: Summary, Cont’d

    Summary, Cont’d  Significant issues of process and potential conflicts of interest seriously taint the sale process and raise doubts as to whether or not the Signet deal is the best outcome for holders.  The acquisition of Zale creates enormous financial synergies for Signet holders and allows for

  7. Slide 7: Summary, Cont’d

    Summary, Cont’d  We encourage shareholders of Zale to recognize the Company’s true value and vote AGAINST the merger with Signet on its current terms.  Shareholders of Zale concerned with downside risk if a merger with Signet fails should consider not voting for, against or abstain on the merger v

  8. Slide 8: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest 7

  9. Slide 9: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest - Summary

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest - Summary  TIG Advisors has a number of concerns for how the process was conducted in reaching the agreement with Signet and unaddressed conflicts of interest. Golden Gate The inclusion on the Negotiation Committee of Golden Gate’s board representative cre

  10. Slide 10: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Summary, cont’d

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Summary, cont’d Management Conflicts of Interest Amidst discussions with Signet as to the sale of the Company, Signet indicated to Theo Killion, CEO of Zale, that it was Signet’s preference for Mr. Killion to continue leading the Zale division of Signet p

  11. Slide 11: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Golden Gate

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Golden Gate  Golden Gate’s conflicted role deprived holders of fair value for their shares. With a representative on the “Negotiation Committee” and as the largest shareholder, Golden Gate is in essence both judge and jury of the deal.  Zale was essenti

  12. Slide 12: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Golden Gate

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Golden Gate  Mr. Olshansky should not have been included on the Negotiation Committee and should have been recused from (i) voting on the transaction and; (ii) recused from Board deliberations on the proposed merger. Additionally, the Board and Negotiati

  13. Slide 13: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Bank of America

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Bank of America  Bank of America’s (BofA’s) actions and representations throughout their engagement with Zale raise serious concerns and taint both the process itself as well as the outcome.  In spite of Zale having paid BofA $10.5M during the two years

  14. Slide 14: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Bank of America

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Bank of America  On discovering BofA’s inherent conflicts after executing the merger agreement, the Board met several times and concluded on April 2nd that BofA’s presentation to Signet “did not impact the Board’s determination and recommendation regardi

  15. Slide 15: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Projections

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Projections  In response to Signet’s unsolicited interest in Zale, Management’s financial projections were utilized in three ways: the Board reviewed them to help understand what would be a fair price, BofA based their “fairness opinion” on them and Sign

  16. Slide 16: Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Management

    Failure of Process / Conflicts of Interest – Management  On at least two occasions throughout the sale process, Mike Barnes, CEO of Signet, indicated to Theo Killion, CEO of Zale, that it was his preference to retain Mr. Killion as the head of the Zale division post transaction closing. According t

  17. Slide 17: Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling

    Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling 16

  18. Slide 18: Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling

    Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling  Management’s expectations for margin improvement (even Management’s downside case) far exceeded the Street’s expectations at the time of agreeing to the Merger – moreover, Management’s projections were being exceeded by actual performance less than

  19. Slide 19: Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling

    Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling  Zale’s prospects have improved markedly since the depths of the recession. Closures of underperforming stores, a more focused use of marketing dollars, improvements in sourcing and the introduction of exclusive, branded merchandise has allowed Zale

  20. Slide 20: Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling

    Standalone Prospects – Undisclosed and Compelling  The day before the announced acquisition, Zale was trading at an EV/EBITDA of 9.1x. Using Management’s now disclosed 2016 base case estimate, this would imply a $31 share price. Using Management’s alternative (“downside”) case would imply a $25 sha

  21. Slide 21: Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably

    Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably 20

  22. Slide 22: Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably

    Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably  While we believe the current transaction values Zale below standalone value, the market has definitively spoken that Signet’s shareholders are the real winners.  The below analysis, supported by data in the following pages, demonstrates that the market assessed

  23. Slide 23: Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably

    Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably  Signet created significant value for their holders, at the expense of Zale holders, through the deal and a more efficient use of their balance sheet. But the vast majority of the Merger value creation was driven by the deal itself. The Zale deal, not securitized

  24. Slide 24: Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably – Zale Share Price

    Deal Synergies Not Split Equitably  In any thorough analysis, the deal value creation shared with Zale holders is well- below normal. Evaluated versus Zale’s share count and capitalized at 8.5x, TIG Advisors values the deal synergies/economic creation as worth ~$35/Zale share (calculated without an

  25. Slide 25: A More Appropriate Structure

    A More Appropriate Structure 24

  26. Slide 26: A More Appropriate Structure

    A More Appropriate Structure  We believe that the agreed upon transaction with Signet was flawed from the outset because it neither recognized the value of the turnaround already well underway nor did it split the value of deal synergies with Zale holders in an equitable manner – both issues could

  27. Slide 27: The Right Steps Forward

    The Right Steps Forward  TIG Advisors believes the decision to vote down the current deal with Signet is an easy one given the lack of compelling value delivered versus the standalone alternative.  While TIG Advisors believes there is minimal or no downside given disclosures made subsequent to the

  28. Slide 28: The Zale merger agreement “Put”

    The Zale merger agreement “Put” 27

  29. Slide 29: The Withhold Quorum Advantage

    The Withhold Quorum Advantage  Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, a quorum must be present to conduct business at the Special Meeting.  The Company’s Bylaws explain that a quorum is present where at least a majority of all the issued and outstanding shares of Company common stock are present or rep

  30. Slide 30: The Withhold Quorum Advantage

    The Withhold Quorum Advantage  Because the Merger Agreement sets an “end date” of 2/19/2015, by which the transaction must be completed or automatically terminate on its own terms, Zale can reschedule or adjourn a special meeting lacking quorum and as long as stockholder approval is obtained before

  31. Slide 31: Zale Shareholders Own a Valuable Put Option

    Zale Shareholders Own a Valuable Put Option  TIG Advisors believes that the Zale Board of Directors, knowingly or unknowingly, negotiated an extremely valuable asset for holders of Zale.  One could see the Put implicit in the merger agreement as providing significant additional value to ZLC shares

  32. Slide 32: Zale Shareholders Own a Valuable Put Option

    Zale Shareholders Own a Valuable Put Option  TIG Advisors anticipates that, if shareholders agree with our perspective regarding the value of the Put option, it would be reasonable to predict that Signet may approach Zale’s Board at some point and ask to amend the merger agreement to shorten the En

  33. Slide 33: How Much is the Put Worth?

    How Much is the Put Worth?  A representative valuation of the embedded Put option is shown below using the following assumptions and the Bloomberg OV tool. Assumed volatilities are based on pre-Merger implied volatilities. Strike $ 21.00 Expiration 2/19/2015 Assumed Volatility 40% Standalone Value

  34. Slide 34: Appendix

    Appendix | IG ADVISORS, LLC 33

  35. Slide 35: Appendix: Analyst Price Target Revisions

    Appendix: Analyst Price Target Revisions  Analysts covering Signet significantly revised their price targets higher after the announcement of the Merger – primarily reflecting the synergy capture potential of the deal. Signet Zale Price Target as of: Price Target as of: Firm 2/18/2014 2/24/2014 3/3

  36. Slide 36: Appendix: Zale Shares Performed Poorly Since S-3 Filed

    Appendix: Zale Shares Performed Poorly Since S-3 Filed  Since Zale filed an S-3 in relation to the registration of Golden Gate’s shares on 10/2/13, ZLC underperformed its two best comparables, the S&P and the S&P Retail ETF. 10/1/2013 2/18/2014 % chng Zales $ 15.51 $ 14.91 ‐3.9% Signet Jewelers $ 7

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