Boingo Wireless — Proxy Contest (May 2016)
61 slides from Boingo Wireless's proxy contest presentation, May 16, 2016
Slide 1: Driving Stockholder Value at Boingo
DRIVING STOCKHOLDER VALUE AT BOINGO
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE O
Slide 3: Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ¾ Executive Summary Pages 3-8 ¾ Poor Financial Performance Pages 9-25 ¾ Lack of Credibility with Investors Pages 26-32 ¾ Weak Corporate Governance Pages 33-45 ¾ Ides’ Plan to Drive Value at Boingo Pages 46-60 CONFIDENTIAL 2
Slide 4: Overview of Ides Capital
Overview of Ides Capital Ides Capital Is Focused On Driving Positive Operational and Governance Changes at Undervalued and Misunderstood Companies Managed by Dianne McKeever, Chief Investment Officer and Co-Founder, and Robert Longnecker, Partner and Co-Founder, formerly Partners of Barington Capi
Slide 5: Boingo Overview
Boingo Overview Boingo has 5 business segments: Retail, DAS, Company Snapshot Military/Broadband, Wholesale Wi-Fi and Advertising Ticker WIFI Boingo is best known for its Retail business of offering IPO Date May 4, 2011 paid Wi-Fi access at airports, but this legacy business is increasingly less i
Slide 6: Boingo's Market Opportunity
Boingo’s Market Opportunity Boingo is well-positioned for N. American Cellular Traffic (TB/month) and Boingo MB/session revenue growth due to ongoing 350 3,500 data demand in North America Cisco’s VNI Global Mobile Data 300 3,000 N. American Cellular Traffic (TB/month) Traffic forecasts North Amer
Slide 7: Why Ides Invested in Boingo
Why Ides Invested in Boingo Boingo is deeply undervalued and – if it can restore the confidence of investors by improving operations and governance – Ides believes it could be worth up to 100% more than the current stock price Boingo sits at the intersection of several secular growth trends and th
Slide 8: Why Ides Was Compelled to Run a Proxy Contest
Why Ides Was Compelled to Run a Proxy Contest Although Ides prefers to work behind the scenes, at Boingo we found a Company with little interest in sorely- needed change While the Company has claimed that Ides refused to participate in their process, the reality is that on March 30, 2016 the Compa
Slide 9: Ides' Big Picture Concerns
Ides’ Big Picture Concerns Ides has three core concerns that are at the root of almost every problem at Boingo: 1. Management incentive structures are not aligned with stockholders’ interests 2. Management and the Board have not demonstrated a focus on returns on invested capital 3. Management and t
Slide 10: Issue I: Poor Financial Performance
ISSUE I: POOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ISSUE I: POOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE i. POOR STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE AND TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS ii. POOR OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE CONFIDENTIAL 9
Slide 11: Poor Stock Price Performance
Poor Stock Price Performance Since going public in 2011, Boingo’s Total Shareholder Return (TSR) is a disappointing -46% compared to 78% for the NASDAQ index, an underperformance of -124% TSR since the IPO has also materially underperformed the 2016 Proxy Peers and Ides’ Selected Peer Group WIFI S
Slide 12: Poor Total Shareholder Return (TSR)
Poor Total Shareholder Return (TSR) Boingo’s TSR has underperformed the NASDAQ, the 2016 Proxy Peers and Ides’ Selected Peer Group over the 3-Year time frame as well, which includes the period since the Company’s supposed “transformation” Total Shareholder Return: 1-Year Total Shareholder Return: 3-
Slide 13: Total Shareholder Return (TSR) Summary
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) Summary Disappointing TSRs are at odds with the Company’s claim of a “proven track record of success” Ides believes that a good starting point for measuring success at a public company is Total Shareholder Return, where Boingo has clearly underperformed nearly every
Slide 14: Proxy Peer Group is Problematic, But Still Outperforms
Proxy Peer Group is Problematic, But Still Outperforms Boingo’s 2016 Proxy Peer Group is sub-optimal for a number of reasons: Boingo’s 2016 Proxy Peer Group has changed 5 times since 2011, including a new peer group that debuted in Boingo’s May 10, 2016 letter to stockholders, less than 2 weeks af
Slide 15: Ides' Selected Peer Group
Ides’ Selected Peer Group The Ides’ Selected Peer Group better mirrors Boingo’s segments with respect to end markets, sources of revenue, margins and growth profiles Given Boingo’s 5 business segments and low transparency into segment results, there are no “perfect peers” While we understand tha
Slide 16: Boingo is Assigned a Big Discount by Investors
Boingo is Assigned a Big Discount by Investors Boingo trades at a discount to its 2016 Proxy Peers, the Ides’ Selected Peer Group, the Cell Tower Companies and the Cable Companies Boingo’s large valuation discount exists despite having projected 2016 revenue growth of 13%, which is roughly in-line
Slide 17: Low Valuation Relative to Private Market Transactions
Low Valuation Relative to Private Market Transactions Boingo’s valuation is extremely discounted in comparison to the EV/EBITDA multiples paid for DAS assets by strategic acquirers: Digital Bridge acquisition of ExteNet in July 2015 for $1.4 billion or estimated 22-26x EV/EBITDA ExteNet has 10,000
Slide 18: Annual Operating Performance Since IPO
Annual Operating Performance Since IPO Boingo’s deteriorating operating performance since its IPO in 2011 is glaringly apparent: Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Retail 46.1 43.2 40.3 31.8 DAS 30.8 32.7 38.3 46.5 Wholesale - WiFi 18.7 17.3 15.2 21.9 Military - 1.3 4.5 19.9 Advertising, other 6.9
Slide 19: Operating Expense Growth Outpaces Revenue Growth
Operating Expense Growth Outpaces Revenue Growth 5-Year Revenue Growth 5-Year Operating Expense Growth $160 $120 $140 $100 $120 $100 $80 $80 $60 $60 $40 $40 $20 $20 $0 $0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Company has grown revenues at a 5-year CAGR of 10% Gross margins have remai
Slide 20: Boingo Has a Bloated Cost Structure
Boingo Has a Bloated Cost Structure Expenses have grown at a 5-year CAGR of 21% and every expense category appears to have grown faster than revenues Employee headcount has increased at a 5-year CAGR of 18% – 1.8x revenue growth – which aligns anecdotally with former employees telling us that Boin
Slide 21: Expenses Universally Higher at Boingo
Expenses Universally Higher at Boingo Expenses at Boingo have exploded in excess of revenue growth Every expense category has experienced significant growth at a rate that exceeds the revenue growth over the same time period Network Operations as % of Revenue Devel. and Tech. as % of Revenue 25% 1
Slide 22: Boingo's Problematic EBITDA Margins
Boingo’s Problematic EBITDA Margins Boingo’s bloated cost structure is evident in its weak EBITDA margins As shown, expenses have consistently grown faster than revenues, pressuring EBITDA margins If no change is made then stockholders can only expect that, despite revenue growth, EBITDA margins
Slide 23: Negative Operating Leverage = Large Losses
Negative Operating Leverage = Large Losses As Boingo’s operating expenses have ballooned, operating losses have worsened and operating margins have plummeted The ever-worsening losses are at odds with the Company’s recent claim that it has undergone a “successful transformation” Part of the prob
Slide 24: Balance Sheet Deterioration
Balance Sheet Deterioration Management’s large and sustained capital expenditures have materially weakened Boingo’s balance sheet and grown assets without commensurate growth in EBITDA, reflecting a lack of focus on returns on capital In the last three years, management has spent $223 million on c
Slide 25: Poor Returns on Capital
Poor Returns on Capital Boingo’s EBITDA as a percent of total assets – a measure of return on capital – compares negatively to the Ides’ Selected Peer Group Boingo is one of the worst performers in the Ides’ Selected Peer Group, reflecting the steady decline in return on capital since 2012 Altho
Slide 26: Returns on Capital Have Fallen Steadily Since the IPO
Returns on Capital Have Fallen Steadily Since the IPO The bottom line for any company is whether Returns on Invested Capital (ROIC) exceeds its Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) over time and Boingo has dramatically underperformed on this core investment criteria Boingo WACC vs ROIC 15.0% 10.0
Slide 27: Issue II: Lack of Credibility with Investors
ISSUE II: LACK OF CREDIBILITY WITH INVESTORS ISSUE II: LACK OF CREDIBILITY WITH INVESTORS i. HEAVY INSIDER SELLING ii. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY iii. WEAK INCUMBENT DIRECTORS CONFIDENTIAL 26
Slide 28: Heavy Insider Selling Deters Investors
Heavy Insider Selling Deters Investors $14.00 WIFI Stock Price Since IPO and CEO Hagan Selling $13.00 Red Arrows Indicates $12.00 CEO Hagan Selling Activity $11.00 $10.00 $9.00 $8.00 $7.00 $6.00 $5.00 $4.00 4-May-11 4-May-12 4-May-13 4-May-14 4-May-15 4-May-16 4-Nov-11 4-Nov-12 4-Nov-13 4-Nov-14 4-N
Slide 29: Heavy Insider Selling Not Driven "Primarily" By Tax
Heavy Insider Selling Not Driven “Primarily” By Tax Boingo’s 2016 Proxy Statement assertion that executives “primarily” sell to “cover taxes” is a half-truth that conceals the reality The reality is that CEO David Hagan has sold 82% of his vested stock options and restricted stock unit (“RSUs”) aw
Slide 30: Lack of Transparency Precludes Accountability
Lack of Transparency Precludes Accountability Boingo regularly changes metrics, neglects to disclose hurdles and fails to be meaningfully transparent – a combination of practices that undermine the credibility of management and the Board and impedes the creation of stockholder value Practice Consequ
Slide 31: Changes at Boingo are Reactive and Cosmetic
Changes at Boingo are Reactive and Cosmetic Deloitte’s Center for Corporate Governance suggests that boards should “think like an activist investor” and should proactively “prepare themselves by working to clearly understand the value drivers of the business and considering ways to improve those dri
Slide 32: Board Has Deflected Strategic Interest
Board Has Deflected Strategic Interest Is this Board open to all options for delivering value to stockholders? In our due diligence on this Company, we came across multiple private equity firms that have apparently tried to engage with Boingo over the past few years It is our understanding that
Slide 33: Weak Incumbent Directors
Weak Incumbent Directors Charles Boesenberg (Director Since IPO) Mr. Boesenberg, despite being Lead Independent Director, has never reached out to the Ides group over the course of their attempts to engage the Company, including a letter sent to each member of the Board requesting a dialogue on go
Slide 34: Issue III: Weak Corporate Governance
ISSUE III: WEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Issue III: Weak Corporate Governance i. POOR COMPENSATION PRACTICES ii. ENTRENCHED, NON-DIVERSE BOARD iii. POOR STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS CONFIDENTIAL 33
Slide 35: Ides Has Called for Governance Improvements
Ides Has Called for Governance Improvements Boingo’s Board has been wholly resistant to addressing any of Ides’ governance concerns in a timely manner and has further refused to discuss the rationale behind maintaining the objectively weak governance “status quo” Ides suggested – in numerous conve
Slide 36: Experts Give Compensation Structure Low Marks
Experts Give Compensation Structure Low Marks Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis – leading corporate governance experts – give Boingo’s compensation structures low and deteriorating marks Institutional Shareholder Services On March 16, 2016, ISS downgraded Boingo’s Compensati
Slide 37: Compensation Doesn't Effectively Align Interests
Compensation Doesn’t Effectively Align Interests The Compensation Committee, chaired by incumbent director Boesenberg, has created a compensation structure that almost exclusively excludes profitability and EBITDA, effectively de-linking it to any measure tied to stockholder returns Performance-base
Slide 38: RSU Plan Eliminates Need For Stock Appreciation
RSU Plan Eliminates Need For Stock Appreciation The Compensation Committee, chaired by incumbent director Boesenberg, has conveniently moved from a stock compensation plan exclusively focused on Options to RSUs creating a no-lose situation for management In fiscal year 2011, the Compensation Commi
Slide 39: Compensation Disconnected from Losses and Returns
Compensation Disconnected from Losses and Returns The Compensation Committee, chaired by incumbent director Boesenberg, rewards poor operational and stock price performance with increased compensation and has failed to align compensation with Total Shareholder Return Boingo’s Total Shareholder Los
Slide 40: Peer Group is a Moving – or Non-existent – Target
Peer Group is a Moving – or Non-existent – Target Boingo’s Compensation Committee chaired by incumbent director Boesenberg utilizes a “moving target” proxy Peer Group that undergoes dramatic changes on an annual basis…if it utilizes a Peer Group at all Ides is deeply concerned that Boingo’s 2013 P
Slide 41: Board Elevated Hagan to the Role of Imperial CEO
Board Elevated Hagan to the Role of Imperial CEO In August 2014 – despite a stock price that had plummeted nearly 50% from the date of Boingo’s IPO – the Board elevated CEO Hagan to the additional position of Chairman of the Board, implementing a dual role structure often referred to as the “Imperia
Slide 42: Disturbing Pattern of Bypassing Stockholders
Disturbing Pattern of Bypassing Stockholders Boingo’s Board regularly appoints new directors for a nearly year-long “trial run” before submitting them to the stockholder vote at the Annual Meeting The Board appointed Lance Rosenzweig in July 2014, approximately ONE MONTH after the 2014 Annual Meet
Slide 43: Lack of Diversity Raises Risk of Groupthink
Lack of Diversity Raises Risk of Groupthink Boingo’s Boardroom Lacks Every Form of Diversity Making it Susceptible to “Groupthink” Hagan Boesenberg Davis Jones Finley Rosenzweig Boingo’s Board consists of six seemingly non-diverse men with an average age of 59 years who have virtually identical sk
Slide 44: The Board Will Wait Until Next Year to Declassify
The Board Will Wait Until Next Year to Declassify The Board has finally – and only with a likely proxy contest on the horizon – decided to allow Boingo’s stockholders to vote on the declassification of the Board…but not until next year’s Annual Meeting When asked why the Board would choose to dela
Slide 45: Boingo's Governance is Adverse to Stockholders
Boingo’s Governance is Adverse to Stockholders Boingo has poor stockholder rights and protections The Board is classified and there is no resignation policy Directors may only be removed for cause Board may increase or decrease the size of the board without stockholder approval Vacancies are
Slide 46: Governance Meetings are in Short Supply
Governance Meetings are in Short Supply Boingo’s deficient governance practices are surely attributable, at least in part, to the near-complete lack of time and attention paid to governance matters since the Company’s 2011 IPO Incumbent director Terrell Jones represents 50% of the current two-memb
Slide 47: Ides' Plan to Drive Value at Boingo
IDES’ PLAN TO DRIVE VALUE AT BOINGO IDES’ PLAN TO DRIVE VALUE AT BOINGO i. REFRESH THE BOARD ii. RESTORE CREDIBILITY WITH INVESTORS iii. STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE AND STOCKHOLDER PROTECTIONS iv. IMPROVE OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE v. VALUATION CONFIDENTIAL 46
Slide 48: Ides' Plan to Drive Value at Boingo
Ides’ Plan to Drive Value at Boingo CAN ONLY BE ACOMPLISHED BY REFRESHING THE BOARD WITH NEW INDEPENDENCE Restore Credibility and Improve Operational Strengthen Corporate Accountability Performance Governance • Increase segment-level transparency • Evaluate long-term strategy and vision • Declassify
Slide 49: Ides' Nominees Bring Sorely Needed Fresh Perspective
Ides’ Nominees Bring Sorely Needed Fresh Perspective Ides highly-qualified nominees are truly independent and have no relationship with Ides – financial or otherwise – that would impede their ability to work on behalf of all Boingo stockholders Karen Finerman Co-founder and Former CEO of Metropoli
Slide 50: Ides' Nominees are Stronger than the Incumbents
Ides’ Nominees are Stronger than the Incumbents Ides specifically sought Karen Finerman and Brad Stewart as nominees due to their respective expertise and skill sets which fill big voids that exist in Boingo’s current boardroom Skill Set to Address Each “Big Picture” Issue at Boingo? "Big Picture" I
Slide 51: Ides' Plan to Restore Accountability and Credibility
Ides’ Plan to Restore Accountability and Credibility Ides’ nominees Karen Finerman and Brad Stewart will work with the Board to align compensation practices with shareholders’ interests, enhance transparency and improve accountability Provide investors with greater segment-level transparency 9 Imp
Slide 52: Ides' Plan to Improve Operational Performance
Ides’ Plan to Improve Operational Performance Ides’ nominees Karen Finerman and Brad Stewart will work with the Board and management to implement operating performance and ROIC discipline that will materially improve operating results Evaluate long-term strategy and vision 9 Assess where the Compa
Slide 53: Ides' Plan to Improve Corporate Governance
Ides’ Plan to Improve Corporate Governance Ides’ nominees Karen Finerman and Brad Stewart will work with the Board to improve governance including further augmenting the Board with new and diversifying directors and strengthening stockholder protections Commit to boardroom diversification and oppo
Slide 54: Ides' Valuation Overview
Ides’ Valuation Overview Boingo is deeply undervalued and – if it can restore the confidence of investors by improving operations and governance – Ides’ believes it could be worth up to 100% more than the current stock price If the Ides’ nominees are elected to this board, we believe they can move
Slide 55: Ides' Valuation Summary
Ides’ Valuation Summary Ides believes that Boingo has intrinsic value that could be as high as 100% greater than current market valuation Ides’ Selected Peer Group was chosen to better reflect all facets of Boingo’s operations and includes a Cable Company and a Cell Tower Company, as well as other
Slide 56: Segment Disclosure Should Lead to Higher Valuations
Segment Disclosure Should Lead to Higher Valuations Boingo’s lack of transparency compels many investors to apply a “shorthand”, single-multiple approach which fails to capture the full upside opportunity at Boingo – enhanced segment level disclosure should close that gap Given the complexity of B
Slide 57: Sum of the Parts Valuation
Sum of the Parts Valuation A detailed “Sum of the Parts” valuation accurately reflects the size and value of each segment, potentially resulting in substantial upside relative to current prices Based on Ides segment level assumptions and estimates, Boingo could be worth up to 100% or more than cur
Slide 58: Additional Upside Possible From Cost Cuts
Additional Upside Possible From Cost Cuts For the last 5 years, Boingo’s Fiscal Year Estimated Cost Pro Forma 2013 2014 2015 2016 Cuts 2016 expenses have grown 2x as fast as revenues Revenue 106.7 119.3 139.6 161.0 161.0 % change 11.8% 17.0% 15.3% Ides and our nominees have done Gross profit 59.
Slide 59: Karen Finerman: Next Steps
Karen Finerman: Next Steps If elected to the Boingo Board, Ms. Finerman would seek to work with the existing Board and management team to implement changes and processes that will restore the Company’s accountability to and credibility with its stockholders and improve stockholder protections Object
Slide 60: Brad Stewart: Next Steps
Brad Stewart: Next Steps If elected to the Boingo Board, Mr. Stewart would like to partner with management and other directors to conduct a comprehensive strategic assessment of the business. Objectives Evaluate Boingo’s longer-term strategy and mission – comprehensively, while considering the bro
Slide 61: Ides' Objectives at Boingo are Clear
Ides’ Objectives at Boingo are Clear 9 IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY 9 ALIGN MANAGEMENT’S INTERESTS WITH STOCKHOLDERS’ INTERESTS 9 IMPLEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES 9 RESTORE PROFITABILITY 9 FOCUS ON RETURNS ON INVESTED CAPITAL 9 BUILD SUSTAINABLE SHAREHOLDER VALUE CONFIDENTIAL 60