Slide 1: AREHOLDERS
AREHOLDERS aantiy ig Soe = —
Slide 2: Why We Are Seeking Board Representation
Why We Are Seeking Board Representation > Whitestone owns a strong portfolio of shopping center assets in attractive markets, which should provide a foundation for long-term growth and value creation > However, Whitestone has not performed well for its owners: — The Company has pursued an equity rec
Slide 3: Table of Contents
Table of Contents ¥ Il. Executive Summary s} I. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 th. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset 37 V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help
Slide 4: Executive Summary
Executive Summary Whitestone has underperformed its potential and the Board's expectations Vv Prior to takeover speculation in October 2023, Whitestone had underperformed its peers and was trading well below its 2010 IPO price Even with takeover speculation priced in, Whitestone continues to trade a
Slide 5: About Whitestone REIT
About Whitestone REIT (NYSE: WSR) Whitestone is an undervalued small cap ($557M*) shopping center REIT with properties in Arizona and Texas > Whitestone REIT is an internally managed, community shopping center real estate investment trust that acquires, owns, operates and develops open-air, neighbor
Slide 6: About Erez Asset Management (“Erez”)
About Erez Asset Management (“Erez”) OVERVIEW » Established in 2022 by Bruce Schanzer, Erez Asset Management is a New York-based investment management firm focused on deep value investment opportunities in small-cap REITs » Top Shareholder in WSR: Erez owns 644,900 shares, representing ~1.3% of outs
Slide 7: Shareholders Should Support Erez’s Nominees
Shareholders Should Support Erez’s Nominees ¥ x) Change Is Needed Whitestone has consistently underperformed its peers in the shopping center REIT space WSR is over-levered, subscale in size and currently undervalued when compared to peers WSR lacks a clear strategy for addressing this challenge, ha
Slide 8: Table of Contents
Table of Contents ¥ |. Executive Summary 3 Il. | Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 th. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset aL V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help
Slide 9: Whitestone Has An Attractive Portfolio of Shopping Center Assets
Whitestone Has An Attractive Portfolio of Shopping Center Assets Highlights » Diverse asset and tenant base with minimal exposure to any single industry > Service-oriented tenants in industries such as quick-service food, self care, services, education and entertainment Low tenant concentration risk
Slide 10: Whitestone’s Assets Are in Attractive and Growing Markets
Whitestone’s Assets Are in Attractive and Growing Markets & Properties are in markets with favorable fundamentals and supply / demand trends Phoenix Houston Dallas-Fort Worth Austin San Antonio 47% 22% 17% 9% 6% 26 42 v One of just three major markets to boast record-low vacancy in retail properties
Slide 11: Whitestone Has Not Delivered Value for Shareholders
Whitestone Has Not Delivered Value for Shareholders 4 5-Year Total Shareholder Return+ Consistently Disappointing Stock Performance+ Prior to Takeover Speculation News (Oct. 26, 2023) Prior to Takeover Speculation News (Oct. 26, 2023) Total Returns During the Tenure of the Current CEO 11.7% 9.6% i B
Slide 12: Even with Takeover Speculation Built-In, Whitestone Trades at One of the Largest Discounts to NAV
Even with Takeover Speculation Built-In, Whitestone Trades at One of the g = aaah Discounts to Consensus NAV : STITT i: (11%) (13%) (16%) (17%) (18%) (19%) (22%) (22%) (23%) (30%) (31%) (31%) PECO SITC AKR IVT FRT REG BRX KIM KRG ROIC UE BFS WSR We believe this massive discount is evidence that inve
Slide 13: Whitestone Has Consistently Traded at a Discount to NAV
Whitestone Has Consistently Traded at a Discount to NAV 4 — Whitestone Premium / (Discount) to Consenus NAVPS. Current Board Oversight Period § — s & (10%) (20%) (30%) Discount (40%) (50%) (60%) (70%) Oct-10 Oct-11. Oct-12 Oct-13 Oct-14 Oct-15 Oct-16 Oct-17 Oct-18 Oct-19 Oct-20 Oct-21, Oct-22 Oct-23
Slide 14: Whitestone Trades at One of the Lowest Multiples of AFFO Among Peers
Whitestone Trades at One of the Lowest Multiples of Adjusted Funds ¥ from Operations Among Peers Price/2024 Consensus AFFO per Share Price/2025 Consensus AFFO per Share* 25.0 25.0x 219% 20.5x 20.0x 20.0x 18.6x 17.6 17.4 17K 6% 16.6 Median: 16.7 pe ia sail 16.0% 15.8% 15.7x HBB soe Median: 15.4x tet
Slide 15: ..And Has Done So Consistently
..And Has Done So Consistently & Forward AFFO perShare Multiple —WSR Forward AFFOPS Multiple Shopping Center REIT Peers Forward AFFOPS Multiple! Shopping Center REIT Peers Median 20.4x WSR Median 12.8x 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015, 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Whitestone has traded at an aver
Slide 16: Table of Contents
Table of Contents |. Executive Summary 3 Il. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 lll. | Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset aL V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help
Slide 17: Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Known Causes
Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Known Causes fo PoP Po te Te Whitestone Is Sub-Scale Whitestone’s portfolio and revenue are considerably smaller than other publicly-traded shopping center REITs Growth Has Been Disappointing Whitestone’s growth has lagged peers despite its presence in some of the m
Slide 18: Whitestone Is Sub-Scale
@) Whitestone Is Sub-Scale ¥ Whitestone has the least assets and fewest number of properties among its peers $15.4 544 $108 381. 362 78 $76 zat $64 189 $46 a7 nese Median: 140 = = parecer aurea n: 933 al - ee renner $28 $28 102 101 5 $22 S19 76 62 87 55 | if \| i | il KIM REG BRX FRT KRG PECO AKR SI
Slide 19: Whitestone Is Sub-Scale
@) Whitestone Is Sub-Scale ¥ Whitestone also has the least leasable square footage and lowest revenue 89.7 $1,797, 64.5, $1,279 4 45 568 $828 32.2 204 ea Median: ab a Sicececerweee fs Median: 22.7 = | agg on ------ $417 ELeG ‘$260 106 103 gg | i | 7 hii a KIM BRX REG PECO KRG FRT SITC UE ROIC iT BFS
Slide 20: Whitestone Is Sub-Scale
@) Whitestone Is Sub-Scale Whitestone is the smallest company in its peer group $12.0 $a2 $64 Median: $3.4 | Diaz: $19 $17 $47 gis The = eel ee Gere Tae peel en ees et Gone cones tees ee $195 $158 $13.2 $115 $78 $6.4 $38 l | [| [ $26 04 ils KIM REG FRT BRK KRG PECO AKR SIC UE ROI «BFS MT WSR. ‘Sourc
Slide 21: This Has Led to Underinvestment by Institutional Shareholders
@ This Has Led to Underinvestment by Institutional Shareholders ¥ Institutional Ownership as a Percentage of Float? Number of Institutional Shareholders* 786 102% 102% 100% 98% 97% 96% Median: 96% 20% 94%. 90% 680 82% e2t 64% 497 td 478 469 Median: 413 46% 357 sap 317313 256 29 L | vr BFS FRT AKR WS
Slide 22: ..And Stock Volatility and Thin Trading Liquidity
@ ..And Stock Volatility and Thin Trading Liquidity ¥ 31% $105 pea Se Sere eet 2h 2S 22% 22% $75 de $63 $40 $30 Median: $26 I eae mesectemnt teint rom eoti meen mets $19 $16 g45 0 | : $4 $2 Ba = REG FRT KRG SIT PECO OIC WT WSR BFS sie BFS FRT IVT ROI AKR «KRG WSR) UE KIM PECO KIM REG | a : ‘Source(s
Slide 23: Whitestone’s Growth Has Trailed Peers
@) Whitestone’s Growth Has Trailed Peers ¥ Whitestone is one of the worst performing shopping center REITs 25.5% 58% 49% 4aK 4.8% 42% fusis) Median 3.9% sa ae a ATK AGK AL iA 3% soy Median 3.1% a8 i sa os 2.0% 11% (14.6%) | UE AMR PECO KRG BRK FRT. «BFS MT REG «KIM. SIC. ROC. «WSR AKR IVT KRGBFS.-PE
Slide 24: Whitestone’s Growth Has Trailed Peers
@) Whitestone’s Growth Has Trailed Peers Whitestone has failed to scale its asset base 6x 4% = 2% i Median: 1% m2: a KRG SIC REG MT AKR ROC BFS RT PECO UE WSR BX KIM KRG KIM UE FRT REG AKR 6%) (17%) BFS ROIC PECO WSR BRX SIC MT ‘Source(s: FactSet, Bloomberg and Company flings. 4L__Poors represent co
Slide 25: Whitestone’s Operations Are Inefficient
@) Whitestone’s Operations Are Inefficient & Whitestone’s G&A ratios dramatically lag its shopping center REIT peers aox 91% 93% 94% 1.8% 12.0% 12.2% 13% 12% Median: 8.3% 1.0% wewceweneeoe=: TOK 7.88 a 10% 67% 6.8% sag Oe | FRT ROI KRG PECO KIM REG UE SIC BRX AKR) = WT WSR FRT REG ROIC PECO KIM KRG
Slide 26: Whitestone’s Board has Grossly Misallocated Shareholder Capital
@) Whitestone’s Board has Grossly Misallocated Shareholder Capital 4 This has driven Whitestone’s chronic underperformance versus peers and in turn, earned its Discounted Valuation The current Board of Trustees has: Repeatedly issued stock below NAV Over-levered the Company, impairing its ability to
Slide 27: Whitestone has Continuously Issued Equity at a Discount to NAV
Ol 4) Whitestone has Continuously Issued Equity at a Discount to NAV 4 Issuance Price Discount to NAVPS at Time of Equity Issuance+? FO Offerings Proceeds Raised mAtw Offerings Pr retea I Current Board Oversight Period > ‘Discount to NAVPS at Issuance (%) $104 ~$80M+ in equity value destroyed by iss
Slide 28: Whitestone is Overlevered, Which Has Limited Its Ability to Grow
(@© whitestone is Overtevered, Which Has Limited Its Ability to Grow © 10.5x 80x = _ 42% 43% or Median _ 38% cam pannna-------- 35-3 a a Yee lUellUmlUmlUmlUmllhUl ree ee ee TTT sat IVT AKR PECO REG SITC KRG ROIC KIM FRT UE BRX WSR BFS SIC IMT KRG PECO REG UE BRX KIM FRT ROIC AKR WSR BFS At these lev
Slide 29: Whitestone’s Board has Pursued a Costly Equity Recycling Strategy to Bolster Returns
() rc) Whitestone’s Board has Pursued a Costly Equity Recycling Strategy to Bolster Returns Instead of using the equity it raised to de-lever or scale the business, Whitestone has returned a substantial amount of equity in the form of “return of capital” dividends is significantly higher than the RE
Slide 30: Whitestone’s Equity Recycling Strategy Masks the Negative Impact to Shareholder Value
() rc) Whitestone’s Equity Recycling Strategy Mask the Negative £ Impact to Shareholder Value Whitestone’s costly equity recycling strategy obscures the impact to the Company’s underlying value Breakdown of Five-Year Shareholder Returns - Price Appreciation vs. Dividend Return Whitestone REIT FTSE N
Slide 31: Returning “Excess” Equity is Nonsensical For Whitestone
@Oo Returning “Excess” Equity is Nonsensical For Whitestone We believe there is no logical or economically justifiable reason to raise equity at a discount to NAV and then return “excess” equity in the same year Reasons Not to Return Equity Capital >The Company is diluting shareholders to raise equi
Slide 32: Whitestone Has Failed to Achieve Its Long-Term Commitments
G) Whitestone Has Failed to Achieve Its Long-Term Commitments & In February 2018, Whitestone unveiled its long-term plan, which it reaffirmed in Q4 2020; however, the Company has failed to achieve either of its two key performance targets Whitestone REIT Q4 2020 Investor Presentation Debt / EBITDA n
Slide 33: The Board Set Unambitious Performance Targets for 2023
G) The Board Set Unambitious Performance Targets for 2023 For three of the four financial metrics in its annual incentive plan, the Board set targets - and even “stretch” goals - that were materially below the Company's actual results in 2022 Annual Incentive Plan Goals $1.03 $1.03 || a a 2022 Actua
Slide 34: ...Which Whitestone Still Missed
(S) ...Which Whitestone Still Missed & Despite these easy targets, management missed all four financial targets in the Company's Annual Incentive Plan in 2023 FFO per Share Annual Incentive Plan Goals Same Store NOI Growth Annual Incentive Plan Goals $1.03 55% $0.99 war 4.5% 35% L | 7 LJ : 2023 "Exc
Slide 35: Whitestone Even Missed Its Lowered 2023 Guidance
() Whitestone Even Missed Its Lowered 2023 Guidance ¥ Whitestone missed its FFO guidance for 2023, despite setting a target that was lower than the result for 2022 and then cutting that lower guidance in August Whitestone REIT Funds from Operations per Share Lowered target vs. 2023 $1.03 — | Da aaa
Slide 36: Whitestone’s Claim of “New Leadership” to Address Underperformance is Misleading
Whitestone’s Claim of “New Leadership” to Address g Underperformance is Misleading Former Leadership ODre James Mastandrea » Former Whitestone CEO David Holeman » Former Whitestone CFO John Dee » Former Whitestone COO _——_> Scott Hogan ——————~ > Former Whitestone Controller | Christine Mastandrea »
Slide 37: Table of Contents
Table of Contents |. Executive Summary 3 Il. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 Ul. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. | Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset 37 V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help 5
Slide 38: Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset
Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset & Expertise 1 Ee non-management trustees appear to lack critical real estate, REIT capital markets and shopping center industry experience and are therefore ill-suited to provide effective oversight of management Alignment Most of
Slide 39: Whitestone’s Board Lacks Critical Skills
@) Whitestone’s Board Lacks Critical Skills ¥ Despite the Company’s claims, we do not believe the non-management trustees have any meaningful REIT, real estate or shopping center expertise which, in our view, limits their ability to provide effective oversight Our Nominees Bruce Schanzer aa ae ea ea
Slide 40: The Board Has Seemingly Overstated Its Trustees’ Qualifications
@ The Board Has Seemingly Overstated Its Trustees’ Qualifications & The Company has presented its trustees as having significant real estate, finance and other expertise, but we question whether there was any reasonable basis for some of those determinations Board Skills Matrix as Disclosed in White
Slide 41: Most Trustees Lack Alignment with Shareholders
@) Most Trustees Lack Alignment with Shareholders & Whitestone’s non-management trustees own very little of the Company's stock 644,900 54K 34,536 118,503 17408 a 96,128 eee Ea Nandita Berry Julia Buthman Any Feng Jettrey ones David Taylor ‘AINon Management Trustees Erez Asset Management Source(s):
Slide 42: The Board Is Riddled with Undisclosed Business Relationships
@) The Board Is Riddled with Undisclosed Business Relationships & Nearly all of Whitestone’s non-management trustees had a prior business relationship with the Company as an advisor or lender; to date, the Company has failed to disclose the full extent and nature of those relationships Nandita Berry
Slide 43: The Board Lacks a Fiduciary Mindset
(3) The Board Lacks a Fiduciary Mindset The Board failed to disclose a civil complaint alleging fraud against a trustee; that trustee is now in jail |B | The Board failed to disclose prior business relationships between Whitestone and its trustees (as well as fees paid to them) The Board adopted a v
Slide 44: We Believe Whitestone’s Disclosure of a Former Trustee’s Resignation Was Inadequate
6) We Believe Whitestone’s Disclosure of a Former Trustee’s Resignation Was Inadequate We believe Whitestone may have known or had reason to know of the complaint against former trustee Najeeb Khan that seemingly led to his resignation from the Board in July 2019 (and later imprisonment) but did not
Slide 45: Part I: David Taylor
@ Part I: David Taylor The Board Failed to Disclose Potential Conflicts of Interest * David Taylor is Chair of Locke Lord; Locke Lord served as legal counsel to Whitestone prior to Mr. Taylor’s appointment to the Board; the Company has not been direct in disclosing this relationship, the fees genera
Slide 46: Other Locke Lord Partners Joined Boards with Proper Disclosure
@Oo Other Locke Lord Partners Joined Boards with Proper Disclosure & NOTHING _——_—— mame | Leen een e ene nen eennenenennnd { “Historically, the law firm of Locke Lord LLP, of which Ms. Earley | 1 isa partner, has performed legal service for the Company. Fees H 1 “Prompt and full disclosure is alway
Slide 47: The Board Failed to Disclose Potential Conflicts of Interest: Amy Feng
6) The Board Failed to Disclose Potential Conflicts of Interest g Part Il: Amy Feng Whitestone has failed to disclose the fact that trustee Amy Feng served as an advisor to the Company prior to her appointment to the Board » Amy Feng joined the Board in July 2022 » Prior to joining the Board, she se
Slide 48: The Board Failed to Disclose Potential Conflicts of Interest: Julia Buthman
6) The Board Failed to Disclose Potential Conflicts of Interest g Part Ill: Julia Buthman Julia Buthman served as a financing provider and vendor to the Company prior to her appointment to the Board; the Company has again been remiss in its disclosures » Julia Buthman joined the Board in May 2023 Pr
Slide 49: The Board Adopted a Very Unusual 5% Poison Pill
@Oo The Board Adopted a Very Unusual 5% Poison Pill & The Whitestone Board adopted a shareholder rights plan (“poison pill”) with just a 5% threshold, and declined to put the pill up for a vote In May 2020, Whitestone’s Board approved the adoption of a poison Triggering Threshold for Non-NOL Poison
Slide 50: The Board Rejected the Resignation of a Rejected Trustee
(3)@ The Board Rejected the Resignation of a Rejected Trustee ¥ At the 2021 annual meeting, Trustee Jack Mahaffey received 45% support, but his resignation was rejected Trustee Jack Mahaffey - Chair of the Nominating and Corporate Whitestone REIT 2021 Annual Meeting Vote Governance Committee -failed
Slide 51: Whitestone Maintains Single-Trigger Change-in-Control Provisions
@@e@ Whitestone Maintains Single-Trigger Change-in-Control Provisions & Shareholders, analysts, proxy advisors and other observers have criticized Whitestone’s change in control provisions; the Board has seemingly refused to heed their input Unlike the vast majority of public companies,*+ - raf ~, ;
Slide 52: ...Made Worse Because “Change-in-Control” Includes Shareholder-Driven Board Change
6) ...Made Worse Because “Change-in-Control” Includes g Shareholder-Driven Board Change Whitestone’s single-trigger is triggered when shareholders elect to replace a majority of the trustees » Whitestone’s equity plans state that a “change in control” is triggered if a majority of the Board is repla
Slide 53: The Board Seemingly Rejected a Takeover Proposal Without Analysis
@Oo The Board Seemingly Rejected a Takeover Proposal Without g Analysis The Board may have prematurely rebuffed interest from a credible third party interested in acquiring the Company » In October 2023, Bloomberg reported that Fortress Investment Group had approached Whitestone about a possible acq
Slide 54: Whitestone Has Not Engaged with Us in Good Faith
(3)@ Whitestone Has Not Engaged with Us in Good Faith We have sought meaningful, substantive engagement with Whitestone’s Board, but have been limited to a single brief meeting with management and some perfunctory interviews December 6 Mr. Schanzer spoke with the CEO and Director of Investor Relatio
Slide 55: We Believe the Board’s Interactions with Us Have Been Performative
@O We Believe the Board’s Interactions with Us Have Been Performative Whitestone’s trustees had seemingly made up their minds about Erez and our candidates after minimal, perfunctory engagement » Erez introduced itself as a new shareholder on November 6, 2023, and soon after requested a meeting to d
Slide 56: Table of Contents
Table of Contents & |. Executive Summary 3 Il. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 Ul. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset aL V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help 5
Slide 57: Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help
Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help ¥ 1 Focus on cost of capital and NAV in making more disciplined capital allocation decisions based on rigorous financial analysis Clean up the balance sheet by making debt reduction a top priority instead of buying assets and pursuing rede
Slide 58: Closing the Valuation Discount Can Deliver Value to Shareholders
Closing the Valuation Discount Can Deliver Value to Shareholders & Given the track record of value destruction, Whitestone continues to trade at a discount to our estimated NAV Unaffected Stock Price vs. NAVPS* Current Stock Price vs. NAVPS? Whitestone’s stock, unaffected by any acquisition rumors,
Slide 59: Erez’s Nominees Can Assist Whitestone
Erez’s Nominees Can Assist Whitestone Our Nominees Are Well Qualified And Have the Experience to Oversee the Complex Strategic and Capital Allocation Decisions Whitestone Faces Expertise Bruce Schanzer > Bruce and Cathy have decades of experience in managing and capitalizing shopping center REITs »
Slide 60: Mr. Schanzer Has Relevant and Differentiated Expertise
Mr. Schanzer Has Relevant and Differentiated Expertise & Bruce Schanzer Chairman and ClO of Erez > Chairman and Chief Investment Officer of Erez Asset Management LLC, a fund manager focused on investment opportunities in small market cap REITs (2022 - Present) > President, CEO and a Director of Ceda
Slide 61: Ms. Clark has Relevant and Differentiated Expertise
Ms. Clark has Relevant and Differentiated Expertise Cathy Clark » Chief Investment Officer of Bedrock Management Services LLC, a full-service commercial real estate firm specializing in the strategic development of urban cores (2020 - Present) > Managing Partner of CCR Partners LLC, a real estate ad
Slide 62: Incumbent Trustees We Oppose Should Be Replaced
Incumbent Trustees We Oppose Should Be Replaced David Taylor Chair, Locke Lord LLP Nandita Berry Former Senior Counsel, Locke Lord LLP * No real estate experience * No operating company experience * Allowed former CEO Jim Mastandrea to remain in place while underperforming for five years * Nota mean
Slide 63: Table of Contents
Table of Contents I. Executive Summary 3 I. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 th. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset 37 V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help 56 V
Slide 64: Conclusion
Conclusion Change Is Needed at Whitestone Erez’s Nominees Can Help «= Whitestone’s persistent underperformance and deep valuation discount do not appropriately reflect the value or potential of its underlying assets = Whitestone’s Board has failed to address the root causes of this underperformance,
Slide 65: Vote the Card for Bruce Schanzer and Cathy Clark
Vote the Card for Bruce Schanzer and Cathy Clark ¥ You can do so online or by returning the enclosed proxy card We encourage you to vote for change - improved capital allocation, balance sheet management, transparency, and governance - by voting: and “WITHHOLD” from David Taylor and Nandita Berry Fo
Slide 66: Table of Contents
Table of Contents ¥ I. Executive Summary 3 I. Whitestone Has Underperformed Its Potential 8 th. Whitestone’s Underperformance Has Readily Apparent Causes 16 IV. Whitestone’s Board Lacks Expertise, Alignment and a Fiduciary Mindset 37 V. Whitestone Can Correct Its Course, and Our Nominees Can Help 56
Slide 67: Nominee Biographies
Nominee Biographies ¥ and Past Affiliations Experience Ms. Clark is the Chief Investment Officer of Bedrock Management Services LLC, a full- service commercial real estate firm based in downtown Detroit specializing in the a strategic development of urban cores Ms. Clark also serves as Managing Part
Slide 68: Nominee Biographies (Continued)
Nominee Biographies (Continued) & Nominee Bruce Schanzer Age 55 Chief Investment Officer Erez Asset Management rrent and Past Affiliations Erez cdr a Ate achs MERRILL OS ABANK OF AMERICA COMPANY Experience Mr. Schanzer is Chairman and Chief Investment Officer of Erez Asset Management, a fund manager
Slide 69: Disclaimer
Disclaimer This material does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any of the securities described herein in any state to any person. In addition, the discussions and opinions in this press release and the material contained herein are for general information only, an