Automatic Data Processing, Inc. · NASDAQ:ADP

Automatic Data Processing — Proxy Contest (August 2017)

168 slides from Automatic Data Processing's proxy contest presentation, Aug 17, 2017

  1. Slide 1: ADP: The Time is Now

    ADP The Time is Now August 17, 2017

  2. Slide 2: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer The information contained in this presentation (“Information”) is based on publicly available information about Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (“ADP” or the “Company”), which has not been independently verified by Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. ("Pershing Square"). Pershing Squ

  3. Slide 3: An Overview of Pershing Square's Analysis

    An Overview of Pershing Square’s Analysis Our analysis of the Company’s performance and the potential areas for improvement on the pages that follow are based on public information and extensive due diligence completed, which includes: 85+ consultations with industry executives, including former sen

  4. Slide 4: An Overview of Pershing Square's Analysis (cont'd.)

    An Overview of Pershing Square’s Analysis (cont’d.) This presentation contains statements reflecting Pershing Square’s opinions and beliefs with respect to ADP and its business, based on Pershing Square’s research, analysis, and experience. All such statements are made to Pershing Square’s opinion a

  5. Slide 5: Quote from Henry Taub, Founder of ADP

    “As a company, we've had a knack of making a friend out of change, turning its uncertainty into opportunity. That's a relationship I hope we're able to renew for a very long time to come.” - Henry Taub, Founder of ADP

  6. Slide 6: ADP – Overview

    ADP – Overview Market cap: $49bn Headquarters: Roseland, NJ 58,000 employees Largest provider of HR services in North America, Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific Rim Recruit-to-retire services and HR solutions with a strong legacy presence in payroll processing Pays 26 million (1 in 6) workers i

  7. Slide 7: Segment: How We Think About ADP

    Employer Services (“ES”) ADP’s core business, a software and service-based delivery of payroll and a broad suite of “Beyond Payroll” HCM tools including business process outsourcing Professional Employer Organization (“PEO”) A fully-outsourced HCM solution where ADP becomes the legal co-employer of

  8. Slide 8: ADP's Historical Success Has Made it a Lethargic and Inefficient Sleeping Giant

    ADP’s Historical Success Has Made it a Lethargic and Inefficient Sleeping Giant ADP has enjoyed a decades-long, leading market position and a strong historical track record Historical dominance in payroll. Throughout the 2000s, ADP built out its “Beyond Payroll” offering, mostly through product acqu

  9. Slide 9: Focus on Hitting the Numbers Has Led to Value-Destructive Decisions

    ADP’s Focus on “Hitting the Numbers” Has Led to Value-Destructive Decisions with Negative Long-Term Consequences ADP Total Shareholder Return Expectations – 2015 Analyst Day ________________________________________________ Source: ADP Analyst Day, March 3, 2015. “[ADP is] very focused on per share v

  10. Slide 10: Is ADP Achieving its Maximum Potential?

    The Critical Question for Shareholders: Is ADP Achieving its Maximum Potential? ADP is materially underperforming its potential Employer Services growth is slowing and margins are vastly below their potential ADP is losing ground, most notably against enterprise and mid-market competitors Key eviden

  11. Slide 11: Employer Services is materially underperforming its competitors and potential

    We believe ADP’s Employer Services segment, its largest business and currently ~2/3 of profit, is materially underperforming its competitors and its potential

  12. Slide 12: We Will Demonstrate That if ADP is Managed Optimally

    We Will Demonstrate That if ADP is Managed Optimally: Employer Services can increase its actual operating margins (excluding float income) by 1,500 to 2,000 basis points by FY 2022 Assuming a 1,700 basis point expansion in ES, ADP’s overall EBIT margins can increase from 20% in FY 2017 to ~32% by FY

  13. Slide 13: I. Industry & ADP Overview

    I. Industry & ADP Overview

  14. Slide 14: Human Capital Management (HCM) Overview

    Human Capital Management (“HCM”) Overview The Human Capital Management industry is a secularly attractive, growing, and underpenetrated market HCM market overview: Comprehensive recruit-to-retire tools which help clients manage their employees, including: Payroll / HR information systems (“HRIS”) “B

  15. Slide 15: ADP was started by accountants and has a long heritage in data processing

    ADP was started by accountants and has a long heritage in data processing Payroll “service bureaus” largely thrived on scale and processing efficiency, supplemented with human service, not innovative technology The rise of Beyond Payroll HCM, largely non-processing-related functionality, led to the

  16. Slide 16: ADP Built its HCM Offering Almost Entirely Through Acquisitions

    Lacking Innovation Capabilities, ADP Built its HCM Offering Almost Entirely Through Acquisitions ADP “cobbled” together a collection of HCM products across disparate platforms which have largely remain siloed operationally ADP should be focusing on acquisition integration, product integration, and o

  17. Slide 17: ADP's Products and Technology Need Modernization

    ADP’s Products and Technology Need Modernization ADP’s buy, instead of build, strategy has led to weak product offerings (most notably in Enterprise) and inefficient legacy back-end infrastructure ADP’s Enterprise segment has multiple unintegrated products performing the same effective functions ~6

  18. Slide 18: ADP's Products and Technology Need Modernization

    ADP’s Products and Technology Need Modernization ADP’s product migration efforts in SMB and Mid-Market(1) have moved customers to version-less Cloud-based platforms Products not integrated into a single, unified HCM solution ADP’s new HCM platforms are largely “wrappers” around legacy products and b

  19. Slide 19: SMB, Mid-Market, Enterprise, International Segments

    SMB (Small Business) Mid-Market (Major Accounts) Enterprise (National Accounts) International & Multinational % of ES Revenue ~20%-25% ~35%-40% ~20% ~20% Client Size 1-49 50-999 1,000+ Varies Key Product Offering Payroll + Limited HCM Payroll + HCM Payroll + Full HCM Payroll + HCM Product Complexity

  20. Slide 20: Industry Research Notes: ADP's Deficiencies in Enterprise HCM

    Industry Research Notes ADP’s Deficiencies in Enterprise HCM Nucleus Research HCM Technology Value Matrix 2016 Emphasis Added ________________________________________________ (1) Nucleus Research, HCM Technology Value Matrix 2016, September 2016. (2) Gartner, Magic Quadrant for Cloud HCM Suites for

  21. Slide 21: ADP's Mid-Market Competitors are Gaining Share

    ________________________________________________ Source: Company SEC financials, press releases and news articles. Note: Financials have been adjusted to a June fiscal year end for Paycom and Paycor. Paycor financials based on public news articles. Includes both expensed and capitalized R&D. ADP’s M

  22. Slide 22: ADP Appears to be Losing Significant Share in Enterprise HCM

    ADP Appears to be Losing Significant Share in Enterprise HCM “[Y]ou can see as you move to the right, national accounts spaces for clients with employees over 1,000. We have about a little over $2 billion of revenue in that space and 4,000 clients.” – Chris Reidy, CFO(2) ____________________________

  23. Slide 23: ADP Appears to be Losing Significant Share in Enterprise HCM

    ________________________________________________ Source: ADP Analyst Day (2009), Company SEC financials, press releases and earnings transcripts. Note: Vantage reported as live clients, consistent with competitor customer counts. ADP reported 5,000 Enterprise clients as of the 2009 Analyst Day and 4

  24. Slide 24: ADP's Enterprise Competitors are Gaining Share

    ADP’s Enterprise Competitors are Gaining Share ADP’s SaaS Cloud-based competitors, with high quality and integrated HCM offerings, are stealing significant share in Enterprise Ultimate Software has spent only ~$590m on R&D cumulatively since 2011 while building and maintaining a world-class enterpri

  25. Slide 25: Poor Technology is Compensated for with Headcount

    Lee Cooperman, ADP Board Member (1991-2011) “What [Bill Ackman] doesn’t understand is they’ve never been as strong as they ought to be in software and technology, so they made up for that weakness by having a high-touch business model, with high degrees of client service. They have 700,000 clients,

  26. Slide 26: Outdated and Inefficient Technology + Service = Less Growth and Lower Margins

    Outdated and Inefficient Technology + “Service” = Less Growth and Lower Margins “They have relied on ‘service’ as a differentiator but over time ‘service’ became something the customer expected to do themselves with self-service.” – Former DVP of Business Transformation _____________________________

  27. Slide 27: ADP is at a Critical Inflection Point

    ADP is at a Critical Inflection Point The HCM industry is rapidly evolving. ADP needs to urgently become an efficient world-class technology company HCM capabilities Beyond Payroll – from recruitment to retirement – are growing in importance with the rise in strategic importance of HR in an economy

  28. Slide 28: II. ADP has Enormous Potential

    II.ADP has Enormous Potential

  29. Slide 29: ADP has Enormous Structural Advantages

    ADP has Enormous Structural Advantages ADP should be the market leader, with world-class offerings ADP enjoys significant structural advantages: ADP’s significant scale, in total and by segment, provides: Significant free cash flow and financial resources so R&D resources are not a constraint ADP’s

  30. Slide 30: Proper Enhancements to Product and Back-End Will Drive Long-Term Value

    Long-term Shareholder Value Higher Growth Greater Efficiency Higher Margins Proper Enhancements to Product and Back-End Infrastructure Will Drive Long-Term Value Enhanced technology offerings, on the front-end and back-end, would drive improvements in ADP’s competitive position, long-term growth and

  31. Slide 31: ADP's Potential for Improved Growth

    ADP’s Potential for Improved Growth We believe fixing ADP’s competitive position will increase ES’s potential revenue growth from ~4% to 7% – 8% Fixing ADP’s product, back-end technology, and go-to-market strategy would yield significant long-term value: Improved competitive position and growth pros

  32. Slide 32: ADP has Enormous Upside If It Can Transition to a Real Technology Company

    ADP has Enormous Upside If It Can Transition to a Real Technology Company ADP has a unique and incredibly valuable position at the epicenter of businesses of all sizes, collectively serving ~700,000 clients worldwide ADP should be the ecosystem and partner of choice, if it can become a technology le

  33. Slide 33: What is The Risk of the Status Quo?

    What is The Risk of the Status Quo? ADP’s current status quo is harming its long-term competitive position The risk of inaction is great; ADP is already losing share If customers are lost, they can be lost for a decade or more Exceedingly slow transformation is harmful Competitors are moving faster

  34. Slide 34: III. ADP is Materially Underperforming its Potential

    III. ADP is Materially Underperforming its Potential

  35. Slide 35: Why has the market and the Board not recognized the problem?

    Why has the market and the Board not recognized the problem?

  36. Slide 36: Underperformance concealed by complex accounting and reduced disclosure

    ADP’s underperformance has been concealed due to complex accounting and reduced disclosure which makes benchmarking to competitors difficult

  37. Slide 37: Large PEO and Client Fund Income Complicate Benchmarking

    ADP’s Large PEO + Substantial Clients Fund Income Complicates Operational Benchmarking PEO “revenue” overstates economic revenue and distorts growth rates and operational benchmarking Client Fund Income (or “float income”), overstates operational profitability. Earnings from float are not impacted b

  38. Slide 38: PEO Revenue Accounting Overstates Growth and Economic Revenue

    ADP’s accounting for PEO “revenues” overstates growth and economic revenue and complicates operational benchmarking given the significant pass-throughs ADP uniquely monetizes its Client Funds (“Funds Held for Clients”), generating nearly 100% margin float income which overstates ES’s operational pro

  39. Slide 39: ADP's Reported Metrics are Overstating Growth

    ADP’s Reported Metrics are Overstating Growth ADP’s PEO pass-throughs are inflating growth. Growth is slowing while ADP’s sales force growth is accelerating ________________________________________________ Excludes Dealer Services in all periods. PEO estimated at ~11% of total revenue based on manag

  40. Slide 40: Reported Bookings Appear Good

    Reported Bookings Appear Good ADP’s total reported bookings suggest a ~7% CAGR since FY 2011. This is not heroic in light of industry tailwinds and an 8% CAGR increase in ADP’s sales force(1) CAGR ~7% ________________________________________________ Source: SEC financials, press releases. (1)FY’2011

  41. Slide 41: PEO Pass-Through Costs Overstate Net Economic Bookings

    ADP reports worldwide new business bookings by consolidating Employer Service and PEO bookings(2), which should be reported and analyzed separately We estimate that pass-throughs embedded in gross bookings have increased materially (from ~27% to ~37% of gross bookings) given the PEO’s growth, inflat

  42. Slide 42: Historical Disclosure Reduced Over Time

    Category Example of Historical Disclosure Year Last Reported Currently Reported? Revenue and Client by Sub-Segment “[SMB] is about $1 billion of revenue, it comprises about 382,000 clients… Then in the major accounts space… our revenue is about $2 billion in that space, 63,000 payroll clients... We

  43. Slide 43: Client Count Growth in SMB and International Masks Weak Mid-Market and Enterprise

    While ADP has grown its client count in SMB and international (including acquisitions), its Mid-Market and Enterprise performance is poor ADP Reports Positive Overall Client Count Trends But This is Misleading ADP reports total client counts 2% – 3% annual growth, but this masks underlying weakness

  44. Slide 44: High-level Disclosures Do Not Tell the Full Story

    ADP’s High-level Disclosures Do Not Tell the Full Story with Respect to ADP’s Competitive Position While ADP’s total client count appears to be growing, the loss of larger clients disproportionately impacts overall performance ADP needs ~185 SMB accounts or ~13 Mid-Market clients to replace the loss

  45. Slide 45: Management's Commentary on Client Wins/Losses is Misleading

    ________________________________________________ Q1’2015 Earnings Call. October 29, 2014. Ultimate Software Q1’2015 Investor Presentation. February 3, 2015. Scott Scheer. Q4’2016 Earnings Call. February 7, 2017. ADP Management’s Commentary on Client Wins/Losses is Misleading ADP Ultimate Software(2)

  46. Slide 46: Consolidated Revenue Retention Masks Enterprise Underperformance

    ADP’s client retention appears to be in-line with weighted-average peer retention when adjusted for ADP’s estimated business mix Note that Ultimate has a best-in-class ~97% retention, while growing rapidly – this contradicts the notion that ADP’s “high touch service” model leads to differentiated re

  47. Slide 47: Weak Trends Masked by Sell-in

    Weak Underlying Trends are Also Masked by “Sell-in” (Sales of Additional HCM Modules to Existing Clients) ADP’s competitive weakness is masked partially by “sell-in” driven by recent industry trends toward HCM Beyond Payroll Recent sell-in has inflated growth as the industry built-out Beyond Payroll

  48. Slide 48: Sell-In Won't Last Forever

    ________________________________________________ Q2’2016 Earnings Call. February 3, 2016. Q3’2017 Earnings Call. May 3, 2017. Sell-In Won’t Last Forever… “[H]istorically our mix has been 50/50 -- about 50% of bookings roughly towards new client counts and new logos, and 50% of upsell. And but obviou

  49. Slide 49: Reported Employer Services Margins are Overstated

    ADP’s Reported Employer Services Margins in its SEC Filings are Overstated

  50. Slide 50: Employer Services SEC Margin Disclosure

    ADP’s Employer Services SEC Margin Disclosure ________________________________________________ Source: ADP Form 10-K. Page 32. ADP’s Form 10-K, Page 32 “Employer Services’ overall margin increased from 30.4% to 30.6% for fiscal 2017…”

  51. Slide 51: Employer Services Margins are Overstated

    45 Pages Later the Company Explains that Employer Services Margins are Overstated ________________________________________________ Source: ADP Form 10-K. Page 77. ADP Form 10-K, Page 77 “There is a reconciling item for the difference between actual interest income earned on invested funds held for c

  52. Slide 52: Comparing with Competitors: Excluding Float and Charging Overhead

    To compare with competitors, one must (1) exclude float-income as a separate line-item, and (2) charge Employer Services for corporate overhead(1) Our analysis focuses on a “Net Operational Profit Margin” to isolate float income (including the overstated credited yield) and to properly account for c

  53. Slide 53: Compare with competitors after excluding float and charging overhead

    Once you exclude float income and charge corporate overhead to Employer Services you can then compare with competitors

  54. Slide 54: ADP Comparative Size by Net Operational Revenue

    ADP Comparative Size: ADP Comp. Segment Size: 3x ~1x 6x ~1x 12x ~2x 13x ~1x 14x ~1x 22x ~7x 28x ~10x 32x ~11x ________________________________________________ Note: Based on latest fiscal year end, as relevant. Note that Kronos and Ceridian are two privately-owned competitors which do not have publi

  55. Slide 55: Net Operational Revenue per Employee Underperforms Competitors

    Despite its Scale, ADP’s Net Operational Revenue per Employee Significantly Underperforms Competitors When adjusted for PEO pass-throughs, ADP substantially trails its competitor group in efficiency, despite ADP’s significant scale advantages This deficiency is not specific to one “category” of comp

  56. Slide 56: ADP's Labor Productivity is Essentially Flat

    ADP’s Labor Productivity is Essentially Flat ________________________________________________ 2009 used as a starting point given the availability of segment headcount for Dealer Services (reported as 7k in 2009) in the 2009 Analyst Day presentation. Alternatively, net operational revenue per employ

  57. Slide 57: Adjusted Gross Margins Lower than Competitors

    ADP’s adjusted gross margins(1) are significantly lower than competitors’ despite ADP’s significant scale advantages ________________________________________________ Note that Kronos and Ceridian are two privately-owned competitors which do not have public financials. ADP’s gross margins adjusted to

  58. Slide 58: Apples-to-Apples Benchmarking Shows Dramatic Underperformance

    Apples-to-Apples Benchmarking to Competitors Shows Dramatic Underperformance Achieving just competitor-level efficiency would yield massive improvements in profitability Net operational revenue per employee (ADP $161k vs. $223k competitor median) Adjusted gross margins (ADP 60%(1) vs. 74% recurring

  59. Slide 59: ADP has an Enormous Margin Opportunity in ES

    ADP has an Enormous Margin Opportunity in ES Employer Services (“ES”) Current Optimized Key Drivers Gross Margin ~58% 72% – 75% Automated product support, implementation, and reduced back-end spend Sales Expense NA Low 20s% Increased sales force productivity General & Admin NA L-S-D% Corp. restructu

  60. Slide 60: Benchmarking margin potential by sub-segment

    Because ADP participates in SMB, Mid-Market, Enterprise, and International, ADP’s structural margin potential can be best estimated by benchmarking against competitors in each sub-segment

  61. Slide 61: IV. Potential Margins by Sub-Segment

    IV. Potential Margins by Sub-Segment

  62. Slide 62: How We Analyze Business-Mix-Adjusted Structural Margin Potential

    How We Analyze the Business-Mix-Adjusted Structural Margin Potential of ADP: We do not presume the current margin of any sub-segment (e.g., International) is the structural potential margin We estimate the structural potential margin of ADP's various sub-segments by analyzing the segments' underlyin

  63. Slide 63: Paychex is an Appropriate Comparable

    Paychex is an Appropriate Comparable Paychex is a direct comparable to ADP in SMB (low- to mid-20s% of ES) Both are mature industry participants with mid- to high-single-digit revenue growth and a “service bureau” legacy Paychex had ~20% operational margins in the late 1990s. Paychex expanded margin

  64. Slide 64: ADP vs. Paychex

    ADP vs. Paychex ________________________________________________ For both ADP and Paychex analysis excludes Client Funds and PEO pass-through costs. Paychex PEO pass-through estimated at $165m on ~$340m of gross PEO revenue. Assumes ADP has 2,500 dedicated PEO employees. Assumes Paychex has 580 dedi

  65. Slide 65: ADP vs. Paychex: the Gap is Widening

    While Paychex historically generated similar Net Operational Revenue per Employee as ADP (from 2008-2011), it has dramatically outperformed ADP since 2011 ADP vs. Paychex: the Gap is Widening Net Operational Revenue per Employee(1) ($’000) Net Operational Revenue Benchmarking Per Employee(3,4) ($’00

  66. Slide 66: ADP vs. Paychex margin benchmarking

    ________________________________________________ Employer Services revenue only. Assumes PEO has 2,500 dedicated employees (in-line with Insperity and TriNet). $226k as reported. $214k excludes PEO pass-through costs (estimated at ~$165m). Paychex PEO believed to be ~$340m based on management commen

  67. Slide 67: The Math Doesn't Add Up

    The Math Doesn’t Add Up… If ADP earned Paychex’s ~41% SMB margin(1) on its ~$2bn SMB business, it would imply ~$820mm of operating profit. SMB-only profits would therefore account for ~50%+ of total Employer Services total profit If true, this would imply the rest of the Employer Services business e

  68. Slide 68: Mid-Market: Structural Margin Potential

    Multiple former ADP executives have articulated their belief that Mid-Market has the highest structural margin potential as it sits in a “sweet spot” between SMB and Enterprise, with moderate churn, good pricing power, lower sales-intensity, good ancillary module attachment rates, and a larger reven

  69. Slide 69: Consider Growth and Scale of Competitors

    Investors should consider the growth and scale of competitors when gauging current and potential structural operating margins of competitors Comparisons to Sub-Scale and Rapidly Growing Peers Sub-scale and rapidly growing peers have significant operating expense burdens in their P&L – margins improv

  70. Slide 70: Comparisons to Sub-Scale & Rapidly Growing Competitors (continued)

    Comparisons to Sub-Scale & Rapidly Growing Competitors (continued) Comparisons to ADP’s competitors are most appropriate at the revenue and gross margin levels given the higher operating expense levels of ADP’s sub-scale and rapidly growing competitors In comparisons to competitors on revenue and gr

  71. Slide 71: Ultimate at Scale: Illustrative Margin Profile

    Ultimate at Scale: Illustrative Margin Profile Higher absolute growth (>20%) burdens Ultimate’s P&L with implementation expense and variable sales commissions; G&A and R&D will scale over time ________________________________________________ Source: Ultimate Public financials. Adjusted to exclude ce

  72. Slide 72: Ultimate at Scale: Wall Street Agrees

    Ultimate at Scale: Wall Street Agrees ________________________________________________ Source: Wall Street research. Emphasis added. “Substantial long-term operating leverage: Longer term, our hypothetical margin expansion analysis shows the potential for a significant ramp in pro forma operating ma

  73. Slide 73: Ultimate Software management on long-term margins

    Question Answer Justin Furby, William Blair “Longer-term margins, two of your competitors have a little bit of a different margin structure: Paychex, high 30s%, 40%; ADP, mid 20s%. Where do you guys think you shake out over the very long term?” Mitch Dauerman, Ultimate Software, CFO “We look at Payc

  74. Slide 74: Ultimate Software is an Appropriate Comparable

    Ultimate Software is an Appropriate Comparable Ultimate Software (“Ultimate”) is an appropriate comparable for ADP’s upper-mid and enterprise markets Ultimate Software was founded by Scott Scheer, in 1990, a former ADP executive Transitioned to cloud-based UltiPro offering in 2002 Ultimate Software

  75. Slide 75: Enterprise: HCM SaaS Margins 35%–40%

    Enterprise: HCM SaaS Margins 35% – 40%, but Decline to ~26% to 30% When Lower Margin Sub-Segments are Included Key Observations Enterprise is now ADP’s smallest sub-segment at ~20% of ES revenue(1) Segment margins suppressed by legacy, sprawling product portfolio and archaic back-end infrastructure

  76. Slide 76: International: Structural Margin Potential

    International: Structural Margin Potential ~25% to 30% Key Observations We believe the components of International ES include: In-country domestic HCM / payroll (ADP is a #1 or #2 market player), including Canada and Western Europe, which should be structurally very profitable (i.e. 30%-40%+) Multin

  77. Slide 77: Structurally High Margin HCM SaaS Business Mix

    Structurally High Margin (35%-40%+) HCM “SaaS” (Est. ~70%-80% of ES Revenue) ADP’s Structural Margin Potential by Underlying Business Sub-Segment Substantial majority of ES’s revenue base has structurally high potential margins Small Business (Incl. ASO) Illustrative Employer Services Business Mix M

  78. Slide 78: Segment Comparables Demonstrate Enormous Margin Opportunity in ES

    Segment Comparables Demonstrate That ADP has an Enormous Margin Opportunity in ES Employer Services is materially underperforming and should achieve 35% or greater margins by FY 2022 if properly managed Employer Services % of Revenue Optimized Margin (%) Evidence Small / Medium Business Low- to Mid-

  79. Slide 79: Unlike ADP's competitors, ADP provides service

    “Unlike ADP’s competitors, ADP provides “service” to its customers” The vast majority of what ADP calls “service” is product support to compensate for weak software and technology, which when fixed, will improve growth and margins Value-added service – to the extent it is differentiated, unique, and

  80. Slide 80: Unlike Paychex, only a minority of ADP's business is SMB

    “Unlike Paychex, only a minority of ADP’s business is SMB” While this is true, if ADP achieved Paychex’s margins in its SMB business, this would imply that the rest of Employer Services earns a 12% margin on $6.5bn of revenue (Slide 66) ADP is not achieving its structural margin potential across mul

  81. Slide 81: V. What are the Causes of ADP's Underperformance

    V. What are the Causes of ADP’s Underperformance

  82. Slide 82: Underperformance in Employer Services is Broad-Based, But Fixable

    ADP’s Underperformance in Employer Services is Broad-Based, But Fixable ADP’s underperformance in Employer Services is driven by numerous inefficiencies across ADP’s organization: Service organization is overstaffed and poorly structured Implementation teams are siloed and lack automation tools Back

  83. Slide 83: A. Service Organization is Overstaffed and Inefficient

    A. ADP’s Service Organization is Overstaffed and Inefficient

  84. Slide 84: Support ≠ Service

    Support ≠ “Service” ________________________________________________ Source: Interviews with prior ADP executives. “What they call ‘service’ is mostly support. The executives don’t understand this. They count as service: ‘you tried to run it, it’s not working, walk me through how to do this again…’

  85. Slide 85: ADP does not distinguish between service and support

    ADP does not distinguish between “service” and “support” when describing its service organization Service: Value-added enhancements which help clients utilize products Value-added services include compliance, tax, filings, etc. Adds value and should generate greater market share and/or higher pricin

  86. Slide 86: ADP's Service Footprint is Overstaffed

    ADP’s Service Footprint is Overstaffed ADP is not achieving leverage on its overall associate headcount, particularly in its service organization Service is the largest component of the associate count at ADP ADP’s service offering is highly labor intensive; support-related headcount needs should de

  87. Slide 87: ADP's Service Structure: Sprawling and Sub-Scale

    ADP’s Service Structure: Sprawling and Sub-Scale ADP has ~10 million square feet of real estate and 143 US office locations

  88. Slide 88: Service Alignment Initiative

    In July 2016, ADP announced its “Service Alignment Initiative” but has made no commitments regarding improved efficiency or client service levels

  89. Slide 89: B. Implementation Teams are Siloed and Lack Automation Tools

    B. ADP’s Implementation Teams are Siloed and Lack Automation Tools

  90. Slide 90: Implementation Teams are Siloed and Lack Automation Tools

    ADP’s Implementation Teams are Siloed and Lack Automation Tools Implementations are labor intensive and generally siloed by product – the current structure precludes operating leverage Substantial “hands-on-keyboard” implementation teams – thousands of employees involved in implementation efforts La

  91. Slide 91: C. Back-End Infrastructure is Outdated and Complex

    C. ADP’s Back-End Infrastructure is Outdated and Complex

  92. Slide 92: ADP Payroll Product Architecture

    ________________________________________________ Compiled based on public sources and private interviews. Certain views may be dated and as such, ADP may have modernized the architecture in recent years. We understand that all of these products are premised on PeopleSoft code from the 1990s and are

  93. Slide 93: Core payroll engine is inefficient

    While ADP’s core payroll engine “works” and has been the backbone of the Company’s offering for decades it is inefficient A “Spaghetti of code” written over time Written largely in COBOL Expensive to maintain; requires tenured engineers and programmers Does not work for other regions; payroll offeri

  94. Slide 94: Bloated Back-End – Enterprise Product Complexity

    Bloated Back-End – Example #2: Enterprise Product Complexity Enterprise is ADP’s most dysfunctional business segment – ADP goes to market with overlapping and often competitive products on legacy architecture Vantage is a sub-scale product today, a “wrapper” around the legacy siloed product architec

  95. Slide 95: Enterprise products cobbled together as Vantage

    Enterprise consists of a combination of various products acquired over time, many of which have been cobbled together as Vantage HR Anytime (HRIS) PayForce Enterprise HR (HRIS & Payroll) Enterprise Payroll Pro Business Payroll Workforce Now(1) Full HR BPO (“COS”) Health and Welfare Services (Benefit

  96. Slide 96: Outdated and Duplicative Support Tools

    ADP’s service organization has been attempting to unify onto a single instance of on premise Siebel CRM for the past ~10 years Plethora of home-grown widgets and manual workarounds By the time ADP fully migrates onto its unified CRM system, the system will be dated relative to best-in-class solution

  97. Slide 97: D. Sales Force Productivity is Declining

    D. ADP’s Sales Force Productivity is Declining

  98. Slide 98: Sales productivity should be analyzed on a net basis

    ADP sales productivity should be analyzed on a net basis, isolating the gross up of PEO pass-through revenue on bookings Sales associates have grown from ~5,000 in FY 2014 to ~6,540+ currently,(1) (targeting 4% additional growth in FY 2018) while total Net and Employer Services Bookings have increas

  99. Slide 99: Sales Force Productivity – Less Than Meets the Eye

    Sales Force Productivity – Less Than Meets the Eye ________________________________________________ Gross bookings reported per ADP management. Sales force headcount based on management commentary from quarterly conference calls. PEO bookings assumes 80-86% retention (per the 10K) and certain estima

  100. Slide 100: Best Direct Sales Force in the World Is Underachieving

    Ed Flynn, Former EVP, Worldwide Sales and Marketing “The way to think about the 10% [growth in bookings], both in the past and in terms of our future intention, is that roughly half of our growth will come through headcount additions. The other half will come through productivity lift.” The “Best Di

  101. Slide 101: Sales productivity versus competitors

    ________________________________________________. Note: Analysis spreads estimated competitor net bookings over their last fiscal year average sales head count. Net bookings estimated by subtracting the change in recurring revenue (excluding implementation, PEO pass-through costs and float revenue)

  102. Slide 102: The Problem is Not the Sales Force... It's the Products

    The Problem is Not the Sales Force... It’s the Products “And this goes back to the linkage of our focus on technology and innovation, because we can't prove that over the last three or four years -- because this has really been also coincident with an economy that's been improving. And so we can't t

  103. Slide 103: E. Spending Significantly on Legacy IT Systems Support

    E. ADP is Spending Significantly on Legacy IT Systems Support

  104. Slide 104: ADP Dwarfs Competitor Systems Spending

    On an absolute dollar basis, ADP dwarfs competitor systems spending, other than Workday, which is growing rapidly and building out its ERP / financials product for Enterprise clients ADP should be an HCM technology leader given its vast spending and resources Systems Development and Programming Expe

  105. Slide 105: Legacy Systems Costs Relatively Unchanged

    Despite management’s goal to eliminate spending to support legacy architecture,(1) we believe these costs are relatively unchanged in recent years The change in composition in IT spend between legacy systems and new development is driven by higher absolute spend vs. a true reduction in legacy system

  106. Slide 106: Significant Reductions in Legacy Systems Spend Possible

    ADP should achieve significant reductions in systems development and programming spend on legacy platforms and infrastructure To date, minimal reductions in legacy systems spend If ADP cut legacy systems expense by 50% this would drive ~$150m of profit and ~180bps of margin opportunity for ES ADP ma

  107. Slide 107: F. Corporate Structure is Bloated and Complex

    F. ADP’s Corporate Structure is Bloated and Complex

  108. Slide 108: ADP's Corporate Structure is Inefficient

    ADP’s Corporate Structure is Inefficient Various business units operate in a mostly siloed manner Multiple HQs for each business unit Each business unit operates with its own staffing across most functions, including administrative functions (HR, Finance, etc.) Matrix structure with many functions h

  109. Slide 109: ADP's Sprawling Corporate Footprint

    ADP’s Sprawling Corporate Footprint ADP’s business units and corporate offices are spread across the country largely due to historical locations for each business Mid-Market (Majors) Small Business (SMB) Corporate HQ Enterprise (National Accounts) Value-Add and Tax PEO

  110. Slide 110: Sprawling Corporate Footprint (cont'd.)

    ADP’s Sprawling Corporate Footprint (cont’d.) ADP’s Corporate HQ (Roseland, NJ), SMB (Florham Park, NJ), and Mid-Market (Parsippany, NJ) offices are a 15-20 minute drive from one another

  111. Slide 111: G. Platform Migrations Should Drive Significant Margin Uplift

    G. Platform Migrations Should Drive Significant Margin Uplift

  112. Slide 112: Product Migrations Should Yield Big Improvements in Revenue and Margin

    Better user experience More cross-selling of modules Higher retention Fewer errors with real-time capabilities Fewer manual processes Fewer support calls and less support activity Less maintenance expense Less R&D supporting legacy infrastructure Significantly higher growth and margins ADP’s Product

  113. Slide 113: VI. Root Causes of ADP's Underperformance

    VI. Root Causes of ADP’s Underperformance

  114. Slide 114: A. Management Insularity & Culture

    A. Management Insularity & Culture

  115. Slide 115: ADP's Senior Executive Management

    ADP’s senior executive management Executives have decades of tenure at ADP and effectively no outside experience and perspective “He’s [Bill Ackman] saying that somehow the company is insular and that people stick around forever, and the people that have worked for me have been around the company fo

  116. Slide 116: ADP's Management Team Needs Improvement

    ADP’s Management Team Needs Improvement ADP’s senior executive management team needs outside experience and fresh perspectives; historically, outsiders have been rejected ADP’s senior executive management team is lacking critical capabilities ADP should be hiring from leading companies in its quest

  117. Slide 117: ADP's Culture Needs to Change

    ADP’s Culture Needs to Change ADP’s insular, bureaucratic, and staid corporate culture causes the Company to trail competitors in recruiting talent, eroding the Company’s long-term competitive position Many of ADP’s direct competitors rank amongst the best places to work in the country, according to

  118. Slide 118: ADP Trails Major Peers Across Employee Satisfaction Metrics

    ________________________________________________ Source: Glassdoor, Inc. July 2017. Note: Green stars denote Glassdoor Highest Rated CEOs from 2016 or 2017 based on U.S. employee feedback between 5/2/15 - 5/1/17. Overall Rating Approval of CEO Approve of Senior Management ADP Rank: Last 2nd to Last

  119. Slide 119: ADP Trails Major Peers Across Employee Satisfaction Metrics

    ________________________________________________ Source: Glassdoor, Inc. July 2017. Culture & Values Recommend to a Friend Positive Business Outlook ADP Rank: Last Last Last ADP Trails Major Peers Across a Variety of Employee Satisfaction Metrics

  120. Slide 120: B. Legacy Organization Structure is Neither Client Centric Nor Efficient

    B. Legacy Organization Structure is Neither Client Centric Nor Efficient

  121. Slide 121: ADP's Structure is Not Client Centric

    Intl. In-Country Structure ________________________________________________ Note: Informed by primary research interviews. The above represents a complete understanding to the best of our ability. ADP’s Structure is Not Client Centric and Requires Duplicative Back-Office Functions ADP Corporate Smal

  122. Slide 122: ADP's Product Map Spills Across Business Units

    ADP’s Product Map Spills Across Business Units Complicating the issue, ADP’s product portfolio spills across multiple business units, creating duplicative implementation and support organizations SMB Mid-Market Enterprise Canada RUN by ADP TotalSource (PEO) Workforce Now Vantage

  123. Slide 123: ADP's Business Structure is Sub-Optimal

    ADP’s Business Structure is Sub-Optimal ________________________________________________ Source: Interviews with prior ADP executives. ADP’s current structure is hurting ADP’s ability to execute in the marketplace while incentivizing sub-optimal outcomes The current structure: Does not put the clien

  124. Slide 124: BU Presidents Manage Cost-Centers Without True Product Ownership

    Hard-Line Divisional Functions Matrix Functions to Corporate ________________________________________________ Note: Informed by primary research interviews. Internal divisional segmentation may have changed in recent years. The above represents a complete understanding to the best of our ability. Ad

  125. Slide 125: Functional Matrix Structure is Sub-Optimal

    ADP’s Functional Matrix Structure is Sub-Optimal ________________________________________________ Source: Interviews with prior ADP executives. ADP’s functional matrix reporting structure hampers execution, precludes transformational change, and promotes waste The current structure: Prevents transfo

  126. Slide 126: VII. Financial Model Assumptions

    VII. Financial Model Assumptions

  127. Slide 127: ADP has Three Distinct Drivers of Value

    Continued modest ~3% – 5% growth from FY 2018 to 2022 Incremental margin improvement of +50-75bps per annum after FY’18 Continued secular growth from underpenetrated base Conservatively assuming 12% growth (vs. 15% last 5 years) Client fund balances conservatively assumed to grow ~3% Yield on float

  128. Slide 128: Key Financial Modeling Assumptions

    Key Financial Modeling Assumptions Projected CAGR (’17A–’22E) Business Unit Last 6 Yrs. (‘11-’17) Status Quo Transformation Employer Services 5% 4% 5% (exit at 7%) PEO 14% 12% 12% Operational Revenue (Gross) 7% 7% 7% Interest on Funds Held for Client (5%) 14% 14% Total Revenue 7% 7% 8% Projected Mar

  129. Slide 129: Status Quo Valuation of ADP

    Status Quo Valuation of ADP ADP will be challenged to re-accelerate Employer Services top line growth Management has guided to 2% – 3% ES growth for FY 2018 ADP’s long-term EPS algorithm should drive modest margin expansion over time but will continue to leave ADP competitively exposed _____________

  130. Slide 130: The Value of ADP (Transformation)

    The Value of ADP (Transformation) Our proposed “Transformation Case” for ADP will lead to more robust top-line growth (i.e. better competitive positioning in Enterprise) and expand long-term operating margins Near-term cash generation reduced by accelerated product investment and cash restructuring

  131. Slide 131: The Value of ADP (Transformation) – Illustrative Valuation

    The Value of ADP (Transformation) Structurally higher long-term growth should translate into multiple expansion Illustrative Valuation (1,2) ________________________________________________ 2018 financials based on management guidance. Long-term model assumes Employer Service growth rates accelerate

  132. Slide 132: VIII. Solera & CDK Tell the Story

    VIII. Solera & CDK Tell the Story

  133. Slide 133: Case Study #1: Solera

    Case Study #1: Solera (Formerly ADP Claims Services Group) ________________________________________________ Source: ADP and Solera Holdings Inc. SEC filings and transcripts. Adjusted EBITA adds back restructuring costs, acquisition related costs, litigation related expenses (most notably in FY’2015)

  134. Slide 134: Solera Q&A on margin potential

    Question Answer Gary Bisbee, Lehman Brothers “Then just the last question -- the Dealer margin is obviously doing terrific now that you've lapped the Kerridge. Can you give us a sense, as you look out over the next few years, what's sort of the margin potential of this business? Does it remain subst

  135. Slide 135: Case Study – CDK Global

    Case Study – CDK Global CDK Global, f.k.a. Dealer Services within ADP, was spun out from ADP on September 30, 2014 An activist investor, Sachem Head, announced an investment in CDK shortly after its spinoff In June 2015, aided by the help of an analysis by outside consultants, CDK announced its Busi

  136. Slide 136: CDK Global: A Clean-sheet Look at Margins

    CDK Global: A “Clean-sheet” Look at Margins Steven Anenen, CDK Global, Former CEO “What we have done with the Board is we said, listen, now is a perfect time for us; we are out 120 days. Let's look at all of our margins and see if there are areas we could get a lot more effective. So, leaning a proc

  137. Slide 137: CDK Global: At ADP, No Urgency to Capture Potential

    CDK Global: At ADP, No Urgency to Capture Potential Question Answer Brian Bissett, Morgan Stanley “And were those things that were not addressed as you were inside ADP, or are these things that are incrementally directed towards how you are going to grow the business? In other words, did ADP kind of

  138. Slide 138: CDK Transformation Opportunities Similar to ADP

    Many areas of the transformative opportunity at CDK are similar to those which exist at ADP CDK Global: Many Efficiency Opportunities Similar to ADP ________________________________________________ Source: CDK FY Q3 2017 Results, May 2, 2017. CDK Business Transformation Plan

  139. Slide 139: IX. The Path Forward for ADP

    IX.The Path Forward for ADP

  140. Slide 140: The Path Forward for ADP

    The Path Forward for ADP ADP, with support from shareholders, has an opportunity to transform Add a major shareholder to the Board and two new independent directors, with fresh perspectives and relevant expertise Board forms Committee to oversee the transformation plan Evaluation of necessary produc

  141. Slide 141: A Transformation Plan for ADP

    A Transformation Plan for ADP Commit to a transformation plan and path to achieving ADP’s potential Fix corporate structure, Business Unit silos, matrix structure, corporate bloat and inefficiency (bureaucracy, spans-and-layers) Accelerate investments in necessary product and back-end improvements B

  142. Slide 142: ADP Should be Managed to Maximize Long-term Value

    ADP Should be Managed to Maximize Long-term Value Rather than focus on short-term quarterly earnings, ADP should focus on maximizing long-term shareholder value A proper transformation will require some investments in the near term We believe these investments can be paid for by significant improvem

  143. Slide 143: Improved Disclosure Would Allow for Analysis of Underlying Performance

    Improved Disclosure Would Allow for Analysis of ADP’s Underlying Performance Additional disclosures would allow investors to analyze the performance of the business in its underlying sub-segments and increase management accountability for performance relative to competitors and potential ADP should

  144. Slide 144: Support The Nominees for ADP's Transformation

    Support The Nominees for ADP’s Transformation In order to vote at the shareholder meeting, you must own shares on or before September 5th for the September 8th record date Elect a major shareholder to the Board Add two new independent directors with fresh perspectives and relevant expertise Send a m

  145. Slide 145: The Nominees for ADP's Transformation

    William Ackman Veronica Hagen Paul Unruh The Nominees for ADP’s Transformation William A. Ackman is the founder, chief executive officer and portfolio manager of Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., an SEC-registered investment adviser founded in 2003. Pershing Square is a concentrated research

  146. Slide 146: Q&A

    Q&A

  147. Slide 147: Our Questions for ADP

    Our Questions for ADP What is the mix of revenue by sub-segment? What are client count and revenue trends by sub-segment over time? What is the breakout of ES and PEO (gross and net) bookings over time? Why is sales force productivity declining so dramatically? What is the recent growth of payroll v

  148. Slide 148: Supplemental Materials

    Supplemental Materials

  149. Slide 149: Pershing Square Team Biographies

    Brian Welch Charles Korn Pershing Square Team Biographies Contact Details Phone: 212-652-3124 Email: welch@persq.com Biography Brian Welch is a Partner at Pershing Square Capital Management L.P. Mr. Welch joined Pershing Square in September 2011, and is responsible for identifying, analyzing and mon

  150. Slide 150: Supporting Analyses

    Supporting Analyses

  151. Slide 151: Adjusted Segment Margins

    Adjusted Segment Margins ________________________________________________ Source: ADP Form 10-K (2017), Q4’2017 financial press release. Note: Assumes Clients Funds / Float Income has a 100% profit margin to Operating Profit. Per the 10K, “there is a reconciling item for the difference between actua

  152. Slide 152: Illustrative Bookings Analysis

    Illustrative Bookings Analysis (pp.40,98) ________________________________________________ Source: SEC filings, conference call transcripts. Estimated based on the YoY growth in average worksite employees per client. Estimated based on the YoY growth in net revenue per average worksite employee. Bas

  153. Slide 153: Revenue composition and volume analysis

    ________________________________________________ Note: Based on estimated net operational revenue excluding Client Funds allocations. 2009 based on 2009 Analyst Day presentation. 2009 Revenue adjusted to exclude ~$675m of allocated Client Funds. Assumes 90% of Client Funds revenue relate to domestic

  154. Slide 154: Net Operational Revenue per Employee – Alternate Comparable Group

    Net Operational Revenue per Employee(1) (Ex-Float) An alternate comparable group(1) similarly illustrates a significant opportunity for efficiency SuccessFactors and Taleo are based on the latest publicly available data prior to being acquired (circa 2011) ___________________________________________

  155. Slide 155: Kronos Adj. EBITDA margins versus Employer Services

    At ~32%, Kronos’ Adj. EBITDA margins are ~900bps(1) higher than Employer Services margins. This is despite the fact that: Kronos is sub-scale compared to ADP: Kronos produces ~$1.2bn(2) of revenue compared to ADP Employer Services of $8.5bn Kronos is engaged in a business transformation initiative:

  156. Slide 156: HR BPO / Benefits Structural Margin Potential

    HR BPO / Benefits Structural Margin Potential (pp.74) ________________________________________________ Adjusted EBIT adds back amortization, allocated corporate overhead and other stand-alone adjustments. (Source: http://www.aon.com/risk-services/acceleratinginnovation/pdfs/benefits-admin-hrbpo-sale

  157. Slide 157: Multinational: Structural Margin Potential

    Multinational: Structural Margin Potential (pp.75-77) ________________________________________________ Note: Revenue based on management commentary. 2013 margins based on management commentary. Assumes fixed costs growth at ½ the rate of revenue growth. Multinational is a highly differentiated and r

  158. Slide 158: Estimating ADP's Non-SaaS Business

    Estimating ADP’s Non-SaaS Business (pp.74,76-77) Business Line Segment Last Disclosed Revenue Time Frame Est. Current Revenue Estimated Margin Benefits Administration Enterprise “[M]ultiple hundreds of millions of dollars”(1) FY’2010 $300m - $500m(2) Estimated between 15% and 25% Recruitment Process

  159. Slide 159: ADP's Recent Performance

    ADP’s Recent Performance

  160. Slide 160: Total Shareholder Returns Before Pershing Square

    ________________________________________________ Source: Capital IQ; Total Shareholder Return from November 8, 2011 to May 9, 2017, prior to Pershing Square’s rapid accumulation of ADP’s stock. Note that ADP uses a TSR calculation through “intraday on July 27, prior to rumors of Pershing Square's in

  161. Slide 161: ADP's Recent TSR in Context

    ADP’s Recent TSR in Context HCM market participants have benefitted from employment growth since 2009, trends in HCM Beyond Payroll offerings, ACA demand drivers and earnings multiple expansion Businesses which participate in attractive industries should have positive long-term performance ADP parti

  162. Slide 162: Platform Migrations Should Drive Significant Margin Uplift

    Platform Migrations Should Drive Significant Margin Uplift

  163. Slide 163: ADP is Migrating Clients to New Product Platforms

    >500k Clients 1 – 50 By year-end 2017, ADP will have completed its product migrations on the vast majority of their customer base and potential profit pool ADP is Migrating Clients to New Product Platforms 2018+ 1,000+ SMB Mid-Market Enterprise 50 – 1,000 Underlying Client Size Years RUN Powered by

  164. Slide 164: Is ADP's Potential Post Transition Underappreciated?

    Is ADP’s Potential Post Transition Underappreciated? MIGRATIONS Before During After Quality of Offering vs. Best-in-Class LOW IMPROVING HIGH Customers at Risk HIGH LOWER LOW Retention OK Revenue per Customer / Cross-Sell LOW IMPROVING Support /Service Needs On-going and Maintenance Costs Implementat

  165. Slide 165: ADP has Highlighted its Potential Post-Migrations

    ADP has Highlighted its Potential Post-Migrations Question Answer Rod Bourgeois, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. “As you move clients off of the legacy platforms onto the new platforms across all your client segments, do you ultimately get a margin benefit?...So clearly in that bucket [in R&D] as you mov

  166. Slide 166: ADP Potential Post-Migrations: Analyst Day (2010)

    ADP has Highlighted its Potential Post-Migrations Analyst Day (2010) Question Mark Marcon, Robert W. Baird & Company “I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about the pricing for RUN and for Workforce Now relative to the alternatives, and how we should think about the margin profiles of those so

  167. Slide 167: Analyst Day (2010) – Continued

    ADP has Highlighted its Potential Post-Migrations Analyst Day (2010) – Continued Answer Gary C. Butler, President and CEO “Yeah, RUN also has the advantage of being on newer technology which scales more cheaply in terms of incremental margins. In addition, in our traditional platforms on the low end

  168. Slide 168: Analyst Day (2010) – Continued

    ADP has Highlighted its Potential Post-Migrations Analyst Day (2010) – Continued Answer Gary C. Butler, President and CEO “The other thing and Mike, I don't know if you want to comment on this, but with our SaaS-based products we're investing not only for future functionality but for scalability, so

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