Bob Evans Farms — Proxy Contest (April 2014)
74 slides from Bob Evans Farms's proxy contest presentation, Apr 24, 2014
Slide 1: Refresh Bob Evans: A Plan for Comprehensive Change
Refresh Bob Evans A Plan for Comprehensive Change April 2014 1 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer THIS PRESENTATION WITH RESPECT TO BOB EVANS FARMS, INC. (“BOB EVANS” OR THE “COMPANY’”) IS FOR GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY OR PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS
Slide 3: Additional Information Regarding the Solicitation
Additional Information Regarding the Solicitation SANDELL ASSET MANAGEMENT CORP., CASTLERIGG MASTER INVESTMENTS LTD., CASTLERIGG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, CASTLERIGG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED, CASTLERIGG OFFSHORE HOLDINGS, LTD., CASTLERIGG MERGER ARBITRAGE AND EQUITY EVENT FUND, LTD., CASTLERIGG M
Slide 4: Table of Contents
Table of Contents Executive Summary I Bob Evans: Numerous Problems II Source of Problems: A Stale and Entrenched Board III Solution: A Fresh, Independent, Highly-Qualified Board to Effect Change IV Comprehensive Improvements: Operational, Financial, Strategic V Potential Upside for Shareholders VI A
Slide 5: Executive Summary
Refresh Bob Evans Executive Summary 5 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 6: About Sandell Asset Management
About Sandell Asset Management ■ Sandell Asset Management Corp. (“Sandell”) is a leading private, alternative asset management firm specializing in global corporate event-driven investing ■ Over 16 years of managing event-driven strategies across both equity- and credit-oriented opportunities ■ Comb
Slide 7: Overview of Bob Evans Farms, Inc.
Overview of Bob Evans Farms, Inc. ■ Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (“Bob Evans” or the “Company”) was founded in 1953 by the Company’s namesake and became publicly traded in 1963 ■ The Company operates in two distinct business segments: Bob Evans Restaurants, and ($ millions, except per share) Bob Evans Farm
Slide 8: Executive Summary
Executive Summary ■ Sandell has beneficial ownership of 6.8%1 of Bob Evans, making us one of the Company’s largest shareholders ■ We believe that Bob Evans is materially undervalued and that the Company’s stock price does not fairly reflect the significant value associated with the Company’s unique
Slide 9: Executive Summary
Executive Summary ■ We believe that Bob Evans is plagued with many problems that have contributed to this underperformance, including: Repeated reduction in operating and earnings guidance Inordinately high SG&A expenses Abysmal returns on invested capital Real estate value not reflected in
Slide 10: Executive Summary
Executive Summary ■ To address these problems and best position Bob Evans to deliver enhanced shareholder value, the Board needs a fresh, independent, highly-qualified Board of Directors that is able to provide effective management oversight and bring new perspectives and ideas to the Company ■ We h
Slide 11: Executive Summary
Executive Summary ■ If elected, we believe the Director Nominees would be ideally suited, subject to their fiduciary duties, to oversee the implementation of a comprehensive plan to increase shareholder value ■ We would recommend a plan that contemplates change in the following areas: Operational
Slide 12: Bob Evans: Numerous Problems
Refresh Bob Evans Bob Evans: Numerous Problems 12 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 13: Numerous Problems
Numerous Problems ■ The problems plaguing Bob Evans are numerous ● Chronic and Severe Stock Price Underperformance ● Repeated Reduction in Operating and Earnings Guidance ● SG&A Expense Far in Excess of Peers, due to: Bloated Corporate Infrastructure Unnecessary Expenditures Extravagant New Co
Slide 14: One Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
One Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 50% Bob Evans Proxy Peers 45% Proxy Peers +28.4% Cracker Barrel 40% Family & Casual Dining Peers 35% 30% +21.3% 25% Family & Casual 20% Dining +20.4% 15% 10% 5% +11.3% 0% Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-13 Jan-14 Source: Bloomberg (as of April 21, 2014) Note: Proxy Peer
Slide 15: Three Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Three Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 160% Bob Evans 140% Proxy Peers +102.5% Cracker Barrel 120% Family & Casual Dining Peers 100% Proxy Peers +87.5% 80% 60% Family & Casual 40% Dining +68.0% 20% 0% -20% +54.1% -40% Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Source: Bloomberg (as of April 21, 2014) Note:
Slide 16: Five Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Five Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 350% Bob Evans Proxy Peers Proxy Peers +237.5% 300% Cracker Barrel 250% Family & Casual Dining Peers 200% +228.7% 150% Family & Casual 100% Dining +155.4% 50% 0% +107.5% -50% Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Source: Bloomberg (as of April 21, 201
Slide 17: Ten Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Ten Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 300% Bob Evans Proxy Peers Proxy Peers +239.4% 250% Cracker Barrel Family & Casual Dining Peers 200% 150% +207.4% 100% Family & Casual 50% Dining +133.0% 0% -50% +79.2% -100% Apr-04 Apr-05 Apr-06 Apr-07 Apr-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Sour
Slide 18: Chronic and Severe Stock Price Underperformance
Chronic and Severe Stock Price Underperformance Bob Evans’ Total Shareholder Return Relative to: Family & Casual Proxy Peers Dining Peers 1 Year -10.0% -17.0% -9.1% 3 Year -48.4% -33.4% -13.9% 5 Year -121.2% -130.1% -47.9% 10 Year -128.2% -160.2% -53.8% Shareholders of Bob Evans have suffered years
Slide 19: Repeated Reduction in Operating and Earnings Guidance
Repeated Reduction in Operating and Earnings Guidance ■ Management has repeatedly reduced its guidance for FY 2014 9% Operating Margin $3.00 Earnings Per Share 8.0% to 8.5% $2.75 $2.60 to $2.67 $2.60 to $2.65 8% 7.5% to 8.0% $2.50 $2.20 to $2.30 $2.25 7% 6.1% to 6.6% $2.00 6% $1.60 to $1.75 $1.75 5.
Slide 20: SG&A Expense Far in Excess of Peers
SG&A Expense Far in Excess of Peers ■ The Company suffers from a cost structure that has resulted in SG&A expense far in excess of virtually all its peers ● Because Bob Evans does not pursue a franchising strategy, to most accurately asses the Company’s relative cost structure, we compare Bob Evans
Slide 21: Perennially High SG&A Expense
Perennially High SG&A Expense ■ As the following exhibit graphically illustrates, the last fiscal year was not an aberration, as Bob Evans has suffered from high SG&A expenses for a number of years versus the average of its family and casual dining peers that are not majority-franchised SG&A as a %
Slide 22: Bloated Corporate Infrastructure
Bloated Corporate Infrastructure ■ There are several reasons why the Company’s SG&A expenses are far too high ■ One reason is the Company’s bloated corporate infrastructure; Bob Evans has 512 employees at its corporate headquarters, which has resulted in overhead efficiency (revenue per corporate em
Slide 23: Unnecessary Expenditures
Unnecessary Expenditures ■ Also contributing to the Company’s inflated SG&A is the fact that Bob Evans has incurred expenses far in excess of its peers for what are, in our view, several unnecessary and extravagant pursuits ■ New Corporate Headquarters – The Company recently opened a new 40 acre, $4
Slide 24: Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters
Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters ■ We believe that the wasteful spending behavior of management is best illustrated by the recent construction of the Company’s new $48.2 million corporate headquarters campus in New Albany, Ohio ■ The construction of this elaborate facility reflects a spendthri
Slide 25: Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters (cont.)
Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters (cont.) “The new corporate headquarters campus will include a 175,197 SF facility comprised of three separate structures. The Main Building is 137,542 SF of private and open offices, conference rooms, various test kitchens, cafeteria, fitness area, locker rooms
Slide 26: Farm and Homestead Museum, Company Airplane
Farm and Homestead Museum, Company Airplane ■ The Company is required to incur the expenses associated with maintaining the 937-acre Bob Evans Farm in southeastern Ohio and not long ago invested more than $4 million in renovations to the Farm and its Homestead Museum ■ For many years Bob Evans was s
Slide 27: Disastrous Farm Fresh Refresh Remodeling Results
Disastrous “Farm Fresh Refresh” Remodeling Results ■ The Company’s much-promoted “Farm Fresh Refresh” remodeling initiative, which has required capital expenditures of $225,000 per restaurant across the entire Bob Evans chain, has been a consummate failure based on the Company’s disappointing same s
Slide 28: Abysmal Return on Invested Capital
Abysmal Return on Invested Capital ■ The Company’s 3-year Farm Fresh Refresh initiative, slated to be completed by the end of April 2014, will have cost over $120 million and has generated almost no return on this invested capital Farm Fresh Refresh Rate of Return Same Store Sales (SSS) Year 1 Year
Slide 29: Extensive Real Estate Holdings
Extensive Real Estate Holdings ■ The Company has amassed an extensive portfolio of 482 wholly-owned restaurants (both land and building), or 86% of its entire restaurant base, all of which will have been remodeled at significant cost by the end of FY 2014 100% 90% 80% 70% % Restaurants Owned 60% 50%
Slide 30: Unrecognized Real Estate Value
Unrecognized Real Estate Value ■ Our analysis shows that the Company’s stock price does not reflect the significant value associated with its owned real estate, including its wholly-owned restaurants as well as its industrial and office real estate, which in total may be worth upwards of $900+ milli
Slide 31: BEF Foods: Virtually No Synergies and Value Disconnect
BEF Foods: Virtually No Synergies and Value Disconnect ■ BEF Foods, the Company’s packaged foods division, contributes little in the way of synergies ■ Volatile sow prices, a significant cost to BEF Foods, have had a dramatic, negative impact on the Company’s earnings ■ BEF Foods operates independen
Slide 32: Starbucks quote from Steven Davis
“Starbucks started out with coffee shops and now when you go into the grocery channel, you’ll find bags of coffee, you’ll find Starbucks kiosks. I think they’ve done the best job of what we’re trying to do. I think that serves as a great model for us.” - Steven Davis, Chairman & CEO of Bob Evans Col
Slide 33: Case Study: Cracker Barrel
Case Study: Cracker Barrel (Last Fiscal Year) $1,615 million Total Revenue $2,662 million 560 Store Count 625 Non-Franchised Business Model Non-Franchised $8.92 Average Check $9.68 No Serves Alcohol No 86% % Restaurants Owned 66% Cracker Barrel is the most comparable family dining peer to Bob Evans…
Slide 34: Case Study: Cracker Barrel (cont.)
Case Study: Cracker Barrel (cont.) Yes Non-Core Segments No2 14 Average Board Tenure1 4 13.3% SG&A as a % of Revenue1 7.7% $2.6 million Revenue Per Corporate Employee1 $5.5 million 107.5% 5-Year TSR3 228.7% No Separate Chairman and CEO1 Yes … yet Bob Evans compares poorly to Cracker Barrel in severa
Slide 35: Case Study: Cracker Barrel (cont.)
Case Study: Cracker Barrel (cont.) ■ Cracker Barrel operates more than 600 stores, located in 42 Five Year Total Shareholder Return2 states, serving breakfast, lunch, and dinner in the dining room, 300% and offering a wide variety of decorative and functional items 275% within their gift shops 250%
Slide 36: Source of Problems: A Stale and Entrenched Board
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Slide 37: Gordon Gee quote on corporate boards
“Sitting on a corporate board has been like playing golf to me. It is my hobby.” – Gordon Gee, Director at Bob Evans since 2009 Vanderbilt Hustler, September 27, 2006 37 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 38: A Stale Board
A Stale Board ■ Bob Evans suffers from a stale Board of Directors, with an average Director tenure of over 14 years TSR Relative to Family & Casual Dining Peers that TSR Relative to Director Year Appointed Tenure (Years) are not majority- Cracker Barrel1 franchised1 Larry C. Corbin 1981 33 -800.1% -
Slide 39: Board Inaction: The History of Mimi's Café
Board Inaction: The History of Mimi’s Café ■ The disastrous history of Mimi’s Café, from its acquisition by Bob Evans in July of 2004 for $183 million to its sale in February of 2013 for $50 million, is a painful illustration of the value destruction resulting from this current Board’s failure to re
Slide 40: Mimi's Café: Even Less than Meets the Eye
Mimi’s Café: Even Less than Meets the Eye ■ The actual value received for Mimi’s may be even less than reported ● Of the reported $50 million received by Bob Evans for the Mimi’s chain, $30 million was in the form of a seven-year promissory note with an annual interest rate of 1.5%, which is current
Slide 41: A Highly Conflicted Board
A Highly Conflicted Board “Bob Evans’ Board is parochial in the extreme for a public company…This is in part due to the fact that a majority of the Board’s members have long- standing relationships with each other and with the Company’s Chairman and CEO, Defendant Steven A. Davis, whether through lo
Slide 42: A Highly Conflicted Board
A Highly Conflicted Board ■ The vast majority of Board members have numerous personal connections both to Steven Davis, who is Chairman and CEO, as well as amongst themselves ■ This closely-knit Board has allowed the irresponsible spending and failed initiatives of management go unchallenged, and th
Slide 43: Dizzying Array of Connections
Dizzying Array of Connections Mary Haben Gordon Bill Ingram Gee Cheryl Michael Krueger Gasser Steven Key Davis The Ohio State Univ. Former The James Foundation CEO The Columbus Academy Robert Lucas Vorys, Sater Greif, Inc. Larry State Auto Corbin Eileen Paul Columbus College A&D Mallesch Williams Kr
Slide 44: A Highly Conflicted Board (cont.)
A Highly Conflicted Board (cont.) Larry Corbin Former CEO Steven A. Davis Michael J. Gasser E. Gordon Gee Mary Kay Haben E. W. Ingram III Cheryl C. Krueger G. Robert Lucas Eileen A. Mallesch Paul S. Williams The Board of Bob Evans resembles a social club, not the board of a public company 44 Strictl
Slide 45: Board's Entrenchment Action Forced Sandell Litigation
Board’s Entrenchment Action Forced Sandell Litigation ■ In November of 2011, the Board sought to impose an improper Bylaw restriction on shareholders that would have further entrenched the Board by severely limiting the ability of shareholders to effect change by amending the Company’s Bylaws ● Spec
Slide 46: Oklahoma Firefighters vs. Bob Evans
Oklahoma Firefighters vs. Bob Evans ■ Because of the Board’s improper action, another long-time shareholder, the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System (“Oklahoma Firefighters”), filed suit in Delaware against the Company and its Directors in January of 2014 ■ The complaint filed by the O
Slide 47: Solution: A Fresh, Independent, Highly-Qualified Board to Effect Change
Refresh Bob Evans Solution: A Fresh, Independent, Highly-Qualified Board to Effect Change 47 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 48: A Fresh, Independent, Highly-Qualified Board
A Fresh, Independent, Highly-Qualified Board ■ The Company needs a fresh, truly independent, highly-qualified Board of Directors that is able to provide effective management oversight and bring new perspectives and ideas to the Company as they seek to protect and enhance value for all the Company’s
Slide 49: Doug Benham – Restaurant Operations & Finance
Doug Benham – Restaurant Operations & Finance Former President and CEO of Arby’s Restaurant Group, Doug Benham led the revitalization of the $3 billion Arby’s chain of 3,500 restaurants, increasing company-operated restaurant EBITDA by over 100% Mr. Benham was previously Chief Financial Officer
Slide 50: Charles Elson – Corporate Governance
Charles Elson – Corporate Governance Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, Charles Elson is one of the foremost authorities on corporate governance issues in the United States Professor Elson is “Of Counsel” to the law firm of Holland & K
Slide 51: David Head – Restaurant Brand Management
David Head – Restaurant Brand Management President and CEO of Primanti Brothers, Inc., David Head has a broad skill set and deep operational experience in the restaurant industry, bringing valuable perspective through his track record of refining and repositioning restaurant brands With over 35
Slide 52: Steve Lynn – Restructuring
Steve Lynn– Restructuring Founder and Partner of Reconstruction Partners, LLC, a firm that offers strategy, restructuring, refranchising, and interim management services to chain restaurant companies, Steve Lynn has over 40 years of experience in the restaurant industry Mr. Lynn spent 12 years a
Slide 53: Annelise Osborne – Finance
Annelise Osborne – Finance Credit Officer at Moody’s Investor Services, Annelise Osborne has over 15 years of finance experience that encompasses a wide range of transactions Ms. Osborne has a deep knowledge of real estate and has led sizeable teams of analysts involved in assessing transactions
Slide 54: Aron Schwartz – Strategic Planning
Aron Schwartz – Strategic Planning Founder of Constructivist Capital, LLC, Aron Schwartz has been a private equity professional for over 15 years and has been involved in the acquisition, supervision, and growth of many companies Mr. Schwartz was a Managing Director at the private equity firm Fe
Slide 55: Michael Weinstein – Marketing
Michael Weinstein – Marketing Former CEO of the Triarc Beverage Group, where he successfully orchestrated the purchase of Snapple for $300 million and its subsequent sale three years later for $1.5 billion, Mr. Weinstein is a highly-respected professional who has delivered tremendous value to shar
Slide 56: Lee Wielansky – Real Estate
Lee Wielansky– Real Estate Chairman and CEO of Midland Development Group, which focuses on the development of retail properties in the mid-west and southeast and was the largest developer of Kroger supermarket-anchored shopping centers in the United States, Lee Wielansky has over 37 years of real
Slide 57: Continuity and Transition Planning
Continuity and Transition Planning ■ Given the un-challenged, vise-like grip with which Chairman and CEO Steven Davis has run Bob Evans, along with the close personal relationships among current Directors, it is our strongly-held belief that only by dramatically changing the composition of the Board
Slide 58: Comprehensive Improvements: Operational, Financial, Strategic
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Slide 59: Comprehensive Improvements: Operational, Financial, Strategic
Comprehensive Improvements: Operational, Financial, Strategic ■ In order to increase long-term shareholder value, we believe that Bob Evans should implement a comprehensive plan that contemplates improvements to the Company’s operational, financial, and strategic policies Operational Financial Strat
Slide 60: Operational – Revenue Enhancing Opportunities
Operational – Revenue Enhancing Opportunities ■ New ideas are needed to re-focus the core Bob Evans restaurant brand in order to reverse the Company’s same store sales declines and begin to deliver increased revenue ■ We believe that Bob Evans should work to drive traffic by re-focusing its core bra
Slide 61: Operational – Cost Reduction Opportunities
Operational – Cost Reduction Opportunities ■ We believe there are at least $35 million of excess annual SG&A costs at the corporate level ■ The Company’s inordinately high corporate office headcount (512 employees as of the last 10-K) coupled with its history of wasteful spending sanctioned by the c
Slide 62: Operational – Cost Reduction Opportunities (Analysis at Various Percentages)
Operational – Cost Reduction Opportunities (Analysis at Various Percentages) ($ in millions, except per share) Peer Current Pro Forma Average* SG&A as a % of Revenue 13.25% 12.00% 11.00% 10.70% 10.00% 9.00% 8.17% 8.00% FY2016E EPS 1 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 $ 3.37 FY 2016E Net Incom
Slide 63: Financial – Capital Spending Discipline
Financial – Capital Spending Discipline ■ We believe that Bob Evans has expended far too much capital on low-return or no-return projects ■ The Company needs to promptly reassess its capital spending plans, particularly what we believe to be its imprudent Farm Fresh Refresh 2.0 plan, as well as the
Slide 64: Financial – Unlock Real Estate Value
Financial – Unlock Real Estate Value ■ Bob Evans fully owns a higher percentage of its underlying real estate (both the land and building of 86% of its restaurants, as well as other corporate properties) than its family and casual dining peers that are not majority-franchised and the Company must av
Slide 65: Strategic – Structural Repositioning of BEF Foods
Strategic – Structural Repositioning of BEF Foods ■ We find no strategic rationale for combined ownership of Bob Evans Restaurants and BEF Foods ● The business profile of a packaged foods company is very different from that of a restaurant, a fundamental principle that this current Board apparently
Slide 66: Strategic – Impartially Evaluate Outside Investment Proposals
Strategic – Impartially Evaluate Outside Investment Proposals ■ Transactions with credible outside parties should not be reflexively dismissed ● We are aware of at least one private equity firm that was rebuffed by the Company’s financial advisors after indicating their interest in exploring a trans
Slide 67: Potential Upside for Shareholders
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Slide 68: Potential Upside – EPS Power
Potential Upside – EPS Power ■ The comprehensive changes to the EPS Power Company’s operational, financial, and ($ in millions, except per share) FY2015E FY2016E strategic policies that we would Current Bob Evans Stock Price $44.21 $44.21 advocate have the potential to deliver EPS (Bloomberg) $2.66
Slide 69: Potential Upside – Intrinsic Value
Potential Upside – Intrinsic Value ■ The table to the right is predicated on Intrinsic Value the same assumptions as the prior ($ in millions, except per share) FY2015E FY2016E page EBITDA Restaurants $134.4 $141.0 BEF Foods 49.9 61.0 Total EBITDA 184.3 202.0 SG&A Savings (70% / 30% Split) Restauran
Slide 70: Assumptions
Assumptions ■ The table to the right sets forth the Assumptions various assumptions for the previous ($ in millions, except per share) pages Potential Annual SG&A Savings $35.0 SG&A savings realized in FY2015 50.0% SG&A savings realized in FY2016 100.0% Real Estate (per recent communications) Value
Slide 71: Appendix
Refresh Bob Evans Appendix 71 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 72: Comparable Restaurant and Packaged Food Companies
Comparable Restaurant and Packaged Food Companies ($ in millions) EV to EV to Market Enterprise 2014E 2015E Restaurants Value Value (EV) EBITDA EBITDA Family and Casual Dining (Non-Majority Franchised, > $500MM) BJs $842 $809 10.0x 8.3x Bloomin' Brands 2,809 4,045 8.5x 7.6x Brinker 3,400 4,171 9.6x
Slide 73: Revenue per Corporate Employee
Revenue per Corporate Employee Revenue Per Corporate Employee Average ex-BOBE Corporate/Support Office 512 195 860 644 400 492 NA 315 476 Headcount (Last Fiscal Year) Revenue (FY 2014E) $1,344 $854 $4,438 $2,914 $2,001 $2,720 $8,792 $1,114 $1,556 ($ in millions) Revenue Per Employee $2,625 $4,381 $5
Slide 74: Investor and Media Contacts
Investors: MacKenzie Partners, Inc. Dan Burch or Larry Dennedy (212) 929-5500 Press/Media: Sloane & Company Elliot Sloane or Dan Zacchei (212) 446-1860 or (212) 446-1882 74 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.