Schweizerische Nationalbank · SIX:SNBN

Schweizerische Nationalbank — Czech National Bank — Eight Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar (May 2011)

33 slides from Schweizerische Nationalbank's conference presentation, May 2011

  1. Slide 1: Monetary Policy in a Small Economy after Tsunami: A New Consensus on the Horizon?

    Monetary Policy in a Small Economy after Tsunami: A New Consensus on the Horizon? Jan Frait, Zlatuse Komarkova and Lubos Komarek Czech National Bank Eight Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar May 2011, Zürich

  2. Slide 2: Presentation Outline / Structure of background paper

    Presentation Outline / Structure of background paper  1. Introduction  2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness  3. The BIS Approach, or the Austrian Business Cycle Revisited  4. Global Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy before the Crisis  5. Does the Exchange Rate

  3. Slide 3: Special issue of the Czech Journal of Economics and Finance

    Special issue of the Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (impact factor 0.43) • ASSET PRICE BUBBLES • Petr ZEMČÍK • Kamil JANÁČEK Is There a Real Estate Bubble in Asset Price Bubbles (Introduction) the Czech Republic? • Jan Frait, Zlatuše KOMÁRKOVÁ, • Luboš KOMÁREK, Michal Luboš KOMÁREK HLAVÁČEK

  4. Slide 4: 1. Introduction

    1. Introduction  2nd half of the 80s ⇒ response of CB´s to two high inflation decades ⇒ price stability was achieved relatively quickly…. but  fall in inflation expectation and the efforts to stop currency appreciation ⇒ decline of interest rates to historically low values ⇒ „Great Moderation“ lea

  5. Slide 5: 1. Introduction

    1. Introduction Great Moderation Finacial Crisis New Concensus? Stable inflation and solid Lehman PIGS Promise economic growth Brothers „disease“ of better time? 5

  6. Slide 6: 2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets' Wilderness

    2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness  I. „benign neglect view“ - CB cannot an should not try to constrain asset price bubbles on their own; - Direct response to asset price ⇒ few if any gains and bring greater variability of output, interest rates and exchange rate; - MP is

  7. Slide 7: 2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets' Wilderness

    2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness  II. the „predominant view“ (more active MP approach to asset price swings) - CB should „lean against the wind“ cannot an should not try to constrain asset price bubbles on their own; - Inflation targeting CB is likely to succeed by adjus

  8. Slide 8: 2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets' Wilderness

    2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness  Traditional arguments against the „lean against the wind“ strategy; 1. CB cannot reliably identify bubbles in asset prices, since it does not have any information advantage relative to private market participants. 2. Timing of the CB´s r

  9. Slide 9: 2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets' Wilderness

    2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness Volatility, misalignment, bubble… PRICE OF ASSET BUBBLE BURSTING OF BUBBLE FORMATION OF MISALIGNMENT BUBBLE MARKET VOLATILITY PRICE FUNDAMENTAL VALUE TIME 9

  10. Slide 10: 3. The BIS Approach or the Austrian Business Cycle Revisited

    3. The BIS Approach or the Austrian Business Cycle Revisited  BIS approach: - Achieving both price and output stability still does not automatically guarantee financial stability - One of the primary causes of financial instability (simultaneously contributed to the stabilization of inflation) is b

  11. Slide 11: 6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus

    6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus • L↑ until the point, when the crisis breaks out ⇒ optimistic phase (temporarily good times) • L↓ (deleveraging) ⇒ pessimistic phase, although remaining high in the initial phase of the crisis • L in the stock sense adjusts to changed e

  12. Slide 12: 6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus

    6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus • The risk of financial instability is strongly discontinuous variable (risk ↑ in good times as L↑ and ↓ when crisis occurs) • Sources of risk of financial instability: (i) availability of cheap credit (ii) overly optimistic expectation

  13. Slide 13: 6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus

    6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus • In good times, when the risk of financial instability ↑ , default rates ↓ , NPL ratio ↓, banks creates fewer provisions and report low credit losses. • In the beginning of bad times the situation is reversed ⇒ CB based on stress test

  14. Slide 14: 6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus

    6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus • When the risk of financial instability is rising ⇒ MP rates should at some point rise sharply above neutral level consistent with „pure“ inflation targeting) • When the crisis breaks out, the central bank should respond with sharp rat

  15. Slide 15: 8. Conclusion

    8. Conclusion  The financial crisis significantly modified views concerning the relationship among monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability.  The financial tsunami effect was observed, i.e. decline of risk premia during tranquil years of the Great Moderation replaced by a destructive

  16. Slide 16: 8. Conclusion

    8. Conclusion  Following an assessment of what happened during the last decade the approach favoured by the economic profession has begun to shift from benign neglect to leaning against the wind strategy.  These lead to the fundamental changes to the existing monetary policy paradigm (via the way

  17. Slide 17: Czech Economy a) inflation

    Czech Economy a) inflation Clear disinflation process, from 1998 successful IT framework 21 19 17 15 56.6% 13 11 inflation rate 9 7 5 3 1 -1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 17

  18. Slide 18: Czech Economy a) inflation

    Czech Economy a) inflation Few mistakes in implementing the IT framework at beginning ….. 7 6 5 4 target band for headline inflation 3 point target for headline inflation 2 targets for net inflation 1 0 18 12/97 12/98 12/99 12/00 12/01 12/02 12/03 12/04 12/05 12/06 12/07 12/08 12/09 12/10 12/11

  19. Slide 19: Czech Economy a) inflation

    Czech Economy a) inflation Fulfilment of inflation targets were not always perfect….. 13 11 9 target 1998 6% +/- 0,5p.p. (set in Dec 97) target 2000 7 target 1999 4,5 +/- 1p.p. start of the 4,5 +/- 0,5p.p. (set in Dec 97) target band (set in Nov 98) 3-5% end of the 5 target band target band 2-4% 200

  20. Slide 20: Czech Economy a) inflation

    Czech Economy a) inflation May 2011 prediction – we are exactly at the 2% inflation target 8 7 monetary 6 inflation policy 5 horizon 4 3 2 1 monetary-policy 0 relevant inflation -1 I/06 II III IV I/07 II III IV I/08 II III IV I/09 II III IV I/10 II III IV I/11 II III IV I/12 II III IV 20

  21. Slide 21: Czech Economy b) exchange rate

    Czech Economy b) exchange rate Exchange rate development of the CZK during last 20 years 20 15 depreciation 10 band +/-7,5% 5 Feb 28.1996 - May 27.1997 the level of ER 0 against the former -5 band +/-0,5% currency basket Sep 27. 1992 - Feb 2.1996 (65% DEM, 35% USD) -10 -15 appreciation -20 -25 -30 t

  22. Slide 22: Czech Economy b) exchange rate

    Czech Economy b) exchange rate Exchange rate development of the CZK and FX intervention 40 3560 bil 1200 38 EUR 1050 36 900 34 750 CZK per 1 EUR 32 mil EUR 600 30 450 28 300 26 150 24 0 22 -150 1/98 1/99 1/00 1/01 1/02 1/03 1/04 1/05 1/06 1/07 1/08 1/09 1/10 1/11 intervention sale of forex reserves

  23. Slide 23: Czech Economy c) interest rates

    Czech Economy c) interest rates Interest rates stay for last decade very low, sometimes below ECB rates 20 1W repo rate and 18 1W PRIBOR 75%, the Lombard rate 50% 16 in May 1997 14 2W repo 12 in % 10 8 6 1W PRIBOR the Lombard rate 4 2 discount rate 0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

  24. Slide 24: Thank for your attention!

    Thank for your attention! Jan Frait Zlatuše Komárková Luboš Komárek Director, Financial Stability Head of the Systemic Risk Unit, Director, External Economic Department, jan.frait@cnb.cz zlatuse.komarkova@cnb.cz Relations Division, lubos.komarek@cnb.cz

  25. Slide 25: Practical techniques for identifying bubbles

    Practical techniques for identifying bubbles A) Trend curves and statistical filters  Purpose: An initial idea of the degree of misalignment (but without identifying main factors)  Methods: • Standard linear or non-linear fitting methods • Simple univariate filtres (Hodrick-Prescott, Band-Pass fil

  26. Slide 26: Practical techniques for identifying bubbles

    Practical techniques for identifying bubbles B) Ratios  Purpose: An initial idea of the degree of misalignment (but without identifying main factors)  Types of ratios: Price-to-Income, Price-to-Rent, Price-to- Earning  Examples: Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Hlaváček and Komárek (2009, 2010

  27. Slide 27: Practical techniques for identifying bubbles

    Practical techniques for identifying bubbles C) Empirical Models  Purpose: A detailed idea of the degree of misalignment  Methods: regressions, cointegration, panel data  Examples: Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Hlaváček and Komárek (2009, 2010), Komárek and Kubicová (2011). 27

  28. Slide 28: Practical techniques for identifying bubbles

    Practical techniques for identifying bubbles D) Structurally reach theoretical models  Purpose: A very detailed idea of the degree of misalignment  Methods: simultaneous models  Examples: Hlavacek, Komarek and Motl (work in progress). 28

  29. Slide 29: Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets

    Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets A) Trend curves and statistical filters 29

  30. Slide 30: Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets

    Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets B) Ratios Price-to-income Price-to-rent (absolute index; 2000 = 100) (absolute index; 2000 = 100) 30

  31. Slide 31: Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets

    Results of identifying bubbles for housing markets C) Empirical Models 31

  32. Slide 32: Concluding remarks

    Concluding remarks To sum up, approximate identification of bubbles is possible ex post, but:  (i) continuous asset price monitoring is a necessary condition for this;  (ii) we recommend using the entire range of methods and models available, from the simplest (trend curves and filters) to the com

  33. Slide 33: Background papers

    Background papers  Komárek et. al. (2010): Practical Approaches to the identification of Asset Market Bubbles. Financial Stability Report 2009/10, Box 5, pp 49-52. http://www.cnb.cz/en/financial_stability/fs_reports/fsr_2009-2010/index.html  Hlaváček, M. – Komárek, L. (2011): Regional Analysis of

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