Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB
Banque nationale de Belgique SA — presentatie jesper linde
104 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, Jun 21, 2010
Slide 1: Asymmetric Shocks in a Currency Union with Monetary and Fiscal Handcuffs
Asymmetric Shocks in a Currency Union with Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board June 21, 2010 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 1 / 29
Slide 2: Motivation
Motivation To mitigate the e¤ects of the …nancial crisis in the fall of 2008, many countries implemented large …scal stimulus packages Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 2 / 29
Slide 3: Motivation
Motivation To mitigate the e¤ects of the …nancial crisis in the fall of 2008, many countries implemented large …scal stimulus packages A number of in‡uential papers were supportive of these policy actions (e.g. Eggertson (2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) because monetary policy was
Slide 4: Motivation
Motivation To mitigate the e¤ects of the …nancial crisis in the fall of 2008, many countries implemented large …scal stimulus packages A number of in‡uential papers were supportive of these policy actions (e.g. Eggertson (2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) because monetary policy was
Slide 5: Motivation
Motivation To mitigate the e¤ects of the …nancial crisis in the fall of 2008, many countries implemented large …scal stimulus packages A number of in‡uential papers were supportive of these policy actions (e.g. Eggertson (2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) because monetary policy was
Slide 6: Motivation
Motivation What we do Use an open economy DSGE model similar to the one developed by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) to analyze how asymmetric shocks concentrated in a subset of member states in a currency union a¤ect the union at an aggregate level and di¤erentially across members Erceg and Lindé
Slide 7: Motivation
Motivation What we do Use an open economy DSGE model similar to the one developed by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) to analyze how asymmetric shocks concentrated in a subset of member states in a currency union a¤ect the union at an aggregate level and di¤erentially across members This question ha
Slide 8: Motivation
Motivation What we do Use an open economy DSGE model similar to the one developed by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) to analyze how asymmetric shocks concentrated in a subset of member states in a currency union a¤ect the union at an aggregate level and di¤erentially across members This question ha
Slide 9: Motivation
Motivation What we do Use an open economy DSGE model similar to the one developed by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) to analyze how asymmetric shocks concentrated in a subset of member states in a currency union a¤ect the union at an aggregate level and di¤erentially across members This question ha
Slide 10: Motivation
Motivation What we do Use an open economy DSGE model similar to the one developed by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) to analyze how asymmetric shocks concentrated in a subset of member states in a currency union a¤ect the union at an aggregate level and di¤erentially across members This question ha
Slide 11: Motivation
Motivation What we do Our contribution is to study this issue in a liquidity trap Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 4 / 29
Slide 12: Motivation
Motivation What we do Our contribution is to study this issue in a liquidity trap We de…ne a liquidity trap as a situation where nominal interest rates cannot be lowered for a protracted period due to the zero lower bound constraint Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤
Slide 13: Motivation
Motivation What we do Our contribution is to study this issue in a liquidity trap We de…ne a liquidity trap as a situation where nominal interest rates cannot be lowered for a protracted period due to the zero lower bound constraint In this environment, the impact of shocks in the periphery (and cor
Slide 14: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Interestingly, we …nd that the logic of the conventional wisdom is reversed in a liquidity trap Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 5 / 29
Slide 15: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Interestingly, we …nd that the logic of the conventional wisdom is reversed in a liquidity trap In this environment the e¤ects a negative asymmetric shock (e.g. …scal contraction) on periphery output is larger the larger the size of the periphery Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reser
Slide 16: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Interestingly, we …nd that the logic of the conventional wisdom is reversed in a liquidity trap In this environment the e¤ects a negative asymmetric shock (e.g. …scal contraction) on periphery output is larger the larger the size of the periphery This result obtains because mo
Slide 17: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Interestingly, we …nd that the logic of the conventional wisdom is reversed in a liquidity trap In this environment the e¤ects a negative asymmetric shock (e.g. …scal contraction) on periphery output is larger the larger the size of the periphery This result obtains because mo
Slide 18: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Interestingly, we …nd that the logic of the conventional wisdom is reversed in a liquidity trap In this environment the e¤ects a negative asymmetric shock (e.g. …scal contraction) on periphery output is larger the larger the size of the periphery This result obtains because mo
Slide 19: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Our algorithm for computing the equilibrium makes the duration of the liquidity trap endogenous Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 6 / 29
Slide 20: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Our algorithm for computing the equilibrium makes the duration of the liquidity trap endogenous In this framework, the marginal impact on currency union GDP of asymmetric shocks in the periphery grows with the size of the asymmetric shock Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board
Slide 21: Motivation
Motivation What we …nd Our algorithm for computing the equilibrium makes the duration of the liquidity trap endogenous In this framework, the marginal impact on currency union GDP of asymmetric shocks in the periphery grows with the size of the asymmetric shock For example, a spending cut of 1% in a
Slide 22: Discussion outline
Discussion outline Model Parameterization of model E¤ects of …scal shocks (E¤ects of …nancial shocks) Sensitivity analysis Concluding remarks Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 7 / 29
Slide 23: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 8 / 29
Slide 24: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2
Slide 25: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Mone
Slide 26: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Erceg and L
Slide 27: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Investment
Slide 28: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Investment
Slide 29: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Investment
Slide 30: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Investment
Slide 31: Model
Model Key structure of model DSGE model with two countries, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts Habit persistence in consumption Investment
Slide 32: Model
Model Optimizing households Maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (separability) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 9 / 29
Slide 33: Model
Model Optimizing households Maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (separability) Accumulate capital by purchasing a composite investment good subject to investment adjustment costs
Slide 34: Model
Model Optimizing households Maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (separability) Accumulate capital by purchasing a composite investment good subject to investment adjustment costs
Slide 35: Model
Model Optimizing households Maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (separability) Accumulate capital by purchasing a composite investment good subject to investment adjustment costs
Slide 36: Model
Model Optimizing households Maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (separability) Accumulate capital by purchasing a composite investment good subject to investment adjustment costs
Slide 37: Model
Model Hand-to-mouths households We assume that a fraction ς of households are purely “Keynesian” and do not save so that: PC ,t CtHM (h) = (1 τ N ,t ) Wt (h) Nt (h) + TRt (h) Tt Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 10 / 29
Slide 38: Model
Model Hand-to-mouths households We assume that a fraction ς of households are purely “Keynesian” and do not save so that: PC ,t CtHM (h) = (1 τ N ,t ) Wt (h) Nt (h) + TRt (h) Tt The Hand-to-mouth (HM) households set their wage at the average wage of the optimizing households, and since they face sam
Slide 39: Model
Model Firm behavior There are three types of producers in each country: intermediate-goods producers, producers of the aggregate domestic good, and distributors Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 11 / 29
Slide 40: Model
Model Firm behavior There are three types of producers in each country: intermediate-goods producers, producers of the aggregate domestic good, and distributors Producers of the intermediate-goods are monopolistically competitive and set prices in Calvo-style contracts, dynamic indexation for non-op
Slide 41: Model
Model Firm behavior There are three types of producers in each country: intermediate-goods producers, producers of the aggregate domestic good, and distributors Producers of the intermediate-goods are monopolistically competitive and set prices in Calvo-style contracts, dynamic indexation for non-op
Slide 42: Model
Model Firm behavior There are three types of producers in each country: intermediate-goods producers, producers of the aggregate domestic good, and distributors Producers of the intermediate-goods are monopolistically competitive and set prices in Calvo-style contracts, dynamic indexation for non-op
Slide 43: Model
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 12 / 29
Slide 44: Model
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Government spending does not a¤ect OH utility or production but requires real resources Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 12 / 29
Slide 45: Model
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Government spending does not a¤ect OH utility or production but requires real resources Finances its expenditures with distortionary labor income taxes, lump-sum taxes, seigniorage and debt issue Erce
Slide 46: Model
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Government spending does not a¤ect OH utility or production but requires real resources Finances its expenditures with distortionary labor income taxes, lump-sum taxes, seigniorage and debt issue Labo
Slide 47: Model: Government and monetary policy rule
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Government spending does not a¤ect OH utility or production but requires real resources Finances its expenditures with distortionary labor income taxes, lump-sum taxes, seigniorage and debt issue Labo
Slide 48: Model: Government and monetary policy rule
Model Government Government purchase part of the …nal consumption good produced by the Distributors Government spending does not a¤ect OH utility or production but requires real resources Finances its expenditures with distortionary labor income taxes, lump-sum taxes, seigniorage and debt issue Labo
Slide 49: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 13 / 29
Slide 50: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Import shares determined by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for Greece and PIGIS. Periphery import share of output 14%, while core import share 0.3% and 7% for small and large peri
Slide 51: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Import shares determined by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for Greece and PIGIS. Periphery import share of output 14%, while core import share 0.3% and 7% for small and large peri
Slide 52: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Import shares determined by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for Greece and PIGIS. Periphery import share of output 14%, while core import share 0.3% and 7% for small and large peri
Slide 53: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Import shares determined by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for Greece and PIGIS. Periphery import share of output 14%, while core import share 0.3% and 7% for small and large peri
Slide 54: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Small and Large periphery, ζ = 0.02 and ζ = 1/2 (implies large periphery 1/3 or curr union) Import shares determined by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for Greece and PIGIS. Periphery import share of output 14%, while core import share 0.3% and 7% for small and large peri
Slide 55: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Important aspect of calibration It is important for our analysis that the model embodies a plausible monetary transmission mechanism, and has spending multipliers that squares reasonably well with conventional wisdom Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fisc
Slide 56: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Important aspect of calibration It is important for our analysis that the model embodies a plausible monetary transmission mechanism, and has spending multipliers that squares reasonably well with conventional wisdom These considerations are met for our calibration of the m
Slide 57: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Important aspect of calibration It is important for our analysis that the model embodies a plausible monetary transmission mechanism, and has spending multipliers that squares reasonably well with conventional wisdom These considerations are met for our calibration of the m
Slide 58: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model Important aspect of calibration It is important for our analysis that the model embodies a plausible monetary transmission mechanism, and has spending multipliers that squares reasonably well with conventional wisdom These considerations are met for our calibration of the m
Slide 59: Baseline Scenario
Baseline Scenario In models where the zero lower bound bind, the baseline scenario for the nominal interest rate is important Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 15 / 29
Slide 60: Baseline Scenario
Baseline Scenario In models where the zero lower bound bind, the baseline scenario for the nominal interest rate is important In our baseline scenario, we assume that both the periphery and the core is hit by a common negative consumption demand shock in period 0 which induces a symmetric persistent
Slide 61: Baseline Scenario
Baseline Scenario In models where the zero lower bound bind, the baseline scenario for the nominal interest rate is important In our baseline scenario, we assume that both the periphery and the core is hit by a common negative consumption demand shock in period 0 which induces a symmetric persistent
Slide 62: Baseline Scenario
Baseline Scenario In models where the zero lower bound bind, the baseline scenario for the nominal interest rate is important In our baseline scenario, we assume that both the periphery and the core is hit by a common negative consumption demand shock in period 0 which induces a symmetric persistent
Slide 63: Baseline Scenario
Baseline Scenario In models where the zero lower bound bind, the baseline scenario for the nominal interest rate is important In our baseline scenario, we assume that both the periphery and the core is hit by a common negative consumption demand shock in period 0 which induces a symmetric persistent
Slide 64: Baseline Scenario in model
Baseline Scenario in model Solution when interest rates are unconstrained and subject to ZLB F ig u re 1: Baselin e Scen ario W h en Mo n etary Po licy is Un co n strain ed an d Su b ject to th e Z ero Lo w er Bo u n d Periphe ry N omina l Int eres t R a t e ( A PR ) C ore N omina l Int e re s t R a
Slide 65: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Small periphery In Figure 2, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the SMALL periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 17 / 29
Slide 66: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Small periphery In Figure 2, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the SMALL periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) For comparison purposes, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency u
Slide 67: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Small periphery In Figure 2, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the SMALL periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) For comparison purposes, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency u
Slide 68: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Small periphery In Figure 2, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the SMALL periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) For comparison purposes, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency u
Slide 69: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Government spending cut in small periphery in alternative situations F ig u re 2: Resp o n ses to a F ro n t-L o ad ed Decrease in G o vern men t Sp en d in g in Small Perip h ery u n d er F lexib le Exch an g e Rate an d in a Cu rren cy Un io n Periphe ry N omina l Int eres t
Slide 70: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Large periphery In Figure 3, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the LARGE periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 19 / 29
Slide 71: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Large periphery In Figure 3, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the LARGE periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) As before, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency union case when
Slide 72: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Large periphery In Figure 3, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the LARGE periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) As before, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency union case when
Slide 73: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Large periphery In Figure 3, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the LARGE periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) As before, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency union case when
Slide 74: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Large periphery In Figure 3, we plot the e¤ects of a close to permanent (AR(1) root 0.99) cut in …scal spending in the LARGE periphery the …rst period the ZLB bind (i.e. period 2) As before, we also compare results to the ‡exible exchange rate case and currency union case when
Slide 75: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Government spending cut in large periphery in alternative situations F ig u re 3: Resp o n ses to a F ro n t-L o ad ed Decrease in G o vern men t Sp en d in g in L arg e Peri ph ery u n d er F lexib le Exch an g e Rate an d in a Cu rren cy Un io n Periphe ry N omina l Int eres
Slide 76: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Size of spending cut important in large periphery In our solution algorithm, the duration of the liquidity trap is endogenous. This means the adverse e¤ects of the spending cut is increasing in the size of the cut Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Han
Slide 77: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Size of spending cut important in large periphery In our solution algorithm, the duration of the liquidity trap is endogenous. This means the adverse e¤ects of the spending cut is increasing in the size of the cut In Figure 4, we illustrate this for three di¤erent spending cut
Slide 78: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Size of spending cut important in large periphery In our solution algorithm, the duration of the liquidity trap is endogenous. This means the adverse e¤ects of the spending cut is increasing in the size of the cut In Figure 4, we illustrate this for three di¤erent spending cut
Slide 79: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Size of spending cut important in large periphery In our solution algorithm, the duration of the liquidity trap is endogenous. This means the adverse e¤ects of the spending cut is increasing in the size of the cut In Figure 4, we illustrate this for three di¤erent spending cut
Slide 80: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Size of spending cut important in large periphery In our solution algorithm, the duration of the liquidity trap is endogenous. This means the adverse e¤ects of the spending cut is increasing in the size of the cut In Figure 4, we illustrate this for three di¤erent spending cut
Slide 81: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Di¤erent sized government spending cuts in large periphery F ig u re 4: Resp o n ses to G o vern men t Sp en d in g Cu ts o f Differen t Mag n i- tu d es fo r L arg e Perip h ery Cu rren cy Un io n Memb er in a L iq u id ity T rap 0 .4 Periphe ry N omina l Int eres t R a t e (
Slide 82: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 23 / 29
Slide 83: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 84: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 85: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 86: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 87: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 88: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core We now consider the e¤ects of a coordinated spending cut in large periphery and core The idea is that policymakers in periphery and core wants to reduce de…cit and debt levels against the background of the severe recession s
Slide 89: Effects of fiscal shocks
E¤ects of …scal shocks Coordinated and non-coordinated government spending cuts F ig u re 5: Resp o n ses to G o vern men t Sp en d in g Cu t in L arg e Perip h ery Cu rren cy Un io n Memb er W ith an d W ith o u t Co re Sp en d i n g Ad ju stmen t 0 .4 Periphe ry N omina l Int eres t R a t e ( A PR
Slide 90: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 25 / 29
Slide 91: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Therefore, instead do sensitivity analysis w.r.t. shown results above Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤
Slide 92: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Therefore, instead do sensitivity analysis w.r.t. shown results above First, take out the HM consumers of the model, i.e. we set ς = 0 Er
Slide 93: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Therefore, instead do sensitivity analysis w.r.t. shown results above First, take out the HM consumers of the model, i.e. we set ς = 0 Co
Slide 94: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Therefore, instead do sensitivity analysis w.r.t. shown results above First, take out the HM consumers of the model, i.e. we set ς = 0 Co
Slide 95: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis No HM households in the model Results above also holds for …nancial spread shocks that a¤ects the borrowing costs of …rms and the government. Therefore, instead do sensitivity analysis w.r.t. shown results above First, take out the HM consumers of the model, i.e. we set ς = 0 Co
Slide 96: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Non-coordinated and coordinated spending cuts with no HM households in model Figure X : Responses to Gov ernment S pending Cut in Large P eriphery Curr Union Member W ith and W ithout Core S pending Adj ustment: No HM 0 .2 Perip h ery No min al In terest Rate (APR) 0 .2 Co re No
Slide 97: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Gradual spending decline pro…le helpful How should then a spending cut be designed to prevent rise in government debt and mitigating the e¤ects on output in a liquidity trap? Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Monetary and Fiscal Handcu¤s June 21, 2010 27 / 29
Slide 98: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Gradual spending decline pro…le helpful How should then a spending cut be designed to prevent rise in government debt and mitigating the e¤ects on output in a liquidity trap? As the potential real interest rate is related to the growth rate of government consumption, spending cu
Slide 99: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Gradual spending decline pro…le helpful How should then a spending cut be designed to prevent rise in government debt and mitigating the e¤ects on output in a liquidity trap? As the potential real interest rate is related to the growth rate of government consumption, spending cu
Slide 100: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Gradual spending decline pro…le helpful How should then a spending cut be designed to prevent rise in government debt and mitigating the e¤ects on output in a liquidity trap? As the potential real interest rate is related to the growth rate of government consumption, spending cu
Slide 101: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis E¤ects of a coordinated gradual spending decline F ig u re X: Resp o n ses to G o vern men t Sp en d in g Cu ts in L arg e Perip h ery Cu rren cy Un io n Memb er Un d er Perfect an d Imp erfect Cred ib ility in a L iq u id ity T rap 0 .4 Periphe ry N omina l Int eres t R a t e (
Slide 102: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Overall, our results indicate that the usual optimal currency argument suggesting that the e¤ects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across members of a currency union is not valid in an environment with monetary and …scal constraints Erceg and Lindé (Feder
Slide 103: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Overall, our results indicate that the usual optimal currency argument suggesting that the e¤ects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across members of a currency union is not valid in an environment with monetary and …scal constraints From a European policy
Slide 104: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Overall, our results indicate that the usual optimal currency argument suggesting that the e¤ects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across members of a currency union is not valid in an environment with monetary and …scal constraints From a European policy
Banque Nationale De Belgique — presentatie jesper linde on 6ix