SilverBow Resources — Proxy Contest (April 2024)
103 slides from SilverBow Resources's proxy contest presentation, Apr 29, 2024
Slide 1: SilverBow Resources: A Board in Need of Change
SilverBow Resources: A Board in Need of Change
Slide 2: Agenda
2 I. Executive Summary II. The Board’s Status Quo Approach III. SilverBow’s Paths to Maximize Long - Term Value for All Shareholders IV. Worst - in - Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy V. The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board’s Stale, Incumbent Nominees VI. Our Independent Nominees Appendice
Slide 3: Executive Summary
y Kimmeridge Executive Summary
Slide 4: Kimmeridge's track record of engagement at E&P companies
4 Company Mboe /d at Investment Kimmeridge Role Company Action Taken Oasis 75 Engaged Merged with Whiting to form Chord Enerplus 100 Engaged Merged with Chord Chesapeake 572 Engaged Merged with Southwestern Southwestern 767 Engaged Merged with Chesapeake California Resources 85 Engaged Announced str
Slide 5: SBOW's claims versus the facts
5 SBOW’s Claims 1 The Facts “Kimmeridge launched a proxy fight to facilitate a path to change control of the Company without paying a premium to SilverBow shareholders” • Kimmeridge has not bought an SBOW share in >650 days and remains below the poison pill threshold • Kimmeridge has engaged with SB
Slide 6: Executive summary of the case for change
6 • The U.S. E&P industry is at a critical juncture. The industry is consolidating in a race for relevance . Subscale companies trade at a discount and are lagging consolidating peers. Participating in the consolidation would be a significant prize for SilverBow shareholders. • SBOW’s leadership has
Slide 7: The U.S. E&P industry stands at an inflection point
7 / $60Bn, Oct - 23 / $5Bn, Jan - 24 / $12Bn, Jan - 24 As E&P companies fight for scale and relevance with investors, 2023 represented an inflection point in M&A activity. The industry trend is now firmly established through 1Q2024, with companies in a race to gather increasingly scarce high - quali
Slide 8: E&Ps are in a race for relevance as scale drives multiples
8 0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x 5.0x 6.0x 7.0x 8.0x 9.0x 10.0x 300 600 1,200 2,400 4,800 9,600 EV/'24E EBITDA (x) 2024E Production (MMcfe/d) Among the companies in the XOP, scale has a high correlation with valuation multiple. SBOW is an outlier with the lowest EV / EBITDA of its peers , in part due to t
Slide 9: SilverBow in danger of being left behind
9 Kimmeridge Active Involvement Kimmeridge’s Annualized TSR 2 Track Record Proxy Performance Peer Status 1 • Filed for Chapter 11 • Acquired • Active • Filed for Chapter 11 / Re - emerged SilverBow in Danger of Being Left Behind Source: Public disclosure, FactSet. 1 Since SilverBow bankruptcy reemer
Slide 10: The Eagle Ford is primed for consolidation
10 The Eagle Ford basin, where SBOW operates, is the most disaggregated major basin in the U.S. Consolidation in the basin is inevitable and SBOW could lead and create significant value for all shareholders if it changed its status quo approach . HH Index Across U.S. Oil and Gas Basins 1 593 711 721
Slide 11: SBOW's M&A prioritizes empire building over value creation
11 16% 25% (18%) (14%) (20%) (3%) (10%) 60 - day Share Price Performance vs. XOP SBOW’s M&A strategy has grown the Company, but the market has not reacted positively. This strategy has saddled SBOW with its subscale status and high leverage, foreclosing its ability to scale as a buyer . $5.4 $4.9 $4
Slide 12: Claims of successful M&A ring hollow
12 SilverBow’s M&A framework has neither propelled the Company to relevance nor generated meaningful value for shareholders. On a debt - adjusted basis, the Company’s per - share production and proved reserves metrics have stayed relatively flat since 2017 (the year current CEO was hired). Proved Re
Slide 13: SBOW has generated negative TSR and underperformed the XOP
13 (100%) (80%) (60%) (40%) (20%) - 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Feb-17 Aug-17 Feb-18 Aug-18 Feb-19 Aug-19 Feb-20 Aug-20 Feb-21 Aug-21 Feb-22 Aug-22 Feb-23 Aug-23 SBOW XOP Total Shareholder Return (%) Through the cycle, SBOW has underperformed the XOP and provided negative 4% total shareholder return. A hol
Slide 14: The Board overpays management regardless of performance
14 131% 104% 100% 128% 197% 140% 157% (12%) (20%) (58%) (46%) 310% 30% 3% (4%) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Management Payout as % of Target SBOW TSR Average: 137% Since Mr. Woolverton was hired, he has received above target pay and delivered negative TSR 1 Regardless of the Company’s ann
Slide 15: SBOW has multiple paths to maximizing value
15 At the Board’s invitation, Kimmeridge presented the 8 separate compelling combination options shown below to drive value, one of which was a combination with Kimmeridge Texas Gas (“KTG”). Following the presentation, the Board requested that Kimmeridge submit a formal proposal to combine SBOW with
Slide 16: The KTG combination was a financed premium proposal
16 The KTG Combination was a financed, compelling, accretive and credit - enhancing premium proposal , offering all shareholders a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company , positioned to lead the next phase of consolidation in the Eagle Ford. Market Response (Price Performance) KTG Com
Slide 17: SBOW feigns engagement to maintain the status quo
17 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement , either through requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or flat - out rejecting above - market premiums. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo Note: SBOW 2022 counter premium represents value over 30 - day VWAP; othe
Slide 18: Management and Board received $65MM while selling shares
18 Management and the Board h ave received $65MM over the last 6 years, while consistently selling shares. Shareholders have received (4%) TSR and $0 cash distributed • Boar d directors are active net s ellers of SBOW equity since 2017, and CEO Woolverton has not purchased a single share since 2018
Slide 19: SilverBow's fortress of bad governance
19 See slides 46 - 56 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures . • No Board refreshment occurred in 7 years until Kimmeridge’s involvement • Long - tenured director did not step down until after we proposed h
Slide 20: Incumbent nominees' questionable track record
20 We have serious questions regarding the Company’s nominees’ lack of independence, a strategy - aligned skillset, respect for corporate governance and shareholder accountability. We believe they will perpetuate the same, tired status quo. Incumbent Nominees’ Questionable Track Record Source: Bloom
Slide 21: Our nominees have the necessary skillsets
21 Our nominees are E&P industry leaders who will undertake a fresh, deeply thoughtful, highly - informed and independent assessment of SBOW’s strategy and governance. Our Nominees Have the Skillsets Necessary to Ensure a Sustainable Future for SBOW Katherine Minyard Ms. Minyard has spent her whole
Slide 22: Kimmeridge's expertise in driving positive change
22 Kimmeridge’s Expertise in Driving Positive Change Kimmeridge is a first - mover in diagnosing and capitalizing on the industry’s ailments – at scale. Over the past decade, our investments, engagement and thought leadership have delivered differentiated returns for our investors, attracted diverse
Slide 23: The Board's Status Quo Approach
The Board’s Status Quo Approach How SBOW’s Subscale Market Position Drives Its Underperformance and Dooms It to Long - Term Irrelevance
Slide 24: What upstream investors want
24 • The U.S. Upstream Industry is rapidly consolidating in a race for relevance • As the capital pool available for upstream oil and gas has declined, the competition for capital has increased with investment increasingly concentrated in a few names • Investors have increasingly focused on companie
Slide 25: Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity
25 Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company that is positioned to drive growth and lead the next phase in the Eagle Ford as the basin’s preeminent pure - play operator. SilverBow can build a peer - group - leading South Texas Champion that: 1) Drives the cons
Slide 26: The Eagle Ford is primed for consolidation
26 The Eagle Ford basin, where SBOW operates, is the most disaggregated major basin in the U.S. Consolidation in the basin is inevitable and SBOW could be positioned to lead and create significant value for all shareholders if it changed its status quo approach. If SBOW does not act, a competitor wi
Slide 27: E&Ps are in a race for relevance as scale drives multiples
27 0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x 5.0x 6.0x 7.0x 8.0x 9.0x 10.0x 300 600 1,200 2,400 4,800 9,600 EV/'24E EBITDA (x) 2024E Production (MMcfe/d) Among the companies in the XOP, scale has a high correlation with valuation multiple. SBOW is an outlier with the lowest EV / EBITDA of its peers , in part due to
Slide 28: SilverBow has underperformed peers since 2021
28 SilverBow’s EV / NTM EBITDA multiple discount has widened since January 2021 from 1.5x to 2.0x in February 2024. The subscale nature of the Company makes it difficult to execute M&A effectively , but M&A is required to scale and narrow the widening valuation gap. 1.0x 1.5x 2.0x 2.5x 3.0x 3.5x 4.0
Slide 29: SBOW's communication about shareholder returns
29 SBOW publicly touts its performance since January 2021, conveniently leaving out that the TSR prior to that date was negative 82%. In other words, the stock lost $24 /share in value before regaining $23/share . (200%) (150%) (100%) (50%) - 50% 100% 150% 200% Feb-17 Aug-17 Feb-18 Aug-18 Feb-19 Aug
Slide 30: A track record of destroying value
30 (5%) (4%) 18% 18% (5%) (29%) (9%) (29%) (33%) 10% 4% 3% 8% (5%) (8%) Sep-2016: Marc Rowland Hired as Board Chairman Feb-2017: Sean Woolverton Hired as CEO Aug-2021: SBOW Acquires San Isidro Aug-2021: SBOW Acquires Assets from Post Oak Oct-2021: SBOW Acquires Teal Apr-2022: SBOW Acquires Sandpoint
Slide 31: Claims of successful M&A ring hollow
31 SilverBow’s M&A framework has neither propelled the Company to relevance nor generated meaningful value for shareholders. On a debt - adjusted basis, the Company’s per - share production and proved reserves metrics have stayed relatively flat since 2017 (the year current CEO was hired). Proved Re
Slide 32: Without scale, continued stock issuance will destroy more value
32 5LOH\ ([SORUDWLRQ 3HUPLDQ 6LOYHU%RZ 5HVRXUFHV 9LWDO(QHUJ\ 7DORV(QHUJ\ &UHVFHQW (QHUJ\ 6XE %Q0NW &DS ! %Q0NW &DS SilverBow’s recent equity offering resulted in a loss of shareholder value ; the Board’s M&A strategy has failed to achieve the necessary scale to effectively raise equity capital…but t
Slide 33: SilverBow seems intent on destroying shareholder value
33 The Board’s actions show it is willing to destroy value and dilute shareholders to entrench themselves Despite its disadvantaged size and knowing Kimmeridge was willing to purchase shares at market, SBOW issued equity on September 12, 2023 at a massive discount, destroying shareholder value. …But
Slide 34: Summary: consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity
34 Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity to become a more resilient Company as the preeminent pure - play Eagle Ford shale operator, where SBOW operates • The Eagle Ford basin is the most disaggregated in the U.S. If SBOW does not act, a competitor will Meanwhile, recent M&A has neither pro
Slide 35: SilverBow's Paths to Maximize Long-Term Value
SilverBow’s Paths to Maximize Long - Term Value for All Shareholders And How the Board has Blocked Changes to the Status Quo at Every Turn
Slide 36: SBOW has multiple paths to maximizing value
36 At the Board’s invitation, Kimmeridge presented the 8 separate compelling combination options shown below to drive value, one of which was a combination with KTG. Following the presentation, the Board requested that Kimmeridge submit a formal proposal to combine SBOW with KTG, with an associated
Slide 37: The KTG combination was a financed premium proposal
37 The KTG Combination was a financed, compelling, accretive and credit - enhancing premium proposal , offering all shareholders a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company , positioned to lead the next phase of consolidation in the Eagle Ford. Market Response (Price Performance) KTG Com
Slide 38: SBOW feigns engagement to maintain the status quo
38 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement , either through requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or flat - out rejecting above - market premiums. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo Note: SBOW 2022 counter premium represents value over 30 - day VWAP; othe
Slide 39: Kimmeridge far surpassed upstream M&A premiums
39 Acquirer Target Date 2/28/23 5/22/23 7/13/23 8/21/23 10/11/23 10/23/23 1/4/24 1/11/24 2/21/24 Kimmeridge Far Surpassed Upstream M&A Premiums Source: FactSet and respective company filings. Note: Transactions include U.S. domiciled corporate E&P transactions with an enterprise value over $500mm si
Slide 40: SBOW feigns engagement: event timeline
40 The Board has consistently hidden behind its fortress of poor corporate governance , including its poison pill and classified board structure , to enable its stonewalling of compelling offers to maximize value on behalf of all shareholders. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo ID Eve
Slide 41: Event timeline (continued)
41 ID Event Description Mr. Rowland informs Mr. Dell of an upcoming block sale and asks if Kimmeridge would be interested in purchasing the block. Mr . D ell reminds him that this would not be possible, as the poison pill was still in place. Mr. Dell meets with CEO Woolverton to discuss strategic pa
Slide 42: SBOW refused to engage in a good faith process
42 A comparison of SBOW’s actions with market norms makes clear they never made a good faith attempt to engage on the March 13 proposal – a proposal they, themselves, requested. SBOW Refused to Engage in a Good Faith Process Milestone Standard Practice Reply SilverBow Reply February 26, 2024 SilverB
Slide 43: The market has spoken
43 SBOW and XOP Share Price Performance Since Most Recent Engagements in 2024 1 The Market Has Spoken: Shareholders Hoped for Meaningful Engagement, and Were Let Down When the Board Failed Them Source: FactSet, public disclosure, and market data as of 4/17/2024. 1 Market reaction reflects 2 - day pr
Slide 44: The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement
44 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement, either requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or rejecting above - market premiums • Kimmeridge has attempted to engage in good faith, with an offer that far surpassed average M&A premiums Most recently, the Company refused to
Slide 45: Worst-in-Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy
Worst - in - Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy The Board’s Last - Minute, Window - Dressing, Attempts Cannot Hide its Retrenchment
Slide 46: Management and the Board received $65MM over six years
46 Management and the Board h ave received $65MM over the last 6 years, while consistently selling shares. Shareholders have received (4%) TSR and $0 cash distributed • Boar d directors are active net s ellers of SBOW equity since 2017, and CEO Woolverton has not purchased a single share since 2018
Slide 47: SBOW's worst-in-class governance
47 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures . • No Board refreshment occurred in 7 years until Kimmeridge’s involvement • Long - tenured director did not step down until after we proposed his removal by share
Slide 48: But what about the poison pill?
48 But…What About the Poison Pill? The Board’s silence on its retention of a two - years - and - counting poison pill is deafening. A Board that was at least trying to pretend to care about shareholder accountability would have put the poison pill to a shareholder ratification vote at the 2024 AGM.
Slide 49: Mid-negotiation board stacking
49 The facts clearly show one of the most blatantly obvious examples of a defensive Board refreshment in recent corporate histor y: The “Mid - Negotiation Board Stacking” Not a single new director was brought on to the Board in the past 7 years up until January 9, 2023 In the midst of negotiations w
Slide 50: The Board overpays management regardless of performance
50 131% 104% 100% 128% 197% 140% 157% (12%) (20%) (58%) (46%) 310% 30% 3% (4%) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Management Payout as % of Target SBOW TSR Average: 137% Since Mr. Woolverton was hired, he has received above target pay and delivered negative TSR 1 Regardless of the Company’s ann
Slide 51: Opaque and malleable executive compensation metrics
51 Vague “Strategic Goals” Metric: Assigned a 25% weighting (the most across SBOW’s STI categories) with minimal insight into determination other than reliance on proved reserves growth and acquisitions – creating perverse incentives to manipulate reserves forecasts Opaque D&C ROR Metric: 20% tied t
Slide 52: Opaque and shifting metrics enable overpayment
52 Focusing on a single metric, the STI’s ‘Strategic Goals’, showcases how the Board has failed to select metrics that properly incentivize management. • Per SBOW’s proxy, 2023 Strategic Goals “also included balance sheet optimization for the Company to enhance liquidity ” A similar phrase was used
Slide 53: The Board rewards management for bad deals
53 The Board Consistently Rewards Management for Bad Deals …Combined With High Pay for “Strategic Goals” Value - Destructive M&A Deals… 180% 200% 200% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 2021 2022 2023 “Strategic Goals” Payout vs. Target Target Source: FactSet and respective company filings. Note: XOP returns exc
Slide 54: Incumbent Board and management are net sellers of SBOW stock
54 (100%) (80%) (60%) (40%) (20%) 0% 20% 40% 60% Jan-17 Mar-17 May-17 Jul-17 Sep-17 Nov-17 Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20 Mar-20 May-20 Jul-20 Sep-20 Nov-20 Jan-21 Mar-21 May-21 Jul-21 Sep-21 Nov-21 Jan-22 Mar-22 May-22 Jul-22 Sep-22 Nov-22
Slide 55: Joint CFO/GC role is unique among public companies
55 Joint CFO/GC Role Is “Unique” Among Public Companies Source: Public filings. 2,271 Companies on the NYSE have a separate CFO and G eneral C ounsel SBOW Combined CFO / GC Note: Plotted size is to scale by area. Among the 2,272 listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange, SilverBow is the only
Slide 56: Governance and pay summary
56 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures, including: Classified Board with 3 - year terms Unilateral adoption of a poison pill without a vote or end in sight Joint GC / CFO role, which we believe exposes t
Slide 57: The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board's Incumbent Nominees
The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board’s Stale, Incumbent Nominees
Slide 58: The Company's nominees raise serious questions
58 The Company’s three incumbent nominees fail to have the independence , capital allocation and transactional expertise necessary to fully and fairly assess all paths forward for SBOW. The Company’s Nominees Raise Serious Questions Regarding Independence and Will Perpetuate the Same, Tired, Status
Slide 59: SBOW's critiques apply to their own nominees
59 SBOW’s Critiques Apply to Their Own Nominees Mr. Ellisor Mr. Wampler Ms. McAllister “Mixed track record, overseeing shareholder value destruction during director and executive tenures” N/A – has not served more than a 12 - month tenure outside of SilverBow Wampler TSR at other tenures: EGC: (70%)
Slide 60: Mr. Ellisor's record
60 SBOW shareholders deserve better than Mr. Ellisor’s long - standing commitment to insulating the Board from accountability while over - paying management for its failure to chart a course for the long - term success of SBOW. Mr. Ellisor Is Responsible for Executive Compensation That Drives Overpa
Slide 61: Mr. Ellisor's record (continued)
61 SBOW shareholders deserve better than Mr. Ellisor’s long - standing commitment to insulating the Board from accountability while over - paying management for its failure to chart a course for the long - term success of SBOW. Mr. Ellisor Is Responsible for Executive Compensation That Drives Overpa
Slide 62: Mr. Wampler's record
62 • Past - His - Expiration Date Noteholder Appointee: Appointed to the Board via an expired 2016 Nomination Agreement with senior noteholders • Lacks Necessary Skillset to Save SBOW from Irrelevance: No history of successfully transitioning a subscale public company into a market leader in the E&P
Slide 63: Mr. Wampler's record (continued)
63 • Responsible For Overseeing SBOW’s Worst - In - Class Governance: Allowed and perpetuated SBOW’s fortress governance since the Company’s emergence from bankruptcy, including a classified board, unilaterally adopted and extended poison pill and troubling lack of shareholder rights to ensure Board
Slide 64: Ms. McAllister's record
64 SBOW shareholders need board members who will introduce a robust assessment of the Company’s governance and strategy – not “new” directors like Ms. McAllister who rubber - stamp the status quo . • Significant Concerns Regarding her 2 Years as a Public Company CEO Led Transocean Partners as CEO in
Slide 65: Ms. McAllister's record (continued)
65 • Oversees Board’s Defensive Board “Refreshment” in Face of Proxy Contest: As a member of the Nominating and Strategy Committee, she has approved the Board’s highly reactionary refreshment efforts to minimize Board accountability at the 2024 Annual Meeting, including failing to welcome ethnic div
Slide 66: All of our nominees are needed
66 We believe all 3 of our nominees are needed to end the Board’s self - serving cycle of utilizing entrenched corporate governance to avoid shareholder accountability for its destructive status quo approach. • Messrs. Ellisor , Wampler and Ms. McAllister have overseen significant value destruction
Slide 67: Our Independent Nominees
Our Independent Nominees Deeply Respected Industry Leaders Who Will Fully and Fairly Assess All Paths to Value Creation on Behalf of All Shareholders
Slide 68: What we hope the Board will achieve with our nominees
68 With our three nominees on the Board, we hope the Board will achieve the following: x Undertake a clear - eyed assessment of the sustainability of the Company’s current approach to its long - term viability x Introduce a sense of urgency to secure all advantages possible for SBOW shareholders at
Slide 69: Our nominees have the skillsets necessary
69 Our nominees are E&P industry leaders who will undertake a fresh, deeply thoughtful, highly - informed and independent assessment of SBOW’s strategy and governance. Our Nominees Have the Skillsets Necessary to Ensure a Sustainable Future for SBOW Katherine Minyard Ms. Minyard has spent her whole
Slide 70: Our nominees will fully and fairly assess all paths
70 We know our nominees will fully and fairly assess all paths to value creation on behalf of all SBOW shareholders because we have seen them in action. They will earn SBOW shareholders’ trust, just as they earned our trust. • Given Kimmeridge's established and respected reputation in our industry,
Slide 71: Douglas Brooks nominee profile
71 Mr. Brooks’ significant strategic, operating, financial, and transformational governance experience as a senior executive within the E&P industry , as well as his extensive public company board experience, would make him a uniquely valuable addition to the Board as a demonstrated value creator wo
Slide 72: Mr. Brooks at Oasis Petroleum / Chord Energy
72 Mr. Brooks led the Company and Board of Oasis Petroleum, now Chord Energy (NYSE: CHRD) following Oasis Petroleum’s emergence from bankruptcy. Mr. Brooks spearheaded the Company’s subsequent resurgence, now considered a model among the E&P industry Served as Chair and interim CEO until April 2021
Slide 73: Carrie Fox nominee profile
73 Ms. Fox’s track record of leading strategic E&P transactions, overseeing successful consolidation strategies at single - basin public companies and significant operating, financial, and environmental management experience as a senior executive within the industry, and her significant public compa
Slide 74: Ms. Fox's transaction expertise
74 Ms. Fox’s Transaction Expertise Is Critical to Ensure Robust Dialogue in the SBOW Boardroom Source: Company news, public filings, Seeking Alpha. Ares Joint Venture and Equity Investment Highlights Overview Pro Forma Asset Map Following its spin - off from Occidental Petroleum, Ms. Fox led the cor
Slide 75: Katherine Minyard nominee profile
75 x Deep expertise in the E&P industry as Executive Director on J.P. Morgan’s Equity Research team covering integrated oil, refining, and E&P companies x Ms. Minyard communicated directly with public company management teams and institutional investors, providing her with a unique lens into capital
Slide 76: Ms. Minyard's board oversight of a strategic transformation
76 Ms. Minyard’s Effective Board Oversight of a Best - in - Class Strategic Transformation Source: FactSet. EnCap Acquisition / Bakken Divestiture Highlights (25%) 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% Overview Ms. Minyard brought her vast experiences through her capital markets - focused leadership roles t
Slide 77: Incumbent nominees versus Kimmeridge nominees
77 Shareholders deserve better than the incumbent nominees’ long - held resolve to insulate the Board from accountability for its failure to plan for the success of SBOW in a rapidly evolving industry SBOW’s Chronic Failures Necessary Skillset to Overcome Status Quo SBOW’s Incumbent Nominees Kimmeri
Slide 78: A Board in need of change
78 SilverBow undoubtedly has a Board in need of change today. We believe change is urgently needed at SilverBow at this critical juncture for the E&P industry • The Board’s status quo approach and self - preservationist tendencies have resulted in chronic value destruction and unaccountability , mad
Slide 79: Appendix: Kimmeridge Industry Experience & Sector Leadership
Appendix: Kimmeridge Industry Experience & Sector Leadership
Slide 80: About Kimmeridge
80 Kimmeridge is an acquiror, developer and operator of U.S. unconventional energy assets at the front end of the cost curve. • Founded in 2012 by Ben Dell, Dr. Neil McMahon and Henry Makansi, Kimmeridge is an alternative asset manager focused on the energy sector. We believe that the firm is differ
Slide 81: Kimmeridge's engagement track record
81 Company Mboe /d at Investment Kimmeridge Role Company Action Taken Oasis 75 Engaged Merged with Whiting to form Chord Enerplus 100 Engaged Merged with Chord Chesapeake 572 Engaged Merged with Southwestern Southwestern 767 Engaged Merged with Chesapeake California Resources 85 Engaged Announced st
Slide 82: Kimmeridge drives positive industry change
82 Kimmeridge Drives Positive Industry Change Kimmeridge and its founder Ben Dell was recently recognized by Hart Energy, and nominated to their Agents of Change in Energy series recognizing “a group of energy stars leading the way into the future.” “I’ve told people if it wasn’t for Ben Dell — and
Slide 83: Case study: Ovintiv background
83 • After building our position, we attempted to constructively engage with management, sharing our views on the optimal value - unlocking strategy for the Company. Despite our best efforts, the Board was not receptive to our engagement. In January 2021 we formally nominated three directors to refr
Slide 84: Ovintiv: a successful outcome for all
84 Through the course of our successful engagement , we made several recommendations to reform Ovintiv’s capital allocation, corporate governance, and ESG standards. The Company implemented most of them : Case Study | OVV | A Successful Outcome for All x Established a long - term capital allocation
Slide 85: Third parties agree on the Ovintiv campaign's success
85 Management heeded our advice for a more prescriptive capital allocation framework, greater visibility into longer - term debt reduction and meaningful changes to their executive compensation plan. Case Study | OVV | Third Parties Agree on the Campaign’s Success Source: Barclays, JP Morgan Researc
Slide 86: A brighter future for Ovintiv
86 Since our settlement with Ovintiv , 10 sell - side analysts have upgraded the stock due to greater visibility of debt reduction, FCF generation and improving governance. Case Study | OVV | A Brighter Future for Ovintiv Source: public equity research. March 30, 2021: Upgrade to Overweight $35 targ
Slide 87: Case study: Civitas Resources background
87 Kimmeridge originally took interest in Extraction Oil & Gas ( nka Civitas Resources, NYSE: CIVI) through our proprietary analysis on the DJ Basin. Our internal findings suggested the Company had a valuable asset base, although its balance sheet was in disrepair with excessive leverage . • As the
Slide 88: Civitas: with the Kimmeridge playbook, a dominant player
88 Civitas’ focus on accretive acquisitions, shareholder returns, and best - in - class corporate governance has set the stage for its current status as a >$10Bn EV company with minimal leverage . Case Study | CIVI | With the Kimmeridge Playbook, a Dominant Player Source: Corporate Reports and Kimme
Slide 89: Civitas ESG leadership
89 x Civitas is Colorado’s first carbon neutral oil and gas producer on a Scope 1 & 2 basis and is committed to achieving carbon neutrality on new assets by YE2024 x Offsetting residual Scope 1 & 2 GHG emissions with certified carbon credits x CIVI uses electric grid power on sites to eliminate exha
Slide 90: Appendix: Our Response to SBOW's Lies and Obfuscations
Appendix: Our Response to SBOW’s Lies and Obfuscations
Slide 91: Shareholders will not be distracted by SBOW's false statements
91 We know shareholders will not be distracted by SBOW’s false statements about Kimmeridge’s engagement and too - little - too - late attempts to normalize their entrenched governance practices and board refreshment. • We knew SBOW would throw the book at our nominees, which is why we selected indus
Slide 92: SBOW's critiques of our engagement record
92 SBOW’s Critiques of Our Engagement Record Our Response Kimmeridge asked SBOW to not compete in the Laredo auction Kimmeridge had won the Laredo bid prior to meeting with SBOW Kimmeridge had no interest in partnering with SBOW on the Laredo bid The Shareholder Rights Plan is a proportional respons
Slide 93: SBOW's critiques of our nominees
93 SBOW’s Critiques of Our Nominees Our Response Kimmeridge said it would seek control of the Board through proxy fights Kimmeridge has never threatened SBOW with a “hostile takeover,” has only nominated people who are truly independent of Kimmeridge, and only has the ability to run for a minority o
Slide 94: SBOW's critiques of Carrie Fox
94 SBOW’s Critiques of Carrie Fox Our Response Ms. Fox has a $3MM LP interest in Kimmeridge Fund VI Investment represents a de minimis amount of the fund Like many industry experts, Ms. Fox can make private investments. The fact that she made a past, passive LP investment in a Kimmeridge fund is a d
Slide 95: SBOW's critiques of Douglas Brooks
95 SBOW’s Critiques of Douglas Brooks Our Response Mr. Brooks has a mixed track record, overseeing shareholder value destructions during director and executive tenures at a number of companies, with an average TSR underperformance of approximately (60%) While SilverBow has accused Mr. Brooks of havi
Slide 96: SBOW's critiques of Katherine Minyard
96 A Necessary Correction to SBOW’s Lies and Obfuscations SBOW’s Critiques of Katherine Minyard Our Response Ms. Minyard served as a Kimmeridge nominee at another target company We know Ms. Minyard well and deeply respect her long history of success as an energy industry investor who earned deep res
Slide 97: SilverBow historical performance vs. blended commodity price
97 24% 27% 12% 76% 85% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year SBOW Performance Weighted Avg. Commodity Price ($/boe) 235% On a long - term basis, the SilverBow team has failed to generate any alpha vs. the commodity. Leadership has benefitted from COVID and industry tailwinds, a
Slide 98: Appendix: The March Proposal
Appendix: The March 13 Proposal
Slide 99: March 13 proposal was actionable and reasonably valued
99 The March 13 proposal’s valuation for KTG was attractively priced compared to its peer set. The Company never made a serious attempt at a due diligence process despite readily - available data. • The March 2024 offer, which proposed contributing KTG’s assets at $1.1Bn of equity value and an addit
Slide 100: March 13 proposal within market norms
100 SBOW’s continued attempts to obfuscate the merits of the March 13 proposal cannot hide that Kimmeridge’s offer was competitive with market comparables, as confirmed by third party analysis. SBOW’s analysis also fails to account for the proposed $500MM capital injection at a premium. March 13 Pro
Slide 101: Legal Disclaimers
y Kimmeridge Legal Disclaimers
Slide 102: Important Information
102 Important Information Kimmeridge Energy Management Company, LLC, KEF Investments, LP, KEF Fund V Investments, LP, Benjamin Dell, Alexander Inkster, Ne da Jafar, Denis Laloy, Noam Lockshin, Henry Makansi, Neil McMahon, Douglas E. Brooks, Carrie M. Fox and Katherine L. Minyard (collectively, the “
Slide 103: Disclaimer (Cont.)
Disclaimer (Cont.) Kimmeriage Notan Offer to Sell ora Solicitation of an Offer to Buy Unger no orcumstanoas i this presantston intended fob, nor shoul it be conatuad.as, an offarto sellers sslsttion ofan offrto buy any securty. This presentation does not ecornmend te purchase or {sof any secury, and