SilverBow Resources Inc

SilverBow Resources — Proxy Contest (April 2024)

103 slides from SilverBow Resources's proxy contest presentation, Apr 29, 2024

  1. Slide 1: SilverBow Resources: A Board in Need of Change

    SilverBow Resources: A Board in Need of Change

  2. Slide 2: Agenda

    2 I. Executive Summary II. The Board’s Status Quo Approach III. SilverBow’s Paths to Maximize Long - Term Value for All Shareholders IV. Worst - in - Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy V. The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board’s Stale, Incumbent Nominees VI. Our Independent Nominees Appendice

  3. Slide 3: Executive Summary

    y Kimmeridge Executive Summary

  4. Slide 4: Kimmeridge's track record of engagement at E&P companies

    4 Company Mboe /d at Investment Kimmeridge Role Company Action Taken Oasis 75 Engaged Merged with Whiting to form Chord Enerplus 100 Engaged Merged with Chord Chesapeake 572 Engaged Merged with Southwestern Southwestern 767 Engaged Merged with Chesapeake California Resources 85 Engaged Announced str

  5. Slide 5: SBOW's claims versus the facts

    5 SBOW’s Claims 1 The Facts “Kimmeridge launched a proxy fight to facilitate a path to change control of the Company without paying a premium to SilverBow shareholders” • Kimmeridge has not bought an SBOW share in >650 days and remains below the poison pill threshold • Kimmeridge has engaged with SB

  6. Slide 6: Executive summary of the case for change

    6 • The U.S. E&P industry is at a critical juncture. The industry is consolidating in a race for relevance . Subscale companies trade at a discount and are lagging consolidating peers. Participating in the consolidation would be a significant prize for SilverBow shareholders. • SBOW’s leadership has

  7. Slide 7: The U.S. E&P industry stands at an inflection point

    7 / $60Bn, Oct - 23 / $5Bn, Jan - 24 / $12Bn, Jan - 24 As E&P companies fight for scale and relevance with investors, 2023 represented an inflection point in M&A activity. The industry trend is now firmly established through 1Q2024, with companies in a race to gather increasingly scarce high - quali

  8. Slide 8: E&Ps are in a race for relevance as scale drives multiples

    8 0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x 5.0x 6.0x 7.0x 8.0x 9.0x 10.0x 300 600 1,200 2,400 4,800 9,600 EV/'24E EBITDA (x) 2024E Production (MMcfe/d) Among the companies in the XOP, scale has a high correlation with valuation multiple. SBOW is an outlier with the lowest EV / EBITDA of its peers , in part due to t

  9. Slide 9: SilverBow in danger of being left behind

    9 Kimmeridge Active Involvement Kimmeridge’s Annualized TSR 2 Track Record Proxy Performance Peer Status 1 • Filed for Chapter 11 • Acquired • Active • Filed for Chapter 11 / Re - emerged SilverBow in Danger of Being Left Behind Source: Public disclosure, FactSet. 1 Since SilverBow bankruptcy reemer

  10. Slide 10: The Eagle Ford is primed for consolidation

    10 The Eagle Ford basin, where SBOW operates, is the most disaggregated major basin in the U.S. Consolidation in the basin is inevitable and SBOW could lead and create significant value for all shareholders if it changed its status quo approach . HH Index Across U.S. Oil and Gas Basins 1 593 711 721

  11. Slide 11: SBOW's M&A prioritizes empire building over value creation

    11 16% 25% (18%) (14%) (20%) (3%) (10%) 60 - day Share Price Performance vs. XOP SBOW’s M&A strategy has grown the Company, but the market has not reacted positively. This strategy has saddled SBOW with its subscale status and high leverage, foreclosing its ability to scale as a buyer . $5.4 $4.9 $4

  12. Slide 12: Claims of successful M&A ring hollow

    12 SilverBow’s M&A framework has neither propelled the Company to relevance nor generated meaningful value for shareholders. On a debt - adjusted basis, the Company’s per - share production and proved reserves metrics have stayed relatively flat since 2017 (the year current CEO was hired). Proved Re

  13. Slide 13: SBOW has generated negative TSR and underperformed the XOP

    13 (100%) (80%) (60%) (40%) (20%) - 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Feb-17 Aug-17 Feb-18 Aug-18 Feb-19 Aug-19 Feb-20 Aug-20 Feb-21 Aug-21 Feb-22 Aug-22 Feb-23 Aug-23 SBOW XOP Total Shareholder Return (%) Through the cycle, SBOW has underperformed the XOP and provided negative 4% total shareholder return. A hol

  14. Slide 14: The Board overpays management regardless of performance

    14 131% 104% 100% 128% 197% 140% 157% (12%) (20%) (58%) (46%) 310% 30% 3% (4%) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Management Payout as % of Target SBOW TSR Average: 137% Since Mr. Woolverton was hired, he has received above target pay and delivered negative TSR 1 Regardless of the Company’s ann

  15. Slide 15: SBOW has multiple paths to maximizing value

    15 At the Board’s invitation, Kimmeridge presented the 8 separate compelling combination options shown below to drive value, one of which was a combination with Kimmeridge Texas Gas (“KTG”). Following the presentation, the Board requested that Kimmeridge submit a formal proposal to combine SBOW with

  16. Slide 16: The KTG combination was a financed premium proposal

    16 The KTG Combination was a financed, compelling, accretive and credit - enhancing premium proposal , offering all shareholders a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company , positioned to lead the next phase of consolidation in the Eagle Ford. Market Response (Price Performance) KTG Com

  17. Slide 17: SBOW feigns engagement to maintain the status quo

    17 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement , either through requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or flat - out rejecting above - market premiums. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo Note: SBOW 2022 counter premium represents value over 30 - day VWAP; othe

  18. Slide 18: Management and Board received $65MM while selling shares

    18 Management and the Board h ave received $65MM over the last 6 years, while consistently selling shares. Shareholders have received (4%) TSR and $0 cash distributed • Boar d directors are active net s ellers of SBOW equity since 2017, and CEO Woolverton has not purchased a single share since 2018

  19. Slide 19: SilverBow's fortress of bad governance

    19 See slides 46 - 56 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures . • No Board refreshment occurred in 7 years until Kimmeridge’s involvement • Long - tenured director did not step down until after we proposed h

  20. Slide 20: Incumbent nominees' questionable track record

    20 We have serious questions regarding the Company’s nominees’ lack of independence, a strategy - aligned skillset, respect for corporate governance and shareholder accountability. We believe they will perpetuate the same, tired status quo. Incumbent Nominees’ Questionable Track Record Source: Bloom

  21. Slide 21: Our nominees have the necessary skillsets

    21 Our nominees are E&P industry leaders who will undertake a fresh, deeply thoughtful, highly - informed and independent assessment of SBOW’s strategy and governance. Our Nominees Have the Skillsets Necessary to Ensure a Sustainable Future for SBOW Katherine Minyard Ms. Minyard has spent her whole

  22. Slide 22: Kimmeridge's expertise in driving positive change

    22 Kimmeridge’s Expertise in Driving Positive Change Kimmeridge is a first - mover in diagnosing and capitalizing on the industry’s ailments – at scale. Over the past decade, our investments, engagement and thought leadership have delivered differentiated returns for our investors, attracted diverse

  23. Slide 23: The Board's Status Quo Approach

    The Board’s Status Quo Approach How SBOW’s Subscale Market Position Drives Its Underperformance and Dooms It to Long - Term Irrelevance

  24. Slide 24: What upstream investors want

    24 • The U.S. Upstream Industry is rapidly consolidating in a race for relevance • As the capital pool available for upstream oil and gas has declined, the competition for capital has increased with investment increasingly concentrated in a few names • Investors have increasingly focused on companie

  25. Slide 25: Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity

    25 Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company that is positioned to drive growth and lead the next phase in the Eagle Ford as the basin’s preeminent pure - play operator. SilverBow can build a peer - group - leading South Texas Champion that: 1) Drives the cons

  26. Slide 26: The Eagle Ford is primed for consolidation

    26 The Eagle Ford basin, where SBOW operates, is the most disaggregated major basin in the U.S. Consolidation in the basin is inevitable and SBOW could be positioned to lead and create significant value for all shareholders if it changed its status quo approach. If SBOW does not act, a competitor wi

  27. Slide 27: E&Ps are in a race for relevance as scale drives multiples

    27 0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x 5.0x 6.0x 7.0x 8.0x 9.0x 10.0x 300 600 1,200 2,400 4,800 9,600 EV/'24E EBITDA (x) 2024E Production (MMcfe/d) Among the companies in the XOP, scale has a high correlation with valuation multiple. SBOW is an outlier with the lowest EV / EBITDA of its peers , in part due to

  28. Slide 28: SilverBow has underperformed peers since 2021

    28 SilverBow’s EV / NTM EBITDA multiple discount has widened since January 2021 from 1.5x to 2.0x in February 2024. The subscale nature of the Company makes it difficult to execute M&A effectively , but M&A is required to scale and narrow the widening valuation gap. 1.0x 1.5x 2.0x 2.5x 3.0x 3.5x 4.0

  29. Slide 29: SBOW's communication about shareholder returns

    29 SBOW publicly touts its performance since January 2021, conveniently leaving out that the TSR prior to that date was negative 82%. In other words, the stock lost $24 /share in value before regaining $23/share . (200%) (150%) (100%) (50%) - 50% 100% 150% 200% Feb-17 Aug-17 Feb-18 Aug-18 Feb-19 Aug

  30. Slide 30: A track record of destroying value

    30 (5%) (4%) 18% 18% (5%) (29%) (9%) (29%) (33%) 10% 4% 3% 8% (5%) (8%) Sep-2016: Marc Rowland Hired as Board Chairman Feb-2017: Sean Woolverton Hired as CEO Aug-2021: SBOW Acquires San Isidro Aug-2021: SBOW Acquires Assets from Post Oak Oct-2021: SBOW Acquires Teal Apr-2022: SBOW Acquires Sandpoint

  31. Slide 31: Claims of successful M&A ring hollow

    31 SilverBow’s M&A framework has neither propelled the Company to relevance nor generated meaningful value for shareholders. On a debt - adjusted basis, the Company’s per - share production and proved reserves metrics have stayed relatively flat since 2017 (the year current CEO was hired). Proved Re

  32. Slide 32: Without scale, continued stock issuance will destroy more value

    32 5LOH\ ([SORUDWLRQ 3HUPLDQ 6LOYHU%RZ 5HVRXUFHV 9LWDO(QHUJ\ 7DORV(QHUJ\ &UHVFHQW (QHUJ\ 6XE %Q0NW &DS ! %Q0NW &DS SilverBow’s recent equity offering resulted in a loss of shareholder value ; the Board’s M&A strategy has failed to achieve the necessary scale to effectively raise equity capital…but t

  33. Slide 33: SilverBow seems intent on destroying shareholder value

    33 The Board’s actions show it is willing to destroy value and dilute shareholders to entrench themselves Despite its disadvantaged size and knowing Kimmeridge was willing to purchase shares at market, SBOW issued equity on September 12, 2023 at a massive discount, destroying shareholder value. …But

  34. Slide 34: Summary: consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity

    34 Consolidation offers SBOW a unique opportunity to become a more resilient Company as the preeminent pure - play Eagle Ford shale operator, where SBOW operates • The Eagle Ford basin is the most disaggregated in the U.S. If SBOW does not act, a competitor will Meanwhile, recent M&A has neither pro

  35. Slide 35: SilverBow's Paths to Maximize Long-Term Value

    SilverBow’s Paths to Maximize Long - Term Value for All Shareholders And How the Board has Blocked Changes to the Status Quo at Every Turn

  36. Slide 36: SBOW has multiple paths to maximizing value

    36 At the Board’s invitation, Kimmeridge presented the 8 separate compelling combination options shown below to drive value, one of which was a combination with KTG. Following the presentation, the Board requested that Kimmeridge submit a formal proposal to combine SBOW with KTG, with an associated

  37. Slide 37: The KTG combination was a financed premium proposal

    37 The KTG Combination was a financed, compelling, accretive and credit - enhancing premium proposal , offering all shareholders a unique opportunity to become a more resilient company , positioned to lead the next phase of consolidation in the Eagle Ford. Market Response (Price Performance) KTG Com

  38. Slide 38: SBOW feigns engagement to maintain the status quo

    38 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement , either through requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or flat - out rejecting above - market premiums. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo Note: SBOW 2022 counter premium represents value over 30 - day VWAP; othe

  39. Slide 39: Kimmeridge far surpassed upstream M&A premiums

    39 Acquirer Target Date 2/28/23 5/22/23 7/13/23 8/21/23 10/11/23 10/23/23 1/4/24 1/11/24 2/21/24 Kimmeridge Far Surpassed Upstream M&A Premiums Source: FactSet and respective company filings. Note: Transactions include U.S. domiciled corporate E&P transactions with an enterprise value over $500mm si

  40. Slide 40: SBOW feigns engagement: event timeline

    40 The Board has consistently hidden behind its fortress of poor corporate governance , including its poison pill and classified board structure , to enable its stonewalling of compelling offers to maximize value on behalf of all shareholders. SBOW Feigns Engagement to Maintain the Status Quo ID Eve

  41. Slide 41: Event timeline (continued)

    41 ID Event Description Mr. Rowland informs Mr. Dell of an upcoming block sale and asks if Kimmeridge would be interested in purchasing the block. Mr . D ell reminds him that this would not be possible, as the poison pill was still in place. Mr. Dell meets with CEO Woolverton to discuss strategic pa

  42. Slide 42: SBOW refused to engage in a good faith process

    42 A comparison of SBOW’s actions with market norms makes clear they never made a good faith attempt to engage on the March 13 proposal – a proposal they, themselves, requested. SBOW Refused to Engage in a Good Faith Process Milestone Standard Practice Reply SilverBow Reply February 26, 2024 SilverB

  43. Slide 43: The market has spoken

    43 SBOW and XOP Share Price Performance Since Most Recent Engagements in 2024 1 The Market Has Spoken: Shareholders Hoped for Meaningful Engagement, and Were Let Down When the Board Failed Them Source: FactSet, public disclosure, and market data as of 4/17/2024. 1 Market reaction reflects 2 - day pr

  44. Slide 44: The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement

    44 The Board has repeatedly feigned engagement, either requesting significantly out - of - market share price premiums or rejecting above - market premiums • Kimmeridge has attempted to engage in good faith, with an offer that far surpassed average M&A premiums Most recently, the Company refused to

  45. Slide 45: Worst-in-Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy

    Worst - in - Class Corporate Governance & Pay Policy The Board’s Last - Minute, Window - Dressing, Attempts Cannot Hide its Retrenchment

  46. Slide 46: Management and the Board received $65MM over six years

    46 Management and the Board h ave received $65MM over the last 6 years, while consistently selling shares. Shareholders have received (4%) TSR and $0 cash distributed • Boar d directors are active net s ellers of SBOW equity since 2017, and CEO Woolverton has not purchased a single share since 2018

  47. Slide 47: SBOW's worst-in-class governance

    47 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures . • No Board refreshment occurred in 7 years until Kimmeridge’s involvement • Long - tenured director did not step down until after we proposed his removal by share

  48. Slide 48: But what about the poison pill?

    48 But…What About the Poison Pill? The Board’s silence on its retention of a two - years - and - counting poison pill is deafening. A Board that was at least trying to pretend to care about shareholder accountability would have put the poison pill to a shareholder ratification vote at the 2024 AGM.

  49. Slide 49: Mid-negotiation board stacking

    49 The facts clearly show one of the most blatantly obvious examples of a defensive Board refreshment in recent corporate histor y: The “Mid - Negotiation Board Stacking” Not a single new director was brought on to the Board in the past 7 years up until January 9, 2023 In the midst of negotiations w

  50. Slide 50: The Board overpays management regardless of performance

    50 131% 104% 100% 128% 197% 140% 157% (12%) (20%) (58%) (46%) 310% 30% 3% (4%) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Management Payout as % of Target SBOW TSR Average: 137% Since Mr. Woolverton was hired, he has received above target pay and delivered negative TSR 1 Regardless of the Company’s ann

  51. Slide 51: Opaque and malleable executive compensation metrics

    51 Vague “Strategic Goals” Metric: Assigned a 25% weighting (the most across SBOW’s STI categories) with minimal insight into determination other than reliance on proved reserves growth and acquisitions – creating perverse incentives to manipulate reserves forecasts Opaque D&C ROR Metric: 20% tied t

  52. Slide 52: Opaque and shifting metrics enable overpayment

    52 Focusing on a single metric, the STI’s ‘Strategic Goals’, showcases how the Board has failed to select metrics that properly incentivize management. • Per SBOW’s proxy, 2023 Strategic Goals “also included balance sheet optimization for the Company to enhance liquidity ” A similar phrase was used

  53. Slide 53: The Board rewards management for bad deals

    53 The Board Consistently Rewards Management for Bad Deals …Combined With High Pay for “Strategic Goals” Value - Destructive M&A Deals… 180% 200% 200% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 2021 2022 2023 “Strategic Goals” Payout vs. Target Target Source: FactSet and respective company filings. Note: XOP returns exc

  54. Slide 54: Incumbent Board and management are net sellers of SBOW stock

    54 (100%) (80%) (60%) (40%) (20%) 0% 20% 40% 60% Jan-17 Mar-17 May-17 Jul-17 Sep-17 Nov-17 Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20 Mar-20 May-20 Jul-20 Sep-20 Nov-20 Jan-21 Mar-21 May-21 Jul-21 Sep-21 Nov-21 Jan-22 Mar-22 May-22 Jul-22 Sep-22 Nov-22

  55. Slide 55: Joint CFO/GC role is unique among public companies

    55 Joint CFO/GC Role Is “Unique” Among Public Companies Source: Public filings. 2,271 Companies on the NYSE have a separate CFO and G eneral C ounsel SBOW Combined CFO / GC Note: Plotted size is to scale by area. Among the 2,272 listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange, SilverBow is the only

  56. Slide 56: Governance and pay summary

    56 The Company’s true mindset regarding shareholder accountability is best encapsulated in its worst - in - class governance structures, including: Classified Board with 3 - year terms Unilateral adoption of a poison pill without a vote or end in sight Joint GC / CFO role, which we believe exposes t

  57. Slide 57: The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board's Incumbent Nominees

    The Serious Concerns Raised by the Board’s Stale, Incumbent Nominees

  58. Slide 58: The Company's nominees raise serious questions

    58 The Company’s three incumbent nominees fail to have the independence , capital allocation and transactional expertise necessary to fully and fairly assess all paths forward for SBOW. The Company’s Nominees Raise Serious Questions Regarding Independence and Will Perpetuate the Same, Tired, Status

  59. Slide 59: SBOW's critiques apply to their own nominees

    59 SBOW’s Critiques Apply to Their Own Nominees Mr. Ellisor Mr. Wampler Ms. McAllister “Mixed track record, overseeing shareholder value destruction during director and executive tenures” N/A – has not served more than a 12 - month tenure outside of SilverBow Wampler TSR at other tenures: EGC: (70%)

  60. Slide 60: Mr. Ellisor's record

    60 SBOW shareholders deserve better than Mr. Ellisor’s long - standing commitment to insulating the Board from accountability while over - paying management for its failure to chart a course for the long - term success of SBOW. Mr. Ellisor Is Responsible for Executive Compensation That Drives Overpa

  61. Slide 61: Mr. Ellisor's record (continued)

    61 SBOW shareholders deserve better than Mr. Ellisor’s long - standing commitment to insulating the Board from accountability while over - paying management for its failure to chart a course for the long - term success of SBOW. Mr. Ellisor Is Responsible for Executive Compensation That Drives Overpa

  62. Slide 62: Mr. Wampler's record

    62 • Past - His - Expiration Date Noteholder Appointee: Appointed to the Board via an expired 2016 Nomination Agreement with senior noteholders • Lacks Necessary Skillset to Save SBOW from Irrelevance: No history of successfully transitioning a subscale public company into a market leader in the E&P

  63. Slide 63: Mr. Wampler's record (continued)

    63 • Responsible For Overseeing SBOW’s Worst - In - Class Governance: Allowed and perpetuated SBOW’s fortress governance since the Company’s emergence from bankruptcy, including a classified board, unilaterally adopted and extended poison pill and troubling lack of shareholder rights to ensure Board

  64. Slide 64: Ms. McAllister's record

    64 SBOW shareholders need board members who will introduce a robust assessment of the Company’s governance and strategy – not “new” directors like Ms. McAllister who rubber - stamp the status quo . • Significant Concerns Regarding her 2 Years as a Public Company CEO Led Transocean Partners as CEO in

  65. Slide 65: Ms. McAllister's record (continued)

    65 • Oversees Board’s Defensive Board “Refreshment” in Face of Proxy Contest: As a member of the Nominating and Strategy Committee, she has approved the Board’s highly reactionary refreshment efforts to minimize Board accountability at the 2024 Annual Meeting, including failing to welcome ethnic div

  66. Slide 66: All of our nominees are needed

    66 We believe all 3 of our nominees are needed to end the Board’s self - serving cycle of utilizing entrenched corporate governance to avoid shareholder accountability for its destructive status quo approach. • Messrs. Ellisor , Wampler and Ms. McAllister have overseen significant value destruction

  67. Slide 67: Our Independent Nominees

    Our Independent Nominees Deeply Respected Industry Leaders Who Will Fully and Fairly Assess All Paths to Value Creation on Behalf of All Shareholders

  68. Slide 68: What we hope the Board will achieve with our nominees

    68 With our three nominees on the Board, we hope the Board will achieve the following: x Undertake a clear - eyed assessment of the sustainability of the Company’s current approach to its long - term viability x Introduce a sense of urgency to secure all advantages possible for SBOW shareholders at

  69. Slide 69: Our nominees have the skillsets necessary

    69 Our nominees are E&P industry leaders who will undertake a fresh, deeply thoughtful, highly - informed and independent assessment of SBOW’s strategy and governance. Our Nominees Have the Skillsets Necessary to Ensure a Sustainable Future for SBOW Katherine Minyard Ms. Minyard has spent her whole

  70. Slide 70: Our nominees will fully and fairly assess all paths

    70 We know our nominees will fully and fairly assess all paths to value creation on behalf of all SBOW shareholders because we have seen them in action. They will earn SBOW shareholders’ trust, just as they earned our trust. • Given Kimmeridge's established and respected reputation in our industry,

  71. Slide 71: Douglas Brooks nominee profile

    71 Mr. Brooks’ significant strategic, operating, financial, and transformational governance experience as a senior executive within the E&P industry , as well as his extensive public company board experience, would make him a uniquely valuable addition to the Board as a demonstrated value creator wo

  72. Slide 72: Mr. Brooks at Oasis Petroleum / Chord Energy

    72 Mr. Brooks led the Company and Board of Oasis Petroleum, now Chord Energy (NYSE: CHRD) following Oasis Petroleum’s emergence from bankruptcy. Mr. Brooks spearheaded the Company’s subsequent resurgence, now considered a model among the E&P industry Served as Chair and interim CEO until April 2021

  73. Slide 73: Carrie Fox nominee profile

    73 Ms. Fox’s track record of leading strategic E&P transactions, overseeing successful consolidation strategies at single - basin public companies and significant operating, financial, and environmental management experience as a senior executive within the industry, and her significant public compa

  74. Slide 74: Ms. Fox's transaction expertise

    74 Ms. Fox’s Transaction Expertise Is Critical to Ensure Robust Dialogue in the SBOW Boardroom Source: Company news, public filings, Seeking Alpha. Ares Joint Venture and Equity Investment Highlights Overview Pro Forma Asset Map Following its spin - off from Occidental Petroleum, Ms. Fox led the cor

  75. Slide 75: Katherine Minyard nominee profile

    75 x Deep expertise in the E&P industry as Executive Director on J.P. Morgan’s Equity Research team covering integrated oil, refining, and E&P companies x Ms. Minyard communicated directly with public company management teams and institutional investors, providing her with a unique lens into capital

  76. Slide 76: Ms. Minyard's board oversight of a strategic transformation

    76 Ms. Minyard’s Effective Board Oversight of a Best - in - Class Strategic Transformation Source: FactSet. EnCap Acquisition / Bakken Divestiture Highlights (25%) 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% Overview Ms. Minyard brought her vast experiences through her capital markets - focused leadership roles t

  77. Slide 77: Incumbent nominees versus Kimmeridge nominees

    77 Shareholders deserve better than the incumbent nominees’ long - held resolve to insulate the Board from accountability for its failure to plan for the success of SBOW in a rapidly evolving industry SBOW’s Chronic Failures Necessary Skillset to Overcome Status Quo SBOW’s Incumbent Nominees Kimmeri

  78. Slide 78: A Board in need of change

    78 SilverBow undoubtedly has a Board in need of change today. We believe change is urgently needed at SilverBow at this critical juncture for the E&P industry • The Board’s status quo approach and self - preservationist tendencies have resulted in chronic value destruction and unaccountability , mad

  79. Slide 79: Appendix: Kimmeridge Industry Experience & Sector Leadership

    Appendix: Kimmeridge Industry Experience & Sector Leadership

  80. Slide 80: About Kimmeridge

    80 Kimmeridge is an acquiror, developer and operator of U.S. unconventional energy assets at the front end of the cost curve. • Founded in 2012 by Ben Dell, Dr. Neil McMahon and Henry Makansi, Kimmeridge is an alternative asset manager focused on the energy sector. We believe that the firm is differ

  81. Slide 81: Kimmeridge's engagement track record

    81 Company Mboe /d at Investment Kimmeridge Role Company Action Taken Oasis 75 Engaged Merged with Whiting to form Chord Enerplus 100 Engaged Merged with Chord Chesapeake 572 Engaged Merged with Southwestern Southwestern 767 Engaged Merged with Chesapeake California Resources 85 Engaged Announced st

  82. Slide 82: Kimmeridge drives positive industry change

    82 Kimmeridge Drives Positive Industry Change Kimmeridge and its founder Ben Dell was recently recognized by Hart Energy, and nominated to their Agents of Change in Energy series recognizing “a group of energy stars leading the way into the future.” “I’ve told people if it wasn’t for Ben Dell — and

  83. Slide 83: Case study: Ovintiv background

    83 • After building our position, we attempted to constructively engage with management, sharing our views on the optimal value - unlocking strategy for the Company. Despite our best efforts, the Board was not receptive to our engagement. In January 2021 we formally nominated three directors to refr

  84. Slide 84: Ovintiv: a successful outcome for all

    84 Through the course of our successful engagement , we made several recommendations to reform Ovintiv’s capital allocation, corporate governance, and ESG standards. The Company implemented most of them : Case Study | OVV | A Successful Outcome for All x Established a long - term capital allocation

  85. Slide 85: Third parties agree on the Ovintiv campaign's success

    85 Management heeded our advice for a more prescriptive capital allocation framework, greater visibility into longer - term debt reduction and meaningful changes to their executive compensation plan. Case Study | OVV | Third Parties Agree on the Campaign’s Success Source: Barclays, JP Morgan Researc

  86. Slide 86: A brighter future for Ovintiv

    86 Since our settlement with Ovintiv , 10 sell - side analysts have upgraded the stock due to greater visibility of debt reduction, FCF generation and improving governance. Case Study | OVV | A Brighter Future for Ovintiv Source: public equity research. March 30, 2021: Upgrade to Overweight $35 targ

  87. Slide 87: Case study: Civitas Resources background

    87 Kimmeridge originally took interest in Extraction Oil & Gas ( nka Civitas Resources, NYSE: CIVI) through our proprietary analysis on the DJ Basin. Our internal findings suggested the Company had a valuable asset base, although its balance sheet was in disrepair with excessive leverage . • As the

  88. Slide 88: Civitas: with the Kimmeridge playbook, a dominant player

    88 Civitas’ focus on accretive acquisitions, shareholder returns, and best - in - class corporate governance has set the stage for its current status as a >$10Bn EV company with minimal leverage . Case Study | CIVI | With the Kimmeridge Playbook, a Dominant Player Source: Corporate Reports and Kimme

  89. Slide 89: Civitas ESG leadership

    89 x Civitas is Colorado’s first carbon neutral oil and gas producer on a Scope 1 & 2 basis and is committed to achieving carbon neutrality on new assets by YE2024 x Offsetting residual Scope 1 & 2 GHG emissions with certified carbon credits x CIVI uses electric grid power on sites to eliminate exha

  90. Slide 90: Appendix: Our Response to SBOW's Lies and Obfuscations

    Appendix: Our Response to SBOW’s Lies and Obfuscations

  91. Slide 91: Shareholders will not be distracted by SBOW's false statements

    91 We know shareholders will not be distracted by SBOW’s false statements about Kimmeridge’s engagement and too - little - too - late attempts to normalize their entrenched governance practices and board refreshment. • We knew SBOW would throw the book at our nominees, which is why we selected indus

  92. Slide 92: SBOW's critiques of our engagement record

    92 SBOW’s Critiques of Our Engagement Record Our Response Kimmeridge asked SBOW to not compete in the Laredo auction Kimmeridge had won the Laredo bid prior to meeting with SBOW Kimmeridge had no interest in partnering with SBOW on the Laredo bid The Shareholder Rights Plan is a proportional respons

  93. Slide 93: SBOW's critiques of our nominees

    93 SBOW’s Critiques of Our Nominees Our Response Kimmeridge said it would seek control of the Board through proxy fights Kimmeridge has never threatened SBOW with a “hostile takeover,” has only nominated people who are truly independent of Kimmeridge, and only has the ability to run for a minority o

  94. Slide 94: SBOW's critiques of Carrie Fox

    94 SBOW’s Critiques of Carrie Fox Our Response Ms. Fox has a $3MM LP interest in Kimmeridge Fund VI Investment represents a de minimis amount of the fund Like many industry experts, Ms. Fox can make private investments. The fact that she made a past, passive LP investment in a Kimmeridge fund is a d

  95. Slide 95: SBOW's critiques of Douglas Brooks

    95 SBOW’s Critiques of Douglas Brooks Our Response Mr. Brooks has a mixed track record, overseeing shareholder value destructions during director and executive tenures at a number of companies, with an average TSR underperformance of approximately (60%) While SilverBow has accused Mr. Brooks of havi

  96. Slide 96: SBOW's critiques of Katherine Minyard

    96 A Necessary Correction to SBOW’s Lies and Obfuscations SBOW’s Critiques of Katherine Minyard Our Response Ms. Minyard served as a Kimmeridge nominee at another target company We know Ms. Minyard well and deeply respect her long history of success as an energy industry investor who earned deep res

  97. Slide 97: SilverBow historical performance vs. blended commodity price

    97 24% 27% 12% 76% 85% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year SBOW Performance Weighted Avg. Commodity Price ($/boe) 235% On a long - term basis, the SilverBow team has failed to generate any alpha vs. the commodity. Leadership has benefitted from COVID and industry tailwinds, a

  98. Slide 98: Appendix: The March Proposal

    Appendix: The March 13 Proposal

  99. Slide 99: March 13 proposal was actionable and reasonably valued

    99 The March 13 proposal’s valuation for KTG was attractively priced compared to its peer set. The Company never made a serious attempt at a due diligence process despite readily - available data. • The March 2024 offer, which proposed contributing KTG’s assets at $1.1Bn of equity value and an addit

  100. Slide 100: March 13 proposal within market norms

    100 SBOW’s continued attempts to obfuscate the merits of the March 13 proposal cannot hide that Kimmeridge’s offer was competitive with market comparables, as confirmed by third party analysis. SBOW’s analysis also fails to account for the proposed $500MM capital injection at a premium. March 13 Pro

  101. Slide 101: Legal Disclaimers

    y Kimmeridge Legal Disclaimers

  102. Slide 102: Important Information

    102 Important Information Kimmeridge Energy Management Company, LLC, KEF Investments, LP, KEF Fund V Investments, LP, Benjamin Dell, Alexander Inkster, Ne da Jafar, Denis Laloy, Noam Lockshin, Henry Makansi, Neil McMahon, Douglas E. Brooks, Carrie M. Fox and Katherine L. Minyard (collectively, the “

  103. Slide 103: Disclaimer (Cont.)

    Disclaimer (Cont.) Kimmeriage Notan Offer to Sell ora Solicitation of an Offer to Buy Unger no orcumstanoas i this presantston intended fob, nor shoul it be conatuad.as, an offarto sellers sslsttion ofan offrto buy any securty. This presentation does not ecornmend te purchase or {sof any secury, and

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