iRobot — Proxy Contest (April 2016)
98 slides from iRobot's proxy contest presentation, Apr 21, 2016
Slide 1: Enhancing Shareholder Value at iRobot
Enhancing Shareholder Value at iRobot April 2016 www.irobotproxycontest.com
Slide 2: Table of Contents
Table of Contents Executive Summary Pages 2-12 iRobot Performance Review Pages 13-30 Corporate Governance Concerns Pages 31-47 Improving iRobot Pages 48-62 Our Nominees Pages 63-69 iRobot Has Validated the Need for Red Mountain on the Board Pages 70-89 Red Mountain’s Peer Group Selecti
Slide 3: Executive Summary
iRobot Executive Summary TaN RED MOUNTAIN CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC
Slide 4: Introduction to Red Mountain
Introduction to Red Mountain Red Mountain Capital Partners LLC (“Red Mountain”) is an investment management firm that invests primarily in undervalued and underperforming small-cap public companies with the objective of unlocking value for the benefit of all shareholders We have a successful tra
Slide 5: Red Mountain's Value Enhancement Framework
Red Mountain’s Value Enhancement Framework We introduce a combination of governance, strategic, capital management and operational initiatives to enhance value in our core investments Align Interests Upgrade Improve Internal Enhance Through Governance Shareholder Rights Management Management and/or
Slide 6: iRobot Overview
iRobot Overview Company Snapshot(1) Founded in 1990 by three MIT roboticists, Colin Angle, Rodney Brooks and Helen Greiner, to focus $ in millions, except per share $ on a wide range of robotics applications Ticker IRBT IPO Date November 9, 2005 Developed its first commercial product in 1998 and
Slide 7: Why We Invested
Why We Invested “We believe in the potential of A category killer iRobot’s business to create significant shareholder value. A pioneer in A dominant leader in a The standalone Home Robots home robots high-growth industry segment has excellent revenue growth and gross margins. With better capital all
Slide 8: How Did We Get Here?
How Did We Get Here? In April 2015, Red Mountain filed a 13D and sent a private letter to Chairman and CEO, Colin Angle, in which we outlined a detailed plan to enhance value for shareholders(1) Over the past year, we have met and corresponded frequently with Mr. Angle, his senior management tea
Slide 9: Why Is a Proxy Fight Necessary?
Why Is a Proxy Fight Necessary? Given that the Company has committed to focus on Home Robots, to sell Defense & Security, to de- emphasize Remote Presence, to accelerate its stock repurchases, to de-classify its Board and to eliminate its supermajority voting requirement, one may wonder why we are
Slide 10: Continuing to Improve iRobot
Continuing to Improve iRobot While the Board has validated many of our ideas for enhancing value, there is much to be done in order for shareholders to fully realize the benefits of iRobot’s recent strategic changes Improve Capital Improve Revenue Improve Corporate Improve Profitability Allocation
Slide 11: Red Mountain's Key Objectives
Red Mountain’s Key Objectives TOP-LINE GROWTH AND IMPROVED PROFITABILITY EFFECTIVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SUSTAINABLE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 10
Slide 12: Red Mountain's Nominees
Red Mountain’s Nominees Will Mesdag – Former partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co. in its investment banking division – Served with distinction on seven public company boards – Long track record of working constructively and collaboratively (as an advisor and an investor) with management and boards to cre
Slide 13: Our campaign is about establishing a culture of accountability in the boardroom
Our campaign at iRobot is about establishing a culture of accountability in the boardroom 12
Slide 14: iRobot Performance Review
iRobot Performance Review 13
Slide 15: iRobot Has Underperformed
iRobot Has Underperformed Underperforming Stock Since going public in 2005, iRobot’s total shareholder return is a mere 36% compared to 152% vs. the NASDAQ index(1), which is disappointing for a high-margin, high-growth business with a dominant market share in its core business Declining Marke
Slide 16: Total Shareholder Return
Total Shareholder Return 1-Year TSR 3-Year TSR 25% 21.9% 120% 20.4% 109.1% 20% 100% 15% 10.6% 76.5% 10% 80% 66.3% 5% 60% 0% -5% 40% 27.6% -10% 20% -15% -20% -16.2% 0% Nasdaq Composite Vanguard Selected Peer iRobot Selected Peer Vanguard Nasdaq Composite iRobot Index Consumer Group Median Group Media
Slide 17: Total Shareholder Return Since IPO
Total Shareholder Return Since IPO 450% 398.3% 400% 350% 300% 250% 200% 166.0% 151.5% 150% 100% 50% 36.1% 0% Selected Peer Group Vanguard Consumer Nasdaq Composite iRobot Median Discretionary ETF Index Source: Bloomberg Note: Total shareholder return as of unaffected share price date of April 7, 201
Slide 18: Total Shareholder Return Summary
Total Shareholder Return Summary iRobot’s total shareholder return relative to: Vanguard Selected Peer Nasdaq Consumer Group Composite Index Discretionary ETF 1-Year -26.8% -38.2% -36.7% 3-Year -81.5% -38.7% -48.8% 5-Year -24.6% 0.8% -28.4% 7-Year -300.2% -43.4% -83.1% Since iRobot IPO -362.2% -115.
Slide 19: Declining Market Valuation
Declining Market Valuation EV/NTM EBITDA 30.0x 25.0x 20.0x 15.0x 10.0x 5.0x “On any measure, we do not view iRobot shares as expensive. They may be mildly undervalued. However, we have a harder time identifying the catalyst that might inspire investors to materially and sustainably pay up for the sh
Slide 20: Low Valuation for Current Growth Profile
Low Valuation for Current Growth Profile iRobot has among the highest EBITDA growth numbers compared to its peers(1), yet it trades at a discount to its peer average EV/NTM EBITDA(2) 18.0x 6.5x 7.0x 16.0x 15.5x EV/NTM EBITDA/Revenue Growth 6.0x 14.0x 13.0x 5.0x 11.7x 12.0x 11.2x EV/NTM EBITDA 3.6x 9
Slide 21: Operating Expense Growth Has Outpaced Revenue Growth
Operating Expense Growth Has Outpaced Revenue Growth 5-Year Revenue Growth 5-Year Operating Expense Growth $650 $250 $600 $225 $550 $200 $500 $450 $175 $400 $150 $350 $300 $125 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Revenue Growth Since 2005 Operating Expense Growth Since 2005 $650 $250 $
Slide 22: Operating Expense Benchmarking
Operating Expense Benchmarking 3-Year Median Operating Expense as a Percentage of Revenue 40% 37% 35% 30% 30% 30% 29% Median: 28% 28% 25% 24% 21% 20% 17% 15% ASX:BRG NTGR TSE:7965 KOSE:A192400 HELE TPX SWX:LOGN IRBT A BENCHMARKING ANALYSIS TO OUR PEER GROUP CONSISTING OF OTHER GLOBAL CONSUMER PRODUC
Slide 23: More Than $500 Million Spent on R&D and Acquisitions
More Than $500 Million Spent on R&D and Acquisitions Cumulative R&D and Acquisition Spend $600 Cumulative Acquisitions Cumulative R&D $500 $400 $ in millions $300 $200 $100 $0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 “Culturally, iRobot is more about technology than products. It has skunkwo
Slide 24: R&D Example: Remote Presence
R&D Example: Remote Presence OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS, WE ESTIMATE THAT IROBOT SPENT OVER $50 MILLION IN R&D (PLUS COGS AND SG&A) FOR REMOTE PRESENCE TO GENERATE ~$5 MILLION IN REVENUE Cumulative Remote Presence R&D Spend vs. Cumulative Remote Presence Revenue $60 Remote Presence R&D $53 Remote Pres
Slide 25: "We will maintain fairly constant investment in R&D as a percent of revenue"
“We will maintain fairly constant investment in R&D as a percent of revenue” = No Longer Part of iRobot Source: iRobot Investor Presentation, September 22, 2015 (emphasis added) Note: Slide title taken from statement made by iRobot CFO Alison Dean during the Q4 2015 earnings call on February 11, 201
Slide 26: Cost of Capital Consistently Exceeds Returns
Cost of Capital Consistently Exceeds Returns WACC Compared to ROIC 20% WACC ROIC 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% Over the long run, iRobot’s capital investments -15% have not generated an acceptable return -20% -25% Apr-06 Apr-07 Apr-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Apr-15 THIS CHART SHOULD BE “F
Slide 27: iRobot's Cost of Capital Is Burdened by Excess Cash
iRobot’s Cost of Capital Is Burdened by Excess Cash Historical Net Cash as a Percentage of Market Cap 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% “iRobot generates gobs of cash, but how that benefits investors is unclear. Internal efforts are well funded, it seems disinclined to return it to shareholders…
Slide 28: We Are Concerned About Capital Allocation Priorities
We Are Concerned About Capital Allocation Priorities Annual Net Cash vs. Annual Capital Returned to Shareholders $250 $222 $212 $200 $187 $145 $150 $139 $ in millions $107 $100 $72 $63 $50 $43 $41 $37 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2 $0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Annual Net Cash Ann
Slide 29: Disingenuous Share Repurchase Programs
Disingenuous Share Repurchase Programs On February 25, 2013, iRobot issued a press release announcing that the Board had authorized the repurchase of up to $25 million of stock beginning on March 28, 2013, and ending March 27, 2014(1) “The Board's authorization of a share repurchase program reflec
Slide 30: Capital Allocation Concerns: iRobot Ventures
Capital Allocation Concerns: iRobot Ventures In January 2015, iRobot launched a fully staffed $25 million venture capital fund in Silicon Valley,(1) which “fosters engagement with the entrepreneurs and early-stage companies that are driving innovation in consumer robotics and across the connected
Slide 31: iRobot Ventures is symbolic of the Company's long-running culture
iRobot Ventures is symbolic of the Company’s long-running culture, which prioritizes the personal interests of management over prudent capital stewardship 30
Slide 32: Corporate Governance Concerns
Corporate Governance Concerns 31
Slide 33: Summary of Governance Concerns
Summary of Governance Concerns iRobot has been a public company for over 10 years but, until recently, maintained structural defenses typically reserved for new public companies that have yet to develop a track record ISS summed up the issues with iRobot’s corporate governance in its 2013 report
Slide 34: De Minimis Shareholder Rights
De Minimis Shareholder Rights One of the most frustrating things about being a shareholder of iRobot is the fortress of protections which has historically insulated the Board In addition to structural defenses for Board members, the Company had a poison pill in place from its IPO through October
Slide 35: Board has decided to phase-in declassification
Now that iRobot is supporting declassification of the Board, the Board has decided to phase-in the new structure, meaning that the full Board will not be annually elected until 2019… The Board chose this structure over an immediate declassification. 34
Slide 36: Recent Management Turnover Is Troubling
Recent Management Turnover Is Troubling Resigned Resigned Resigned Resigned October 2012 April 2013 November 2013 August 2015 Joseph Dyer John Leahy Jeff Beck Paolo Pirjanian Chief Strategy Officer Chief Financial Officer Chief Operating Chief Technology Officer Officer Not Replaced Internally Repla
Slide 37: Lack of Board Independence
Lack of Board Independence Need to Refresh the Board Need to Separate the Chairman & CEO iRobot has been led by its Founder, who is The separation of Chairman and CEO would also the Chairman and CEO, for the last 25 provide checks on management to ensure that years iRobot is being operated withi
Slide 38: Consistently Poor Compensation Reviews
Consistently Poor Compensation Reviews Both ISS and Glass Lewis have offered sharp critiques of iRobot’s executive compensation practices, and Glass Lewis has given the Company a “D” grade for its pay for performance alignment for the last three years COMPENSATION GRADES 2015 2014 2013 “The Compan
Slide 39: Executive Compensation Is Not Aligned with TSR
Executive Compensation Is Not Aligned with TSR Despite overall poor returns, Mr. Angle has enjoyed steadily increasing annual compensation CEO Compensation vs. iRobot TSR 120% $4,000 FY CEO Compensation 100% FY TSR $3,500 CEO Compensation ($ in thousands) 80% Total Shareholder Return $3,000 60% $2
Slide 40: Annual Incentives Not Aligned with Shareholders
Annual Incentives Not Aligned with Shareholders Since 2009, Mr. Angle’s compensation plans have increasingly shifted toward revenue, but revenue is not correlated with profitable growth or shareholder value 2014 & 2015 2013 2012 EBITDA 30% EBITDA 40% EBITDA 50% 50% Revenue Revenue 60% Revenue 70%
Slide 41: Long-Term Incentives Not Aligned with Shareholders
Long-Term Incentives Not Aligned with Shareholders ISS criticized iRobot over its entirely time-based equity incentive plans, "ISS' quantitative model which inflated executive compensation despite iRobot’s chronic TSR underperformance indicates a high concern due to TSR performance which In orde
Slide 42: Decline in Incumbent Director Ownership
Decline in Incumbent Director Ownership Stock Ownership of Incumbent Directors Since IPO 40% 38% 35% Beneficial ownership of current directors Angle, 30% Chwang, Geisser and McNamee who were also 25% directors at the time of iRobot’s IPO(1) 20% Beneficial ownership of all 15% current directors(2) 10
Slide 43: CEO Stock Dispositions
CEO Stock Dispositions Cumulative Dispositions of iRobot Stock by CEO Over Last 11 Years (2005-2015) $40 $35 Mr. Angle has disposed of $36 million $30 of iRobot stock $25 $ in millions $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 MR. ANGLE HAS NEVER PURCHASED SHARES OF IR
Slide 44: iRobot received shareholder proposals in 2014 and 2015
iRobot received shareholder proposals in 2014 and 2015 that, if passed and implemented, would have had a dramatic impact on shareholders’ ability to hold management accountable… 43
Slide 45: The way the Board handled these proposals is telling of its culture
…the way the Board “handled” these proposals is very telling of its culture 44
Slide 46: Response to Shareholder Proposal – 2014
Response to Shareholder Proposal – 2014 At the 2014 Annual Meeting, a non-binding shareholder proposal was presented calling for the elimination of supermajority voting in the Company’s governing documents Although the Board made no recommendation on the proposal, ISS and Glass Lewis both came o
Slide 47: Response to Shareholder Proposal – 2015
Response to Shareholder Proposal – 2015 In response to the 2014 shareholder proposal calling for the elimination of supermajority voting, which passed, the Board put forward a binding proposal to eliminate the supermajority voting requirements, calling for a majority of shares outstanding threshol
Slide 48: Board must change its culture to become in-house change agents
Beyond any structural governance reform, iRobot’s Board must change its culture to become in-house change agents, holding management accountable for their performance and aligning themselves with shareholder interests 47
Slide 49: Improving iRobot
iRobot Improving iRobot IN RED MOUNTAIN CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC 48
Slide 50: Continuing to Improve iRobot
Continuing to Improve iRobot While the Board has validated many of our ideas for enhancing value, there is much to be done in order for shareholders to fully realize the benefits of iRobot’s recent strategic changes Improve Capital Improve Revenue Improve Corporate Improve Profitability Allocation
Slide 51: Enhance Profitability Through Operating Leverage
Enhance Profitability Through Operating Leverage Determine the appropriate R&D spend of a “focused” consumer company (e.g., R&D for a consumer robots company is different than a defense & security firm and an enterprise-focused firm) Research & Development Given iRobot’s poor track record of R&D
Slide 52: Operating Leverage: Significant Share Price Opportunity
Operating Leverage: Significant Share Price Opportunity with Modest Expense Reductions Peer benchmarking indicates that iRobot has an opportunity to increase operating income margins with cost excellence initiatives Our highly conservative analysis below shows that even modest expense reductions
Slide 53: Disciplined R&D Framework
Disciplined R&D Framework R&D expense for Home Robots, D&S and Remote Presence was $63.6 million in 2013, $69.4 million in 2014 and $76.1 million in 2015(1) iRobot has stated that R&D will stay the same as a percentage of total revenue(2), which implies an INCREASE in R&D to $78 million in 2016,
Slide 54: Capital Allocation – Illustrative R&D Framework
Capital Allocation – Illustrative R&D Framework Stage gates Consumer have clear goals STAGE GATES STAGES research is the and hurdles basis for all “Data-driven development decision, not emotional.” Consumer Research Process is well- Focus on defined rigorous Ideation Consistent validation early
Slide 55: Implement Disciplined Capital Allocation
Implement Disciplined Capital Allocation iRobot must demonstrate capital allocation stewardship by generating ROIC in excess of WACC Returns can be enhanced by improving profitability and/or increasing sales Cost of capital can be reduced by returning excess capital to shareholders and conside
Slide 56: Reposition iRobot as a Global Consumer Products Company
Reposition iRobot as a World-Class Technology-Enabled Global Consumer Products Company Create a vision for the iRobot brand based on in-depth consumer insights of what it means today and where it needs to migrate over the longer-term Ensure that iRobot’s brand architecture establishes a mega-bra
Slide 57: Global Consumer Products Company (cont'd)
Reposition iRobot as a World-Class Technology-Enabled Global Consumer Products Company (cont’d) Ensure there is a robust sales and operations planning process in place to closely match supply with demand Supply Chain Optimize product design to remove all non-value-added costs Management Create
Slide 58: Improved Branding: "Why" iRobot Must Be Clear
Improved Branding: “Why” iRobot Must Be Clear Why Am I Buying a Roomba? Dyson Makes It Easy(1) How much time Who is it for? will it save me? “Removes dirt and dust from every floor type.” “Expels air cleaner than the air you breathe.” How hard is it to Is it more effective use? than a vacuum Does it
Slide 59: Clarified Pricing: Benefits Should Be Obvious
Clarified Pricing: Benefits Should Be Obvious Snapshot of iRobot’s Current Website(1) ? Each feature requires an explanation PRICES RANGE FROM $375–$900 WITH CONFUSING DIFFERENCES AND PROPRIETARY JARGON TO EXPLAIN BENEFITS (1) Source: iRobot website 58
Slide 60: Clarified Pricing: Dyson Makes It Easy
Clarified Pricing: Dyson Makes It Easy Dyson’s Website Is Selling Solutions – Not Technology(1) Mostly easy to understand differences and transparent customer reviews (1) Source: Dyson website 59
Slide 61: Expanded Offering Case Study: Dyson
Expanded Offering Case Study: Dyson Dyson’s sharp focus on consumers has resulted in natural product extensions and driven substantial growth 2012-2015: History of Natural Expansion Humidifier and heaters introduced Created stronghold in specific product: cyclone-based, bag-less Fans vacuum clea
Slide 62: Adopt Corporate Governance Best Practices
Adopt Corporate Governance Best Practices Immediate Objectives if Elected • Seek to overhaul executive compensation plan (bonus and LTIP) to better align management incentives with shareholder returns • Seek to reconstitute Compensation Committee with new independent directors Discussion Items for R
Slide 63: Management and board must welcome accountability
Beyond continued structural governance improvements, iRobot's management and board must welcome accountability 62
Slide 64: Our Nominees
iRobot Our Nominees aN RED MOUNTAIN APITAL PARTNERS LLC 63
Slide 65: Willem Mesdag
Willem Mesdag Will Mesdag (age 62) has served as the Managing Partner of Red Mountain since he founded the firm in 2005 Prior to this, Mr. Mesdag was a Partner and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs & Co., which he joined in 1981 Mr. Mesdag is currently a Director of: Heidrick & Struggles In
Slide 66: Case Study: Cost Plus
Case Study: Cost Plus Cost Plus is a specialty retailer of casual home $25 furnishings and entertaining products operating primarily under the World Market brand Cost Plus skyrocketed over $20 1,300% during Red Mountain’s During the housing boom in the mid-2000s, Cost tenure on its board Plus sw
Slide 67: iRobot has insisted Mr. Mesdag's election is not in shareholders' interests… Why?
iRobot has insisted that Mr. Mesdag’s election to the Board is “not in the best interests of shareholders”… Why? 66
Slide 68: Does the Board Not Want Shareholder Representation?
Does the Board Not Want Shareholder Representation? WHY NOT WILL? Represents a 6% shareholder Has served with distinction on seven public company boards Has deep expertise in effective capital allocation and governance Has provided references from every Chairman and every CEO of every board
Slide 69: Lawrence Peiros
Lawrence Peiros Larry Peiros (age 60) is a seasoned business leader with over 30 years of experience in the consumer packaged goods industry Mr. Peiros is a former executive with The Clorox Company, a household consumer products company with a broad portfolio of well-known consumer brands, havin
Slide 70: Case Study: Clorox
Case Study: Clorox Clorox is a publicly held global consumer packaged $85 goods company with $5.6 billion in sales and more $80 than 8,000 employees in 30+ locations worldwide During Mr. Peiros’ tenure as an that manufactures and distributes many well- $75 executive of Clorox, the known consumer b
Slide 71: iRobot Has Validated the Need for Red Mountain on the Board
iRobot Has Validated the Need for Red Mountain on the Board 70
Slide 72: We Observed That Home Robots Was Growing
We Observed That Home Robots Was Growing Over the last five years, Home Robots growth dramatically outpaced D&S growth Annual Segment Revenue 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 88% 91% 91% 40% 82% 30% 60% 58% 56% 57% 60% 56% 20% 10% 0% Dec '06 Dec '07 Dec '08 Dec '09 Dec '10 Dec '11 Dec '12 Dec '13 Dec '14
Slide 73: Yet iRobot Was Committed to a Portfolio of Robotics
Yet iRobot Was Committed to a Portfolio of Robotics It is improbable that the shift to become a consumer products company was “well under way” due to management’s expressed desire to participate in all sectors of the robotics market iRobot Before Red Mountain(1) iRobot Today(2) “[Home Robots] is o
Slide 74: We Recommended the Sale of Defense & Security
We Recommended the Sale of Defense & Security In our value enhancement plan, we recommended that iRobot focus on Home Robots in order to: Prioritize its consumer marketing and distribution operations, Capitalize on its robust market opportunity to increase household penetration, Defend its m
Slide 75: Analysts Responded Positively to Our Recommended Actions
Analysts Responded Positively to Implementations of Our Recommended Actions Sharpens focus with D&S sale “Reiterate BUY following positive pre-announcement of 2015 results and the intended sale of the lower-margin Defense and Security business. We view the sale as positive as it allows management to
Slide 76: We Recommended Return of Excess Capital
We Recommended Return of Excess Capital In the Company’s 2013 and 2014 share repurchase programs, the Board authorized repurchases of $25 million(1) and $50 million(2), respectively, yet the Company repurchased $0 and $6.6 million under those programs(3) In 2015, the Company authorized a new $50
Slide 77: We Recommended Governance Improvements
We Recommended Governance Improvements Since our engagement, iRobot has improved its corporate governance Issue Pre-Red Mountain 13D Filing Current Status The Board has put the measure to declassify the Board on the ballot Classified Board Board opposed measure to declassify the Board in 2015
Slide 78: iRobot says its actions were in the works for years
Despite years of underperformance, iRobot is saying that its unprecedented actions over the past four months – which happen to be almost exactly what Red Mountain prescribed in April 2015 – were in the works for years and have nothing to do with our advocacy for positive change on behalf of our fell
Slide 79: "Executing Thoughtfully?"
“Executing Thoughtfully?” On March 30th and April 14th in letters to iRobot shareholders, Mr. Angle outlined the Board’s rationale for not appointing Mr. Mesdag to the Board: 1. The Board and management “have been executing thoughtfully on the next phase of the Company’s evolution for several year
Slide 80: Changes Were "Well Underway"
Changes Were “Well Underway” “Your Board and management team have been executing thoughtfully on the next phase of the Company’s evolution for several years. On December 1, 2015, Red Mountain delivered a letter to the Board promoting changes that were already well underway.” Red Mountain filed a 1
Slide 81: "Appropriate Capital Discipline"
“Appropriate Capital Discipline” “Our focus throughout the years has been on running the business efficiently and with appropriate capital allocation discipline, making necessary adjustments as the business evolved.” THIS TRACK RECORD OF RETURNS ON INVESTED CAPITAL CANNOT CONTINUE 20% WACC 15% ROIC
Slide 82: "Significantly Outperformed the S&P 500"
“Significantly Outperformed the S&P 500” “With the successful execution of our strategy, iRobot has significantly outperformed the S&P 500 … : Delivered total shareholder return of 66% over the past three years, compared to … 50% for S&P 500 companies” iRobot is not in the S&P 500 The Board’s
Slide 83: The Board's Selected Index: S&P 500
The Board’s Selected Index: S&P 500 In his March 30th letter to shareholders, Mr. Angle uses the S&P 500 index to assert outperformance, whereas, in its 2015 annual report, iRobot uses the NASDAQ index to benchmark its performance • In the Company’s 2015 annual report distributed to shareholders a
Slide 84: "No New Ideas"
“No New Ideas” “Red Mountain has provided no new ideas to drive value for iRobot shareholders” and “Red Mountain has provided no alternative operational plan to drive long-term value for shareholders” While we strongly believe that the shift in the Company’s focus to Home Robots, the return of cap
Slide 85: "No Relevant Industry Expertise"
“No Relevant Industry Expertise” “Red Mountain's candidates who have no relevant expertise in our industry and lack a fundamental understanding of iRobot’s business” Red Mountain’s nominees have the necessary expertise to help reposition iRobot as a world-class technology-enabled global consumer p
Slide 86: "Seeking to Replace Two Newest Directors"
“Seeking to Replace Two Newest Directors” “Red Mountain is seeking to replace two of iRobot’s newest directors.” Red Mountain did not seek to replace the Board's nominees We proposed to increase the size of the Board from eight to 10 in order to include the Company’s nominees as well as our nomi
Slide 87: "Interests Are Not Aligned"
“Interests Are Not Aligned” “Red Mountain’s interests are not aligned with all iRobot shareholders” We own 6.2% of iRobot and are its third-largest shareholder More than 14% of Red Mountain’s fund is invested in iRobot We therefore have a significant economic interest in enhancing value at iRo
Slide 88: Red Mountain's Investment Horizon
Red Mountain’s Investment Horizon “in September 2015, Red Mountain announced it was changing from an open end to a closed end fund structure ‘to address the asset/liability mismatch inherent in our relatively illiquid investment strategy, particularly in the context of an unusually volatile market e
Slide 89: "Mr. Mesdag's Personal Agenda"
“Mr. Mesdag’s Personal Agenda” “Proxy fight is driven by Mr. Mesdag’s personal agenda to be on the board” iRobot has not expounded on its cryptic assertion that this proxy contest is about a “personal agenda” What do they mean by this? What is their evidence for this claim? We can assure you
Slide 90: Our Objectives Are Clear
OUR OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR TOP-LINE GROWTH AND IMPROVED PROFITABILITY EFFECTIVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SUSTAINABLE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 89
Slide 91: Red Mountain's Peer Group Selection
Red Mountain’s Peer Group Selection 90
Slide 92: Red Mountain's Selected Peer Group
Red Mountain’s Selected Peer Group There are no “perfect peers,” particularly in the case of iRobot, as no other public company focuses on high- end robotic household appliances We selected high-end consumer product companies with unique technologies that improve the standard of living of modern
Slide 93: The Board's Selected "Peer" Group
The Board’s Selected “Peer” Group In contrast, the Board selected a peer group with no obvious size or industry parameters and included the three largest companies in the world (Apple, Google and Microsoft) EV/NTM Gross EBITDA TSR Since Company Market Cap EBITDA Margin Margin iRobot IPO 3D Systems
Slide 94: Red Mountain Board Service
Red Mountain Board Service 93
Slide 95: Red Mountain Board Service
Red Mountain Board Service Company Investment Thesis Outcome Deploy capital at high ROIC through the Business transformation with no change in acquisition and conversion of passenger management 767s to freighters for long-term dry lease Company poised for significant profitable growth as and/o
Slide 96: Red Mountain Board Service (continued)
Red Mountain Board Service (continued) Company Investment Thesis Outcome Drive value through a store format Business transformation with minor change in transition that improves store-level management returns and expands the customer base Strong performance of new store formats despite challen
Slide 97: www.irobotproxycontest.com
Contact Information 48 Wall Street New York, NY 10005 Shareholders: (866) 796-1271 Banks and Brokers: (212) 269-5550 www.irobotproxycontest.com 96
Slide 98: Disclaimer
Disclaimer THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE O