Airtran Holdings Inc

Airtran — Midwest Air Group — Merger or Acquisition (May 2007)

34 slides from Airtran's merger presentation, May 30, 2007

  1. Slide 1: Presentation to ISS

    Exhibit (a)(53) Presentation to ISS May 30, 2007 1

  2. Slide 2: Safe Harbor Disclosure

    Safe Harbor Disclosure Forward Looking Information Certain of the statements contained herein should be considered "forward-looking staternents," including, except in connection with the Offer (as defined below) within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forwar

  3. Slide 3: Safe Harbor Disclosure

    Safe Harbor Disclosure Additional Information This document relates, in part, to the offer (the "Offer") by AirTran Holdings, Inc., ("AirTran") through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Galena Acquisition Corp. ("Galena"), to exchange each issued and outstanding shere of common stock and Series 4 Junior

  4. Slide 4: Agenda

    Agenda Background and AirTran’s Proposal to Midwest Midwest’s Poor Corporate Governance Record The Nominees Commitment to Midwest Shareholders Addendum: The Strategic and Financial Benefits of a Combined AirTran - Midwest 4

  5. Slide 5: Background and AirTran's Proposal to Midwest

    Background and AirTran’s Proposal to Midwest 5

  6. Slide 6: AirTran's Offer to Midwest Shareholders

    Air Tran’s Offer to Midwest Shareholders Offer Price Represents: $15.98 per share as of May 25, 2007 Per Share Consideration: $9.00 in cash; 0.5842 shares of AAI Stock Premium: 93% to 30 Day Avg. (1) 65% to day prior to announcement (12/12/06) Conditions: Tender of a majority of Midwest shares on fu

  7. Slide 7: Timeline of Key Events

    Timeline of Key Events October 20, 2006 AirTran sends initial offer letter to Midwest December 6, 2006 Midwest rejects AirTran's offer December 13, 2006 AirTran makes offer of $11.25 per share public January 11, 2007 AirTran commences exchange offer and increases price to $13.25 per share January 25

  8. Slide 8: Compelling Strategic Rationale for Transaction Recognized by Analysts; Rejected by Board

    Compelling Strategic Rationale for Transaction Recognized by Analysts; Rejected by Board AirTran’s plan will generate greater growth and efficiencies — Increased departures, expansion of Midwest hubs, new markets — Greater efficiencies — New jobs and economic benefits in Milwaukee — Estimated synerg

  9. Slide 9: The Midwest Response to the Offer

    The Midwest Response to the Offer AirTran has repeatedly approached Midwest in an attempt to engage in merger discussions All overtures to Midwest’s board, management & financial advisors to expand upon the merits of the combination have been rejected out of hand AirTran’s most recent offer was a fu

  10. Slide 10: Midwest's Poor Corporate Governance Record

    Midwest’s Poor Corporate Governance Record 10

  11. Slide 11: Midwest's Poor Corporate Governance Record

    Midwest’s Poor Corporate Governance Record Entrenched, Management-Compliant Board of Directors Stealth Compensation for Managers and Directors Troubling Consultant/Advisor Compensation Conflicts Repeated Attempts to Prevent Shareholders from Receiving Facts about AirTran Offer 11

  12. Slide 12: Entrenched, Management-Compliant Board of Directors

    Entrenched, Management-Compliant Board of Directors Persistent refusal to even discuss AirTran offer Misuse of anti-takeover provisions (staggered board and poison pill) to entrench existing Board and management, rather than maximize value for MEH holders Average tenure of the Midwest board is 14 ye

  13. Slide 13: Stealth Compensation for Managers and Directors

    Stealth Compensation for Managers and Directors Increased Directors’ annual retainer fee 60% and meeting attendance fee 100%, in December 2006, subsequent to AirTran’s October proposal. Only disclosed when forced to do so in the SEC filings in response to the AirTran offer Fully funded CEO’s $1.4 mi

  14. Slide 14: Troubling Consultant/Advisor Compensation Conflicts

    Troubling Consultant/Advisor Compensation Conflicts Consulting relationship with “independent” aviation firm Simat, Helliesin & Eichner, demonstrates severe board conflict of interest and entrenchment — Chairman, CEO and shareholder of SH&E, David Treitel, has been an “independent” Midwest director

  15. Slide 15: Troubling Consultant/Advisor Compensation Conflicts

    Troubling Consultant/Advisor Compensation Conflicts Relationship with Financial Advisor Goldman Sachs Appears Encumbered by Conflict of Interest — Agreement in place whereby Goldman is paid a premium if Midwest remains independent — If there is no merger, Goldman will be paid $7.4 million; if merger

  16. Slide 16: Midwest's Attempts to Prevent Shareholders from Receiving Facts about AirTran Offer

    Midwest’s Attempts to Prevent Shareholders from Receiving Facts about AirTran Offer Refused to furnish shareholder list to AirTran to allow AirTran to communicate with Midwest shareholders — The partial list that was finally provided excluded NOBO holders Violated SEC rules in setting its initial 20

  17. Slide 17: Why a Need For Independent Directors?

    Why a Need For Independent Directors? Midwest’s corporate governance policies and practices have denied the AirTran offer the consideration Midwest shareholders deserve Instead of carefully considering the AirTran plan, Midwest has promoted its ‘stand- alone plan’ which, according to most independen

  18. Slide 18: The Nominees Commitment to Midwest Shareholders

    The Nominees Commitment to Midwest Shareholders 18

  19. Slide 19: The Nominees Offer Midwest Shareholders

    The Nominees Offer Midwest Shareholders Independence Business and Management Experience Industry Expertise Experience on Boards of Public Companies 19

  20. Slide 20: If Elected, We Believe the Nominees Will

    If Elected, We Believe the Nominees Will Bring high standards and strong corporate governance to the Midwest board Strive to ensure that board is fulfilling its fiduciary duty and acting in the best interests of ALL shareholders Fairly and thoroughly consider all options and opportunities for the co

  21. Slide 21: John Albertine

    John Albertine Chairman, CEO & Founder of Albertine Enterprises Principal & Founder of JJ&B, LLC Investment Bank Executive Chairman of Global Delta Chairman of the Board of Integral Systems Inc. Director of Kadant Inc. Vice-Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Virginia Retirement System Former P

  22. Slide 22: Jeff Erickson

    Jeff Erickson Current Director of Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings Former President & CEO of Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings Former President & CEO of Trans World Airlines Former President & CEO of Reno Air Former President & COO of Midway Airlines Advanced degrees in Aeronautical Engineering & Transportat

  23. Slide 23: Charles Kalmbach

    Charles Kalmbach Vice Chairman of The University Medical Center at Princeton University Chairman of the Audit Committee of The Resources for the Future President & CEO of DBM, Inc. Former Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer of Princeton University Former Global Practice Managing P

  24. Slide 24: Addendum: The Strategic and Financial Benefits of a Combined AirTran – Midwest

    ADDENDUM The Strategic and Financial Benefits of a Combined AirTran – Midwest 24

  25. Slide 25: AirTran's Plan for a Combined Carrier

    AirTran’s Plan for a Combined Carrier Greater efficiencies for both companies, with unit cost for the combined carrier, on a non-fuel basis and stage length adjust basis, 12% lower than current Midwest levels Increase daily departures by 74 flights, double daily seat capacity and add 29 additional d

  26. Slide 26: Complementary Route Networks

    Complementary Route Networks Seattle Duluth Rhinelander Toronto Portland Wausau Minneapolis Green Bay Rochester Appleton Boston Grand Rapids Buffalo Hartford Madison Flint Milwaukee Detroit White Plains New York City Moline Chicago Cleveland Des Moines Canton Pittsburgh Akron-Canton Newark Akron-&#4

  27. Slide 27: The Combination Will Accomplish More Together Than Either Can Independently

    The Combination Will Accomplish More Together Than Either Can Independently Combined airline will create a stronger and more flexible competitor — Upper Midwest hub complements AirTran’s east coast presence — Combined network strengthens position in key markets — Amid industry consolidation, scale w

  28. Slide 28: Midwest's Stand-Alone Plan Is Not Working

    Midwest’s Stand-Alone Plan Is Not Working Following five years of losses, 2006 produced modest profitability; operating profit of less than $600,000, an operating margin of less than 1% Midwest established high expectations for 2007, but are already about 20% below plan (reduced EPS from $1.70 to a

  29. Slide 29: Airline Analyst At Midwest's Former Financial Advisor Doubtful About Midwest's Future without AirTran

    Airline Analyst At Midwest’s Former Financial Advisor Doubtful About Midwest’s Future without AirTran The Airline Analyst at Raymond James & Associates, Midwest’s advisor when AirTran made its first offer to Midwest, observed that absent a merger with AirTran there is “… an increasing likelihood tha

  30. Slide 30: Midwest Has Not Been Able to Sustain Profits

    Midwest Has Not Been Able to Sustain Profits Midwest Airlines Quarterly Operating Profit / Loss ($000s) 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 (5,000) (10,000) (15,000) (20,000) 4Q00 2Q01 4Q01 2Q02 4Q02 2Q03 4Q03 2Q04 4Q04 2Q05 4Q05 2Q06 4Q06 1Q07 (1) Cumulative Net Operating Loss of Nearly $200 million Since 4th Qu

  31. Slide 31: Midwest Guidance Lowered By ± 20% Within Weeks of Providing Guidance

    Midwest Guidance Lowered By ± 20% Within Weeks of Providing Guidance ($) 2.00 >$1.70 $1.50 1.50 $1.30 $1.30 $1.14 2007 Estimated 1.00 Midwest MEH Revised EPS Forecast MEH Forecast 0.50 0.00 25-Jan-07 13-Apr-07 Baird Raymond James 13-Apr-07 01-May-07 • Both Baird and RJA have reduced EPS for 2008 31

  32. Slide 32: Midwest Trading Performance Post-Offer Vastly Different From Its Peers

    Midwest Trading Performance Post-Offer Vastly Different From Its Peers On 12/12/06, the day prior to announcement, Midwest’s stock closed at $9.08 per share — 30 day average prior to the date of the original 10/20/06 offer was $8.21 In the two months since announcement, the AMEX Airline Index is dow

  33. Slide 33: Analysts, Shareholders and Industry Experts Agree; The Merger is a Great Strategic Combination

    Analysts, Shareholders and Industry Experts Agree; The Merger is a Great Strategic Combination “If they go by the Wisconsin law that says all aspects need to be considered, then AirTran wins the deal because it will mean more jobs, more air service and more economic benefits for Milwaukee if AirTran

  34. Slide 34: Analysts, Shareholders and Industry Experts Agree; The Merger is a Great Strategic Combination

    Analysts, Shareholders and Industry Experts Agree; The Merger is a Great Strategic Combination "I think Midwest would have serious trouble proving to its shareholders that it could create more value on a standalone basis." – Marisa Thompson, Morningstar, 12/13/2006 "The only reason Midwest had any i

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