Vail Resorts, Inc. · NYSE:MTN
Vail Resorts — Proxy Contest (November 2026)
118 slides from Vail Resorts's proxy contest presentation, Nov 16, 2026
Slide 1: November 2026
NOVEMBER 2026
Slide 2: Important Information
2 Important Information The information contained herein is provided for discussion and general informational purposes only and does not constitute a n o ffering or the solicitation of an offer to purchase an interest in any investment. The views expressed herein are those of Oasis Management Compan
Slide 3: Important Information (Cont'd)
3 Important Information (Cont’d) CAUTIONARY STATEMENT REGARDING FORWARD - LOOKING STATEMENTS The information herein contains “forward - looking statements.” Specific forward - looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts and include
Slide 4: Table of Contents
4 Table of Contents 5 Executive Summary Section I 22 Vail Resorts Has Been Operationally Mismanaged Section II 40 Mismanagement Has Resulted in Poor Financial Results Section III 54 As a Result, the Company’s Stock Has Underperformed Section IV 69 The Root Cause: The Board Has Failed Shareholders Se
Slide 5: Executive Summary
Executive Summary 5 Section I
Slide 6: What Is This Proxy Contest About?
6 What Is This Proxy Contest About? Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary Whether a public company with irreplaceable and advantaged assets that has lost 50% of its shareholders’ money 1 should be given more time t
Slide 7: About Oasis Management
7 About Oasis Management Founded in 2002, Oasis Management invests globally across capital structures; our objective is to produce consistent, superio r r isk - adjusted returns for our investors ▪ Our team of experienced investment professionals leverage the firm's deep qualitative and quantitative
Slide 8: About Vail Resorts
8 About Vail Resorts (NYSE: MTN) Source: Bloomberg, FactSet and Company filings. 1. Market data as of November 6, 2026. 2. Enterprise value includes noncontrolling interest and excludes operating leases. Vail Resorts is one of the world’s leading hospitality companies, with an unrivaled network of m
Slide 9: Executive Summary
9 Executive Summary Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary Vail Resorts Has Underperformed Its Potential and Destroyed Significant Value… Vail Resorts operates an irreplaceable portfolio of world - class mountain
Slide 10: Vail Resorts Is in an Advantaged Position
10 Vail Resorts Is in an Advantaged Position… Vail’s robust market share and integrated resort network provide a strong foundation for operating efficiencies, guest loyalt y a nd long - term growth Vail Resorts has historically been highly acquisitive and has established a position as the leading
Slide 11: But Has Failed to Execute on Its Strategic Priorities
11 …But Has Failed to Execute on Its Strategic Priorities… Results Strategic Priority 1 Lift revenue and pass unit sales have not grown meaningfully, and total skier visits have declined since FY 2024 Grow the Subscription Model Ancillary revenue per skier has not increased meaningfully for more tha
Slide 12: And Mismanaged Its Operations
12 …And Mismanaged Its Operations… The Company’s poor strategy decisions and operational mismanagement were avoidable and have led to severe financial underperformance Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary The Marc
Slide 13: Leading to Persistent Underperformance
13 …Leading to Persistent Underperformance… Market share has declined, growth has trailed the industry and pass unit sales have stagnated, indicating a persistent shrink ing of the Company’s customer base Market Share Has Declined North American Market Share by Skier Visits 1 Growth Has Trailed the
Slide 14: And Financial Results That Have Deteriorated
14 …And Financial Results That Have Deteriorated… Source: FactSet and Company filings. 1. Free cash flow defined as cash flow from operations less capital expenditures. 2. Return on Invested Capital defined as net operating profit after tax (operating income x (1 – effective tax rate)) divided by av
Slide 15: And Significant Total Shareholder Return Underperformance
15 …And Significant Total Shareholder Return Underperformance… Despite the Company’s advantages, Vail Resorts has underperformed its peers and market benchmarks over all relevant periods u p u ntil market rumors of activist engagement emerged in June 2026 Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026,
Slide 16: All Because of the Board's Failures
16 …All Because of the Board’s Failures Vail Resorts Grade Oasis Management’s Assessment Board Responsibility Topic The Board supports a customer segmentation and operating strategy that has failed to generate value, and it has not insisted on good execution Vet, adopt and oversee the execution of a
Slide 17: The Company's Claim of Progress Rings Hollow
17 The Company’s Claim That It Is Making “Progress” 1 Rings Hollow Management has claimed that the Company has “already seen some early proof points of [its] new strategy,” 1 yet… The Company’s stock price is lower than it was two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine years ago 2 Pass unit
Slide 18: Oasis Sees Multiple Levers for Value Creation
18 Oasis Sees Multiple Levers for Value Creation Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary 1 2 3 4 Introduce new and expanded pass and ticket offerings , such as a “Fast Pass” product, and significantly expand “First
Slide 19: We Have Nominated Exceptional Independent Candidates
19 We Have Nominated Exceptional Independent Candidates to Help Lift the Vail Oasis Management has nominated two candidates who we believe possess the experience and perspectives needed to help address t he issues Vail Resorts faces 1. Source: Tom Nunan, “5 Reasons Why Disney+ Is Breaking Records Wh
Slide 20: This Proxy Contest Is Not About Matthew Prince
20 This Proxy Contest Is Not About Matthew Prince Vail Resorts’ claim that Oasis Management is working “in collaboration” with Matthew Prince is entirely unfounded; in our vie w, the Company’s desperate attempt to portray a “connection” that does not exist demonstrates the depths to which this Board
Slide 21: Shareholders Should Vote the BLUE Proxy Card
21 Shareholders Should Vote the BLUE Proxy Card to Support Our Nominees 1. Source: FactSet and Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management wa s c onsidering launching a proxy contest at the Company. Peer data refers to median. Note: For year
Slide 22: Vail Resorts Has Been Operationally Mismanaged
Vail Resorts Has Been Operationally Mismanaged 22 Section II
Slide 23: Vail Resorts Has Been Operationally Mismanaged
23 Vail Resorts Has Been Operationally Mismanaged Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary The Company’s poor strategy decisions and operational mismanagement were avoidable and have led to severe financial underperfo
Slide 24: Pricing Has Been Suboptimal
24 Pricing Has Been Suboptimal 1 Vail’s 2021 price reset produced a one - time surge in pass unit sales at the expense of long - term price parity with the Company’s primary competitor Pass Price at Launch Epic Pass vs. Ikon Pass Epic Pass Units (in millions) The Company’s 2021 Price Cut Impaired It
Slide 25: Pricing Has Been Suboptimal (Cont'd)
25 Pricing Has Been Suboptimal (Cont’d) 1 Alterra Mountain Company — Vail’s primary competitor — did not cut pass prices in 2021, but it was still able to grow its pass base significantly, leading to substantially greater revenue growth Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperfor
Slide 26: Labor Relations Should Have Been Managed Better
26 Indexed Price Change in December 2024 and January 2025 1 (15%) (10%) (5%) 0% Dec 24 Dec 31 Jan 7 Jan 14 Jan 21 Labor Relations Should Have Been Managed Better The Company’s mishandling of the Park City Mountain ski patrol strike in December 2024 - January 2025 led to severe staffing short ages, l
Slide 27: The Strike Damaged the Company's Brand and Business
27 The Strike Damaged the Company’s Brand and Business “Any momentum MTN had heading into this year’s festive season… will likely sustain some level of erosion from the ongoing strikes at Park City…[T]he limited terrain and suspension of lift tickets on a key holiday weekend day collectively raise t
Slide 28: The Company's Assets Appear Underutilized
28 The Company’s Assets Appear Underutilized 1. Source: Epic Pass and Resort websites. 2. Source: Allison Pohle and Jacob Passy, “When Traveling, Now More Than Ever: Time. Is. Money.,” The Wall Street Journal , November 4, 2024. Many of Vail Resorts’ properties do not offer early morning or late - n
Slide 29: The Company's Assets Appear Underutilized (Cont'd)
29 The Company’s Assets Appear Underutilized (Cont’d) Vail Resorts’ summer events appear inconsistent across North American resorts, suggesting some properties are underutilized d uri ng the off - season Number of Unique Summer Events 1 % of Resorts with Summer Events 1 We Do Not Believe the Company
Slide 30: The Company Has Not Adequately Engaged on YouTube
30 The Company Has Not Adequately Engaged on YouTube… YouTube Subscribers per Resort Account 2 YouTube Videos per Resort Account 2 Total YouTube Subscribers Across All Resorts 2 Source: YouTube, resort websites. 1. Pew Research Center: Americans’ Social Media Use 2025. 2. All owned Alterra destinati
Slide 31: Or TikTok
31 …Or TikTok TikTok Followers per Resort Account 1 Percent of Resort Accounts That Have Posted in Last 30 Days 1 Total TikTok Followers Across All Resorts 1 1. Source: TikTok and resort websites. All owned Alterra destinations (including heli - skiing) and Vail destinations were involved i n this a
Slide 32: Or TikTok (Cont'd)
32 …Or TikTok (Cont’d) Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary 4 Despite its recognition of the importance of TikTok, including at the resort level, the Company appears to have made little p rog ress toward building
Slide 33: Centralization Has Gone Too Far
33 Centralization Has Gone Too Far Vail Resorts centralized marketing away from the resorts, a move we believe has contributed to the Company’s distinct destina tio ns losing their local character and harming relationships in mountain towns, which has ultimately contributed to a deterioration of the
Slide 34: Technology Upgrades Have Taken Too Long
34 Technology Upgrades Have Taken Too Long 1. Source: Vail Resorts Q4 2026 Earnings Call, “This month we introduced native in - app commerce and added Apple Pay and Google Pay for pass offerings…”; Alterra Press Release, November 4, 2025; and “Fuel the Adventure” announcement on lifted.ikonpass.com,
Slide 35: Epic Experience Initiative Does Not Address Core Issues
35 The Company’s Epic Experience Initiative Does Not Address Core Issues Despite the Company’s rhetoric, the Epic Experience initiative appears to be more of the same Oasis Management’s View Key Questions Management’s Statement 1 Topic This is too little, too late; competitors like Black Tie Ski Com
Slide 36: Company's Resorts Are Not Highly Regarded
36 Because of Operational Mismanagement, the Company’s Resorts Are Not Highly Regarded Just one property owned by Vail Resorts ranked among the top ten ski resorts in the East or West in the latest Ski Magazine reader survey Ski Magazine Reader Resort Survey Top Ten Resorts West East Vail Resort? Re
Slide 37: Company's Resorts Are Not Highly Regarded (Cont'd)
37 Because of Operational Mismanagement, the Company’s Resorts Are Not Highly Regarded (Cont’d) The details from the SKI Magazine Top 30 Resorts in the West reflect poorly on operational and strategic execution at some of th e Company’s resorts Source: Samantha Berman, “The Top 30 Resorts in the Wes
Slide 38: The Company's Claims of Progress Are Unavailing
38 The Company’s Claims of “Progress” Are Unavailing Oasis Management’s Response Vail Resorts’ Misleading Claim We welcome the Company’s actions, many of which — as the Company acknowledges in its own proxy statement — are aligned with recommendations Oasis has made and feedback we provided beginn
Slide 39: The Company's Claims of Progress Are Unavailing (Cont'd)
39 The Company’s Claims of “Progress” Are Unavailing (Cont’d) Oasis Management’s Response Vail Resorts’ Misleading Claim We support the Company’s efficiency efforts, but the savings have not shown up in margins; Resort Reported EBITDA margin has fallen four years in a row, and Mountain G&A expense
Slide 40: Mismanagement Has Resulted in Poor Financial Results
Mismanagement Has Resulted in Poor Financial Results 40 Section III
Slide 41: Vail Resorts Is Paying the Price for Its Failures
41 Vail Resorts Is Paying the Price for Its Strategy and Operational Failures Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary Vail Resorts has been losing market share as fewer skiers purchase passes, visit its resorts and s
Slide 42: Market Share Has Declined
42 Vail Resorts North American Market Share By North American Skier Visits Market Share Has Declined 1 Adding further salt to the wound, MTN market share appears to have eased in a material way…, which we attribute to a combination of execution challenges, affordability, and consumer sentiment on th
Slide 43: Skier Visits Are Down and Have Trailed the Market
43 Year - Over - Year Growth in North American Skier Visits North American Vail Resorts vs. Total North American Ski Industry Skier Visits Are Down and Have Trailed the Market Vail Resorts saw its stock fall five percent yesterday after the company reported its Ski Season Metrics through April 19. T
Slide 44: Pass Sales Have Stalled
44 Pass Sales Have Stalled… [P]ricing power has now come under stress and may have hit a ceiling. The clearest warning sign is that MTN has now seen multiple consecutive years of either stagnant or declining pass units …” Lizzie Dove, Goldman Sachs, August 13, 2026 Pass unit sales have largely plate
Slide 45: And Have Declined Sharply This Year
45 …And Have Declined Sharply This Year Year - Over - Year Change in Vail Resorts Pass Unit Sales for 2026 - 2027 Ski Season Pass unit sales for the upcoming 2026 - 2027 North American ski season have declined by approximately 12% through late September 2 026, indicating continued demand headwinds [
Slide 46: Management's Remarks Regarding Poor Pass Sales Are Unconvincing
46 Management’s Remarks Regarding Poor Pass Sales Are Unconvincing Regardless of how management spins it, the continued decline in pass sales is a troubling sign, in our view Oasis Management’s Perspective Management Commentary 1 If the Company anticipated that pass sales would be pressured for the
Slide 47: Ancillary Revenue Growth Has Been Limited
47 Ancillary Revenue Growth Has Been Limited Source: Company filings. 1. Includes Mountain segment dining revenue only. Despite changes to its ski school, dining and gear rental strategies, the Company has not generated any meaningful incrementa l r evenue from skiers in more than a decade Dining Re
Slide 48: Ancillary Revenue Growth Has Been Limited (Cont'd)
48 Total Ancillary ( i.e. , Non - Lift) Revenue per Skier Ancillary Revenue Growth Has Been Limited (Cont’d) $65.86 $68.26 $61.54 $60.34 $42.16 $52.20 $57.70 $62.72 $63.78 $68.77 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 0.5% CAGR Source: Company filings. Ancillary revenue per skier refers t
Slide 49: Organic Growth Has Been Limited Despite Large Investments
49 The Result: Organic Growth Has Been Limited Despite Large Investments The Company has invested billions of dollars in CapEx but has generated little organic growth over the last few years Total Reported EBITDA vs. CapEx ($M) Source: Company filings and Goldman Sachs Research Report, August 13, 20
Slide 50: G&A Expenses Have Grown Faster Than Revenue
50 Meanwhile, G&A Expenses Have Grown Faster Than Revenue… Revenue has stagnated in recent years while overhead in the Company’s Mountain segment has increased, putting pressure on mar gin s Mountain Net Revenue ($M) Mountain General & Administrative Expense ($M) Source: Company filings. $1,956 $1,7
Slide 51: Resulting in Deteriorating Margins
51 …Resulting in Deteriorating Margins Vail Resorts’ margins are worse today than they were a decade ago, when the Company owned fewer than half as many resorts Vail Resorts Resort Reported EBITDA Margin Source: Company filings. 31.4% 30.7% 31.1% 25.7% 28.5% 33.1% 29.0% 28.6% 28.5% 26.3% FY17 FY18 F
Slide 52: Analysts Are Skeptical
52 Despite claims of "Progress", Analysts are Skeptical... Analysts have been revising their forward estimates downward since the beginning of the year Consensus Total EBITDA Estimate ($M) Source: FactSet. Estimates as of the first day of each month. Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failur
Slide 53: As Expressed in Analyst Research
53 …As Expressed in Analyst Research Analysts seemingly lack confidence that the Company will achieve its FY 2027 guidance “We have low conviction in the key underpinnings of MTN’s guidance … [W]e think there are several factors that could result in a shortfall vs. management’s overall expectations.
Slide 54: As a Result, the Company's Stock Has Underperformed
As a Result, the Company’s Stock Has Underperformed 54 Section IV
Slide 55: Underperformed on a TSR Basis Over the Short Term
55 Vail Resorts Relative TSR Through the Trading Day Prior to Press Reports of Activist Engagement Vail Resorts Has Underperformed on a TSR Basis Over the Short Term… Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management was considerin g l aun
Slide 56: And the Long Term
56 …And the Long Term Vail Resorts Relative TSR Through the Trading Day Prior to Press Reports of Activist Engagement Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management was considerin g l aunching a proxy contest at the Company. Peer data r
Slide 57: Many Strategic Pivots; None Have Created Value
57 Vail Resorts Has Had Many Strategic Pivots; None Have Created Value Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management was considerin g l aunching a proxy contest at the Company. Peer data refers to median. 1. “Proxy Peers” refer to the
Slide 58: Destroyed Approximately $10 Billion in Market Value
58 Vail Resorts Has Destroyed Approximately $10 Billion in Market Value Source: FactSet. Data from November 5, 2021 to June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Manageme nt was considering launching a proxy contest at the Company. The Company’s stock price has declined by
Slide 59: Shareholders Have Lost Money Over Virtually Every Period
59 Shareholders Have Lost Money Over Virtually Every Relevant Period Vail Resorts Absolute TSR Through the Trading Day Prior to Press Reports of Activist Engagement Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management was considerin g l aunch
Slide 60: Underperformed Nearly All Its Peers
60 Vail Resorts Has Underperformed Nearly All Its Peers The Company has underperformed nearly all its peers over nearly every period despite having world - class assets and near - duopolis tic market share; the only peer it has consistently outperformed is facing significant financial and operationa
Slide 61: Underperformed During Every Director's Tenure
61 The Company Has Underperformed During Every Director’s Tenure Vail Resorts has significantly underperformed relevant benchmark indices during every director’s tenure, including over Mr. K atz ’s more than three decades on the Board Source: Bloomberg and Company filings. 1. Data as of November 6,
Slide 62: Underperformance Predates the 2025-2026 Ski Season
62 Vail’s Underperformance Predates the 2025 - 2026 Ski Season Source: Bloomberg. TSR measured from July 31 of previous year through July 31 of year shown. Peer data refers to median. 1. “Proxy Peers” refer to the companies referenced in Vail Resorts’ 2025 Proxy Statement and include Boyd Gaming, Ch
Slide 63: Underperformance Predates the 2025-2026 Ski Season (Cont'd)
63 Vail’s Underperformance Predates the 2025 - 2026 Ski Season (Cont’d) Source: Bloomberg. TSR measured from December 31 of previous year through December 31 of year shown. Peer data refers to median. 1. “Proxy Peers” refer to the companies referenced in Vail Resorts’ 2025 Proxy Statement and includ
Slide 64: No Reason to Believe TSR Will Improve
64 Absent Meaningful Change, We See No Reason to Believe TSR Will Improve The Company has claimed that it is making “progress toward delivering long - term shareholder value” 1 … but shareholders have heard that before Relative TSR vs. Performance Peers 2 Since Statement Absolute TSR Since Statement
Slide 65: Valuation Multiple Has Declined
65 Vail Resorts’ Valuation Multiple Has Declined The Company is trading at a significant discount to its historical average Average Enterprise Value to Next Twelve Months EBITDA Multiple by Year Premium / (Discount) to Historical Average Enterprise Value to Next Twelve Months EBITDA Multiple - 52% S
Slide 66: Trades at a Discount to Self-Selected Peers
66 The Company Trades at a Discount to Its Self - Selected Peers… Source: FactSet and Bloomberg. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management wa s c onsidering launching a proxy contest at the Company. Peer data refers to median. 1. “Performance Peers”
Slide 67: And Other Prized Assets
67 …And Other “Prized Assets” Source: FactSet. Data as of June 17, 2026, the last trading day prior to media reports that Oasis Management was considering lau nching a proxy contest at the Company. Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagem
Slide 68: Analysts Are Increasingly Bearish
68 Analysts Are Increasingly Bearish Analysts have cut their price targets dramatically over the last five years Mean Analyst Price Target Source: FactSet. Data as of the first day of each month from November 1, 2021 to November 1, 2026. $347.82/ sh Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failure
Slide 69: The Root Cause: The Board Has Failed Shareholders
The Root Cause: The Board Has Failed Shareholders 69 Section V
Slide 70: The Board Has Failed Shareholders
70 The Board Has Failed Shareholders Vail Resorts Grade Oasis Management’s Assessment Board Responsibility Topic The Board supports a customer segmentation and operating strategy that has failed to generate value, and it has not insisted on good execution Vet, adopt and oversee the execution of a va
Slide 71: Board-Approved Strategy Has Not Delivered Good Results
71 The Company’s Board - Approved Strategy Has Not Delivered Good Results 1 Revenue Has Increased… Resort Net Revenue ($M) …And ROIC Has Deteriorated Return on Invested Capital 2 …But Margins Have Declined… Resort Reported EBITDA Margin …Free Cash Flow Is Down… Free Cash Flow ($M) 1 Despite the Comp
Slide 72: These Performance Issues Are Not New
72 These Performance Issues Are Not New Market share has declined, growth has trailed the industry and pass unit sales have stagnated, indicating a persistent shrink ing of the Company’s customer base rather than a temporary fluctuation in demand Market Share Has Declined North American Market Share
Slide 73: Skier Economics Have Stagnated
73 Skier Economics Have Stagnated Source: Company filings. 1. Source: Vail Resorts Q4 2026 earnings call. 1 Lower pass utilization has increased reported ticket yield while reducing ancillary sales opportunities and weakening per - visit economics …But Mountain EBITDA per Skier Visit Has Not Improve
Slide 74: Board Has Not Ensured Execution of Strategic Priorities
74 The Board Has Not Ensured that Management Has Executed on the Company’s Strategic Priorities 1. Source: Vail Resorts Investors’ Conference Presentation, March 20 - 21, 2024. 1 Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summa
Slide 75: Share Repurchases Have Been Ill-Timed
75 Average Price of Vail Resorts Share Repurchases vs. Current Stock Price The Company’s Share Repurchases Have Been Ill - Timed 2 The Company has spent hundreds of millions of dollars buying back shares at prices well above the current level Source: FactSet and Company filings. Current stock price
Slide 76: Poor Capital Allocation Has Led to High Leverage
76 The Board’s Poor Capital Allocation Has Led to High Leverage 2 Vail Resorts’ Net Leverage continues to climb higher Vail Resorts Net Leverage (Net Debt / Total Reported EBITDA) 2.0x 2.7x 3.0x 3.2x 3.9x FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 +98% Source: Company filings. The [Company] does not have a stated lev
Slide 77: The Company's Valued Dividend May Be at Risk
77 The Company’s Valued Dividend May Be at Risk 2 The continued erosion of the Company’s earnings base and shrinking free cash flow threatens to put the Company’s dividend at ris k Dividends Paid as a Percentage of Free Cash Flow 1 Dividend per Share as a Percentage of GAAP Diluted EPS Source: Compa
Slide 78: The Board Lacks Experience in Critical Areas
78 The Board Lacks Experience in Critical Areas 3 We believe the independent directors lack the skills necessary to oversee management and address the Company’s challenges and op portunities Independent Director Skills Matrix Experience Capital Allocation and Investment Technology Development Ski In
Slide 79: The Board Has Not Been Adequately Refreshed
79 The Board Has Not Been Adequately Refreshed 3 Despite its recent refreshment following our engagement, the Board remains long - tenured relative to peers Source: Bloomberg, FactSet and Company filings. Data as of November 6, 2026. Peer data refers to median. 1. “Proxy Peers” refer to the companie
Slide 80: The Board Has Mismanaged CEO Succession
80 The Board Has Mismanaged CEO Succession 4 Succession — which we regard as one of the most important responsibilities of a board — has been a chronic issue at Vail Resorts, in our view; we believe the Board has become overly reliant on Mr. Katz, creating a fundamental breakdown in the Board’s over
Slide 81: Mr. Katz Continued to Exercise Significant Influence as Executive Chairperson
81 Mr. Katz Continued to Exercise Significant Influence as Executive Chairperson 4 Even after he stepped down as CEO, Mr. Katz continued to exercise significant influence over the Company’s strategy and direc tio n as Executive Chairperson, and his compensation during that period reflects his role a
Slide 82: A Key Executive Remains Disconnected from the Organization
82 A Key Executive Remains Disconnected from the Organization 1. Source: Company filings 4 Vail Resorts’ recently appointed Chief Revenue Officer works remotely from Canada — more than 1,000 miles from the Company’s headq uarters in Colorado — which we believe reflects a lack of focus and urgency wi
Slide 83: Executives Have Been Paid for Underperformance
83 Cumulative NEO Compensation ($M) vs. Total Shareholder Return Executives Have Been Paid for Underperformance 5 Vail Resorts’ NEOs have received approximately $90 million in compensation over the last five years despite disappointing ope rat ing results and significant total shareholder return und
Slide 84: Incentive Targets Have Not Been Sufficiently Challenging
84 Incentive Targets Have Not Been Sufficiently Challenging 5 The Compensation Committee has repeatedly set Resort Reported EBITDA targets below consensus estimates Resort Reported EBITDA Target vs. Consensus Estimate Source: FactSet and Company filings. $829 $919 $944 $933 $896 $809 $920 $940 $866
Slide 85: The Long-Term Incentive Plan Is Suboptimal
85 The Long - Term Incentive Plan Is Suboptimal 5 Unlike its peers — the majority of which have embraced performance - based restricted stock units to incentivize executives and alig n their interests with shareholders — Vail Resorts continues to rely on an equal - weighted mix of stock appreciation
Slide 86: The Board Lacks Alignment with Shareholders
86 The Board Lacks Alignment with Shareholders 5 The Company’s nine current independent directors collectively own just ~0.1M of Vail Resorts stock — the vast majority of which wa s granted to them as director fees Source: FactSet, Bloomberg and Company filings. Note: Count of shares beneficially ow
Slide 87: Mr. Katz Has Reduced His Economic Alignment
87 Mr. Katz Has Reduced His Economic Alignment 5 Mr. Katz holds less than $50 million in Vail Resorts equity, having sold the majority of his stock and substantially reduced his ownership stake over the last decade Cumulative Net Value of Vail Resorts Shares Sold by Mr. Katz ($M) $0 $25 $38 $53 $64
Slide 88: Frequent Guidance Cuts Have Impaired Credibility
88 Frequent Guidance Cuts Have Impaired Credibility… 6 Management has frequently cut guidance Resort Reported EBITDA Guidance ($M) Source: Company filings. Note: Refers to guidance cuts where numerical guidance was specifically given, not guides given in words (i.e. excluding guid es to the “lower h
Slide 89: Inability to Meet Its Initial Forecasts
89 …As Has the Company’s Inability to Meet Its Initial Forecasts 6 The Company has consistently failed to achieve the midpoint of its initial Resort Reported EBITDA guidance over the last few yea rs Initial Resort Reported EBITDA Guidance vs. Actual ($M) Source: Company filings. $893 to $947 $912 to
Slide 90: The Company Has Not Engaged Constructively
90 The Company Has Not Engaged Constructively 6 Despite Oasis’ repeated efforts to engage in good faith, Vail has resisted constructive dialogue and dismissed all opportunit ies for resolution October 2026 September 2026 August 2026 May 2025 – July 2026 On October 22, Oasis reached out to Mr. Katz
Slide 91: Vail Resorts' Performance Can Be Improved
Vail Resorts’ Performance Can Be Improved 91 Section VI
Slide 92: Oasis Sees Multiple Levers for Value Creation
92 Oasis Sees Multiple Levers for Value Creation Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary Introduce new and expanded pass and ticket offerings , such as a “Fast Pass” product, and significantly expand “First Tracks”
Slide 93: Raise the Ceiling
93 Raise the Ceiling 1 Provide pass products and experiences for skiers and guests who are willing to pay premium prices for an exclusive and luxury ex perience Oasis Management’s Suggested Changes A pass that provides access to dedicated express lanes for skiers who are willing to pay top dollar
Slide 94: Lower the Floor
94 Lower the Floor 2 Offer pass products and on - mountain options that appeal to value - conscious consumers and lower barriers for first - time and occas ional guests Oasis Management’s Suggested Changes An ID - verified pass for first - time skiers only, sold at a discount before and during the
Slide 95: Improve Asset Utilization
95 Improve Asset Utilization 3 Expand year - round use of the Company’s irreplaceable mountain assets to unlock revenue opportunities Oasis Management’s Suggested Changes Night skiing extends the operating day, adding capacity and revenue without new terrain; while Vail Resorts offers night skii n
Slide 96: Refine Marketing Strategy
96 Refine Marketing Strategy 4 Modernize marketing efforts to deepen connections with locals and core customers while appealing to new and occasional guests Oasis Management’s Suggested Changes Engage social media platforms, especially YouTube and TikTok, more regularly across resorts to deepen an
Slide 97: Upgrade Technology
97 Upgrade Technology 1. Source: Vail Resorts, “My Epic Pro for Ski and Ride School” press release, March 17, 2025 2. Source: Vail Resorts “Epic Experience” press release, July 14, 2026 3. Source: Ikon Pass, app features for winter 2025 - 2026, ikonpass.com/app 4. Source: Epic Pass, Unlock the Mount
Slide 98: Proposed Initiatives Can Unlock Substantial Value
98 We Believe Our Proposed Initiatives Can Unlock Substantial Value We see a credible path to more than $280 million in incremental EBITDA, and a material valuation re - rating, under a reconstitute d Board with the right skills and expertise and an appropriate sense of urgency Source: Bloomberg and
Slide 99: The Market Has Responded Positively to Our Engagement
99 The Market Has Responded Positively to Our Engagement The overwhelming majority of the appreciation in the Company’s stock price in recent months has been driven by the market’s r eac tion to our campaign and the possibility of positive change Vail Resorts One - Day Total Shareholder Return vs. P
Slide 100: Vail Resorts Has Outperformed as a Result of Our Engagement
100 Vail Resorts Has Outperformed as a Result of Our Engagement Total Shareholder Return Since June 2026 Semafor Article Regarding Rumors of Activist Engagement at Vail Resorts Source: Bloomberg. Data as of November 6, 2026. Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor F
Slide 101: Our Nominees Have the Experience Needed
101 Our Nominees Have the Experience Needed to Address Vail’s Challenges 1. Source: Tom Nunan, “5 Reasons Why Disney+ Is Breaking Records While Making History,” Forbes , August 5, 2020. 2. Based on Walt Disney Parks and Resorts segment (FY2014 - FY2018) and Parks & Experiences domestic and internati
Slide 102: Our Nominees Would Be More Additive than the Incumbents
102 By the Company’s Own Standards, Our Nominees Would Be More Additive than the Incumbents We Are Seeking to Replace Our nominees possess the skills and experience that the Board deems to be important for its directors Vail Resorts Nominees Opposed by Oasis Oasis Management's Nominees Peter A. Vaug
Slide 103: Our Nominees Have Expertise in Critical Areas
103 Our Nominees Have Expertise in Critical Areas Each nominee brings proven expertise that directly addresses the critical challenges Vail Resorts faces today Why Expertise Is Needed at Vail Resorts Basis of Expertise Key Area of Expertise Nominee The Epic Experience initiative requires consisten
Slide 104: Excuses for Rejecting Our Nominees Are Unavailing
104 Vail Resorts’ Excuses for Rejecting Our Nominees Are Unavailing Oasis Management’s Response Vail Resorts’ Misleading Claim Mr. Chapek assumed the role of CEO at a time of unprecedented change; streaming was disrupting Disney’s traditional economic model, and the pandemic had forced the closure
Slide 105: Excuses for Rejecting Our Nominees Are Unavailing (Cont'd)
105 Vail Resorts’ Excuses for Rejecting Our Nominees Are Unavailing (Cont’d) Oasis Management’s Response Vail Resorts’ Misleading Claim A significant portion of Mr. Chapek’s compensation is in the form of a $500,000 forgivable loan to purchase shares of Vail Resorts common stock, which he would on
Slide 106: Vote Against Ms. Romanow and Mr. Vaughn
106 Shareholders Should Vote Against Ms. Romanow and Mr. Vaughn Vail Resorts Nominees Opposed by Oasis Peter A. Vaughn Michele Romanow Meets Criteria? Incumbent Director Criteria Touted as a “global marketing and brand strategy leader,” 2 but the Company has acknowledged that its marketing efforts a
Slide 107: Romanow and Vaughn Fail the Company's Own Director Criteria
107 Ms. Romanow and Mr. Vaughn Fail the Company’s Own Director Criteria Vail Resorts Nominees Opposed by Oasis Peter A. Vaughn Michele Romanow Meets Criteria? Vail Criticism of Shareholder Nominees 1 Has never served in an executive role at another hospitality company Has never served in an executiv
Slide 108: Conclusion
Conclusion 108 Section VII
Slide 109: Shareholders Should Support Change at Vail Resorts
109 Shareholders Should Support Change at Vail Resorts Vail Resorts Has Underperformed Its Potential and Destroyed Significant Value… Vail Resorts operates an irreplaceable portfolio of world - class mountain resorts and should benefit from its unique integrated network and advantaged competitive
Slide 110: Vote the BLUE Proxy Card
110 Vote the BLUE Proxy Card to Support Change at Vail Resorts It’s time to get Vail Resorts back on its edges; vote for each of the Oasis Nominees to help the Company deliver on its enorm ous promise Vote using the BLUE proxy card “ FOR ” both candidates nominated by Oasis Management: Robert Chapek
Slide 111: Appendix A: Nominee Biographies
Appendix A: Nominee Biographies 111 Section VIII
Slide 112: Nominee Biography: Robert Chapek
112 Oasis Management Nominee Biography: Robert (“Bob”) Chapek 1. Based on Walt Disney Parks and Resorts segment (FY2014 - FY2018) and Parks & Experiences domestic and international operations exc luding Consumer Products (FY2019), per Disney Form 10 - K filings. FY2014 is the last full fiscal year b
Slide 113: Nominee Biography: M. Ashton Hudson
113 Oasis Management Nominee Biography: M. Ashton Hudson Professional Experience Partner of Value Acquisition Fund since 2010; Founder and Chairman of Riverwood Asset Management since 2018 Owner and Executive Chairman, Turner Pest Control from 2002 – 2018 ‒ Grew annual revenue from about $1.5 mi
Slide 114: Appendix B: Relative Total Shareholder Return to Today
Appendix B: Relative Total Shareholder Return to Today 114 Section IX
Slide 115: TSR Continues to Underperform Through Today
115 The Company’s TSR Continues to Underperform Through Today Even with the benefit of a ~22% increase to its stock price since reports of our public engagement with the Company emerged, Vai l Resorts has still generally underperformed its peers and other benchmarks on a total shareholder return bas
Slide 116: TSR Continues to Underperform Through Today (Cont'd)
116 The Company’s TSR Continues to Underperform Through Today (Cont’d) Vail Resorts Relative TSR Through Today Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary Source: Bloomberg. Data as of November 6, 2026. Peer data refers
Slide 117: Absolute TSR Through Today
117 The Company’s TSR Continues to Underperform Through Today (Cont’d) Vail Resorts Absolute TSR Through Today Source: Bloomberg. Data as of November 6, 2026. Appendix Conclusion Lifting the Vail Board Failures Underperformance Poor Financial Results Mismanagement Executive Summary 17% (1%) (16%) (1
Slide 118: Contact Oasis Management Company
Contact 118 Oasis Management Company Media: media@oasiscm.com