Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB

Banque nationale de Belgique SA — presentatie fernandez

39 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, Dec 16, 2013

  1. Slide 1: Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activity

    Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activity Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo Guerrón Quintana, Keith Kuester, Juan Rubio Ramírez University of Pennsylvania December 16, 2013 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 1 / 39

  2. Slide 2: Motivation

    Motivation Ben Bernanke [July 18, 2012]: “The recovery in the United States continues to be held back by a number of other headwinds, including still-tight borrowing conditions for some businesses and households, and – as I will discuss in more detail shortly – the restraining effects of fiscal poli

  3. Slide 3: Motivation

    Motivation I Since 2010, many policymakers and observers have seen the U.S. economy as buffeted by larger-than-usual uncertainty about fiscal policy. I There is little consensus among policymakers about the fiscal mix and timing going forward. I Does it matter? FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 3 / 39

  4. Slide 4: Objective

    Objective I Quantify the effects of fiscal volatility shocks on economic activity. I We estimate tax and spending processes for the U.S. with time-variant volatility using a Particle filter and an McMc. I We feed the estimated rules into an equilibrium business cycle model estimated to the U.S. econ

  5. Slide 5: Main Results I

    Main Results I 1. We find a considerable amount of time-varying volatility in all four fiscal instruments. 2. After a fiscal volatility shock, output, consumption, hours, and investment drop on impact and stay low for several quarters. Main transmission mechanism: an endogenous increase in mark-ups.

  6. Slide 6: Why the “Stagflation”?

    Why the “Stagflation”? 1− − I Steady-state profits: Pj /P y − mc Pj /P y Period profits 0.05 0 −0.05 11 −0.1 21 41 −0.15 −0.2 0.95 1 1.05 relative price (Pj /P) FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 6 / 39

  7. Slide 7: Main Results II

    Main Results II 5. A two-standard deviations fiscal volatility shock has an effect similar to a 30 b.p. innovation in the FFR as estimated by a SVAR. 6. At the ZLB, the effects are much bigger: 1.7 percent fall of output if we are at the ZLB for 8 quarters. 7. Most important channel: larger uncertai

  8. Slide 8: How Do We Quantify Fiscal Volatility Shocks?

    How Do We Quantify Fiscal Volatility Shocks? I Volatility is not directly observed. I No data (surveys, asset prices...) or very limited (SPF for g, but short horizon (5qtrs)). I Instead, we estimate a stochastic volatility process as in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011). FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility

  9. Slide 9: Empirical Model

    Empirical Model I Fiscal instruments follow: bt−1 xt = ρx xt−1 + φx,y ỹt−1 + φx,b + exp(σx,t )εx,t yt−1 (1/2) σx,t = (1 − ρσx ) σx + ρσx σx,t−1 + 1 − ρ2σx ηx ux,t I x ∈ {g, τc , τl , τk }. I Fiscal shocks: εx,t . I Volatility shock: ux,t . I No direct effect on taxes. FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 9 /

  10. Slide 10: Data

    Data I Construct aggregate (average) effective tax rates from NIPA (Mendoza et al., 1994; Leeper et al., 2010): consumption, labor and capital income taxes. I General government (= federal + state + local). I Spending rule: ratio of government expenditures to GDP. I Federal debt (held by the public)

  11. Slide 11: Estimation of Fiscal Rules

    Estimation of Fiscal Rules I Instrument by instrument (easily extended). I No correlation of shocks (easily extended). I Particle filter+Bayesian methods. I Flat priors. I 20,000 draws from posterior (5,000 additional burn-in draws) using McMc. I 10,000 particles to perform the evaluation of the lik

  12. Slide 12: Smoothed Volatility

    Smoothed Volatility Government spending Labor Tax Capital Tax Consumption Tax FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 12 / 39

  13. Slide 13: Estimated Parameters

    Estimated Parameters Tax rate on Government Labor Consumption Capital Spending ρx 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 [0.975,0.999] [0.981,0.999] [0.93,0.996] [0.948,0.992] σx −6.01 −7.09 −4.96 −6.13 [−6.27,−5.75] [−7.34,−6.78] [−5.29,−4.66] [−6.49,−5.39] φx,y 0.031 0.001 0.044 −0.004 [0.011,0.055] [0.000,0.005] [0

  14. Slide 14: Forecast Dispersion

    Forecast Dispersion Labor Tax Consumption Tax 0.28 0.1 0.26 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.2 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.14 0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40 Capital Tax Government spending 0.5 0.24 0.23 0.45 0.22 0.4 0.21 Stoch Vola + 2 Std. Dev Shock 0.2 Stoch Vola, No Shock 0.35 Without Stoch Vol 0.19 0.18 0.3 0.17 0.25 0

  15. Slide 15: Relation with Other Measures of Uncertainty

    Relation with Other Measures of Uncertainty I How much do we believe our empirical results? I Bloom et al. (2011) measure uncertainty using news media coverage, tax provisions set to expire, and disagreement among forecasters. I Surprisingly high correlation of their uncertainty measure with our smo

  16. Slide 16: Key Ingredients

    Key Ingredients I Representative household. I Labor supply flexible, but wages with quadratic adjustment cost. I Investment adjustment costs, but flexible utilization margin of capital. I Prices with quadratic adjustment cost. I Fiscal rules as discussed above+Taylor rule for monetary policy. FV-G-K

  17. Slide 17: Households I

    Households I I Household maximizes: ∞ ( Z 1 l 1+ϑ ) X (ct − bh ct−1 )1−ω j,t E0 β t dt −ψ dj 1−ω 0 1+ϑ t=0 I Intertemporal shock dt : log dt = ρd log dt−1 + σd εdt , εdt ∼ N (0, 1) I Savings: 1. Invest, it . 2. Hold government bonds, Bt , with nominal gross interest rate Rt . FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatil

  18. Slide 18: Households II

    Households II I Budget constraint: R1 (1 + τc,t )ct + it + bt + Ωt + 0 ACj,tw dj = R1 b + 1 − τl,t 0 wj,t lj,t dj + 1 − τk ,t rk ,t ut kt−1 + τk ,t δkt−1 R +bt−1 Πt−1 t + zt . I Real wage adjustment costs for labor type j: 2 φw wj,t ACj,tw = − 1 yt 2 wj,t−1 I Quadratic cost 6= Calvo. Remember: non-l

  19. Slide 19: Households III

    Households III I Labor packer: Z 1 w −1 ! ww−1 lt = lj,tw dj 0 I Demand for each type of type of labor: −w wj,t lj,t = lt wt I By a zero-profit condition: ! 1 Z 1 1−w 1−w wt = wj,t 0 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 19 / 39

  20. Slide 20: Households IV

    Households IV I Capital accumulation: it kt = (1 − δ(ut )) kt−1 + 1 − S it it−1 1 where: δ(ut ) = δ + Φ1 (ut − 1) + Φ2 (ut − 1)2 2 I Quadratic adjustment cost: 2 it κ it S = −1 it−1 2 it−1 which implies S(1) = S 0 (1) = 0 and S 00 (1) = κ. I Book value of capital: ktb = (1 − δ)kt−1 b + it FV-G-K-R F

  21. Slide 21: Firms I

    Firms I I Competitive producer of a final good: Z 1 ! ε ε−1 ε−1 ε yt = yit di 0 I Buys intermediate goods at price Pi,t and charges Pt . I Demand: −ε Pit yit = yt Pt I Price index: Z 1 ! 1 1−ε Pt = Pit1−ε di 0 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 21 / 39

  22. Slide 22: Firms II

    Firms II I Intermediate good producer with market power: yit = At kitα lit1−α − φ I At is neutral productivity: log At = ρA log At−1 + σA εAt , εAt ∼ N (0, 1) and ρA ∈ [0, 1) I Intermediate producer sets prices at cost: 2 p φp Pi,t ACi,t = −Π yi,t 2 Pi,t−1 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 22 / 39

  23. Slide 23: Government

    Government I Monetary authority follows Taylor rule: 1−φR (1−φR )γΠ (1−φR )γy Rt Rt−1 Πt yt = eσm ξt R R Π y I Fiscal authority’s budget constraint: R bt = bt−1 Πt−1 t b τ +gt − ct τc,t + wt lt τl,t + rk ,t ut kt−1 τk ,t − δkt−1 k ,t + Ωt I Transfers: Ωt = Ω + φΩ,b (bt−1 − b) where φΩ,b > 0. FV-G-K-

  24. Slide 24: Aggregation and Solution

    Aggregation and Solution I Aggregate demand: 2 φp φw wt yt = ct + it + gt + (Πt − Π)2 yt + − 1 yt 2 2 wt−1 I Aggregate supply: yt = At (ut kt−1 )α lt1−α − φ I Market clearing. I Definition of equilibrium is standard. FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 24 / 39

  25. Slide 25: Estimation

    Estimation I General point: problems for calibration in non-linear models. I The Pruned State-Space System for Non-Linear DSGE Models: Theory and Empirical Applications. I We use a SMM to estimate most parameters. I Parameters for fiscal instruments laws of motion: median of our posteriors. I Third-

  26. Slide 26: Experiment to Understand Fiscal Volatility Shocks

    Experiment to Understand Fiscal Volatility Shocks bt−1 xt = ρx xt−1 + φx,y ỹt−1 + φx,b + exp(σx,t )εx,t yt−1 (1/2) σx,t = (1 − ρσx ) σx + ρσx σx,t−1 + 1 − ρ2σx ηx ux,t I At time 0, the economy is hit by a fiscal volatility shock to capital income tax. I Taxes are constant today. I Two-standard devi

  27. Slide 27: Fiscal Volatility Shocks

    Fiscal Volatility Shocks output cons. invest. hours 0 0 0 −0.02 −0.5 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.06 −1.5 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marg. cost inflation (bps) nom. rate (bps) wages 0 40 0 40 −0.02 −0.02 20 20 −0.04 −0.04 −0.06 0 0 −0.06 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 27 / 39

  28. Slide 28: Fiscal Volatility Shocks vs. 30bps Monetary Shock

    Fiscal Volatility Shocks (black solid) vs. 30bps Monetary Shock (red dots) output cons. invest. hours 0.1 0.5 0.05 0 0 0 0 −0.5 −0.1 −0.1 −0.05 −1 −0.2 −0.2 −1.5 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marg. cost inflation (bps) nom. rate (bps) wages 0 40 40 0.05 −0.02 20 20 0 −0.04 0 0 −0.05 −20 −0.06 −20 −40 −0.1 0 1

  29. Slide 29: VAR Evidence: IRFs

    VAR Evidence: output IRFs consumption investment 0.2 0 0 0 −0.2 −0.2 −0.4 −2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.6 −4 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 quarters quarters quarters hours markup inflation (bps) 0.3 0 0.5 0.2 0.1 −20 0 0 −0.5 −0.1 −40 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 quarters quarters quarters nominal rate (bps) rea

  30. Slide 30: The Effect of the ZLB

    The Effect of the ZLB output cons. invest. hours 0.1 5 0 0 0 −0.1 0 −1 −1 −0.2 −5 −0.3 −2 −2 −10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marginal cost inflation (bps) nominal rate (bps) wages 0.4 800 0.2 0.1 −50 600 0 400 −0.2 −100 0 200 −0.4 X: 1 0 Y: 0 −0.6 −150 −0.1 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 30

  31. Slide 31: Role for Monetary Policy

    Role for Monetary Policy output cons. invest. hours 0 0 0 0 −1 −0.05 −0.1 −0.1 −2 −0.1 −0.2 −0.2 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marg. cost inflation (bps) nom. rate (bps) wages 0 0 100 100 −0.05 −0.05 50 50 −0.1 −0.1 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1−φR (1−φR )γΠ ↑=1.5 (1−φR )γy ↑=0.5 Rt−1 yt I Rt = Πt eσm ξt R R Π y

  32. Slide 32: Degree of Nominal Rigidities

    Degree of Nominal Rigidities output consumption investment hours 0 0 −0.2 0 −0.4 −0.02 −0.05 −0.05 −0.6 −0.8 −0.1 −1 −0.1 −0.04 −1.2 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marginal cost inflation(bps) nominal rate(bps) wages 0 40 40 0 −0.02 −0.04 20 20 −0.05 −0.06 0 0 −0.08 −0.1 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 I blue: (Calvo) φp

  33. Slide 33: The Role of Precautionary Price Setting

    The Role of Precautionary Price Setting output cons. invest. hours 0 0.05 0.05 0 −0.02 −0.5 0 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.06 −1.5 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 marg. cost infl. nom. rate wages 40 0 0.05 40 −0.02 0 20 20 −0.04 −0.05 0 0 −0.06 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 33 / 39

  34. Slide 34: Without Automatic Responses

    Without Automatic Responses output cons. invest. hours 0.05 0 0 0 0 −0.5 −2 −0.5 −0.05 −1 −0.1 −4 −1 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 marg. cost infl. nom. rate wages 0.05 0 400 0 200 −0.05 −0.05 200 100 −0.1 −0.1 0 0 −0.15 −0.15 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 bt−1 xt = ρx xt−1 + φx,y ỹt−1 + φx,b +

  35. Slide 35: Agenda

    Agenda I Additional ingredients? I Financial frictions. I Non-convexities. I “Investment” into labor relationships. I Human capital. I Feedback from higher levels of debt to tax volatility? FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 35 / 39

  36. Slide 36: Conclusion

    Conclusion I High fiscal volatility is a concern for policymakers. I But, how big are the effects of fiscal volatility shocks? I Our simulations indicate that the effect can be important. I Key role for monetary policy in propagation. I Modeling of political-economic equilibrium that leads to these

  37. Slide 37: Estimation I

    Estimation I Preferences and consumer β 0.9945 Estimated. ω 2 Standard choice. ϑ 2 Chetty (2011). ψ 75.66 Estimated. bh 0.75 CEE (JPE, 2005). φw 4889 ACEL (RED, 2011). 21 ACEL (RED, 2011). Cost of utilization and investment Φ1 0.0165 From utilization FOC. Φ2 0.0001 Estimated. κ 3 Estimated. FV-G-K-R

  38. Slide 38: Estimation II

    Estimation II Firms A 1 Normalization α 0.36 Standard choice. δ 0.011 Estimated. φp 236.10 Gali and Gertler (JME, 1999). w 21 ACEL (RED, 2011). Monetary policy and lump-sum taxes Π 1.0045 Estimated. φR 0.6 Estimated. γΠ 1.25 FGR (2010). γy 1/4 FGR (2010). Ω -4.3e-2 Follows from gov. budget constrain

  39. Slide 39: Estimated III

    Estimated III Shocks ρA 0.95 King and Rebelo (1999). σA 0.001 Estimated. ρd 0.18 Smets and Wouters (AER, 2007). σd 0.078 Estimated. σm 0.0001 Estimated. I Parameters for fiscal instruments laws of motion: median of our posteriors. Return FV-G-K-R Fiscal Volatility 39 / 39

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