Avalara — Proxy Contest (September 2022)
38 slides from Avalara's proxy contest presentation, Sep 22, 2022
Slide 1: The Wrong Price, Wrong Process and Wrong Time: Vote Against Vista's Proposed Acquisition
The Wrong Price, Wrong Process and Wrong Time Vote Against Vista’s Proposed Acquisition of Avalara I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N September 2022 AVALARA, INC. (NYSE: AVLR) Altair US, LLC PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT – SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL REVISION
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Altair US, LLC Disc l aimer 2 CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS In connection with the proposed acquisition of Avalara, Inc . (the “Company”) (NYSE : AVLR) by affiliates of Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC (the “Merger”), the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, d
Slide 3: Why We Are Here
Altair US, LLC Why We Are Here 3 ▪ Altair US, LLC has owned Avalara since 2004 and today beneficially owns approximately 1 % of the outstanding shares , making us one of the Company’s largest and longest - tenured shareholders ▪ Avalara is a fundamentally sound business ; we believe strongly that Av
Slide 4: Table of Contents
Altair US, LLC Table of Contents I Executive Summary 5 II The Timing Is Wrong 12 III The Sale Process Was Flawed 17 IV The Price Is Inadequate 24 V Other Observers Are Also Opposed 32 VI Conclusion 35 4
Slide 5: Section One: Executive Summary
S E C T I O N O N E Executive Summary
Slide 6: Executive Summary
Altair US, LLC Executive Summary 6 We are convinced that Avalara can deliver value to shareholders far in excess of the $93.50 per share price that Vista is offering and intend to vote AGAINST the transaction The Timing Is Wrong The Sale Process Was Flawed The Price Is Inadequate ▪ Macroeconomic fac
Slide 7: Avalara company overview
Altair US, LLC ▪ Founded in 1999 and based in Seattle, Avalara provides cloud - based solutions for transaction tax compliance worldwide ▪ A 2018 U . S . Supreme Court decision enabled states to effectively tax interstate e - commerce sales, which provided a significant catalyst for demand for tax c
Slide 8: Overview of Altair US, LLC
Altair US, LLC ▪ Altair US, LLC is a family office based in Santa Rosa, California ▪ We first invested in Avalara in 2004 as one of the Company’s earliest outside shareholders ▪ We purchased additional shares in all but one private investment round prior to the Company’s initial public offering ▪ To
Slide 9: Overview of the Proposed Acquisition by Vista Equity Partners
Altair US, LLC Overview of the Proposed Acquisition by Vista Equity Partners TRANSACTION OVERVIEW 1 Announcement Date August 8, 2022 Buyer Vista Equity Partners Special Meeting Date October 14, 2022 Offer Premium 2 One Day: (2%) 30 Days: 9% 90 Days: 16% One Year: (16) One - Year High: (51%) Deal Pro
Slide 10: Avalara Has Delivered Consistent Growth
Altair US, LLC $123 $167 $213 $272 $382 $501 $699 $3 0 0 $2 0 0 $1 0 0 $0 $6 0 0 $5 0 0 $4 0 0 $8 0 0 $7 0 0 20 1 5 20 1 6 20 1 7 20 1 8 20 1 9 20 2 0 20 2 1 Revenue ($M) 1 ▪ Avalara has delivered strong, consistent growth over a number of years across economic cycles – Since 2015, Avalara has compo
Slide 11: We Are As Enthusiastic as Avalara Management About Its Prospects
Altair US, LLC We Are As Enthusiastic as Avalara Management About Its Prospects In the long run, like other required back - office functions such as payroll, we believe every company will automate their tax compliance. We're addressing a large, low - penetrated market where we are a leader in the sp
Slide 12: Section Two: The Timing Is Wrong
S E C T I O N T W O The Timing Is Wrong
Slide 13: Now Is the Wrong Time to Sell Avalara
Altair US, LLC Now Is the Wrong Time to Sell Avalara 13 Market Volatility Has Diminished Equity Values ▪ A challenging macroeconomic environment has rattled markets in 2022 ▪ The first half of the year saw the worst returns for the Russell 3000 (down 22 % ) since its inception, and the S&P North Ame
Slide 14: Market Volatility Has Diminished Equity Values
Altair US, LLC ▪ Macroeconomic factors like rising interest rates, inflation, supply chain disruptions and concerns over consumer spending have created significant economic dislocation and uncertainty in 2022 – The first half of 2022 saw the worst returns for the Russell 3000 since its inception 1 ▪
Slide 15: It Is a Difficult Financing Environment for Acquirers
Altair US, LLC ▪ Volatile capital markets have made financing of large buyout transactions more difficult ▪ By July 2022, as proposals for Avalara were due under the Board’s process, high - yield corporate bond spread to treasury yields had widened more than 200 basis points from the beginning of th
Slide 16: Avalara's Challenges Are Transitory and the Fundamentals Remain Strong
Avalara’s Challenges Are Transitory and the Fundamentals Remain Strong Despite macroeconomic uncertainty, there is no sign that Avalara’s prospects are fundamentally impaired 3 Id . (“[O]ur pricing model is designed to absorb downside shocks and upside bounces amid changes in economic activity. All
Slide 17: Section Three: The Sale Process Was Flawed
S E C T I O N F O U R The Sale Process Was Flawed
Slide 18: The Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts
Altair US, LLC The Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts ▪ Avalara’s financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, was incentivized to preserve its longstanding and lucrative relationship with Vista and – with a $70 million fee contingent on the closing of the transaction – to facilitate a transaction for Av
Slide 19: Timeline of Avalara's Flawed Sale Process
Altair US, LLC $5 0 .00 $6 0 .00 $7 0 .00 $8 0 .00 $9 0 .00 $100.00 $110.00 $120.00 $130.00 $140.00 Jan - 22 Feb - 22 Mar - 22 Ap r - 22 May - 22 Jun - 22 Ju l - 22 Aug - 22 Sep - 22 Timeline of Avalara’s Flawed Sale Process 19 Source: FactSet and Company filings. Data as of September 19, 2022. Janu
Slide 20: The Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts
Altair US, LLC 20 The Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts In our view, the material conflicts led to a flawed and biased sale process, and a poor outcome for shareholders 1 Source: Avalara Definitive Proxy Statement, filed with the SEC on September 12, 2022, at page 62. 2 Id . 3 Source: Goldman
Slide 21: The Board Did Not Maximize the Universe of Buyers
Altair US, LLC 21 The Board Did Not Maximize the Universe of Buyers We believe the Board’s process was limited, driven by inbound inquiries rather than an effort to create demand and competitive tension 1 Source: Avalara Definitive Proxy Statement, filed with the SEC on September 12, 2022 at page 36
Slide 22: Vista May Have Been the Preferred Buyer All Along
Altair US, LLC 22 Vista May Have Been the Preferred Buyer All Along We believe Vista, with its strong relationships with Avalara and Goldman Sachs, may have been the preferred buyer from the start 3 ▪ Goldman Sachs has a longstanding and lucrative relationship with Vista – Goldman has earned more th
Slide 23: The Board Re-Engaged with Vista from a Position of Weakness
Altair US, LLC 23 The Board Re - Engaged with Vista from a Position of Weakness After terminating the sale process, the Board seemingly welcomed Vista when it reemerged with a substantially lower offer 1 Source: Avalara Definitive Proxy Statement, filed with the SEC on September 12, 2022, at page 41
Slide 24: Section Four: The Price Is Inadequate
S E C T I O N T H R E E The Price Is Inadequate
Slide 25: The Price Is Inadequate and Not a Reflection of Fair Value
Altair US, LLC The Price Is Inadequate and Not a Reflection of Fair Value 25 Vista’s Offer Is Below Analyst Price Targets ▪ Prior to the transaction announcement, sell - side analysts had a mean target price of over $117/share ▪ While change - in - control transactions typically occur above analyst
Slide 26: We Believe Vista's Offer Is Inadequate by Any Measure
Altair US, LLC 26 We Believe Vista’s Offer Is Inadequate by Any Measure Vista’s offer falls short of what we consider to be reasonable benchmarks for value Source: FactSet. Data from July 1, 2020 to July 1, 2022. $150.00 $200.00 $50.00 Ju l - 20 Aug - 20 Sep - 20 O c t - 20 Nov - 20 Dec - 20 Jan - 2
Slide 27: Vista's Offer Is Below Analyst Price Targets
Altair US, LLC ▪ Prior to the announcement of the transaction, sell - side analysts had a mean target price for Avalara of more than $117 per share – Price targets had been at or above $100 since June 2019, when the Company’s LTM revenue was less than half of what it is today – At the time the trans
Slide 28: Vista's Offer Is Below Avalara's Historical Valuation Multiple
Altair US, LLC ▪ Throughout Avalara’s time as a public company, it has traded at a median enterprise value multiple of next - twelve months revenue of 12.9x ▪ Since the beginning of 2020, as the Company’s growth accelerated due to pandemic - driven shifts in customer demand patterns, Avalara has tra
Slide 29: Private Equity Firms Were Likely Prepared to Pay More
Altair US, LLC ▪ Members of Avalara’s senior management team began receiving inbound interest from private equity firms in March and April 2022 ▪ During that time, Avalara was generally trading at or above $90 per share ▪ Even a modest premium – i.e., the 26% median one - day premium of comparable t
Slide 30: Avalara's Trading Should Have Inspired a Higher Premium
Altair US, LLC ▪ Avalara’s total shareholder return during the one - year period prior to the transaction announcement was - 44%, compared to a weighted average of +19% for precedent transactions ▪ Ordinarily, one would expect companies trading at near - term highs to receive smaller premiums, not l
Slide 31: A Premium to the True Undisturbed Price Is Highly Warranted
Altair US, LLC ▪ Goldman’s fairness opinion claims the “undisturbed” price of Avalara’s shares was July 6, the day before rumors of a buyout surfaced ▪ However, while Avalara’s stock undoubted rallied in part because of the deal rumor, comparable public companies also traded up from July 6 to August
Slide 32: Section Five: Other Observers Are Also Opposed
S E C T I O N F I V E Other Observers Are Also Opposed
Slide 33: Analysts Agree the Price Is Low
Altair US, LLC Analysts Agree the Price Is Low We view the transaction and valuation as a somewhat neutral outcome for shareholders believing a valuation closer to 9x was more reasonable given the long term durable growth opportunity in front of Avalara… We do wonder if they could do better than the
Slide 34: Another Shareholder Has Publicly Criticized the Deal
Altair US, LLC Another Shareholder Has Publicly Criticized the Deal 34 AVLR is perfectly capable of remaining independent and has many years of profitable growth ahead. In light of this, the Board of Directors' decision to conduct an auction at this time in a depressed and volatile macroeconomic mar
Slide 35: Section Six: Conclusion
S E C T I O N S I X Conclusion
Slide 36: We Believe Vista Could Pay Significantly More for Avalara
Altair US, LLC We Believe Vista Could Pay Significantly More for Avalara 36 ▪ We believe Vista has ample dry powder to deploy – In May 2022, Vista was already halfway towards raising the $20 billion target it set for its flagship fund, Vista Equity Partners Fund VIII 1 – Vista’s assets under managem
Slide 37: Conclusion: Vote the GOLD Proxy Card AGAINST the Proposed Sale
Altair US, LLC Concl u sion 37 We urge Avalara shareholders to vote the GOLD proxy card AGAINST the proposed sale to Vista Avalara is a strong performer with a competitive moat and a long runway to compound growth The proposed sale of Avalara comes at the wrong time, with the wrong process and at th
Slide 38: Contact Information
Altair US, LLC Contact Information Shareholders Call Toll - Free: (800) 322 - 2885 Email: proxy@mackenziepartners.com 38