Slide 1: The Path Towards Shareholder Value Begins With a New "Tone at the Top"
The Path Towards Shareholder Value Begins With a New “Tone at the Top” April, 2016
Slide 2: Disclosures
Disclosures The information provided is intended for general informational purposes only, is not complete and does not constitute an offer to sell, solicitation of an offer to buy, advice or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any security or to engage in any other transaction (whether on terms
Slide 3: Our Mission
Our Mission We fully realize the extraordinary nature of what we are seeking and the significance of challenging a Chief Executive Officer. However, we believe Green Dot represents an extraordinary opportunity. Our mission is quite simple: provide shareholders a democratic forum to offer direct, bin
Slide 4: Table Of Contents
Table Of Contents Executive Summary 5 Persistent Stock Underperformance 13 Chronically Weak Financial Results 16 Consistently Poor Execution & Shareholder Unfriendly Capital Allocation 23 Mr. Streit’s Inconsistent & Misleading Investor Communications 33 Troubling Executive Turnover & CEO Leadership
Slide 5: Executive Summary
Executive Summary “The other thing that you have to focus on is the team. And be able to field the best team at any one time, no matter how long people have been with you. To be not unfair, or ruthless, or harsh; but detached, objective and clinical about the performance of each individual” Michael
Slide 6: Harvest Capital, A Long-Term Green Dot Shareholder, Is Calling For Change
Harvest Capital, A Long-Term Green Dot Shareholder, Is Calling For Change • One of the largest Green Dot shareholders, owning a 9.3% stake in the Company Our Investment • Patient, long-term investors. We have owned Green Dot since 2012 in Green Dot • Attempted to engage privately and constructively
Slide 7: Harvest's Highly Qualified Nominees
Harvest’s Highly Qualified Nominees Philip Livingston Saturnino Fanlo George Gresham Governance Specialist CFO and President of SoFi Former CFO of NetSpend 7
Slide 8: Green Dot Is A Dominant Franchise…
Green Dot Is A Dominant Franchise… Leading Prepaid Brands • Over 100,000 retail distribution partners Leading • 4.5 million active cards Scale • Nearly 40 million cash reloads in 2015 • Open-loop prepaid is considered the fastest growing segment of the payments market2 Large and • Nearly $350 billio
Slide 9: …And Owns The Best Brands In Prepaid
…And Owns The Best Brands In Prepaid • In a survey of over 750 reloadable prepaid card users, consumers consider Green Dot cards to represent the best brands, are the easiest to use, offer the best features, and are lowest cost11 Best Brand Easiest to Use Walmart MoneyCard 21% Walmart MoneyCard 25%
Slide 10: Despite Unique And Defensible Assets At Mr. Streit's Disposal, Green Dot Shareholders Have Suffered
Despite Unique And Defensible Assets At Mr. Streit’s Disposal, Green Dot Shareholders Have Suffered • Double-digit percentage stock price declines in four of the last five years; cumulative total shareholder Stock Under- loss of 71% since the end of 2010 performance • Returns consistently rank near
Slide 11: Addressing The Elephant In The Room
Addressing The Elephant In The Room Can Green Dot survive, let alone thrive, without Mr. Streit? • YES. We are confident Green Dot can thrive and prosper • Green Dot has talented employees and deep customer relationships that are controlled outside of the CEO suite • Mr. Streit is an entrepreneurial
Slide 12: Strong Support For Our Campaign
Strong Support For Our Campaign Sell-side analysts support our campaign and shareholders appear to desire change • “In our view, while GDOT’s brand has held up amidst Green Dot Share Price increasing competition from larger players, the sample size $26.00 of Streit’s missteps is too large both strat
Slide 13: Persistent Stock Underperformance
Persistent Stock Underperformance “For some people, we're the biggest performing stock they have, if you bought us at $9 a share and we're at $16 and change” Steve Streit, 12/2/15 13
Slide 14: Green Dot's Stock Has Vastly Underperformed The Company's Self-Selected Peers
Green Dot’s Stock Has Vastly Underperformed The Company’s Self-Selected Peers • Over a reasonable time period, we believe the most important shareholder metric for measuring a management team’s performance and execution is total shareholder returns • Over the last five years Green Dot has significan
Slide 15: No Matter How The Data Is Sliced, Green Dot's Underperformance Is Unacceptable
No Matter How The Data Is Sliced, Green Dot’s Underperformance Is Unacceptable • Over the last one-, two-, and five-year periods, Green Dot has significantly underperformed the Russell 2000 and both its original and revised peer groups13 Green Dot and Peer Performance* 1-year 2-years 5-years GDOT (2
Slide 16: Chronically Weak Financial Results
Chronically Weak Financial Results “It's fair to say that we believe we are well positioned to return to double-digit growth in 2014… mathematically it would almost be impossible not to be in the double digits next year” Steve Streit, 10/31/13 GREEN DOT GREW REVENUE JUST 4.8% IN 2014 16
Slide 17: Where Is The Earnings Growth?
Where Is The Earnings Growth? Earnings growth has significantly lagged both revenue and EBITDA growth – why is this the case? • Since 2013, shares outstanding have increased by 19% • Since 2013, depreciation and amortization expense has increased by 42% • Historical Performance compensation focused
Slide 18: Irresponsible And Destructive Capital Allocation
Irresponsible And Destructive Capital Allocation Green Dot’s Board authorized the issuance of $155 million of undervalued stock for three acquisitions in 2014, more than the Company’s entire $150 million buyback plan Green Dot Capital Allocation15 ($ millions) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Cap
Slide 19: The Only Thing Consistent With Financial Results Is The Level Of Inconsistency
The Only Thing Consistent With Financial Results Is The Level Of Inconsistency Green Dot has missed and/or reduced guidance for nine straight quarters • Mr. Streit consistently over-promises and under-delivers, which suggests poor internal financial forecasting processes17 Quarter Issue Stock Reacti
Slide 20: Green Dot Profitability Has Languished
Green Dot Profitability Has Languished • Green Dot’s core EBITDA margins are significantly below a broad processing and payments group*,18 • Excluding our estimated impact from the recent acquisition of Tax Products Group (“TPG”), Green Dot’s current EBITDA margin is below 20% 80.0% 69.8% 70.0% 67.7
Slide 21: Performance Is Particularly Weak Compared To Green Dot's Closest Peer
Performance Is Particularly Weak Compared To Green Dot’s Closest Peer NetSpend’s consistent financial performance is in stark contrast to Green Dot’s inconsistency19 Organic Revenue Growth* Core EBITDA Margin 35% 30% 28.8% 27.5% 27.4% 30% 28% 26.6% 25% 28.5% 22.4% 26% 20.2% 23.7% 20% 24% 25.3% 14.7%
Slide 22: Tale Of The Tape: David Out-Executing Goliath
Tale Of The Tape: David Out-Executing Goliath • Despite a dominant brand, larger card portfolio, larger distribution network and a high margin reload network, Green Dot has underperformed NetSpend in nearly every major category20 Active Cards at 12/31/15 4.5mm 3.9mm Retail Distribution >100k >70k Re
Slide 23: Consistently Poor Execution & Shareholder Unfriendly Capital Allocation
Consistently Poor Execution & Shareholder Unfriendly Capital Allocation “While we’re still in the early stages of integration and our assumptions could change, we expect the Loopt acquisition to be accretive beginning in 2013” John Keatley, Former CFO, 4/26/12 LOOPT HAS YET TO GENERATE A POSITIVE RE
Slide 24: Persistent Execution Issues Are A Major Concern
Persistent Execution Issues Are A Major Concern Mr. Streit has had multiple execution issues in every quarter over the last two years Quarter Category Execution Mistake Q4 13 Cost control • New products and expanded distribution compress margins Operations • Weather blamed for weak purchase volume g
Slide 25: Case Study: Poorly Executed MoneyPak Removal Led To Multiple Negative Revenue Revisions
Case Study: Poorly Executed MoneyPak Removal 1 Led To Multiple Negative Revenue Revisions • Mr. Streit initially stated the discontinuation would not have a material impact on revenue • Just six months later, Mr. Streit forecast MoneyPak to be a 10% headwind to revenue • Management negatively revise
Slide 26: Case Study: Highly Touted Processing Savings Have Not Been Delivered
Case Study: Highly Touted Processing 2 Savings Have Not Been Delivered • Initially discussed bringing processing in-house in early 2012 “On January 24, 2012, the Company announced • Some savings expected in 2013, full processing savings promised in that it expects to transition processing services 2
Slide 27: Case Study: Management Squandered Shareholder Capital In Loopt Acquisition
Case Study: Management Squandered 3 Shareholder Capital In Loopt Acquisition… Loopt deal contained a material conflict of interest, in our view, among a myriad of other issues • Sequoia Capital, Green Dot's largest venture capital investor and largest shareholder at the time, also owned 25% of Loopt
Slide 28: …And Shareholders Are Still Paying The Price With GoBank Failure
…And Shareholders Are Still Paying 4 The Price With GoBank Failure “I think it's fair to say that with the successful launch of GoBank, few today would doubt the value of acquiring Loopt” - Steve Streit, 10/30/14 • Green Dot launched GoBank, a mobile-centric bank account, on January 15, 201329 • Sin
Slide 29: Case Study: We Believe Mr. Streit Severely Miscalculated The MoneyCard Re-launch
Case Study: We Believe Mr. Streit Severely 5 Miscalculated The MoneyCard Re-launch Rather than drive growth, the updated MoneyCard portfolio led to a decline in Walmart revenue* ,31 $120 30% Updated 26% 27% MoneyCard Launch 25% 23% $104 25% $98 $100 19% 21% $94 $93 20% $90 $88 $88 $88 $84 Walmart Re
Slide 30: Case Study: Tax Products Group Has Fallen Well Short Of Expectations
Case Study: Tax Products Group (“TPG”) 6 Has Fallen Well Short Of Expectations Under Mr. Streit’s control, TPG experienced multiple negative revenue revisions and a 22% shortfall relative to management’s initial 2015 forecast32 2015 Forecast Date Revenue Green Dot Commentary Sep 18, 2014 $90M+ • "Fo
Slide 31: Case Study: Green Dot Bank
7 Case Study: Green Dot Bank* Earning Asset Yield (2015)33 Net Interest Margin (2015)34 4.70% 4.28% 4.45% 3.99% 4.28% 4.16% 3.80% 3.69% 4.04% Average – 3.56% 3.89% 3.77% 3.42% Average – 3.61% 3.37% 4.06% 3.30% 3.14% 3.59% 2.94% 0.49% 0.48% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% GDOT 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Slide 32: Examining Mr. Streit's Failures On Major Strategic Initiatives
Examining Mr. Streit’s Failures On Major Strategic Initiatives Strategic Initiative Status Commentary Renew Walmart Contract Under Renewed contract, although terms unclear Reasonable Terms In-source Processing Failed, wasted shareholder money Reinvigorate MoneyCard Failed, reversed strategy Successf
Slide 33: Mr. Streit's Inconsistent & Misleading Investor Communications
Mr. Streit’s Inconsistent & Misleading Investor Communications “I’m the largest shareholder by far…and on top of that I haven’t sold shares since November of 2010” Steve Streit, Q4 15 Earnings Conference Call, 2/24/16 BLACKROCK WAS GREEN DOT’S LARGEST SHAREHOLDER AS OF 2/24/16; MR. STREIT SOLD 536,6
Slide 34: Mr. Streit's Acquisition Disclosures Reflect A Violation Of Investor Trust
Mr. Streit’s Acquisition Disclosures Reflect A Violation Of Investor Trust Green Dot made two acquisitions, in December 2014 and January 2015, which combined accounted for more than 10% of 2015 projected revenue, yet neither acquisition was disclosed37 • Between late December 2014 and January 2015,
Slide 35: Mr. Streit Appears Incapable Of Providing A Clear and Consistent Message On Growth
Mr. Streit Appears Incapable Of Providing A Clear and Consistent Message On Growth • Q3 13 earnings call: Mr. Streit set 2014 expectations for “double-digit” revenue growth “It's fair to say that we believe • Green Dot’s Investor Day: Mr. Streit began to we are well positioned to return hedge his co
Slide 36: Mr. Streit Appears Incapable Of Providing A Clear And Consistent Message On Margins
Mr. Streit Appears Incapable Of Providing A Clear And Consistent Message On Margins • November ‘13: Mr. Streit implied margins would “This past half we spent so expand in 2014 much money [margins were] not • Deutsche Bank take: “Margin expansion in normalized. 18% [is] too low for FY14…The company e
Slide 37: Mr. Streit Does Not Appear To Consider The Severe Consequences Of His Misstatements
Mr. Streit Does Not Appear To Consider The Severe Consequences Of His Misstatements • TPG Acquisition Call: Mr. Streit repeatedly stated in prepared remarks & Q&A that the acquisition “The [TPG] transaction is would be “mid-teens accretive”44 expected to generate non-GAAP • Sell-side analysts added
Slide 38: Valuation Reflects Lack Of Execution And Distrust In Mr. Streit
Valuation Reflects Lack Of Execution And Distrust In Mr. Streit • A company’s stock price is comprised of two factors – (i) the earnings a company generates, and (ii) the multiple investors are willing to pay for those earnings • Given Green Dot’s persistent execution mistakes and chronic financial
Slide 39: Troubling Executive Turnover & CEO Leadership Deficiency
Troubling Executive Turnover & CEO Leadership Deficiency “The CEO is intolerant of anyone who questions his judgment. Therefore, many executives who were brought on board as change agents were either asked to leave or left in short order because the CEO made a promise for change that he didn't inten
Slide 40: Executive Turnover Is Symptomatic Of An Unhealthy Leadership Culture
Executive Turnover Is Symptomatic Of An Unhealthy Leadership Culture Green Dot has experienced executive turnover in nearly all divisions, likely contributing to the poor execution 48 Executive Position Commentary William Sowell Chief Operating Officer • Departed after less than 4 years Mark Trought
Slide 41: It Appears Mr. Streit Is Not Viewed Favorably By Employees
It Appears Mr. Streit Is Not Viewed Favorably By Employees Mr. Streit’s Glassdoor reviews are concerning*, 49 • Green Dot has a 2.4 overall rating, with only 32% of employees approving of Mr. Streit as CEO • The only consistent positive feedback is that Green Dot salaries are high “Take a serious lo
Slide 42: Sell-side Analysts Have Also Expressed Concerns About Leadership
Sell-side Analysts Have Also Expressed Concerns About Leadership Sell-side analysts began questioning Green Dot’s leadership as early as 2012 Date Firm Commentary • “Okay, and let me just ask Steve a tough question. Obviously, these are disappointing results and guidance. Deutsche Jul 26, 2012 Have
Slide 43: Broken Corporate Governance & Board Culpability
Broken Corporate Governance & Board Culpability “The estimated cost of the company's equity compensation program is excessive. CEO pay has significantly increased from prior levels, due primarily to a substantial equity grant which is entirely time-based and not in line with peer companies. The comp
Slide 44: Green Dot Is The Poster Child For Poor Corporate Governance
Green Dot Is The Poster Child For Poor Corporate Governance The Green Dot Board is structured to maintain the status quo, which we believe has contributed to the Company’s poor performance Green Dot Governance Best Practices Governance Provisions50 Declassified Board Shareholders May Call Special Me
Slide 45: A Stale Board With Declining Independent Insider Ownership
A Stale Board With Declining Independent Insider Ownership Greenleaf, Moritz, Aldrich, and Streit have served together on Green Dot’s Board for more than 13 years Glinda Bridgforth Hodges 1 George Shaheen 2 Shares Held by Green Dot’s Long-Tenured Mary Dent 2 Independent Directors52 Moritz* Greenleaf
Slide 46: The Board Appears to Advocate Excessive And Misaligned Compensation
The Board Appears to Advocate Excessive And Misaligned Compensation “Our compensation committee decided to target a higher level of long-term equity award value for our CEO than was recommended by Barney & Barney” - Green Dot 2014 Proxy Statement Incentive compensation was aligned to Revenue and EBI
Slide 47: The Board Has Approved Excessive And Misaligned Compensation For The CFO Position
The Board Has Approved Excessive And Misaligned Compensation For The CFO Position Messrs. Greenleaf and Moritz are culpable, with both serving as members of the troubled Compensation Committee • After an extensive six month search, Green Dot named Grace Wang Chief Financial Officer in October 2013 •
Slide 48: The Board Continues To Reward Mr. Streit Despite His Apparent Destruction of Shareholder Value
The Board Continues To Reward Mr. Streit Despite His Apparent Destruction of Shareholder Value Discrepancy between Mr. Streit’s compensation and performance represents a severe misalignment of interests 57 Streit Total Compensation $ millions $6.6 GDOT Cumulative Underperformance v. Original Peer Gr
Slide 49: The Class III Directors We Seek to Replace Are Long-Tenured With Limited Relevant Experience
The Class III Directors We Seek to Replace Are Long-Tenured With Limited Relevant Experience We believe Messrs. Streit, Greenleaf, and Moritz have failed shareholders 58 Streit Greenleaf Moritz 2013 ISS Recommendation FOR WITHHOLD WITHHOLD Tenure 16 years 15 years 13 years Approved Related Party Loo
Slide 50: We Believe The Class III Directors Are Stale And Have Repeatedly Failed To Represent Shareholders' Interests
We Believe The Class III Directors Are Stale And Have Repeatedly Failed To Represent Shareholders’ Interests Green Dot’s staggered board only presents the opportunity to enact real change once every three years59 Director Evidence of Issues • 71% absolute stock price decline over last five years • C
Slide 51: We Believe The Board's Governance Failures Disenfranchise Shareholders And Serve To Entrench Board Members
We Believe The Board’s Governance Failures Disenfranchise Shareholders And Serve To Entrench Board Members We believe the Green Dot Board has repeatedly demonstrated poor judgment • In the midst of a contest in which shareholders finally have an opportunity to express their views on the performance
Slide 52: Harvest's Plan For Creating Long-Term Shareholder Value
Harvest’s Plan For Creating Long-Term Shareholder Value “Part of being a CEO is you have to evaluate yourself and your other C levels to say, ‘hey, are we here out of habit or are we truly the best people for the job at any given point in time’” Steve Streit, 5/15/13 52
Slide 53: Our Five Step Plan For Setting Green Dot On The Path To Shareholder Value Creation
Our Five Step Plan For Setting Green Dot On The Path To Shareholder Value Creation We believe the following steps must be implemented by a proven leader and an experienced, reconstituted Board to reverse years of underperformance at Green Dot • Fresh, new perspectives on the Board will allow the Com
Slide 54: Reconstitute The Board And Adopt Policies Targeting Shareholder Alignment
Reconstitute The Board And Adopt Policies 1 Targeting Shareholder Alignment • We believe Green Dot’s incumbent Board is misaligned, entrenched, and lacks a shareholder-friendly mindset • Messrs. Streit, Moritz, and Greenleaf have an average tenure of 15 years • Stale and insular approach towards gov
Slide 55: We Believe Our Nominees Have The Experience & Expertise Necessary To Create Value At Green Dot
We Believe Our Nominees Have The Experience & 1 Expertise Necessary To Create Value At Green Dot Livingston Fanlo Gresham • 25-year career as public and private • Over 30 years of industry experience • Significant payments and financial company executive, often in in financial services, banking, and
Slide 56: Livingston – "Roll Up Your Sleeves" Executive Who Will Hold Management Accountable
Livingston – “Roll Up Your Sleeves” Executive 1 Who Will Hold Management Accountable We recruited Mr. Livingston for his immense experience as a positive change agent. Given Mr. Livingston’s strong background in corporate governance, and Green Dot’s multitude of failures in governance, we believe Mr
Slide 57: Fanlo – Accomplished Financial Services Executive Bringing Best Practices In Banking And Regulation
Fanlo – Accomplished Financial Services Executive 1 Bringing Best Practices In Banking And Regulation We are thrilled an executive of Mr. Fanlo’s caliber sees the immense opportunity at Green Dot and the multiple growth avenues that require deep banking and regulatory experience. We believe Mr. Fanl
Slide 58: Gresham – Extensive Payments & Processing Domain Expertise
Gresham – Extensive Payments & 1 Processing Domain Expertise We recruited Mr. Gresham due to his unparalleled background in both GPR and payment processing, as well as his impressive performance track record as CFO of NetSpend, Global Cash, and eFunds. Don’t just take our word for it. Green Dot rece
Slide 59: Our Nominees Individually Address Unique Board Deficiencies
Our Nominees Individually Address 1 Unique Board Deficiencies Nominee to Green Dot Deficit Address Rationale Governance • Served on 10 public boards, chaired 4 audit and 1 compensation committees, garnering a reputation as a strong advocate of shareholders’ rights Operations Philip Livingston • Havi
Slide 60: Install A Highly Qualified CEO With A Track Record Of Success
Install A Highly Qualified CEO 2 With A Track Record Of Success • Identifying the right CEO is the most important change needed at Green Dot • Today’s Green Dot is a $700 million business with over 1,000 employees, multiple product lines, diverse partners, and a bank holding company • Green Dot requ
Slide 61: World-Class CEO Candidates Have Expressed Interest In Green Dot
World-Class CEO Candidates Have 2 Expressed Interest In Green Dot “Leadership is the capacity to translate vision into reality” - Warren Bennis • The Board should commence a search for a world-class CEO • Proven industry all-stars have approached Harvest to understand the possibilities at Green Dot
Slide 62: Realign Strategic Initiatives To Balance Growth With Profitability
Realign Strategic Initiatives To 3 Balance Growth With Profitability • Green Dot is no longer a hyper-growth business; the GPR industry is maturing and consolidating • Stable pricing & competition retrenching = Consistent financial results, opportunities for accretive acquisitions • Goal of double-d
Slide 63: Right-size The Cost Structure And Optimize The Capital Structure
Right-size The Cost Structure And 4 Optimize The Capital Structure • Green Dot should look like a payments company • Operating expense growth is not currently driven by required return analysis • Compensation & benefits, processing, and general & administrative expenses ALL grown > revenue since 201
Slide 64: Explore Consumer Lending And Banking Efficiencies
Explore Consumer Lending 5 And Banking Efficiencies • As regulatory capital restrictions are lifted, we believe Green Dot can work collaboratively with regulators to improve the earnings power of Green Dot Bank • The bottom 10% of all publicly traded small U.S. banks generated a net interest margin
Slide 65: Offer Consumer Credit Products and Solutions that Help Green Dot's Customers
Offer Consumer Credit Products and 5 Solutions that Help Green Dot’s Customers • We recognize the acute sensitivity and care that lending to the unbanked/under-banked community requires • Green Dot’s customers benefit greatly from products and solutions that continue to drive increased financial inc
Slide 66: We Believe Green Dot Can Conservatively Double EPS By 2018
We Believe Green Dot Can Conservatively Double EPS By 2018 • Tremendous earnings power has been trapped within Green Dot 67 • Our EPS bridge assumes only a modest net interest margin increase on Green Dot’s current asset base • We have conservatively excluded any potential benefits from asset growth
Slide 67: Examining Green Dot's Disappointing Response To Our Campaign
Examining Green Dot’s Disappointing Response To Our Campaign “Despite our serious level of concern, we would like to emphasize the desire to work with the Board in a cooperative manner…We do not want to be disruptive, we do not want to be a source of unnecessary costs or distractions, and we definit
Slide 68: The Time For Change Is Now
The Time For Change Is Now “Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed” Warren Buffett, Berk
Slide 69: The Board Needs New Leadership NOW
The Board Needs New Leadership NOW We believe long-tenured Directors Streit, Moritz and Greenleaf must be replaced because under their leadership, poor execution and a misaligned Board have failed shareholders Inexcusable • Multiple execution errors in every quarter over the last two years • Failed
Slide 70: Vote GREEN FOR Livingston, Fanlo, & Gresham: A Referendum On The Need For New Leadership & Accountability
Vote GREEN FOR Livingston, Fanlo, & Gresham: A Referendum On The Need For New Leadership & Accountability • Seeks to remove three long-standing, poorly performing Directors Referendum • Seeks to compel a change in the toxic “tone at the top” for consistently failing to deliver Serves Three on shareh
Slide 71: To Fix Green Dot, Vote "FOR" Livingston, Fanlo, And Gresham On The GREEN Proxy Card TODAY
To Fix Green Dot, Vote “FOR” Livingston, Fanlo, And Gresham On The GREEN Proxy Card TODAY • How To Vote: • Vote by Phone: Please call the telephone number specified on your GREEN proxy card from a touchtone phone and follow the simple instructions • Vote by Internet: Please access the website specif
Slide 72: Endnotes
Endnotes 1. Harvest Capital and Bloomberg. Returns reflect period from 12/1/05 to 12/31/15 2. The Nilson Report and Raymond James research 3. Ibid 4. MasterCard and The Boston Consulting Group 5. Company filings 6. Company presentation dated 11/3/14 7. Company presentation dated 12/2/15 8. Company p
Slide 73: Endnotes (cont'd)
Endnotes (cont’d) 18. Company filings and Bloomberg. All margins are based on 2015 or nearest completed fiscal year results. HAWK EBITDA margin is based on the company’s adjusted operating revenue 19. Company filings. NetSpend results based on standalone reporting for 2011 and 2012; based on segment
Slide 74: Endnotes (cont'd)
Endnotes (cont’d) 40. Green Dot 2014 10-K 41. Deutsche Bank research note dated 11/19/13 42. Green Dot Q4 13 earnings press release dated 1/30/14 43. Green Dot Q4 13 earnings conference call held 1/30/14 44. Santa Barbara Tax Products Group acquisition conference call held 9/18/14 45. Bloomberg cons
Slide 75: Endnotes (cont'd)
Endnotes (cont’d) 65. SNL Database and Green Dot Bank Call Reports 66. SurveyMonkey, survey of 772 consumers who have used an open-loop reloadable prepaid card in the last six months, conducted November 2015 67. Analysis based on Harvest Capital estimates. Assumes 3.0% compound annual growth rate fo