Equity Commonwealth — CommonWealth REIT — Proxy Contest (May 2013)
34 slides from Equity Commonwealth's proxy contest presentation, May 7, 2013
Slide 1: Schedule 14A Proxy Statement Cover
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 14A Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Filed by the Registrant ¨ Filed by a Party other than the Registrant x Check the appropriate box: ¨ Preliminary Proxy Statement ¨ Conf
Slide 2: Date Filed
(4) Date Filed:
Slide 3: The Case for Change Now at CWH
The Case for Change Now at CWH Presentation to ISS May 7, 2013
Slide 4: Disclaimer
Disclaimer This presentation does not constitute either an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any interest in any fund associated with Corvex Management LP (“Corvex”) or Related Fund Management, LLC (“Related”). Any such offer would only be made at the time a qualified offeree receiv
Slide 5: Introduction: Immediate Change is Needed
Introduction Immediate Change is Needed We are pleased to present to ISS our case for change at Commonwealth REIT (1) On behalf of shareholders, Corvex and Related are soliciting consents to remove all members of the board of trustees of Commonwealth REIT (“CWH” or the “Company”) in a desperately ne
Slide 6: Introduction: Immediate Change is Needed
Introduction Immediate Change is Needed We propose to effect Change through Accountability: Path for Shareholders: Action by written consent; a 2/3 vote will remove the entire board of trustees and hold them accountable Value for Shareholders: We believe in a significantly higher NAV per share after
Slide 7: Poor Corporate Governance
Poor Corporate Governance CWH’s Corporate Governance Policies Destined to Fail Shareholders “I’m on both boards and I can say there’s no conflict of interest.” (1) - Adam Portnoy, President/Managing Trustee, CWH; and President/CEO/Part-Owner, REIT Management & Research (“RMR”), External Adviser to C
Slide 8: Conflicted Board of Trustees
Poor Corporate Governance Conflicted Board of Trustees Significant overlap of board members across RMR entities, including so-called “independent” trustees In our view, the Portnoys and CWH’s “independent” trustees are conflicted by any common sense definition 2 of 3 “independent” trustees serve on
Slide 9: Fundamental Misalignment of Incentives
Poor Corporate Governance Fundamental Misalignment of Incentives RMR receives fees based on gross historical cost basis, gross collected rents and construction costs, incentivizing growth through acquisitions regardless of returns to CWH shareholders $2.7 billion of net acquisitions and capex since
Slide 10: Actions Speak Louder Than Words
Poor Corporate Governance Actions Speak Louder Than Words Value destructive actions and attempts by the trustees to disenfranchise CWH shareholders, all undertaken after Corvex/Related attempts at reform, are appalling: A massively dilutive equity offering executed at 48% below book value to repay d
Slide 11: Dilutive Equity Offering
Poor Corporate Governance Dilutive Equity Offering We believe the recently completed equity offering serves as a clear example of poor management, fundamentally misaligned incentives, and terrible capital allocation On March 5, 2013, CWH sold 34.5 million shares at $19.00 despite protests from some
Slide 12: March Bylaw Amendment
Poor Corporate Governance March 1 Bylaw Amendment Related and Corvex believe CWH’s March 1 st bylaw amendment is invalid and a desperate attempt to disenfranchise shareholders On March 1, 2013, CWH announced its bylaws had been amended to “clarify that a shareholder seeking to take action to remove
Slide 13: Failed Maryland House Bill Amendment
Poor Corporate Governance Failed Maryland House Bill Amendment One of the Portnoys’ latest legal maneuvers was a secret attempt (likely using th CWH money) to insert an 11 hour amendment into a Maryland House Bill CWH used deceptive letters (which were later withdrawn) from a conflicted attorney in
Slide 14: April Bylaw Amendment
Poor Corporate Governance April 12 Bylaw Amendment CWH’s latest bylaw amendment conflicts with 14 years of their own public disclosure On April 12, 2013, CWH purported to “opt-in” to Section 3-803 of the Maryland General Corporation Law, which allows Maryland companies to adopt a classified board (s
Slide 15: History of Underperformance: Summary
History of Underperformance Summary CWH has in our view performed poorly in absolute terms and underperformed its peers (1) on almost any metric over any relevant time period Stock price performance: -17%, -45%, -43%, -45%, and -53% return over the last 1 year, 2 (2) years, 3 years, 5 years, and 10
Slide 16: Total Returns
History of Underperformance Total Returns – 3 years CWH has underperformed its peers over the last 3 years • Like CWH, selected peers are also suburban office REITs • CWH has even underperformed CLI, ~80% of whose office markets are either struggling or in secular decline 80.0% RMZ: 52.5% 1 year 3 y
Slide 17: Summary Public Comparables
History of Underperformance Summary Public Comparables CWH trades at a significant discount to its peers on all key measures ($ in millions, except per share values and TEV / sq. ft.) Enterprise Implied G&A / Current Equity value nominal TEV / equity Net debt / P / FFO TEV / EBITDA Div Ticker Compan
Slide 18: Path for Shareholders
Change Through Accountability Path for Shareholders We believe removing CWH’s entire board of trustees immediately is in the best long-term interests of all shareholders, and the only near-term means for shareholders to effect change Given entrenching devices in CWH’s documents, shareholders must ac
Slide 19: Value for Shareholders
Change Through Accountability Value for Shareholders We believe our path will unlock significant value for all shareholders, whereas the status quo will lead to continued value destruction and self dealing for the benefit of the Portnoys Value: $35 per share potential NAV at 4/17/13 after removal of
Slide 20: Plan for Shareholders: Strategy
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: Strategy We propose the following key elements as a starting point for the Company’s new direction, subject to the approval of the new board elected by shareholders Internalize management and adopt a market cost structure Align management compensa
Slide 21: Plan for Shareholders: Board Transition
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: Board Transition The Declaration of Trust contemplates the removal of the entire board of trustees and provides a roadmap for the transition Once the current trustees are removed, CWH is required to promptly call a special meeting during which all
Slide 22: New Corporate Governance Framework
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: New Corporate Governance Framework We will only support trustees who commit to immediately upon their election take steps to amend CWH’s charter and bylaws to conform to ISS and Glass Lewis best practices: Terminate CWH’s poison pill, and impose a
Slide 23: Corporate Management Transition
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: Corporate Management Transition Related/Corvex have identified a potential interim CEO, Jim Lozier, to help transition CWH to internal management Mr. Lozier is a 30+ year real estate industry veteran: – Former CEO and co-founder of the Archon Grou
Slide 24: Property Operations Transition
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: Property Operations Transition CBRE, the world’s largest commercial real estate services firm, has agreed to provide interim property management services and leasing services to the CWH portfolio as necessary CBRE(1) employs 42,000+ people in 430+
Slide 25: Financial Transition
Change Through Accountability Plan for Shareholders: Financial Transition In connection with their scare tactics, current trustees have also emphasized risk that a termination of RMR’s agreements could lead to a “change of control” under CWH’s credit agreements and other agreements We, along with ou
Slide 26: Conclusions
Conclusions Change Through Accountability “Worst-in-class” corporate governance, in our view, has produced a fundamental misalignment of incentives, destroyed value, and disenfranchised shareholders CWH has, in our view, performed poorly in absolute terms and underperformed its peers on almost any m
Slide 27: Valuation Summary
Appendix Valuation Summary With the removal of current trustees, we estimate an NAV per share of $35 today (4/17/13) based on bottom-up property-by-property analysis, and a target stock price of $44 or higher at 12/31/14 We believe NAV can be thought of as fair market value of the current portfolio,
Slide 28: Share Repurchase Analysis
Appendix Share Repurchase Analysis We believe accretive capital allocation could lead to a stock price of $44 by 12/31/14 2012 2013E 2014E Reported CAD $131.4 Stabilized Cash NOI (after Non-Core Asset Sales) $511.4 Cap Rate Assumed 7.50% Run-Rate Target Savings Implied CWH TEV $6,818.7 Business Mgmt
Slide 29: Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking
Appendix Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking Have current trustees created value for CWH shareholders? Is it possible for existing trustees to fairly represent shareholders given their conflicts of interest? Why have RMR’s fees gone up 30% since 2007 while CWH’s stock has declined 68%? W
Slide 30: Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking (cont'd)
Appendix Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking (cont’d) Why haven’t CWH’s “independent” trustees formed an independent committee and hired independent advisors? How have CWH shareholders been compensated for the multiple new RMR platforms launched with CWH’s assets? Does CWH even have a st
Slide 31: "Structural Change is Much Needed"
Appendix “Structural Change is Much Needed” Citi Research has stated that the Company has a flawed structure and history of value destruction 29
Slide 32: "External Manager RMR Causes Concern"
Appendix “External Manager RMR Causes Concern” (1) For the 9 month period ended September 30, 2012, CWH reported a NOI margin of 57.7%. CWH excluded 94 underperforming properties as discontinued properties in its same store financials ending 12/31/2012, making the 9 months ended 9/30/2012 a more rep
Slide 33: "Acting in the best interest of RMR rather than as a fiduciary"
Appendix “Acting in the best interest of RMR rather than as a fiduciary” 31
Slide 34: Related & Corvex Overview
Appendix Related & Corvex Overview Related and Corvex collectively own 10.9 million shares of CWH (9.2% of shares outstanding) Related Companies – Related Fund Management, LLC is an affiliate of Related Companies (“Related”), one of the most prominent privately-owned real estate firms in the United