Cyberonics Inc

Cyberonics — Proxy Contest (January 2007)

35 slides from Cyberonics's proxy contest presentation, Jan 16, 2007

  1. Slide 1: Schedule 14A Proxy Statement Cover

    SCHEDULE 14A Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 FILED BY THE REGISTRANT ¨ FILED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE REGISTRANT x Check the appropriate box: ¨ Preliminary Proxy Statement ¨ Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(

  2. Slide 2: Proxy Solicitation Presentation, 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders

    The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders Proxy Solicitation Presentation Cyberonics, Inc. 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders For Improved Corporate Governance, Effective Oversight and Accountability and Maximized Shareholder Value January 2007

  3. Slide 3: Our Goals and Objectives

    Our Goals and Objectives The Company is at a critical cross-roads. We believe it must have representatives in the boardroom who are nominated by the shareholders and are committed to: • Corporate governance best practices • Effective management oversight and accountability • Exploring all alternativ

  4. Slide 4: Our Message

    Our Message Although our Nominees would represent a minority of the Cyberonics Board, their election will send a strong message that the Company’s shareholders: • Are dissatisfied with the Company’s direction and performance • Strongly support long overdue corporate governance reforms • Demand effec

  5. Slide 5: Our Message

    Our Message • Significant Challenges Face the Company • Dismal Stock Performance • No Management Accountability • Poor Corporate Governance • Ineffective Internal Controls • Damaged Company Credibility 3

  6. Slide 6: Challenges Facing the Company

    Challenges Facing the Company Cyberonics faces significant problems, including: • Options back-dating and spring-loading scandal • Ongoing investigations by the SEC and U.S. Attorney into: • Inability to make timely 10-K and 10-Q filings • Potential delisting from NASDAQ • Default notice and acceler

  7. Slide 7: Poor Stock Performance

    Poor Stock Performance The Company’s stock has consistently and substantially underperformed over the short, intermediate and long term as compared to its industry peers. Comparison of 1 Year Cumulative Total Return (as of September 8, 2006).* 1-Year Performance Cyberonics Med Tech Index $120 $100 $

  8. Slide 8: Poor Stock Performance 3-Year Performance

    Poor Stock Performance Comparison of 3 Year Cumulative Total Return (as of September 8, 2006) 3-Year Performance Cyberonics Med Tech Index $180 $160 $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 6

  9. Slide 9: Diminished Shareholder Value

    Diminished Shareholder Value Losses generated through January 10, 2007: • One year - (34.7%) • Three year - (40.1%) • Five year - (26.3%) The Company’s stock price has only recently shown some modest, and erratic, improvement. However, we believe the improvement is largely attributable to the announ

  10. Slide 10: Lack of Management Accountability

    Lack of Management Accountability Good corporate governance requires that: • Senior management be held accountable for the Company’s performance • Directors be held accountable for failing to oversee and hold management accountable for poor Company performance Incumbent members of the Board have rep

  11. Slide 11: Excessive Management Compensation

    Excessive Management Compensation • In July 2005, Ronald A. Matricaria, a non-management director who was the Chairman of the Compensation Committee, resigned from the Cyberonics Board, stating his opposition to: “The direction of the governance practices of the Cyberonics board, in particular its p

  12. Slide 12: Excessive Management Compensation

    Excessive Management Compensation • Approximately a year later, incumbent Directors approved a severance package valued at over $5 million, when Mr. Cummins resigned under the weight of the options back-dating scandal. • The severance package includes: • Over $3.4 million in cash plus a tax gross-up

  13. Slide 13: Poor Corporate Governance

    Poor Corporate Governance The incumbent Directors have ignored corporate governance best practices, causing significant damage to the Company and shareholder value. For example, as a result of the Board’s option grant practices, first exposed in a June 8, 2006 Robinson Humphrey analyst’s report ques

  14. Slide 14: Option Grant Irregularities

    Option Grant Irregularities According to the Robinson Humphrey analyst’s report, on the same day an FDA advisory panel was scheduled to meet to recommend approval of the Company’s application to treat Treatment Resistant Depression, the Company granted stock options to Robert P. Cummins, Richard L.

  15. Slide 15: Option Grant Irregularities

    Option Grant Irregularities The Company subsequently acknowledged other pervasive option grant irregularities, including: • approving option grants after the purported “actual” date of grant; • documenting the same option grants on multiple, differently-dated documents; • canceling and reissuing cer

  16. Slide 16: Fallout From Option Grant Scandal

    Fallout From Option Grant Scandal As a result of these option practices and the resulting restatements: • The Company is delinquent in its SEC filing obligations • The Company faces the potential delisting from NASDAQ • The Company has received a default notice and acceleration demand from the Trust

  17. Slide 17: Fallout From Option Grant Scandal

    Fallout From Option Grant Scandal The SEC also apparently is investigating: • The Company’s investor and analyst guidance practices • The Company’s financial results announced on May 1, 2006 • The Company’s sales for the quarter ended April 28, 2006 • Insurance coverage of the Company’s VNS Therapy

  18. Slide 18: Poor Corporate Governance

    Poor Corporate Governance In addition: • Incumbent Directors have allowed Kevin Moore, a longstanding close friend of Mr. Cummins, to serve on the Board and be compensated as a Board member for nearly three years without ever being duly elected by the shareholders, in apparent violation of the Compa

  19. Slide 19: Poor Corporate Governance

    Poor Corporate Governance • As reported in a November 21, 2006 USA Today article by Elliot Blair Smith entitled “SEC filings show new chairman got options 3 years before joining board,” Tony Coelho and Stanley Appel, both current or former members of the Compensation Committee and both incumbent dir

  20. Slide 20: Damaged Company Credibility

    Damaged Company Credibility The Company has lost credibility with its shareholders and other members of the investment community through its repeated failures to achieve management’s own stated guidance. • On August 1, 2006, management lowered its guidance for the 2006 fiscal year and announced that

  21. Slide 21: Damaged Company Credibility

    Damaged Company Credibility The Committee believes the Company’s shareholders are entitled to honesty and candor from its Board and management, not repeated instances of over-promising and under-delivery. The credibility deficit created by management, and the failure of incumbent Directors to hold m

  22. Slide 22: Actions Speak Louder Than Words

    Actions Speak Louder Than Words In recent weeks, the incumbent Board members have sought credit for finally making minimal and long overdue improvements to the Company’s corporate governance practices. However, The Committee believes that the primary catalyst for the minimal changes the Board has ma

  23. Slide 23: Basic Shareholder Rights

    Basic Shareholder Rights The Committee feels that the incumbent Board members have not fulfilled their basic duty to implement sound corporate governance practices. We believe shareholders have a fundamental right to have Directors: • who are attuned and committed to corporate governance best practi

  24. Slide 24: Why Our Nominees Should Be Elected

    Why Our Nominees Should Be Elected The Committee is incentivized to maximize shareholder value for all shareholders. • The Committee owns approximately 7.33% of the outstanding corporate stock of Cyberonics - our interests are directly aligned with the other shareholders of the Company Our Nominees

  25. Slide 25: Why Our Nominees Should Be Elected

    Why Our Nominees Should Be Elected If elected, we expect our Nominees to: • Work to implement corporate governance best practices • Push for strong oversight and accountability by: • Participating in selecting the next CEO • Assisting with real CEO succession planning following the selection of the

  26. Slide 26: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees The Committee’s Nominees have significant and relevant experience. • Alfred J. Novak has been a director on the boards of numerous companies, including OrbusNeich Medical Technology Company, Ltd., a privately held interventional cardiology company, ProRhythm, Inc., a company dedicated t

  27. Slide 27: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees • Arthur J. Rosenthal has served as Chairman of Labcoat, Ltd. since January 2002 and CEO from January 2005. He was a Senior Vice President, Corporate Officer and Chief Development Officer of Boston Scientific Corporation and from January 1994 though May 2000, was a Senior Vice President

  28. Slide 28: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees • Jeffrey E. Schwarz is presently the Chief Executive Officer of Metropolitan Capital Advisors, Inc., KJ Advisors, Inc. and Metropolitan Capital III, Inc., investment management companies. Mr. Schwarz has served as non- executive Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors of Bogen Communicat

  29. Slide 29: Help Us Improve Cyberonics For All Shareholders

    Help Us Improve Cyberonics For All Shareholders The members of the Committee have been continually disappointed by management’s inability to meet its own projected targets and the Company’s consistently poor stock performance. We also have been frustrated to watch the Company’s management and incumb

  30. Slide 30: Help Us Improve Cyberonics For All Shareholders

    Help Us Improve Cyberonics For All Shareholders We believe our highly-qualified nominees will bring an important outside perspective to the Board and provide a catalyst for the important changes that must be made for the benefit of the Company and all of its shareholders. Our nominees are committed

  31. Slide 31: Vote the GOLD Proxy Card Today!

    Vote the GOLD Proxy Card Today! A proxy statement regarding this proxy solicitation was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 4, 2006. You should read the proxy statement, as it contains important information. Copies of the proxy statement are available free of charge at www.s

  32. Slide 32: Vote the GOLD Proxy Card Today!

    Vote the GOLD Proxy Card Today! If you have any questions concerning the Committee’s proxy statement, would like additional copies of the proxy statement or the GOLD proxy card, or if you need help voting your shares, please contact our proxy solicitor: D.F. KING & CO., INC. 48 WALL STREET NEW YORK,

  33. Slide 33: Following article may be distributed to stockholders and proxy advisory firms

    THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE MAY BE DISTRIBUTED TO STOCKHOLDERS OF CYBERONICS, INC. AND PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS

  34. Slide 34: SEC filings show new chairman got options 3 years before joining board

    Permission to reprint the following article was neither sought nor obtained by The Committee For Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders. SEC filings show new chairman got options 3 years before joining board Updated 11/21/2006 3:23 AM ET By Elliot Blair Smith, USA TODAY Former U.S. congressman Tony

  35. Slide 35: Article continuation: APB 25 and option accounting

    According to Financial Accounting Standards Board rule APB 25, issued in 1993, Cyberonics should have recorded the 1994 below-market options as an expense for tax and accounting purposes. In addition, the two men would have been required to report as personal income that year the difference between

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