Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB
Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Investor Presentation (April 2015)
31 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, Apr 30, 2015
Slide 1: Work-Related Ability as Source of Information Advantages of Training Employers
Work-Related Ability as Source of Information Advantages of Training Employers Jens Mohrenweiser Bournemouth University Gaby Wydra-Somaggio IAB-Regional, Saarbrücken Thomas Zwick University of Würzburg and ZEW Presentation Prepared for NBB Seminar on Firm Analysis, Bruxelles 30 April 2015
Slide 2: Motivation
Motivation • Investment in transferable skills generates information advantage about employee ability or training content (Katz and Ziderman 1990, Chang and Wang 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998) • Information advantage drives wedge between able employees´ wage and their outside wage offers Return fo
Slide 3: Motivation
Motivation • Many examples of employer-sponsored general training: MBA courses, language and IT courses, apprenticeship training • Most of these training courses end with a certificate • Especially marked certificates issued by an external institution allow outside firms to infer training participan
Slide 4: Open empirical questions
Open empirical questions • What is the source of information advantage given training contents are public knowledge and training achievements are documented by certificates? • Do training firms have the discretion power to select most able employees?
Slide 5: Empirical approach
Empirical approach • Distinguish between cognitive and work- related ability as sources of employee productivity • Use German apprenticeship system as framework of certified and transparent general training • Compare relative ability of apprenticeship graduates in comparison to homogeneous peer grou
Slide 6: Contribution
Contribution • Derive hypotheses on two-period model with two ability dimensions that nests symmetric and asymmetric employer learning (Schönberg 2007) • Develop two new signals on ability in addition to established measures AFQT, schooling, library card (Kahn 2014): – mark in final occupation certi
Slide 7: Model
Model • First period: training firm learns about two ability dimensions • Second period: skilled employee decides whether to stay at training firm or move to another employer • Trained employee stays if inside higher than outside wage offer plus disutility shock incurred during training • Disutility
Slide 8: Model
Model • Outside firms offer wages depending on observable ability, a-priori distribution of unobservable ability, and selectivity • Unobservable ability is indicated by noisy signal • Training firm makes counteroffer if outside wage is lower than productivity • Competition reduces profits to zero •
Slide 9: Hypotheses
Hypotheses • Symmetric employer learning Entry wage determinants are equal for movers and stayers No adverse selection of movers based on ability measures • Asymmetric employer learning Adverse selection of movers The public signal (cognitive skills) stronger influences entry earnings for movers tha
Slide 10: Institution
Institution German dual apprenticeship training system • Defines transferable and visible skills • Investments by training firms • Externally monitored and marked final certificates from the chambers of commerce and craft • Apprentices perform similar tasks • Within one region and occupation: appren
Slide 11: Two types of information on apprenticeship graduates' ability
Two types of information on apprenticeship graduates´ ability Cognitive ability: – final examination marks from external institutions with no economic interest (chambers properly assess ability as public administration duty) – marks known to all labour market actors – training contents tailor-made f
Slide 12: Two types of information
Two types of information Work-related ability: – captures work-related ability – earnings bonus at the end of apprenticeship – bonus is difference from minimum wage paid to apprentice in employer, occupation and year cell – voluntarily paid by employer – mainly paid during last months of apprentices
Slide 13: Bonus determined from earnings variation within an establishment/occupation/graduation year cell
Bonus determined from earnings variation within an establishment/ occupation/ graduation year cell 31 30 29 28 27 26 mean sd- 25 sd+ 24 23 22 21 20 1 2 3 4 5 Establishment/ occupation/ graduation year cell with at least five apprentices over the entire training period. Regular apprenticeships only,
Slide 14: Two types of information
Two types of information – bonus known to recipients because collective bargaining apprentice earnings acts as focal wage or bonus is made transparent – bonus not known to outside firms because complete wage structure not revealed (Waldman, 1987) and bonus small in absolute terms (about 20€ per mont
Slide 15: Data
Data • Saarland Panel: SIAB (social security records) of apprenticeship graduates between 1999 and 2005 in the federal state of Saarland linked to administrative records of chambers of crafts and industry and commerce • Entire population of apprenticeship graduates • Information from chambers: marks
Slide 16: Data
Data • SIAB longitudinal data: Individual level: age, nationality, start and apprenticeship graduation day, earnings Employer level: number of employees and apprentices, earnings level, sector • All spells start on 1 January or when status changes • All spells are on day basis and linked to firm ide
Slide 17: Cell definition
Cell definition • At least two apprentices within an establishment/ occupation/ graduation year – No missings – Graduates who immediately move (< 30 days) to another employer and who stay • Key variables: – Log earnings deviation from cell minimum = earnings bonus – Average mark in final exam (multi
Slide 18: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics Variable Mover Stayer t-Test Marks (work-related -3.01 -2.82 5.92 ability) Log earnings bonus during 0.500 0.638 4.25 training (cognitive ability) Log earnings at first full- 3.942 4.109 7.91 time employment
Slide 19: Probability to move
Probability to move Cells with movers only all Earnings bonus -0.084*** -0.142*** -0.051*** (work-related ability) (5.34) (5.20) (5.10) Marks -0.053*** -0.098*** -0.064*** (cognitive ability) (3.21) (3.12) (6.30) Controls Yes Yes Yes Cell Fixed Effects No Yes No Pseudo R square 0.11 0.26 0.22 Observ
Slide 20: Determinants of first full-time skilled employment log earnings
Determinants of first full-time skilled employment log earnings Stayers Movers Log earnings bonus 0.027*** 0.011* 0.018* 0.008 (work-related ability) (4.84) (2.12) (1.91) (0.82) Marks 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.059*** 0.043*** (cognitive ability) (4.66) (3.52) (5.51) (3.93) Controls No Yes No Yes Observati
Slide 21: Main Findings
Main Findings • Moving apprenticeship graduates receive a lower bonus at the end of training and worse marks at final apprenticeship examination than stayers adverse selection of moving apprenticeship graduates with respect to cognitive and work-related ability
Slide 22: Main Findings
Main Findings • Cognitive ability (marks at final examination) is public signal and has a stronger impact on entry earnings of movers than of stayers • Same pattern for alternative signal on cognitive ability, schooling level (not reported) • Work-related ability (bonus payment by training firm) is
Slide 23: Determinants of log earnings – separate control for earnings bonus and mark
Determinants of log earnings – separate control for earnings bonus and mark Stayers Movers Log earnings bonus 0.011* 0.008 (work-related ability) (2.12) (0.82) Marks 0.019*** 0.043*** (cognitive ability) (3.53) (3.93) Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 3384 3384 2408 2408 R-sq 0.65 0.65 0.35 0.36
Slide 24: Main Findings
Main Findings • Earnings bonus and marks are orthogonal • Impact of ability indicators on earnings does not change if we leave out other determinants (DeVaro and Waldman, 2012) • Both ability indicators measure different dimensions of productivity
Slide 25: Conclusions
Conclusions • Training firms have no information advantage about cognitive skills • They have an information advantage about work- related ability • The information advantage is a pre-requirement of – the possibility to pay able graduates a wage above the market wage but below productivity – possibi
Slide 26: Conclusions
Conclusions • These results are robust if we reduce the sample of apprenticeship movers to those who leave training firms with strong (20%/50%) reductions in retention rate (Von Wachter and Bender 2006) • Determinants of earnings in second year after apprenticeship graduation are very similar to fir
Slide 27: Thanks for your attention
Thanks for your attention thomas.zwick@uni-wuerzburg.de
Slide 28: Sample selection
Sample selection • Graduating apprentices: 20,701 • ~ last apprenticeship spell in IEB in the same year as graduation according to chambers 15,340 • ~ age below 30 and earnings between 50% and 200% of occupational mean 13,597 • ~ with minimum cell size: 5,813 • ~ and without missings: 7,792
Slide 29: Pairwise correlation to marks
Pairwise correlation to marks All Mover Stayer Earnings bonus during training 0.215 0.191 0.228 Log earnings at first full-time 0.134 0.146 0.119 employment Observations 4097 1642 2455
Slide 30: Determinants of log earnings of employer movers– cells with demand shocks only
Determinants of log earnings of employer movers– cells with demand shocks only Retention rate Retention rate 20% below 50% below average average Log earnings bonus 0.020 0.009 (private information) (0.12) (0.49) Grades 0.112 0.089* (public information) (1.18) (1.74) Controls Yes Yes Observations 156
Slide 31: Determinants of log earnings - second year
Determinants of log earnings - second year Stayers Movers Log earnings bonus 0.007 0.009 (private information) (0.12) (0.68) Grades 0.021*** 0.061*** (public information) (2.73) (5.59) Controls Yes Yes Observations 2879 1916 R-sq 0.52 0.38 Dependent variable: log earnings; OLS regression; non-displa
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