Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs · LSE:PSH
Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs — Pershing Square Holdings — Investor Presentation (January 2017)
95 slides from Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs's investor presentation, Jan 26, 2017
Slide 1: Annual Update Presentation
Annual Update Presentation January 26, 2017 Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security mentioned. Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. (“Pershing Square”) believes this presentation contains a balanced presentation of the performanc
Slide 3: Table of Contents
Table of Contents 2016 Performance Review Current Portfolio Update Business & Organizational Update 3
Slide 4: 2016 Performance Review
2016 Performance Review
Slide 5: Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Performance
Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Performance 2016 Net Returns -13.5% S&P 500 11.9% 2015 Net Returns -20.5% S&P 500 1.4% 2014 Net Returns 40.4% S&P 500 13.7% 2013 Net Returns 9.6% S&P 500 32.4% Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All investments involve the possibility of
Slide 6: Cumulative Net Returns Since Inception of the Strategy
Cumulative Net Returns Since Inception of the Strategy (January 1, 2004) Pershing Square, L.P. Net Returns vs. Indexes through December 31, 2016 750.00% 700.00% 650.00% 600.00% Pershing Square, L.P.: 550.00% 503.1% 500.00% 450.00% 400.00% 350.00% 300.00% 250.00% 200.00% S&P 500: 163.4% 150.00% 100.0
Slide 7: Long-Term Performance in Up & Down Markets
Long-Term Performance in Up & Down Markets Pershing Square, L.P. Net Returns vs. S&P 500 (1/1/2004 through 12/31/2016)(1) Average Monthly Return Average Return in Up Months Average Return in Down Months 1.5% 2.7% 2.8% 0.0% 1.3% 3.0% -1.0% 1.0% 2.0% -2.0% (1.5%) 0.7% -3.0% 0.5% 1.0% -4.0% (3.5%) 0.0%
Slide 8: 2016 Winners and Losers (gross returns)
2016 Winners and Losers (gross returns) Winners PSH Losers PSH Restaurant Brands International 3.3% Valeant Pharmaceuticals (19.2%) Air Products & Chemicals Inc & Versum Materials 3.1% Currency Options (1.4%) Fannie Mae 3.1% Mondelez International (1.4%) Freddie Mac 1.7% Platform Specialty Products
Slide 9: Long and Short Attribution (Gross Returns)
Long and Short Attribution (Gross Returns) Pershing Square, L.P. Long Short/Hedge 2004 61.6% (5.9%) 2005 53.7% (1.6%) 2006 36.9% (6.9%) 2007 (5.6%) 34.9% 2008 (23.2%) 11.6% 2009 60.5% (11.4%) 2010 43.8% (4.7%) 2011 2.5% (2.1%) 2012 16.9% 1.1% 2013 25.8% (12.0%) 2014 42.4% 5.8% 2015 (9.3%) (5.6%) 201
Slide 10: Total Assets Under Management
Total Assets Under Management $ in millions 12/31/2016 AUM Pershing Square, L.P. $2,919 Pershing Square International, Ltd. $3,461 Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. $4,517 Pershing Square II, L.P. $85 Total Strategy AUM $10,982 Assets under management are net of any capital redemptions (including cryst
Slide 11: Current Portfolio Update
Current Portfolio Update
Slide 12: Quarterly Returns Since Inception of the Strategy
Quarterly Returns Since Inception of the Strategy Average: +4% Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All investments involve the possibility of profit and the risk of loss, including the loss of principal. Please see the additional disclaimers and notes to performance res
Slide 13: Quarterly Returns – 2015 to 2016
Quarterly Returns – 2015 to 2016 Net Returns by Quarter (PSH) 10% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 0% 0% -5% -10% -9% -15% -15% -20% -25% -26% -30% Q1 '15 Q2 '15 Q3 '15 Q4 '15 Q1 '16 Q2 '16 Q3 '16 Q4 '16 2015 Annual Return: -21% 2016 Annual Return: -13% We generated substantial negative returns from Q3 2015 to Q1 201
Slide 14: Progress Made in 2016
Progress Made in 2016 Throughout the year, we achieved a number of key business objectives to improve both short-term and long-term performance Exited certain portfolio investments to free up capital for new opportunities Identified new investments New Undisclosed Position Assisted our portfol
Slide 15: What We Own Today
What We Own Today Approximate % of Capital Sizable investments in high-quality businesses with catalysts for further value creation: ~80% Mondelez Howard Hughes Air Products Chipotle Restaurant Brands Two Undisclosed Positions Smaller investments with higher risk-adjusted returns but sma
Slide 16: (~16% of Capital)
(~16% of Capital)
Slide 17: Mondelez: A Leader in Global Snacking
Mondelez (“MDLZ”): A Leader in Global Snacking Mondelez has the most attractive stable of sweet snack brands of any packaged food company Introduced Introduced in 1912 Easter Egg in Founded 1875 in 1901 Founded in Founded in 1964 Introduced in 1901 1846 17
Slide 18: Snacks is One of the Best Food Categories
Snacks is One of the Best Food Categories Strong global growth and scale ~$1 trillion global market Significant future growth opportunity in international markets Category responds well to advertising and in-store merchandising High category margins Low private-label penetration Strong sal
Slide 19: Mondelez: 2016 Progress Report
Mondelez: 2016 Progress Report Mondelez made meaningful progress on its business transformation in 2016 Delivered three straight quarters of positive underlying volume growth(1) Expanded operating profit margins by over 250 bps to approximately 15.5%(2) Unveiled a 2018 margin target of 17-18
Slide 20: Progress on Business Transformation
Progress on Business Transformation While the company has made steady progress in boosting margins, we believe that optimized margins are far higher Mondelez EBIT Margin +600 - 700 bps 17-18% 15-16% 13% 12% 11% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 Optimized Guidance Target Source: MDLZ public filings, Pershing
Slide 21: Margins Remain Well Below Best-in-Class Levels
Margins Remain Well Below Best-in-Class Levels CY 2016E Consensus EBIT Margin 27.6% 20.2% 19.2% 19.0% 18.5% 16.4% 15.4% 15.3% 15.2% 15.2% Source: Analyst consensus estimates for calendar year 2016 per Capital IQ. 21
Slide 22: MDLZ: Share Price Performance in 2016
MDLZ: Share Price Performance in 2016 MDLZ’s share price including dividends was approximately flat in 2016* MDLZ share price performance from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $52 6/30/16: Press reports reveal $50 MDLZ had made an offer to 2/3/16: MDLZ reports acquire Hershey for $107 per $48 Q4’15 results an
Slide 23: MDLZ: Share Price Performance Since Inception
MDLZ: Share Price Performance Since Inception MDLZ’s share price including dividends has increased 18% from our average cost at announcement date to January 20, 2017* MDLZ share price performance from 3/30/2015 to 1/20/2017 $52 2/3/16: MDLZ reports 6/30/16: Press reports reveal $50 8/6/15: Pershing
Slide 24: (~13% of Capital)
(~13% of Capital)
Slide 25: Air Products: Investment Thesis
Air Products (“APD”): Investment Thesis High-quality, simple, predictable, free-cash-flow generative business Global oligopoly which enjoys attractive returns due to local incumbency advantages driven by high transportation costs for distributing the product Buffered from macro: diversified; c
Slide 26: APD's Transformation Continues
APD’s Transformation Continues CEO Seifi Ghasemi continues his impressive progress transforming Air Products FY 2016 EPS of $7.55 up 14%, despite 3% foreign exchange headwind Exceeded the high-end of initial guidance despite unforeseen macroeconomic and foreign exchange headwinds Operating mar
Slide 27: APD's Upside Remains Significant
APD’s Upside Remains Significant FY 2017 guidance calls for $6.25 to $6.50 of EPS (+9% to 13%) Driven by continued operating productivity and growth capex contribution Operating potential remains significant $225mm of operating productivity potential remains $100mm to be realized in FY 201
Slide 28: APD: Share Price Performance in 2016
APD: Share Price Performance in 2016 APD’s share price including dividends and the spinoff of Versum increased 24% in 2016 Stock price performance of APD from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 10/1/16: APD spins off 5/6/16: APD Versum 1/29/16: FY Q1 EPS announces sale of $158 +15% despite 5% PMD division to f/
Slide 29: APD: Share Price Performance Since Inception
APD: Share Price Performance Since Inception APD’s share price including dividends and the spinoff of Versum increased by 76% from our average cost at announcement date to January 20, 2017 Stock price performance of APD from 5/22/2013 to 1/20/2017 10/1/16: APD 9/26/14: APD announces 1/29/15: FY Q1 E
Slide 30: (~17% of Capital)
(~17% of Capital)
Slide 31: Restaurant Brands International
Restaurant Brands International Franchised business model is a capital-light, high-growth annuity Brand royalty franchise fees (4-5% of unit sales) generate high margins Significant unit growth opportunity requires little capital Same-store sales are relatively insulated from economic cycles C
Slide 32: Restaurant Brands International
Restaurant Brands International QSR’s intrinsic value continued to meaningfully increase in 2016, with organic EBITDA growth of 16% Positive SSS growth at both Burger King (+2%) and Tim Hortons (+3%) despite a tougher industry backdrop Historically large price gap between grocery and fast food
Slide 33: QSR: Share Price Performance in 2016
QSR: Share Price Performance in 2016 QSR’s share price including dividends increased 29% in 2016 Stock price performance of QSR from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $50 $48 $45 Share price 1/7/16 – 1/8/16: Pershing Square purchases additional $40 1mm shares $35 $30 Note: The performance of Restaurant Brands
Slide 34: QSR: Share Price Performance Since Inception
QSR: Share Price Performance Since Inception As of January 20, 2017, QSR’s share price including dividends has increased 214% (3.14x) from our average cost since it merged with Justice Holdings* Stock price performance of QSR/BKW from 6/19/2012 to 1/20/2017 $50 $49 $45 $40 Share price $35 $30 $25 $2
Slide 35: (~10% of Capital)
(~10% of Capital)
Slide 36: Howard Hughes Corporation
Howard Hughes Corporation HHC was formed so that certain GGP assets could receive appropriate management attention and recognition in the public markets HHC’s mission is to be the preeminent developer of master planned communities (MPCs) and mixed-use properties Majority of value is focused ar
Slide 37: Howard Hughes Corporation (Continued)
Howard Hughes Corporation (Continued) HHC continued to enhance the value of its key assets and business Significant progress at the Seaport District Construction on the Pier 17 building is expected to be substantially completed in late 2017, which will include a 1.5 acre rooftop entertainment ve
Slide 38: HHC: Share Price Performance in 2016
HHC: Share Price Performance in 2016 HHC’s share price increased 1% in 2016 Stock price performance of HHC from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $140 $130 $120 Share price $114 $110 $100 $90 $80 $70 Note: The performance of HHC’s share price is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not an indication
Slide 39: HHC: Share Price Performance Since Inception
HHC: Share Price Performance Since Inception As of January 20, 2017, HHC’s share price increased 190% (2.90x) since the spinoff from GGP in November 2010 Stock price performance of HHC from 11/5/2010 to 1/20/2017 $180 $160 $140 Share price $120 $106 $100 $80 $60 $40 $37 $20 $0 Note: The performance
Slide 40: (~11% of Capital)
(~11% of Capital)
Slide 41: Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG)
Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) Superb restaurant brand that pioneered the “fast casual” category with the success of its outstanding product offering, unique culture, and powerful economic model Founded by Chairman and CEO Steve Ells in 1993 High quality, simple, predictable, unlevered, free-cas
Slide 42: Recent Events Create Opportunity for Long-Term Investor
Recent Events Create Opportunity for Long-Term Investor We believe that a good time to buy a great business is when it is in temporary trouble While Chipotle’s reputation has been bruised, we believe that the business will ultimately recover and become stronger aided by: Improved governance In
Slide 43: Attractive Investment
Attractive Investment Despite recent events, we believe that all of the key drivers of Chipotle’s powerful economic moat and long-term success remain intact Strong and relevant brand built by visionary leadership Differentiated product offering with a highly attractive value proposition Substa
Slide 44: Strong Brand
Strong Brand Ambition to change the way the world thinks about and eats fast food centered around Food With Integrity Loyal customer following enabled Chipotle to grow from one restaurant in 1993 to more than 2,100 today We believe that Chipotle is currently one of the most compelling and auth
Slide 45: Differentiated Product Offering
Differentiated Product Offering CMG’s winning value proposition is that it successfully competes in all the desirable attributes of out-of-home fast eating Fast Casual Competitors Key Value Traditional Illustrative Casual Proposition Fast Food Mom & Pop Dining High Quality Fresh, non-processed, Ofte
Slide 46: Significant Growth Opportunity
Significant Growth Opportunity We believe that the Chipotle brand is still in its growth phase with significant opportunity to increase its unit count and its average unit volume. The drivers of this growth include: “Fast Casual” category growth Mobile and online opportunity Catering opportuni
Slide 47: Fast Casual Will Continue to Grow Share in the U.S.
Fast Casual Will Continue to Grow Share in the U.S. Traditional Casual At-Home Fast Food Dining Dining Searching for healthier, Searching for better Slowing family formations convenient hot meals value and more More women in workforce Lacking “generational convenience without Smaller kit
Slide 48: Digital and Catering Opportunity
Digital and Catering Opportunity Digital ordering ideal for Chipotle customer demographic Mobile Hired former Starbucks CIO Curt Garner in November 2015 and Online to advance digital capabilities Ordering 100% company-owned store base allows for common technology platform Strong growth oppor
Slide 49: Food Safety Advancements
Food Safety Advancements While food safety risk can never be completely eliminated, we think Chipotle has done an excellent job of significantly reducing the risk of another incident while maintaining the freshness and taste of its food 1. SUPPLIER INTERVENTIONS 5. FOOD SAFETY CERTIFICATION 2. ADVAN
Slide 50: Other Attractive Attributes
Other Attractive Attributes Chipotle has a number of other attractive attributes that help to mitigate investment risk Limited global macroeconomic sensitivity and foreign currency exposure Simple business model with limited non-GAAP earnings adjustments High effective tax rate of nearly 40%
Slide 51: Timeline of Events
Timeline of Events September 6 Pershing Square files 13D announcing ~10% stake in Chipotle Constructive dialogue begins between Pershing Square and Chipotle Mid-September management and board Chipotle reports Q3 earnings and outlines several new initiatives to October 25 help the business reco
Slide 52: Recent Sales Trends: Same-Store Sales Change
Recent Sales Trends CMG Monthly Same-Store Sales Change (YoY) 20% 15% 10% Same-Store Sales Change (YoY) 1% 0% (1%) (10%) (16%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (22%) (23%) (23%) (24%) (25%) (30%) (26%) (27%) (30%) (36%) (40%) Oct-15 Nov-15 Dec-15 Jan-16 Feb-16 Mar-16 Apr-16 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-1
Slide 53: Chipotle: Share Price Performance
Chipotle: Share Price Performance CMG’s share price declined 7% from our average cost to year end 2016, and is approximately flat from our average cost through January 20, 2017 CMG share price performance from 8/4/2016 to 1/20/2017 $460 12/16/16: CMG 8/4/16: Pershing announces four new Square first
Slide 54: (~9% of Capital)
(~9% of Capital)
Slide 55: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae (“FNMA”) and Freddie Mac (“FMCC”) Despite significant share price appreciation in 2016, we believe the shares of a reformed Fannie and Freddie will be worth a multiple of their current price Investment thesis as first presented at Annual Dinner in 2014: Fannie and Freddie are essential
Slide 56: FNMA and FMCC
FNMA and FMCC We continue to believe that a reformed Fannie and Freddie is the only viable solution for mortgage finance reform Our key principles for reform as presented at Ira Sohn in 2014: Key elements to reform the GSEs: Significantly increase the GSEs’ capital requirements Eliminate the GSE
Slide 57: FNMA and FMCC
FNMA and FMCC We believe the new administration will successfully reform Fannie and Freddie Steve Mnuchin, Treasury Secretary nominee, on Nov. 30, 2016: “We gotta get Fannie and Freddie out of government ownership. It makes no sense that these are owned by the government and have been controlled by
Slide 58: FNMA and FMCC
FNMA and FMCC We believe the new administration will successfully reform Fannie and Freddie (cont.) Steve Mnuchin, Treasury Secretary nominee, on Jan. 19, 2017: “For very long periods of time, I think that Fannie and Freddie have been well run without creating risk to the government, as well as they
Slide 59: FNMA and FMCC: Share Price Performance in 2016
FNMA and FMCC: Share Price Performance in 2016 FNMA and FMCC share prices increased 138% (2.38x) and 131% (2.31x), respectively, in 2016 Stock price performance of Fannie and Freddie from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $4.50 $4.00 $3.90 $3.74 $3.50 Share price $3.00 $2.50 $2.00 $1.50 $1.00 Fannie Mae Freddi
Slide 60: FNMA and FMCC: Performance Since Inception
FNMA and FMCC: Performance Since Inception FNMA and FMCC share prices have increased 66% and 73%, respectively, from our average cost at announcement date to January 20, 2017 Stock price performance of Fannie and Freddie from 10/4/2013 to 1/20/2017 $6.00 $5.50 $5.00 Share price $4.50 $4.00 $3.79 $3.
Slide 61: (~-9% of Capital)
(~-9% of Capital)
Slide 62: The FTC Weighs in…
The FTC Weighs in… ► On July 15th, 2016 the FTC filed a Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (the “Complaint”)(1) against Herbalife.(2) The same day, Herbalife filed an 8-K, which included a Stipulation to Entry of Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment (the “P
Slide 63: The FTC Weighs in…
The FTC Weighs in… ► A detailed presentation reviewing the Complaint and Permanent Injunction is available here, however it is clear – The findings of the FTC substantially agree with our assertion that Herbalife operates as a pyramid scheme: “[Herbalife] does not offer participants a viable retai
Slide 64: The FTC Isn't Herbalife's Only Problem
The FTC Isn’t Herbalife’s Only Problem ► Decelerating International Growth Growth in China – Herbalife’s 2nd largest market – has decelerated in recent quarters ► SEC probing HLF’s anti-corruption compliance in China; DOJ involved ► Management Turnover Michael Johnson is slated to become Executi
Slide 65: Herbalife: Share Price Performance in 2016
Herbalife: Share Price Performance in 2016 HLF’s share price declined 10% in 2016 Stock price performance of HLF from 12/31/2015 to 12/31/2016 11/01/16: HLF reports Q3 $70 results, provides initial 2/25/16: HLF announces Q4 and FY 2017 guidance and 2015 results, HLF reports broad based announces Mic
Slide 66: HLF: Recent Events
HLF: Recent Events ► Recent events have caused Herbalife’s shares to appreciate; we expect shares to remain volatile given technical factors Perception of a more lenient MLM regulatory regime under the new administration Credit Suisse marketing $1.325bn credit facility to support refinancing / s
Slide 67: HLF: Performance Since Short Inception
HLF: Performance Since Short Inception HLF’s share price has increased 18% including dividends from our average cost at announcement date to January 20, 2017 Stock price performance of HLF from 5/1/2012 to 1/20/2017 $85 $75 Stock price $65 $55 $53 $47 $45 $35 $25 May-12 Nov-12 May-13 Nov-13 May-14 N
Slide 68: (~4% of Capital)
(~4% of Capital)
Slide 69: Platform Specialty Products Corporation
Platform Specialty Products Corporation 2016 was a year of stabilization and positive progress for Platform Solidified core leadership team Rakesh Sachdev, CEO (Former Sigma Aldrich CEO) started in Jan. Diego Casanello, Ag President (Former Ag exec. at BASF) started in Feb. Regained momentum
Slide 70: PAH: Share Price Performance in 2016
PAH: Share Price Performance in 2016 PAH’s share price declined 24% in 2016 Stock price performance of Platform from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $14 $12 Share price $10 $10 $8 $6 $4 Note: The performance of Platform’s share price is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not an indication of futu
Slide 71: PAH: Share Price Performance Since Inception
PAH: Share Price Performance Since Inception Since the IPO on the London Stock Exchange in May 2013 to January 20, 2017, PAH’s share price has increased 11% Stock price performance of Platform from 5/16/2013 to 1/20/2017 10/3/14: Pershing Square purchases 9.4mm additional PAH shares at $25.59 $30 in
Slide 72: (~3% of Capital)
(~3% of Capital)
Slide 73: 2016: Creating the New Valeant
2016: Creating the New Valeant Following a substantial decline in Valeant’s share price in Q1 2016, Bill Ackman and Steve Fraidin joined Valeant’s Board of Directors in March 2016 as part of Pershing Square’s effort to stabilize the company and protect our investment Valeant has achieved signifi
Slide 74: Valeant Today
Valeant Today In effect, Valeant is three diverse businesses, with unique opportunities and challenges and divergent growth profiles Segment Financial Profile(1) Higher relative durability Bausch + Lomb / Robust growth opportunities International Lower relative profitability IP-driven grow
Slide 75: A Business in Transformation
A Business in Transformation Strong operational execution and new product launches coupled with deleveraging should drive equity returns from current levels Near Term Operational turnaround / business execution Asset divestitures Deleveraging New product launches Longer Term Revenue and ea
Slide 76: Valeant: Share Price Performance in 2016
Valeant: Share Price Performance in 2016 VRX’s share price declined 86% in 2016 driven by significant business disruption exacerbated by high absolute leverage levels Stock price performance of VRX from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 $120 2/28/16: VRX withdraws 2016 guidance, announces return of Pearson as
Slide 77: Valeant: Price Performance Since Inception
Valeant: Price Performance Since Inception VRX’s share price has declined 93% from our average cost at announcement through January 20, 2017 Stock price performance of VRX from 2/9/2015 to 1/20/2017 $300 $250 $200 Stock price $196 $150 $100 $50 $15 $0 Feb-15 Apr-15 Jun-15 Aug-15 Oct-15 Dec-15 Feb-16
Slide 78: (~3% of Capital)
(~3% of Capital)
Slide 79: Nomad Foods (NOMD)
Nomad Foods (“NOMD”) Nomad’s acquisitions of Iglo and Findus give it the leading branded frozen foods business in Europe Leading positions in UK, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and Nordic region Stable, high-margin, cash-flow generative with low capex and cash taxes Purchase price for both ass
Slide 80: NOMD: Share Price Performance in 2016
NOMD: Share Price Performance in 2016 NOMD’s share price declined 19% in 2016 Stock price performance of NOMD from 1/1/2016 to 12/31/2016 11/29/16: Q3 results: Share price LFL revenue -3% 5/25/16: Q1 results: 3/31/16: Q4 & ’15: LFL revenue -6% PF 2015 LFL revenue -5% $9.57 8/25/16: Q2 results:
Slide 81: NOMD: Share Price Performance Since Inception
NOMD: Share Price Performance Since Inception NOMD share price has declined 2% from our average cost to January 20, 2017* Stock price performance of NOMD from 1/1/2015 to 1/20/2017 8/13/15: Nomad announces acquisition of non-UK assets of Findus 8/27/15: Q2 results: 6/1/15: Nomad closes LFL revenue
Slide 82: New Undisclosed Positions
New Undisclosed Positions
Slide 83: New Undisclosed Positions
New Undisclosed Positions New Undisclosed Position #1 (late 2016): ~4% of Capital High quality business that generates predictable, recurring cash flow Global business with best-in-class management team Buying opportunity presented due to cyclical and macroeconomic concerns despite strong long
Slide 84: Exited Positions
Exited Positions
Slide 85: Positions Exited in 2016
Positions Exited in 2016 CP zoetis
Slide 86: CP: Share Price Performance Since Inception
CP: Share Price Performance Since Inception CP’s share price including dividends increased 244% (3.44x) from our average cost at announcement date to August 4, 2016* 11/13/15: CP’s Stock price performance of CP from 9/22/2011 to 8/4/2016 (CAD) engages in discussions with 10/2/14: Analyst Day details
Slide 87: Zoetis: Share Price Performance Since Inception
Zoetis: Share Price Performance Since Inception ZTS share price including dividends increased 40% from our average cost at announcement date to November 9, 2016* Stock price performance of Zoetis from 7/22/2014 to 11/9/2016 4/13/15: ZTS and Pershing Square 2/4/15: ZTS agrees to name agree to name AG
Slide 88: Business & Organizational Update
Business & Organizational Update
Slide 89: Personnel Updates in 2016 and 2017
Personnel Updates in 2016 and 2017 2016: Employee count reduced from 72 to 60 ► 12 operational personnel Administration, Finance, Investor Relations, Public Relations, Shareholder Services, and Technology teams ► 3 investment team analysts Paul Hilal in February 2016 Bill Doyle in May 2016 J
Slide 90: Investment Team Analyst Additions in 2017
Investment Team Analyst Additions in 2017 ► Bharath Alamanda Joining Pershing Square in September 2017 KKR & Co. Goldman, Sachs & Co. B.S.E., Princeton University ► Feroz Qayyum Joining Pershing Square in September 2017 Hellman & Friedman Evercore B.A., Richard Ivey School of Busines
Slide 91: Organizational Updates in March 2017
Organizational Updates in March 2017 Tim Barefield, COO to retire ► Over 10 years at the firm Tim has been responsible for building out a best-in-class operation ► Tim plans on returning to academia Nicholas Botta, CFO, will assume the title of President and will be responsible for non-investment te
Slide 92: March 2017 Organizational Design
March 2017 Organizational Design 92
Slide 93: Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)
Long-Term Incentive Plan (“LTIP”) A new form of compensation and long-term incentives for long-standing employees Pershing Square previously had two forms of compensation Base salary and bonus compensation Profits interest in management and incentive fees – behaves like equity but terminates
Slide 94: Additional Disclaimers and Notes to Performance Results
Additional Disclaimers and Notes to Performance Results Presentation of Performance Results and Other Data The performance results of PSH and Pershing Square, L.P., the Pershing Square fund with the longest performance track record, included in this presentation are presented on a gross and net-of-f
Slide 95: Additional Disclaimers and Notes to Performance Results
Additional Disclaimers and Notes to Performance Results Risk Factors Investors in PSH may lose all, or substantially all, of their investment in PSH. Any person acquiring shares in PSH must be able to bear the risks involved. These include, among other things, the following: • PSH is exposed to a co
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