Slide 1: Building a Better AstroNova
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 BUILDING A BETTER ASTRONOVA (ALOT) A PRESENTATION BY THE ASKELADDEN SLATE Samir Patel, Founder / Portfolio Manager, Askeladden Capital Shawn Kravetz | Jeff Sands Ryan Oviatt | Boyd Roberts June 2025
Slide 2: Presenters
Presenters 2 (in addition to Samir Patel) Boyd Roberts, VP Corporate Development – FranklinCovey Ryan Oviatt – VP of Strategy & Integration, CECO Jeff Sands – Founding Partner, Dorset Partners LLC Shawn Kravetz – President, Esplanade Capital
Slide 3: Agenda
Agenda 3 • 1.1: Overview of AstroNova / Askeladden • 1.2: Extreme Shareholder Value Destruction • 1.3: Broken Promises, Failed Execution • 1.4: Broken Go - To - Market Strategy in Product ID • 1.5: Historical Reliance on Memjet • 1.6: Disastrous Acquisition of MTEX • 1.7: Governance Failures Section
Slide 4: Section 1: The Case for Change
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1: THE CASE FOR CHANGE Great business. Flawed strategy. Absent execution. Shareholder value destruction. Comprehensive failure of governance.
Slide 5: Section 1.1: Overview of AstroNova and Askeladden
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1.1: Overview of AstroNova and Askeladden Company ignores largest investor, who has been a significant owner for 5 years.
Slide 6: AstroNova: Two Unrelated but High-Quality Segments
AstroNova: Two Unrelated but High - Quality Segments BUSINESS MODEL 6 Both of AstroNova’s segments have an enviable installed base driving substantial recurring revenues. Despite these predictable and protected revenue streams, the company has recently experienced declining organic revenues, decreas
Slide 7: Askeladden Capital – Founded 2016
Askeladden Capital – Founded 2016 • Concentrated, long - only, value - oriented, >$80M AUM. Closed to new capital at ~$50M of commitments to remain a micro - cap specialist. Clients range from individual investors to $1B+ charitable organizations funding education and medical research. • Have been t
Slide 8: Timeline of Askeladden Involvement (2016–2024)
Timeline of Askeladden Involvement (2016 – 2024) BACKGROUND 8 Askeladden Capital Management has researched AstroNova since 2016, been a large shareholder since 2020, and has actively engaged with AstroNova about concerns since 2023. Concerns First Raised Mr. Patel emails CEO and CFO expressing frust
Slide 9: Timeline of Askeladden Involvement (2024–2025)
Timeline of Askeladden Involvement (2024 – 2025) BACKGROUND 9 Askeladden repeatedly expressed grave concerns to AstroNova in 2024 and early 2025, but the Board did little to alleviate these concerns – and eventually stopped responding entirely. AstroNova Refuses to Engage with Askeladden Mr. Patel h
Slide 10: Askeladden's Primary Research
Askeladden’s Primary Research • We believe it is the fiduciary duty of any Board to thoroughly understand the business which they oversee. Objective governance and independent oversight requires directly sourcing key insights that are not filtered through the biases of the CEO. • Since March, we hav
Slide 11: Section 1.2: Extreme Shareholder Value Destruction
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1.2: Extreme Shareholder Value Destruction Whether on the Board for 3, 7, 11, or 14 years, every incumbent who joined prior to 2025 has overseen extreme shareholder value destruction.
Slide 12: Benchmarking AstroNova's Performance Against Peers
Benchmarking AstroNova's Performance Against Peers • AstroNova is composed of two unrelated divisions and lacks direct publicly - traded competitors, making exact peer group identification challenging. For example, in AstroNova’s Product Identification segment, competitors include relatively small d
Slide 13: Extreme Shareholder Value Destruction During Tenure Of All Incumbents
As of the record date for the annual meeting (May 15, 2025), AstroNova shares had dramatically underperformed all benchmarks dur ing the tenure of ALL incumbent directors serving prior to 2025, with ~50% of shareholder value destroyed in the year following the disastrous MTEX ac quisition in May 202
Slide 14: TSR During Board Tenure of Mitch Quain
In the almost 14 years since Mr. Quain joined the Board, AstroNova’s TSR has lagged its peer median by 251% and its lowest - perfo rming peer by 188%. TSR During Board Tenure of Mitch Quain (August 24, 2011 – Almost 14 Years) 14 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 15: TSR During Board Tenure of Mitch Quain
In the almost 14 years since Mr. Quain joined the Board, AstroNova’s TSR has lagged its peer median by 251% and its lowest - perfo rming peer by 188%. TSR During Board Tenure of Mitch Quain (August 24, 2011 – Almost 14 Years) 15 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 16: TSR During CEO Tenure of Greg Woods
In the 11+ years since Mr. Woods became CEO, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 28%, has lagged its peer median by 283%, and its lo west - performing peer by 110%. TSR During CEO Tenure of Greg Woods (February 1, 2014 – 11+ Years) 16 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 17: TSR During CEO Tenure of Greg Woods
In the 11+ years since Mr. Woods became CEO, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 28%, has lagged its peer median by 283%, and its lo west - performing peer by 110%. TSR During CEO Tenure of Greg Woods (February 1, 2014 – 11+ Years) 17 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 18: TSR During Board Tenure of Richard Warzala
In the 7+ years since Mr. Warzala joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 37%, has lagged peer median by 139%, and low est - performing peer by 75%. TSR During Board Tenure of Richard Warzala (December 6, 2017 – 7+ Years) 18 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D
Slide 19: TSR During Board Tenure of Richard Warzala
In the 7+ years since Mr. Warzala joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 37%, has lagged peer median by 139%, and low est - performing peer by 75%. TSR During Board Tenure of Richard Warzala (December 6, 2017 – 7+ Years) 19 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D
Slide 20: TSR During Board Tenure of Yvonne Schlaeppi
In the 7 years since Ms. Schlaeppi joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 43%, has lagged peer median by 130%, and lo west - performing peer by 79%. TSR During Board Tenure of Yvonne Schlaeppi (April 3, 2018 – 7 Years) 20 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D AT
Slide 21: TSR During Board Tenure of Yvonne Schlaeppi
In the 7 years since Ms. Schlaeppi joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 43%, has lagged peer median by 130%, and lo west - performing peer by 79%. TSR During Board Tenure of Yvonne Schlaeppi (April 3, 2018 – 7 Years) 21 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D AT
Slide 22: TSR During Board Tenure of Alexis Michas
In the 3 years since Mr. Michas joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 24%, has lagged peer median by 55%, and low est - performing peer by 27%. TSR During Board Tenure of Alexis Michas (June 2022 – 3 Years) 22 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 23: TSR During Board Tenure of Alexis Michas
In the 3 years since Mr. Michas joined the Board, AstroNova has a TSR of NEGATIVE 24%, has lagged peer median by 55%, and low est - performing peer by 27%. TSR During Board Tenure of Alexis Michas (June 2022 – 3 Years) 23 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 24: TSR: 1-Year Comparisons
AstroNova TSR has dramatically underperformed all selected benchmarks over the past 1 year. TSR: 1 - Year Comparisons 24 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 25: TSR: 3-Year Comparisons
AstroNova TSR has significantly underperformed all selected benchmarks over the past 3 years. TSR: 3 - Year Comparisons 25 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANNUAL MEETING RECORD D ATE)
Slide 26: TSR: 5-Year Comparisons
While AstroNova has underperformed the median benchmark to a lesser degree over 5 years, this is due primarily to the skewed starting point (May 2020) – ALOT shares plummeted during the early days of COVID, when air travel was essentially halted. On a longer - term basis (next slide), A LOT has unde
Slide 27: TSR: 10-Year Comparisons
AstroNova has dramatically underperformed even its worst - performing peer over the past 10 years. As previously shown for each di rector, periods of 7 years, 11 years, and almost 14 years also show dramatic underperformance. TSR: 10 - Year Comparisons 27 TSR BENCHMARKING (THROUGH MAY 15, 2025 – ANN
Slide 28: Section 1.3: Broken Promises, Failed Execution
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1.3: Broken Promises, Failed Execution ~45% EBITDA Shortfalls Relative to Original FY25/FY26 Guidance Bloated Inventory Balances Ink Quality Issues Four Consecutive Quarters of “Delays” One CEO. Dozens of broken promises. Zero accountability. Acquisition
Slide 29: FY25 EBITDA: ~45% Shortfall
FY25 EBITDA: ~45% Shortfall! 29 OPERATIONS *AstroNova did not provide profitability guidance, but they guided to $8 - $10 million in revenue and repeatedly referenced MTEX ’s low costs and “handsome” margins, so here we use an estimate of 15% EBITDA margins, slightly above the company’s 13.5% midpoi
Slide 30: FY26 EBITDA: Also ~45% Shortfall, 17% Below FY24
FY26 EBITDA: Also ~45% Shortfall, 17% Below FY24! 30 OPERATIONS *AstroNova did not provide profitability guidance for MTEX, but they guided to $8 - $10 million in revenue for the partial year FY2025, “significant growth” expectations, and repeatedly referenced MTEX’s low costs and “handsome” margins
Slide 31: FY25: Bloated Inventory vs FY19 Levels
FY25: Bloated Inventory vs FY19 Levels 31 ALOT filings disclose “days inventory on hand” metric. Multiple promises since FY23 to reduce inventory… but as of year - end FY25, it remained near - peak levels. INVENTORY DAYS ON HAND INCREASED BY ADDITIONAL 6% IN Q1 FY26. Despite excess inventory, compan
Slide 32: Inventory Reduction Promises Broken
FY2023 – Present: Inventory Reduction Promises Broken OPERATIONS 32 AstroNova's inventory days on hand have ballooned from 113 in 2014 to 175 at YE FY25 and 185 Q1 FY26, failing to normalize post - COVID despite repeated management promises, highlighting poor operational control and negatively impac
Slide 33: Ink Quality Issues: FY22–FY24
Ink Quality Issues: FY22 – FY24 OPERATIONS 33 Manager at competitor Afinia told us that Memjet ink quality issues took them only six months to resolve – why did it take AstroNova so much longer? Printers Finally Fixed The issue is finally resolved although not before brand damage (per 10 - K). Altho
Slide 34: FY25: Four Consecutive Quarters of Delays
FY25: Four Consecutive Quarters of “Delays” DELAYS 34 • Q1 FY2025: Aerospace segment sees $3 million revenue shortfall due to component shortages which delayed shipment and repair of certain aircraft printers. Blamed on suppliers who could not deliver product on time – how are they short on critical
Slide 35: FY14–FY25: M&A Earnings Walk
FY14 – FY25: M&A Earnings Walk 35 CAPITAL DEPLOYMENT Mathematical analysis demonstrates that the company’s deployment of >$90 million of shareholder capital on M&A has failed to create value: there is an unexplained ~40% shortfall in actual FY25 adjusted operating income, relative to what the compan
Slide 36: Lack of Accountability or Self-Reflection
Lack of Accountability or Self - Reflection • Mr. Woods had the audacity to cite “value - generating M&A” as positive for “strategy execution” in Q1 FY26, a quarter after experiencing a covenant breach (lender subsequently agreed to waiver), recording a $13.4M (~70%) goodwill impairment on the MTEX
Slide 37: Section 1.4: Broken Go-To-Market in Product ID
SECTION 1.4: Broken Go - To - Market in Product ID “Dinosaur” marketing strategy. Competing with channel partners. Providing customers poor service and quality.
Slide 38: Declining Organic Revenues
Declining Organic Revenues 38 REVENUE ANALYSIS While estimates varied from 4% to “double digit,” our research indicates industry growth rate of mid single digits. Product ID revenues, excl. acquisitions, declined 12.4% from FY22 – FY25 and declined 8.2% from FY19 – FY25. Astro - Machine and MTEX bot
Slide 39: Trade Show Reliance and Lead Generation Failures
Trade Show Reliance and Lead Generation Failures • CEO Greg Woods: “PI… relies heavily on trade show participation.” He frequently mentions trade shows on earnings calls. • In June 2024, Woods expressed excitement about “leads” and “deals” generated via MTEX - ALOT joint booth at Drupa. FY2025 subse
Slide 40: CEO Ignores Pleas From Sales Organization
CEO Ignores Pleas From Sales Organization – Where Is the Board as Leads Dry Up and Sales Decline? MARKETING 40 • Former AstroNova sales manager: “ I was vocal about the lack of leads, as we relied on exhibitions, which were shut down due to Covid - 19. When exhibitions resumed, attendance was low. W
Slide 41: Three Key Revenue Generation Problems
2 Three Key Revenue Generation Problems 41 GO - TO - MARKET • Multiple industry sources state AstroNova frequently poaches sales from dealers / resellers • Strongly disincentivizes sellers – Afinia has much stronger channel approach with far fewer resources • Tried to sell white - labeled OKI produc
Slide 42: Quality & Customer Service Deficiencies
Quality & Customer Service Deficiencies 42 • “When there's a problem, my assumption, whether fair or not, is that I'm not going to get any help. […] It's definitely gotten worse. The woman [here locally] is good. She's very capable and will deal with the problems, but she often has to escalate issue
Slide 43: Labels as Low Cost, High Cost-of-Failure Products
Labels as Low Cost, High Cost - of - Failure Products We believe quality and reliability issues are contributing to deteriorating results. MTEX may exacerbate this issue. 43 QUALITY & CUSTOMER SERVICE • Labels are required to sell products for product - identification, regulatory compliance, and ret
Slide 44: Section 1.5: Excessive Reliance on Memjet
SECTION 1.5: AstroNova’s Excessive Reliance on Memjet: Strategic Risks and Governance Failures AstroNova’s Board fails to diversify away from key supplier, instead doubling down in 2022 via acquisition. Then they make a poorly thought out, risky acquisition to accomplish the exact opposite in 2024.
Slide 45: Strategic Importance of Printheads in Industrial Printing
Strategic Importance of Printheads in Industrial Printing SELECTING PRINTHEAD SUPPLIERS: A KEY STRATEGIC DECISION FOR INDUSTRIAL PRINTING COMPANIES PRINTHEAD STRATEGY 45 • Printhead: The core technology that deposits ink onto various media, determining print quality and consumable compatibility. • I
Slide 46: Industrial Printing - Printhead Providers
Many companies sell printheads for industrial applications. AstroNova’s CEO and Board made a series of intentional decisions to double down on one – Memjet. Industrial Printing - Printhead Providers RISKS
Slide 47: AstroNova: History with Memjet
AstroNova: History with Memjet SUPPLIER CONCENTRATION 47 AstroNova doubled down on Memjet as a key supplier by acquiring Astro Machine – a Memjet OEM – while experiencing persistent ink quality issues with certain TrojanLabel printers which were based on Memjet technology. AstroNova Acquires TrojanL
Slide 48: Missed Opportunity: Epson's Unlocked Printhead Technology
AstroNova later decides to enter the high - priced equipment market anyway, with the acquisition of MTEX. Missed Opportunity: Epson’s Unlocked Printhead Technology 48 Epson offered AstroNova a piezo printhead system that allowed multi - sourced inks, enabling cost savings and margin expansion by avo
Slide 49: AstroNova Relied On Memjet For Technical Expertise
AstroNova Relied On Memjet For Technical Expertise PRINTHEAD USAGE 49 • “ Their knowledge of inkjet, how to optimize an ink, how to get it to jet properly, all the technology that goes into how to do an ink delivery system, it was all given to them by the manufacturer.” • “Their technology base is n
Slide 50: Industry Trend: Democratization of Printhead Technology
Industry Trend: Democratization of Printhead Technology We believe that if AstroNova lacked in - house expertise, they could have worked directly with third - party integrators. 50 INDUSTRY TRENDS A former Domino executive explains: • “A significant change in the last 10 years, maybe less, is the ri
Slide 51: Section 1.6: MTEX Acquisition Failures
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1.6: MTEX Acquisition Failures Lack of due diligence and integration plan leads to: Covenant breach. Nearly 50% loss in market value. 70% impairment on cash outlay less than 1 year after deal.
Slide 52: AstroNova Acquires MTEX
AstroNova Acquires MTEX 52 • May 2024: AstroNova acquires MTEX for $18.7 million upfront cash plus assumption of certain debt and additional contingent consideration. • MTEX described to shareholders as a “technology disruptor” with “handsome margins” expected to drive “significant” revenue growth.
Slide 53: AstroNova / MTEX 'Disruptive' Technology
AstroNova / MTEX ‘Disruptive’ Technology: Just a click away in Shanghai? • According to an Afinia executive, MTEX partnered with Chinese company UPG to jointly develop products based on printheads not directly sourced from HP, but instead found on the open market – potentially refurbished. • Afinia
Slide 54: AstroNova Loses Almost 50% of Value After MTEX
54 AstroNova Loses Almost 50% of Value in 1 Year Following MTEX Acquisition The MTEX acquisition severely damaged AstroNova’s financial health with a $13.4M goodwill impairment, ongoing operating losse s, and a covenant breach / event of default due to increased debt and lower profitability. Liquidi
Slide 55: AstroNova Loses Almost 50% of Value After MTEX
55 AstroNova Loses Almost 50% of Value in 1 Year Following MTEX Acquisition The MTEX acquisition severely damaged AstroNova’s financial health with a $13.4M goodwill impairment, ongoing operating losse s, and a covenant breach / event of default due to increased debt and lower profitability. Liquidi
Slide 56: Expectations vs. Reality: MTEX Financials
Expectations vs. Reality: MTEX Financials FINANCIAL IMPACT 56 MTEX acquisition led to major revenue shortfalls, losses, and liquidity issues within one year, highlighting poor governance and risk management. Poor Initial Performance MTEX generates less than $1 million in Q2 revenue and $1.4 million
Slide 57: Selected MTEX Due Diligence Failures
Selected MTEX Due Diligence Failures 57 GOVERNANCE Immature Product Portfolio Different Market Segment & Business Model Reliability and Support Concerns Key Red Flag Industry Insight • MTEX product line newly developed and unfocused/disparate • Less than one year later, AstroNova discontinues 70% of
Slide 58: MTEX - Lack of Cultural Integration Plan
MTEX - Lack of Cultural Integration Plan INTEGRATION 58 A former C - level executive at Afinia, who worked extensively on - site in Porto while trying to develop a partnership, told us that MTEX was “freewheeling” and “unorganized,” with a lack of process, procedure, and focus that made them difficu
Slide 59: Headwinds to MTEX Technology Adoption
Headwinds to MTEX Technology Adoption CHALLENGES Former sales leader at AstroNova: "I won't perceive this print technology as specifically good. I don't think it is really. It was a different vendor, different ink technology, different printer technology. Other than that, I don't see any big advanta
Slide 60: All-In On MTEX
All - In On MTEX CHALLENGES Careening from excessive reliance on Memjet to excessive reliance on potentially poor - quality, immature MTEX technology. 60 “ Between now and the end of the year, we plan to introduce five next - generation products based on the MTEX print engine technology. Enhanced ve
Slide 61: If MTEX Technology Is So Disruptive, Why Aren't Customers Buying It?
If MTEX Technology Is So Disruptive… … Why Aren’t Customers Buying It? MTEX ACQUISITION FAILURES 61 AstroNova Should Adopt “Voice of Customer,” and Make More Of What People Actually Want To Buy Despite being positioned as a technology disruptor, MTEX has failed to demonstrate commercial acceptance o
Slide 62: Risky, Bet-The-Farm Strategy
Risky, Bet - The - Farm Strategy: Governance Careening From Bad to Worse CHALLENGES “Epson, Canon, and HP optimize their inks for these print engines. When you source your own ink, you need to do extensive testing to ensure it doesn't damage the print head. […] if you […] have multiple sources […] w
Slide 63: Frontline Employees Pay, Failed Leaders Stay
Frontline Employees Pay, Failed Leaders Stay GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Why must shareholders and employees bear the brunt of the CEO and Board’s mistake? 63 Dozens of AstroNova employees – through no fault of their own – lost their jobs due to poor governance. Given predictable installed - based
Slide 64: MTEX Summary Conclusion
MTEX SUMMARY CONCLUSION 64 The MTEX acquisition has revealed severe weaknesses in AstroNova's governance, risk management, and strategic execution. This final summary encapsulates the devastating financial impact, key governance lapses, and misguided strategic assumptions that have eroded shareholde
Slide 65: Section 1.7: Governance Failures
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 SECTION 1.7: Governance Failures No long - term planning. Conflicts of interest. Absent hands - on oversight and lack of relevant expertise. Poor risk management. Lack of internal controls and due diligence. No self - reflection on six years of missed targets.
Slide 66: Comprehensive Failure of Key Governance Areas
Comprehensive Failure of Key Governance Areas 66 GOVERNANCE 1. No Strategic Vision, No Long - Range Planning 2. Absent Hands - On Oversight + Relevant Expertise 3. Interlocked Relationships + Weak Independence Strategic Direction, Board Effectiveness Execution, Controls, and Accountability • AstroNo
Slide 67: Interlocked Board Relationships
Interlocked Board Relationships: Value - Destroying CEO Greg Woods Wields Excessive Influence 67 Greg Woods Richard Warzala Alexis Michas Mitch Quain Woods and Warzala: colleagues in 1990s at American Precision Industries, acquired by Danaher Quain on ALOT Board since 2011 – part of Board that appoi
Slide 68: Proxy Contest Context and Board Response
Proxy Contest Context and Board Response Recent Board Appointment Dynamics GOVERNANCE 68 The appointment of Darius Nevin to AstroNova's Board amidst an ongoing proxy contest highlights the Board's resistance to shareholder engagement and raises concerns about his independence and lack of recent oper
Slide 69: Expertise Gaps: Mr. Quain and Ms. Schlaeppi
Expertise Gaps: Mr. Quain and Ms. Schlaeppi Lack Relevant or Recent Experience GOVERNANCE 69 We believe these Board members have little to offer AstroNova • Mr. Quain has not held any direct operating roles since the COVID pandemic. We believe he may lack hands - on knowledge of key trends affecting
Slide 70: Several Board Members Approach or Exceed Peer Term Limits
Several Board Members Approach or Exceed Peer Term Limits 70 BOARD REFRESHMENT BEST PRACTICES – PEER ANALYSIS “As of July 2022, 57 percent of S&P 500 companies with such a policy require board members to step down after 15 years of service, and 25 percent set the term limit at 12 years. 47 percent o
Slide 71: Section 2: Building a Better AstroNova
SECTION 2: BUILDING A BETTER ASTRONOVA … … THROUGH BETTER GOVERNANCE AstroNova’s best days are still ahead – but not with the current Board.
Slide 72: The Right Slate for the Moment
The Right Slate for the Moment BOARD RENEWAL 72 Each Askeladden nominee has a unique skillset that addresses a key current failure of AstroNova. Mr. Patel brings extensive financial and strategic analysis, capital allocation, and deep research capabilities to AstroNova, and has committed to not acce
Slide 73: Skills Matrix: Askeladden Slate
Skills Matrix: Askeladden Slate 73 The Askeladden slate has the complementary expertise and motivation to rapidly improve governance at AstroNova to drive value cr eation for shareholders plagued by years of poor TSR and abysmal governance. Samir Patel Boyd Roberts Shawn Kravetz Ryan Oviatt Jeff San
Slide 74: Our Case Meets Every Standard For Board Change
Our Case Meets Every Standard For Board Change 74 We meet – and exceed – every benchmark used to recommend Board refreshment. Explanation Condition Met? ALOT shares have significantly underperformed all peers during tenure of all pre - 2025 Board members Prolonged TSR Underperformance Bloated invent
Slide 75: From Ego to Evidence: New Governance Philosophy
From Ego to Evidence: Diverse Perspectives Bring New Governance Philosophy 75 GOVERNANCE Arrogance: Ignoring Frontline Insight Entitlement: Roles Earned, Not Given Chaos: Incoherent Strategy The Greg Woods Model The Askeladden Model • Feedback from sales organization repeatedly ignored – stuck to “d
Slide 76: Restoring Board Functionality: Committee by Committee
1 2 3 4 Restoring Board Functionality: Committee by Committee GOVERNANCE 76 The Askeladden slate addresses critical boardroom failures by refreshing committee memberships with highly qualified nominees, ensuring rigorous oversight and strategic direction tailored to AstroNova's key challenges. This
Slide 77: First Days: Prioritize Cash and Quality
First 60 Days: Prioritize Cash and Quality to Stabilize Foundation 77 TACTICS • Excessive debt; cash tied up in working capital Problem Created By Incumbent Directors Solution Implemented by Askeladden Directors We believe AstroNova needs to invest in areas such as marketing, sales coverage and mana
Slide 78: Next Days: Drive Strategic Repositioning
Next 100 Days: Drive Strategic Repositioning for Long - Term 78 STRATEGY • Lack of technology base diversification Problem Created By Incumbent Directors Solution Implemented by Askeladden Directors We believe a refreshed, modernized marketing strategy and a more customer, margin - focused organizat
Slide 79: Review of Strategic Alternatives
Review of Strategic Alternatives VALUE CREATION 79 • Minimal customer and technology overlap between Aerospace and Product Identification segments, which are each smaller than industry peers, preventing economies of scale in product development and global reach in sales/marketing – acquirer could ge
Slide 80: Demonstration of Corporate Overhead Burden
Demonstration of Corporate Overhead Burden CORPORATE OVERHEAD BURDEN Selling each of the two unrelated businesses to larger peers, who could generate synergies by leveraging existing footprint t o e liminate overhead expenses, may generate substantially more value for AstroNova shareholders than the
Slide 81: Servotronics: May 2025 Sale Unlocks Value
Like AstroNova, Servotronics failed to create shareholder value over the past three years – but a transaction announced in May 2 025 (with multiple bidders leading to a 22% increase in price) exemplifies the substantial value that could be unlocked if AstroNova’s Board comprehensively eva lua tes st
Slide 82: Why Vote For Askeladden
2 Why Vote For Askeladden 82 SUMMARY • Persistent governance failures: entrenched Board members are either conflicted or lack relevant expertise. • MTEX acquisition = $20M unforced error – no diligence or plan, 70% writeoff, covenant breach • Pattern of broken promises and weak execution: inventory
Slide 83: Thank You! Please vote our GOLD proxy card
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Thank You! Please vote our GOLD proxy card for all five Askeladden nominees. Find more information at askeladdencapital.com/astronova Materials are also available at no cost at sec.gov
Slide 84: Questions?
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Questions? The more challenging, the better – AstroNova shareholders deserve Board members who don’t shy away from the toughest questions. All of our nominees will take direct questions from interested stakeholders at the AstroNova Investor Forum on June 12 at 1
Slide 85: Sources
Sources 85 With limited exceptions as highlighted, the majority of analysis in this presentation is based on Askeladden’s previously - published written materials including its definitive proxy statement and various analyses of AstroNova’s business. These documents are available at askeladdencapital
Slide 86: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 86 “FY26 EBITDA: Also ~45% Shortfall, 17% Below FY24” For more details, please refer to Section 4.3 of our MTEX Technology analysis published on June 10, 2025. Underlying data so urc ed from AstroNova’s earnings releases as well as the announ
Slide 87: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 87 “Declining Organic Revenues” For more details, please refer to Section 2.1 of our Primary Research analysis published June 3, 2025. Underlying data sourc ed from AstroNova’s Form 10 - K for the relevant years. Industry growth estimates sou
Slide 88: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 88 “ AstroNova Acquires MTEX” Extensive discussion of MTEX and related issues is provided in Section 1.2 of our Primary Research analysis published June 3, 20 25, as well as our MTEX Technology analysis published June 10, 2025. “MTEX Technolo
Slide 89: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 89 “All - In On MTEX” This graphic is sourced directly from AstroNova’s Q4 FY25 earnings presentation; the accompanying quote is sourced from the conference call transcript. “If MTEX Technology Is So Disruptive…” This chart is presented in Se
Slide 90: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 90 “Recent Board Appointment Dynamics” and “Expertise Gaps” Discussion of Mr. Nevin’s appointment and the background of Mr. Quain and Ms. Schlaeppi is provided in Section 3.1 of our Primary Research analysis published June 3, 2025. Additional
Slide 91: Sources (Continued)
CONFIDENTIAL | DRAFT © Copyright 2025 Sources (Continued) 91 “Demonstration of Corporate Overhead Burden ” This is one of the few slides presenting new analysis not previously published. Underlying data sourced from the Form 10 - K for each of the three companies over the last three fiscal years. Th