Taubman Centers Inc

Taubman Centers — Proxy Contest (April 2018)

33 slides from Taubman Centers's proxy contest presentation, Apr 26, 2018

  1. Slide 1: Change is Still Needed at Taubman Centers

    Change is Still Needed at Taubman Centers April 2018 www.SaveTaubman.com Please email questions or comments to: SaveTaubman@LandandBuildings.com

  2. Slide 2: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents 1. Why We Are Still Here 2. Perception vs. Reality at Taubman 3. Taubman’s Performance: A Deeper Dive 4. Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman 2 www.SaveTaubman.com

  3. Slide 3: Why We Are Still Here

    LANDandBUILDINGS Why We Are Still Here

  4. Slide 4: Overview of Land & Buildings

    Overview of Land & Buildings • Firm Background - Land & Buildings Investment Management, LLC (together with its affiliates, “Land & Buildings”) is an SEC-registered investment advisor founded in 2008 and located in Stamford, Connecticut - Invests in the publicly traded shares of global REITs and rea

  5. Slide 5: Why We Are Still Here

    Why We Are Still Here • We believe Taubman Centers, Inc. (“Taubman,” “Taubman Centers,” “TCO,” or the “Company”) continues to be run for the benefit of the Taubman Family  Fundamental conflict in which apparent efforts to maintain control and avoid paying taxes through the dual-class voting share s

  6. Slide 6: Continued Underperformance After 2017 Annual Meeting

    Continued Underperformance After 2017 Annual Meeting • The status quo has persisted, leading to a 22% TSR underperformance vs. Class A Mall Peers since the 2017 Annual Meeting • This poor performance is, in our view, due primarily to three factors: x The same underlying resistance to truly embrace g

  7. Slide 7: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (1 of 2)

    Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (1 of 2) 1. Add a true shareholder representative in the boardroom  Jonathan Litt of Land & Buildings was already supported at last year’s Annual Meeting by a majority of non-Taubman Family shareholders  The Company has committed to adding a new dir

  8. Slide 8: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (2 of 2)

    Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (2 of 2) 2. Eliminate the dual-class voting structure  Dual-class voting structure has disenfranchised common shareholders of TCO for years, highlighted by rejection of the Simon Property Group (SPG) acquisition offer and the director voting results

  9. Slide 9: Taubman's Dual-Class Voting Structure Benefits the Taubman Family and Disenfranchises Shareholders

    Taubman’s Dual-Class Voting Structure Benefits the Taubman Family and Disenfranchises Shareholders • Taubman’s dual-class structure severely disenfranchises common shareholders by allowing the Taubman Family to effectively control the Company and is largely about delaying taxes for the Taubman Famil

  10. Slide 10: History of Land & Buildings and Taubman

    History of Land & Buildings and Taubman We have known the Taubman Family since the IPO roadshow of the Company in 1992 We covered the Company for decades both as research analysts and investors, and held countless discussions with management over the years From the first half of 2016 until early 201

  11. Slide 11: Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns

    Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns • Taubman’s poor corporate governance, operating results and capital allocation have culminated in substantial shareholder total return underperformance versus its Class A Mall Peers • TCO underperformed its Class A Mall Peers by 22% since the 2017 Ann

  12. Slide 12: Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns

    Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns Total Relative Shareholder Return (TCO / Class A Mall Peer Average) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% The short period of relative outperformance in late 2017 appears to be driven by investors’ hope that Elliott Management would help implement substantial chang

  13. Slide 13: Perception vs. Reality at Taubman

    Perception vs. Reality at Taubman 13

  14. Slide 14: We Believe Taubman's Actions Have Been Reactive and its Words Disingenuous

    We Believe Taubman’s Actions Have Been Reactive and its Words Disingenuous Perception: Taubman ‘got the message’ last year during the proxy fight with Land & Buildings and has taken the right steps Reality: Taubman’s Board has continued to disenfranchise shareholders since the 2017 election • Despit

  15. Slide 15: Taubman Refuses to Level the Playing Field for All Shareholders

    Taubman Refuses to Level the Playing Field for All Shareholders Perception: TCO’s dual-class voting share structure is common in many family owned companies and while not ideal, has not hurt the Company Reality: The Taubman Family has repeatedly used the dual-class voting share structure to the detr

  16. Slide 16: This is STILL Not a Board Truly Independent of the Taubman Family

    This is STILL Not a Board Truly Independent of the Taubman Family Perception: TCO has changed its boardroom culture by adding two truly independent directors following the 2017 Annual Meeting Reality: The Company has continued its long-held practice of appointing directors who are connected to the T

  17. Slide 17: The Underperformance Problem vs. Peers Has Not Been Fixed

    The Underperformance Problem vs. Peers Has Not Been Fixed Perception: Taubman’s underperformance since the 2017 Annual Meeting is a result of the challenging environment for retail landlords and macro retail sector headwinds – and not the fault of management and the Board Reality: Taubman substantia

  18. Slide 18: The Same Capital Allocation Strategy Continues to Hurt the Company

    The Same Capital Allocation Strategy Continues to Hurt the Company Perception: TCO has corrected their capital allocation and development missteps and the worst is behind them Reality: TCO’s development track record of delays and broken promises has continued x After last year’s Annual Meeting, the

  19. Slide 19: The Taubman's Touted 'Sacrifice' Around Comp Is Yet Another Red Herring

    The Taubman’s Touted ‘Sacrifice’ Around Comp Is Yet Another Red Herring Perception: It is meaningful that CEO Bobby Taubman and COO Billy Taubman forfeited a significant portion of their base salary in 2017 (85% and 87%, respectively) Reality: Bobby and Billy Taubman earned approximately $60M in div

  20. Slide 20: Taubman's Performance: A Deeper Dive

    Taubman’s Performance: A Deeper Dive 20

  21. Slide 21: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish

    Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s EBITDA margins are abysmal, deteriorating in 2017 - Taubman’s EBITDA margins declined 310 bps in 2017 - Taubman’s EBITDA margin underperformance grew to a shocking 930 bps below its Class A Mall Peers EBITDA Margin The excuse of a cha

  22. Slide 22: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish

    Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s same store net operating income grew 180 basis points less than its Class A Mall Peers, with only 0.7% growth in 2017  Taubman’s operating results, overseen by Chief Operating Officer Billy Taubman, have been consistently and signifi

  23. Slide 23: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish

    Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s 2018 FFO per share consensus estimates have declined by 12% since the beginning of 2017 • Land & Buildings’ publicly and privately communicated ideas to improve operations at Taubman’s malls – including more food & beverage options, k

  24. Slide 24: Capital Allocation Disappointments Continue in 2017

    Capital Allocation Disappointments Continue in 2017 • Since the 2017 Annual Meeting, the Company has failed to execute on capital allocation strategy, evident through the following: x Lowered development yield expectations x Delayed development stabilization dates by 1 year • Despite continued misse

  25. Slide 25: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman

    Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman 25

  26. Slide 26: Land & Buildings' Highly-Qualified Nominee

    Land & Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Nominee Jonathan Litt – Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Land & Buildings – Former Director at Mack-Cali Realty Corporation, an owner and operator of office and apartments assets throughout New Jersey and the northeast – Former Managing Director and Senior G

  27. Slide 27: New Board Representation: Elect Jonathan Litt

    New Board Representation: Elect Jonathan Litt Mr. Litt is well qualified to add value to the Board of Directors: A majority of common shareholders supported Mr. Litt’s election to the Board in 2017 Three proxy voting advisory firms supported the election of Mr. Litt at the 2017 Annual Meeting Mr.

  28. Slide 28: Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Supported Mr. Litt's Election in 2017

    Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Supported Mr. Litt’s Election in 2017 “…“Nominee Litt is well-positioned to provide an investor perspective, and has raised valid points regarding the company's performance…” ISS (emphasis added) “…Land & Buildings' two director nominees, Mr. Litt, its founder, CIO and a

  29. Slide 29: Immediate Action if Jonathan Litt is Elected at Annual Meeting

    Immediate Action if Jonathan Litt is Elected at Annual Meeting If Mr. Litt is elected to the Board he would take a constructive approach to encourage corporate governance enhancements and strategic modifications for the good of all shareholders: 1. Motion to split Chairman and CEO roles 2. Motion to

  30. Slide 30: Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali

    Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali • Mr. Litt followed Mack Cali Realty Corp (“Mack- 60% Cali”), an office and apartment REIT, since 40% before its IPO in 1994 and identified significant undervaluation relative to real estate value 20% that had persisted throughout the company’s history 0% - Mack-C

  31. Slide 31: Billy Taubman Should Not be Re-elected to the Board

    Billy Taubman Should Not be Re-elected to the Board • Having COO Billy Taubman on the TCO Board, in addition to his brother CEO Bobby Taubman, is highly unnecessary and compromises the independence of the Board • Billy’s operational knowledge may be valuable to have as an executive, but there is no

  32. Slide 32: Eliminate the Dual-Class Voting Share Structure

    Eliminate the Dual-Class Voting Share Structure • It is highly unusual to have a dual-class voting structure – just 3 REITs of 83 covered by Green Street have a dual-class voting structure, and tax protections at many REITs expired long ago allowing boards to pursue the best interests of shareholder

  33. Slide 33: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability, or the particular need of any specific person who may receive this presentation, and should not be taken as advice o

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