Taubman Centers — Proxy Contest (April 2018)
33 slides from Taubman Centers's proxy contest presentation, Apr 26, 2018
Slide 1: Change is Still Needed at Taubman Centers
Change is Still Needed at Taubman Centers April 2018 www.SaveTaubman.com Please email questions or comments to: SaveTaubman@LandandBuildings.com
Slide 2: Table of Contents
Table of Contents 1. Why We Are Still Here 2. Perception vs. Reality at Taubman 3. Taubman’s Performance: A Deeper Dive 4. Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman 2 www.SaveTaubman.com
Slide 3: Why We Are Still Here
LANDandBUILDINGS Why We Are Still Here
Slide 4: Overview of Land & Buildings
Overview of Land & Buildings • Firm Background - Land & Buildings Investment Management, LLC (together with its affiliates, “Land & Buildings”) is an SEC-registered investment advisor founded in 2008 and located in Stamford, Connecticut - Invests in the publicly traded shares of global REITs and rea
Slide 5: Why We Are Still Here
Why We Are Still Here • We believe Taubman Centers, Inc. (“Taubman,” “Taubman Centers,” “TCO,” or the “Company”) continues to be run for the benefit of the Taubman Family Fundamental conflict in which apparent efforts to maintain control and avoid paying taxes through the dual-class voting share s
Slide 6: Continued Underperformance After 2017 Annual Meeting
Continued Underperformance After 2017 Annual Meeting • The status quo has persisted, leading to a 22% TSR underperformance vs. Class A Mall Peers since the 2017 Annual Meeting • This poor performance is, in our view, due primarily to three factors: x The same underlying resistance to truly embrace g
Slide 7: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (1 of 2)
Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (1 of 2) 1. Add a true shareholder representative in the boardroom Jonathan Litt of Land & Buildings was already supported at last year’s Annual Meeting by a majority of non-Taubman Family shareholders The Company has committed to adding a new dir
Slide 8: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (2 of 2)
Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman (2 of 2) 2. Eliminate the dual-class voting structure Dual-class voting structure has disenfranchised common shareholders of TCO for years, highlighted by rejection of the Simon Property Group (SPG) acquisition offer and the director voting results
Slide 9: Taubman's Dual-Class Voting Structure Benefits the Taubman Family and Disenfranchises Shareholders
Taubman’s Dual-Class Voting Structure Benefits the Taubman Family and Disenfranchises Shareholders • Taubman’s dual-class structure severely disenfranchises common shareholders by allowing the Taubman Family to effectively control the Company and is largely about delaying taxes for the Taubman Famil
Slide 10: History of Land & Buildings and Taubman
History of Land & Buildings and Taubman We have known the Taubman Family since the IPO roadshow of the Company in 1992 We covered the Company for decades both as research analysts and investors, and held countless discussions with management over the years From the first half of 2016 until early 201
Slide 11: Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns
Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns • Taubman’s poor corporate governance, operating results and capital allocation have culminated in substantial shareholder total return underperformance versus its Class A Mall Peers • TCO underperformed its Class A Mall Peers by 22% since the 2017 Ann
Slide 12: Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns
Persistently Inferior Total Shareholder Returns Total Relative Shareholder Return (TCO / Class A Mall Peer Average) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% The short period of relative outperformance in late 2017 appears to be driven by investors’ hope that Elliott Management would help implement substantial chang
Slide 13: Perception vs. Reality at Taubman
Perception vs. Reality at Taubman 13
Slide 14: We Believe Taubman's Actions Have Been Reactive and its Words Disingenuous
We Believe Taubman’s Actions Have Been Reactive and its Words Disingenuous Perception: Taubman ‘got the message’ last year during the proxy fight with Land & Buildings and has taken the right steps Reality: Taubman’s Board has continued to disenfranchise shareholders since the 2017 election • Despit
Slide 15: Taubman Refuses to Level the Playing Field for All Shareholders
Taubman Refuses to Level the Playing Field for All Shareholders Perception: TCO’s dual-class voting share structure is common in many family owned companies and while not ideal, has not hurt the Company Reality: The Taubman Family has repeatedly used the dual-class voting share structure to the detr
Slide 16: This is STILL Not a Board Truly Independent of the Taubman Family
This is STILL Not a Board Truly Independent of the Taubman Family Perception: TCO has changed its boardroom culture by adding two truly independent directors following the 2017 Annual Meeting Reality: The Company has continued its long-held practice of appointing directors who are connected to the T
Slide 17: The Underperformance Problem vs. Peers Has Not Been Fixed
The Underperformance Problem vs. Peers Has Not Been Fixed Perception: Taubman’s underperformance since the 2017 Annual Meeting is a result of the challenging environment for retail landlords and macro retail sector headwinds – and not the fault of management and the Board Reality: Taubman substantia
Slide 18: The Same Capital Allocation Strategy Continues to Hurt the Company
The Same Capital Allocation Strategy Continues to Hurt the Company Perception: TCO has corrected their capital allocation and development missteps and the worst is behind them Reality: TCO’s development track record of delays and broken promises has continued x After last year’s Annual Meeting, the
Slide 19: The Taubman's Touted 'Sacrifice' Around Comp Is Yet Another Red Herring
The Taubman’s Touted ‘Sacrifice’ Around Comp Is Yet Another Red Herring Perception: It is meaningful that CEO Bobby Taubman and COO Billy Taubman forfeited a significant portion of their base salary in 2017 (85% and 87%, respectively) Reality: Bobby and Billy Taubman earned approximately $60M in div
Slide 20: Taubman's Performance: A Deeper Dive
Taubman’s Performance: A Deeper Dive 20
Slide 21: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish
Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s EBITDA margins are abysmal, deteriorating in 2017 - Taubman’s EBITDA margins declined 310 bps in 2017 - Taubman’s EBITDA margin underperformance grew to a shocking 930 bps below its Class A Mall Peers EBITDA Margin The excuse of a cha
Slide 22: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish
Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s same store net operating income grew 180 basis points less than its Class A Mall Peers, with only 0.7% growth in 2017 Taubman’s operating results, overseen by Chief Operating Officer Billy Taubman, have been consistently and signifi
Slide 23: Taubman's Operating Performance Continues to Languish
Taubman’s Operating Performance Continues to Languish • Taubman’s 2018 FFO per share consensus estimates have declined by 12% since the beginning of 2017 • Land & Buildings’ publicly and privately communicated ideas to improve operations at Taubman’s malls – including more food & beverage options, k
Slide 24: Capital Allocation Disappointments Continue in 2017
Capital Allocation Disappointments Continue in 2017 • Since the 2017 Annual Meeting, the Company has failed to execute on capital allocation strategy, evident through the following: x Lowered development yield expectations x Delayed development stabilization dates by 1 year • Despite continued misse
Slide 25: Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman
Changes We Believe Are Still Required at Taubman 25
Slide 26: Land & Buildings' Highly-Qualified Nominee
Land & Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Nominee Jonathan Litt – Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Land & Buildings – Former Director at Mack-Cali Realty Corporation, an owner and operator of office and apartments assets throughout New Jersey and the northeast – Former Managing Director and Senior G
Slide 27: New Board Representation: Elect Jonathan Litt
New Board Representation: Elect Jonathan Litt Mr. Litt is well qualified to add value to the Board of Directors: A majority of common shareholders supported Mr. Litt’s election to the Board in 2017 Three proxy voting advisory firms supported the election of Mr. Litt at the 2017 Annual Meeting Mr.
Slide 28: Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Supported Mr. Litt's Election in 2017
Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Supported Mr. Litt’s Election in 2017 “…“Nominee Litt is well-positioned to provide an investor perspective, and has raised valid points regarding the company's performance…” ISS (emphasis added) “…Land & Buildings' two director nominees, Mr. Litt, its founder, CIO and a
Slide 29: Immediate Action if Jonathan Litt is Elected at Annual Meeting
Immediate Action if Jonathan Litt is Elected at Annual Meeting If Mr. Litt is elected to the Board he would take a constructive approach to encourage corporate governance enhancements and strategic modifications for the good of all shareholders: 1. Motion to split Chairman and CEO roles 2. Motion to
Slide 30: Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali
Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali • Mr. Litt followed Mack Cali Realty Corp (“Mack- 60% Cali”), an office and apartment REIT, since 40% before its IPO in 1994 and identified significant undervaluation relative to real estate value 20% that had persisted throughout the company’s history 0% - Mack-C
Slide 31: Billy Taubman Should Not be Re-elected to the Board
Billy Taubman Should Not be Re-elected to the Board • Having COO Billy Taubman on the TCO Board, in addition to his brother CEO Bobby Taubman, is highly unnecessary and compromises the independence of the Board • Billy’s operational knowledge may be valuable to have as an executive, but there is no
Slide 32: Eliminate the Dual-Class Voting Share Structure
Eliminate the Dual-Class Voting Share Structure • It is highly unusual to have a dual-class voting structure – just 3 REITs of 83 covered by Green Street have a dual-class voting structure, and tax protections at many REITs expired long ago allowing boards to pursue the best interests of shareholder
Slide 33: Disclaimer
Disclaimer This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability, or the particular need of any specific person who may receive this presentation, and should not be taken as advice o