Strategic Hotels and Resorts Inc

Strategic Hotels and Resorts — Proxy Contest (November 2013)

54 slides from Strategic Hotels and Resorts's proxy contest presentation, Nov 20, 2013

  1. Slide 1: Orange Capital's Independent Perspectives on Strategic Hotels & Resorts

    Slide 1: Orange Capital's Independent Perspectives on Strategic Hotels & Resorts

    orange capital Orange Capital ’s Independent Perspectives on Strategic Hotels & Resorts November 20, 2013 www.BEE - strategic.com

  2. Slide 2: Table of Contents

    Slide 2: Table of Contents

    orange capital Table of Contents [ 1 ] I. Executive Summary II. Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed III. History of Poor Corporate Governance IV. Orange Capital’s Recommendations V. Orange Capital’s Nominees for Strategic Hotels VI. Appendix NAV Analysis of Strategic Hotels’ Individual

  3. Slide 3: Additional Information

    Slide 3: Additional Information

    orange capital Additional Information Orange Capital, LLC, Orange Capital Master I, Ltd . and Daniel Lewis (collectively, “Orange Capital”) intend to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC") a definitive proxy statement and accompanying proxy card to be used to solicit proxies fr

  4. Slide 4: Forward-Looking Statements

    Slide 4: Forward-Looking Statements

    orange capital Forward - Looking Statements Orange Capital and its affiliates do not assume responsibility for investment decisions . This presentation does not recommend the purchase or sale of any security . Under no circumstances is this presentation to be used or considered as an offer to sell o

  5. Slide 5: I. Executive Summary

    Slide 5: I. Executive Summary

    I. Executive Summary

  6. Slide 6: Executive Summary: Overview of Orange Capital

    Slide 6: Executive Summary: Overview of Orange Capital

    orange capital Executive Summary: Overview of Orange Capital ▪ Orange Capital, LLC ("Orange Capital") is a New York - based investment firm ▪ Orange Capital was co - founded in 2005 by Daniel Lewis and Russell Hoffman ▪ Orange Capital has a successful history of activism in REITs to maximize shareho

  7. Slide 7: Executive Summary: Overview of Strategic Hotels

    Slide 7: Executive Summary: Overview of Strategic Hotels

    orange capital Executive Summary: Overview of Strategic Hotels ▪ Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (“Strategic,” “Strategic Hotels,” or “the Company”) is a Chicago - based Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) that is traded on the New York Stock Exchange ▪ Strategic Hotels owns interests in 18 luxury

  8. Slide 8: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Perspective on Strategic Hotels

    Slide 8: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Perspective on Strategic Hotels

    orange capital Executive Summary: Orange Capital’s Perspective on Strategic Hotels ▪ Strategic Hotels has underperformed its peers (1) and has persistently traded at a large discount to estimated Net Asset Value (NAV) ▪ We believe the Company’s underperformance is directly linked to its poor governa

  9. Slide 9: Executive Summary: We Believe Strategic Hotels Has Structural Challenges

    Slide 9: Executive Summary: We Believe Strategic Hotels Has Structural Challenges

    orange capital Executive Summary: We Believe Strategic Hotels Has Structural Challenges ▪ We believe Strategic has significant overhead expense relative to its current needs ▪ We are skeptical about Strategic’s ability to compete effectively as an acquisition/growth vehicle ▪ We believe the Company

  10. Slide 10: Executive Summary: Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed

    Slide 10: Executive Summary: Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed

    orange capital Executive Summary: Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed [ 9 ] ▪ Strategic Hotels trades at a 28% - 37% discount to NAV, as estimated by PKF Consulting 1 ▪ The Company has failed to publicly articulate a strategy to close the share price discount to NAV ▪ Despite our multi

  11. Slide 11: Executive Summary: History of Poor Corporate Governance

    Slide 11: Executive Summary: History of Poor Corporate Governance

    orange capital Executive Summary: History of Poor Corporate Governance ▪ Strategic has a history of problematic compensation practices, highlighted by a failed say - on - pay vote in 2013 ▪ Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis have repeatedly expressed concerns about Strategic’

  12. Slide 12: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Recommendations

    Slide 12: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Recommendations

    orange capital Executive Summary: Orange Capital’s Recommendations ▪ Explore strategic alternatives ▪ Set strategy for closing the share price discount to NAV ▪ Adopt best practices of corporate governance [ 11 ] “Strategic Hotels has some irreplaceable assets. With the execution of just a few funda

  13. Slide 13: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Nominees for Strategic Hotels

    Slide 13: Executive Summary: Orange Capital's Nominees for Strategic Hotels

    orange capital Mark Woodworth – President of PKF Hospitality Research Portfolio Construction Executive Summary: Orange Capital’s Nominees for Strategic Hotels [ 12 ] John D. Lyons – Founder & Principal of Granite Realty Advisors Exploring Strategic Alternatives Daniel Lewis – Managing Partner of Ora

  14. Slide 14: II. Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed

    Slide 14: II. Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed

    II. Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed

  15. Slide 15: Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed Its Peers

    Slide 15: Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed Its Peers

    orange capital Strategic Hotels Has Significantly Underperformed Its Peers [ 14 ] Source: Bloomberg as of November 18, 2013 Note: See Appendix for list of selected peers -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% Historical Total Shareholder Return (11/2/2007 through 11/2/2012) – Monthly Chart - Strategic Hot

  16. Slide 16: Recent Price Performance

    Slide 16: Recent Price Performance

    orange capital -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 Apr-13 May-13 Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 Recent Price Performance [ 15 ] Historical Total Shareholder Return (10/1/2012 through 11/18/2013) 6/17/13: Orange Capital announced it had re

  17. Slide 17: Unlike All of Its Peers, Strategic Has Not Resumed Paying Dividends

    Slide 17: Unlike All of Its Peers, Strategic Has Not Resumed Paying Dividends

    orange capital 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% Unlike All of Its Peers, Strategic Has Not Resumed Paying Dividends [ 16 ] Dividend Yield (11/18/2009 – 11/18/2013) - Strategic (Common) - Selected Peer Group (Common) 0.0% 2.6% Source: Capital IQ as of November 18, 2013 Note: See Appendix for list of selected peers Str

  18. Slide 18: Strategic Hotels Is Trading at a Significant Discount to PKF Consulting's NAV

    Slide 18: Strategic Hotels Is Trading at a Significant Discount to PKF Consulting's NAV

    orange capital Strategic Hotels Is Trading at a Significant Discount to PKF Consulting’s Net Asset Value ▪ The chart below demonstrates what we believe is the disparity between the current trading price and the Company’s underlying asset value ▪ Shareholders have been subjected to an approximately 2

  19. Slide 19: Strategic Hotels Trades at the Highest Discount to NAV Among its Peers

    Slide 19: Strategic Hotels Trades at the Highest Discount to NAV Among its Peers

    orange capital ▪ The closest comparable lodging REITs trade, on average, well above consensus NAV estimates (1) ▪ US REIT sector trades at a 2.6% discount to NAV, as measured by the SNL US REIT Index (1) ▪ US REIT Hotel sector trades at a 2.0% premium to NAV, as measured by the SNL US REIT Hotel Ind

  20. Slide 20: Strategic Is Destroying Value By Maintaining Excessive Overhead

    Slide 20: Strategic Is Destroying Value By Maintaining Excessive Overhead

    orange capital We Believe Strategic is Destroying Value By Maintaining Excessive and Unnecessary Overhead [ 19 ] Source: Strategic Hotels’ and peer group’s SEC filings; Capital IQ as of November 18, 2013 Note: See appendix for list of peers ▪ In our view, Strategic’s SG&A is excessive both on an abs

  21. Slide 21: Strategic's Lack of an Effective Strategy

    Slide 21: Strategic's Lack of an Effective Strategy

    orange capital Strategic’s Lack of an Effective Strategy ▪ Despite numerous investor presentations and analyst calls, the Company has not publicly articulated anything we could identify as a roadmap for enhancing shareholder value ▪ Questions for the current Board: – What is the Board’s plan to narr

  22. Slide 22: Market Participants Highlight Strategic's Lack of an Effective Strategy

    Slide 22: Market Participants Highlight Strategic's Lack of an Effective Strategy

    orange capital ▪ On the Q1 2013 earnings call on April 30, 2013, Ryan Meliker of MLV & Co. and Chairman & CEO Rip Gellein had this exchange: ▪ On the Q3 2012 earnings call on November 8, 2012, Ian Weissman of ISI Group and Chairman & CEO Rip Gellein had this exchange: ▪ In a report issued August 7,

  23. Slide 23: Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with an Effective Strategy

    Slide 23: Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with an Effective Strategy

    orange capital Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with an Effective Strategy ▪ Strategic has repeatedly failed to provide shareholders with an effective strategic plan ▪ Strategic’s 2013, 2012, 2011 and 2010 shareholder presentations made no mention of the Company’s strategy going forwa

  24. Slide 24: Strategic's Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with a Strategy

    Slide 24: Strategic's Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with a Strategy

    orange capital Strategic’s Track Record of Failing to Provide Shareholders with a Strategy ▪ In fact, the last time the Company articulated any discernable strategy was at the May 2009 annual shareholders meeting [ 23 ] Source: Strategic Hotels & Resorts Investor Presentation, May 2009

  25. Slide 25: Potential Sale of Company Driving Outperformance

    Slide 25: Potential Sale of Company Driving Outperformance

    orange capital Potential Sale of Company Driving Outperformance June 13, 2013 What about the potential sale of the company? April 30, 2013 Rumored Sale Process ▪ We believe the Board’s response to the media reports of a sale process has been incomplete, fundamentally flawed, and lacks reasonable tra

  26. Slide 26: Our Financial Advisor Questions the Rumored Sale Process

    Slide 26: Our Financial Advisor Questions the Rumored Sale Process

    orange capital Our Financial Advisor Questions the Rumored Sale “Process” ▪ Our financial advisor has raised important questions regarding the rumored sales process, including: – Whether all of the logical potential buyers were contacted – Whether some of the parties who were contacted were induced

  27. Slide 27: III. History of Poor Corporate Governance

    Slide 27: III. History of Poor Corporate Governance

    III. History of Poor Corporate Governance

  28. Slide 28: Summary

    Slide 28: Summary

    orange capital Summary [ 27 ] Is this a record of prioritizing the best interests of shareholders? Where are the independent directors? Source: Strategic Hotels’ SEC filings; ISS Reports; Glass Lewis Reports ▪ In addition to financial underperformance, we have significant concerns about the governan

  29. Slide 29: Problematic Compensation Practices

    Slide 29: Problematic Compensation Practices

    orange capital Problematic Compensation Practices ▪ Since say - on - pay voting began in 2011, Strategic is part of the 1% of Russell 3000 companies that received an “against” recommendation from ISS each of the last 3 years (1) ▪ Proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis have routinely expressed concerns

  30. Slide 30: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    Slide 30: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    orange capital Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns [ 29 ] ISS May 2013 Report Glass Lewis May 2013 Report “The Company has been deficient in linking pay to corporate performance, as indicated by the “F” grade received by the Company in Glass Lewis’ pay - for - performance

  31. Slide 31: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    Slide 31: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    orange capital ▪ ISS and Glass Lewis had similar concerns in 2012: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns [ 30 ] “[T]his marks the third consecutive year that pay - for - performance misalignment has been identified at the company. The compensation committee's track record de

  32. Slide 32: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    Slide 32: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    orange capital “The Company has entered into executive employment agreements that have an automatic renewal feature. We believe this is concerning as what is best for the company and employee at one point in time may no longer be true. Furthermore, more and more companies are eliminating executive e

  33. Slide 33: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    Slide 33: Problematic Compensation Practices: ISS & Glass Lewis Concerns

    orange capital “The compensation committee is tasked with the responsibility to ensure that executive compensation is performance based and reasonable. In this case, ISS found the significant increase in the CEO's compensation to be concerning because such increase is done during a time when the com

  34. Slide 34: Lack of a Proper CEO Search

    Slide 34: Lack of a Proper CEO Search

    orange capital Lack of a Proper CEO Search ▪ On November 2, 2012, Strategic announced the resignation of longtime CEO Laurence Geller, and that Rip Gellein would replace Mr. Geller as CEO while also remaining Chairman ▪ The Board appointed Mr. Gellein to fill the CEO role without conducting a custom

  35. Slide 35: Lack of a Proper CEO Search

    Slide 35: Lack of a Proper CEO Search

    orange capital Lack of a Proper CEO Search ▪ During the Company’s November 2, 2012 conference call announcing Mr. Geller’s resignation, ISI Group’s Ian Weissman questioned the lack of any CEO search process: [ 34 ] Mr. Weissman : “ Maybe just following up on earlier questions, it just seems very sud

  36. Slide 36: Consistently Low Director Support

    Slide 36: Consistently Low Director Support

    orange capital 66.1% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 Consistently Low Director Support [ 35 ] Average Voting Support Per Director (1) ISS Industry Average: ~95% We believe shareholders have sent a clear message of dissatisfaction to the Board by consistently wit

  37. Slide 37: Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench

    Slide 37: Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench

    orange capital Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench ▪ In November 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, Strategic adopted a one - year poison pill citing the “significant dislocation in the equity markets and challenging economic environment and outlook, particularly in the lodging secto

  38. Slide 38: Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench

    Slide 38: Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench

    orange capital Defensive Measures That Serve to Entrench [ 37 ] Strategic continues to maintain strong structural defenses that serve to diminish shareholder influence Strategic’s Structural Defenses Directors can only be removed for cause with a vote of 66 2/3% of shares entitled to vote – effectiv

  39. Slide 39: What are Two of the Most Important Responsibilities of a Board of Directors?

    Slide 39: What are Two of the Most Important Responsibilities of a Board of Directors?

    orange capital What are Two of the Most Important Responsibilities of a Board of Directors? [ 38 ] The Board has failed to fulfill these key responsibilities to shareholders 1. Hire CEO The Board interviewed ZERO external candidates 2. Set Corporate Strategy The Board has been silent on strategy sin

  40. Slide 40: IV. Orange Capital's Recommendations

    Slide 40: IV. Orange Capital's Recommendations

    IV. Orange Capital’s Recommendations

  41. Slide 41: Summary

    Slide 41: Summary

    orange capital Summary ▪ Evaluate s trategic alternatives to maximize long - term shareholder value ▪ Set strategy for closing the share price discount to NAV ▪ Reform the Company’s governance [ 40 ] More than any one idea, Strategic Hotels and its Board need a cultural change that only comes with t

  42. Slide 42: Evaluate Strategic Alternatives

    Slide 42: Evaluate Strategic Alternatives

    orange capital Evaluate Strategic Alternatives ▪ Orange believes that there are a number of strategic alternatives available to the Company that should be fully and carefully evaluated ▪ The integrity of any strategic review is critical: – The Board should form a Special Committee comprised solely o

  43. Slide 43: Set Strategy for Realizing NAV

    Slide 43: Set Strategy for Realizing NAV

    orange capital Set Strategy for Realizing NAV ▪ Reduce Current SG&A – By bringing SG&A down to the average of its peers, Strategic could achieve an additional $0.58 per share, or a 11% - 17% reduction in discount to NAV ▪ Streamline Current Portfolio – Strategic’s portfolio inconsistencies make it c

  44. Slide 44: Reform the Company's Governance

    Slide 44: Reform the Company's Governance

    orange capital Reform the Company’s Governance ▪ Improve communications with shareholders – The Company should proactively address the share price discount to NAV without needing to be asked by the investment community ▪ Formulate appropriate succession planning practices – Mandate that comprehensiv

  45. Slide 45: V. Orange Capital's Nominees for Strategic Hotels

    Slide 45: V. Orange Capital's Nominees for Strategic Hotels

    V. Orange Capital’s Nominees for Strategic Hotels

  46. Slide 46: Experience and Expertise is Needed to Enhance Shareholder Value

    Slide 46: Experience and Expertise is Needed to Enhance Shareholder Value

    orange capital Experience and Expertise is Needed to Enhance Shareholder Value ▪ Dave Johnson – President & CEO of Aimbridge Hospitality – Setting a Focused Strategy ▪ Daniel Lewis – Managing Partner of Orange Capital, LLC – Establishing Shareholder Accountability ▪ John Lyons – Founder and Principa

  47. Slide 47: Dave Johnson: Setting a Focused Strategy

    Slide 47: Dave Johnson: Setting a Focused Strategy

    orange capital Dave Johnson: Setting a Focused Strategy [ 46 ] Relevant Experience ▪ President & CEO of Aimbridge Hospitality ▪ Former Director of Ryman Hospitality Properties ▪ Former President of Wyndham Hotels, overseeing approximately 15,000 employees “Corporate strategy drives the day - to - da

  48. Slide 48: Daniel Lewis: Establishing Shareholder Accountability

    Slide 48: Daniel Lewis: Establishing Shareholder Accountability

    orange capital Daniel Lewis: Establishing Shareholder Accountability [ 47 ] Relevant Experience ▪ Managing Partner of Orange Capital, LLC (2005 – Present) ▪ Former Director at Citigroup Global Special Situations “When independent shareholders join a board, the entire culture inside the boardroom cha

  49. Slide 49: John D. Lyons: Exploring Strategic Alternatives

    Slide 49: John D. Lyons: Exploring Strategic Alternatives

    orange capital John D. Lyons: Exploring Strategic Alternatives [ 48 ] ▪ Founder and Managing Principal of Granite Realty Advisors (2013 – Present) ▪ Former President and CEO of Savills LLC (2007 – 2012) ▪ Former Founder and CEO of Granite Partners LLC (1996 – 2007) – Acquired by Savills, plc in 2007

  50. Slide 50: Mark Woodworth: Portfolio Construction

    Slide 50: Mark Woodworth: Portfolio Construction

    orange capital Mark Woodworth: Portfolio Construction [ 49 ] Relevant Experience ▪ Founder and President, PKF Hospitality Research, LLC ▪ Former Partner and Chairman of Hospitality Industry Consulting Services practice at Coopers & Lybrand ▪ Over 35 years of experience in the hospitality industry in

  51. Slide 51: VI. Appendix

    Slide 51: VI. Appendix

    VI. Appendix

  52. Slide 52: Appendix: NAV Analysis of Strategic Hotels' Individual Portfolio Holdings

    Slide 52: Appendix: NAV Analysis of Strategic Hotels' Individual Portfolio Holdings

    orange capital Appendix: NAV Analysis of Strategic Hotels’ Individual Portfolio Holdings [ 51 ] PKF Consulting’s Net Asset Value Detail (1) (1) Valuation data provided by PKF Consulting as of April, 2013 (2) Strategic owns $21.5 million defaulted loan on adjacent Lakeshore Athletic Club (3) Includes

  53. Slide 53: Appendix: Strategic Hotels' Peers

    Slide 53: Appendix: Strategic Hotels' Peers

    orange capital Appendix: Strategic Hotels’ Peers [ 52 ] $3.1 billion market cap $4.6 billion EV LTM RevPAR of $164.68 Portfolio consists of properties located in the United States $1.9 billion market cap $2.4 billion EV Portfolio consists of properties in located in the United States LTM RevPAR of $

  54. Slide 54: Contact Information

    Slide 54: Contact Information

    orange capital Contact Information [ 53 ] Media: ICR, LLC Theodore Lowen / Phil Denning (646) 277 - 1238 / (203) 682 - 8246 Ted.Lowen@icrinc.com / Phil.Denning@icrinc.com Shareholders: Okapi Partners LLC Bruce H. Goldfarb / Patrick J. McHugh / Lydia Mulyk (855)305 - 0856 / (212) 297 - 0720 info@okap

Source: SEC EDGAR · DFAN14A filed Nov 20, 2013

More decks from Strategic Hotels and Resorts Inc