Cannae Holdings, Inc. · NYSE:CNNE

Cannae — Proxy Contest (November 2025)

76 slides from Cannae's proxy contest presentation, Nov 10, 2025

1. Slide 1: A Case for Change: Cannae Holdings

   A Case for Change Cannae Holdings NOVEMBER 2025

2. Slide 2: Important Disclaimers

   IMPORTANT DISCLAIMERS dŚŝƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĨŽƌ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ŽŶůLJ͕ ŝŶ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚͲůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐ͕ ĂĐƚƵĂů ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŵĂLJ ĚŝĨĨĞƌ ƐŽůŝĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽdžŝĞƐŽĨĂŶŶĂĞ;ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďĞůŽǁͿ͘dŚŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞĂŶĂůLJƐŝƐĂŶ

3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

   Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary Page 3 2. Market Performance Demonstrates Need for Change Page 23 3. Governance Actions Misaligned with Shareholder Interests Page 34 4. Concerning Compensation Practices Disadvantage Shareholders Page 51 5. A Plan to Drive Value Creation at Cannae Page 62 6. C

4. Slide 4: Executive Summary

   Executive Summary 3

5. Slide 5: Executive Summary: Who We Are, Why We Are Here

   Executive Summary Who We Are ƒ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĂŵƵůƚŝͲƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĨŝƌŵďĂƐĞĚŝŶĂƌŝĞŶ͕ŽŶŶĞĐƚŝĐƵƚǁŝƚŚĂƉƉƌŽdžŝŵĂƚĞůLJΨϮ͘ϳďŝůůŝŽŶŝŶĂƐƐĞƚƐƵŶĚĞƌ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĚƌŝǀĞŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĐĂƚĂůLJƐƚͲƌŝĐŚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƒ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞ͛ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƐďƌŝŶŐŽǀĞƌϭϮϬĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚLJĞĂƌƐŽĨůŽŶŐͲƚĞƌŵƚƌĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ͕ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ͕Ă

6. Slide 6: Carronade's Investment Philosophy

   Carronade’s Investment Philosophy Carronade, founded in 2020, is a registered investment manager with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission with approximately $2.7 billion in assets under management located in Darien, Connecticut Carronade employs a multi-strategy approach focused on idiosyncrat

7. Slide 7: Carronade Capital's Research Process

   Carronade Capital’s Research Process We have conducted extensive research, including with the help of top-tier external advisors and industry experts, to better understand Cannae’s operations, strategy, and opportunities for value creation ƒ ^ĞŶŝŽƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶĚƵƐƚƌLJĞdžĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚƐĞĂƐŽŶĞĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ͗tĞŚĂ

8. Slide 8: Why We are Here

   Why We are Here ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞŽǁŶƐĂϲ͘ϱйĞƋƵŝƚLJƐƚĂŬĞŝŶĂŶĚŝƐĂƚŽƉƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŽĨĂŶŶĂĞ͕ĂĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶLJƚƌĂĚŝŶŐĂƚĂ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƚŽEsĚƵĞƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐĂŶĚŵŝƐĂůŝŐŶĞĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJ͘ dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶƵƌŐĞŶƚŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŚĂŶŐĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶŶĂĞ͛ƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůŽŶŐͲƚĞƌŵƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞd^Z ƵŶĚĞƌƉĞ

9. Slide 9: Cannae Overview

   Cannae Overview Cannae Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:CNNE) is a diversified holding company that owns a wide portfolio of businesses - 12 disclosed current investments (9 private, 3 public) - NAV of $1,356 million - Market Cap of $887 Million On their website, Cannae states, “We primarily acquire interests i

10. Slide 10: The Status Quo Needs Dramatic Change

    The Status Quo Needs Dramatic Change ͞KƵƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJŚĂƐƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶůĞǀĞƌƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂŶĚǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ͕ŵĂŬŝŶŐŶĞǁŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůLJŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŐƌŽǁEs͕ĂŶĚƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐĐĂƉŝƚĂůƚŽƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ͘͟ Ͳ K͕ZLJĂŶĂƐǁĞůůŽŶYϯϮϬϮϰĂƌŶŝŶŐƐĂůů ͞tĞďĞůŝĞǀĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞďƵƐŝŶĞ

11. Slide 11: Key Investment Highlights (as Disclosed by Cannae)

    Key Investment Highlights (as Disclosed by Cannae) ŽŵƉĂŶLJ<ĞLJ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ,ŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞ͛ƐWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚďLJĂƉƌŽǀĞŶǀĂůƵĞͲĐƌĞĂƚŽƌ Dƌ͘&ŽůĞLJ͛ƐƚĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨĂŶŶĂĞ 1 tŝůůŝĂŵW͘&ŽůĞLJ͕//;͞&ŽůĞLJ͟ͿŝƐĂƉƌĞĞŵŝŶĞŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌĂŶĚĚĞĂůŵĂŬĞƌǁŝƚŚĂ ůŽŶŐ͕ƉƌŽǀĞŶƚƌĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌ

12. Slide 12: Shareholder Returns Materially Underperform Peers

    Shareholder Returns Materially Underperform Peers The most objective indication that fundamental change is required is the fact that CNNE’s total shareholder return has severely underperformed its peers over the long term Cumulative Relative TSR over the past 5 years ϱϬй Ϭй ͲϱϬй ͲϭϬϬй ͲϭϮϳй ͲϭϱϬй Ͳϭ

13. Slide 13: Cannae Has Been Mr. Foley's Co-investment Vehicle

    Cannae Has Been Mr. Foley’s Co-investment Vehicle Cannae’s September investor presentation highlights past investment success, but no commentary on Cannae’s performance Where is Cannae? Ψϯ͘ϯ WƌŽdžLJWĞĞƌWĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ Ψϭ͘ϯ ΨϬ͘ϵ ϮϬϭϳ ƵƌƌĞŶƚ ^ƉŝŶ ĂŶŶĂĞ͛ƐŵŽƐƚ ,ŽǁĚŽĞƐEǀĂůƵĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶΕΨϰϭŵŵůŽƐƐ ƚŽEEŽ

14. Slide 14: Cannae's Strategy is Broken

    Cannae’s Strategy is Broken ϭ Portfolio Issues Ϯ Misaligned Incentives ϯ Loss of Credibility >ĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶŽƌƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐLJŝŶƚŚĞ džŽƌďŝƚĂŶƚƉĂLJĨŽƌƵŶĚĞƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚ tĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŽĂƌĚůĂĐŬƐƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁĞŝŐŚŽŶĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌLJŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚLJ ϭ Ψ

15. Slide 15: Carronade Sought to Engage Constructively

    Carronade Sought to Engage Constructively Carronade sought to engage privately and constructively to help improve performance at Cannae, and believed that we were negotiating in good faith until Cannae’s actions suggested they had different plans ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞƐĞŶĚƐůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞĨŝůĞƐƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌLJ ŽĂƌĚƐĞ

16. Slide 16: The Board Has Failed Cannae Shareholders

    The Board Has Failed Cannae Shareholders We believe the current Board has proven itself unable to effectively oversee management and the Company and has destroyed shareholder value through its lack of independence…if not now, when: &ĂŝůĞĚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐůĂŐŐŝŶŐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŽƚĂůĂŶŶƵĂůŝnjĞĚƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƐŝŶĐĞŝŶĐĞ

17. Slide 17: Entrenched, Intertwined Board Undermines Independence

    Entrenched, Intertwined Board Undermines Independence “In determining independence, the Board considered all relationships that might bear on our directors’ independence from Cannae... The Board determined that these relationships were not of a nature that would impair the independence of the member

18. Slide 18: Misalignment: SPACs in Context

    Misalignment: SPACs in Context We believe the Board allowed Cannae to commit to over $1 billion of shareholder capital during the SPAC craze to help consummate Mr. Foley’s externally sponsored SPACs and generate potentially lucrative founder economics for him 'ŽƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂůů͞ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ͟ŽĂƌĚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ

19. Slide 19: Current Directors We Are Seeking to Replace

    Current Directors We Are Seeking to Replace ƒ ^ĞƌǀĞĚĂƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨĂŶŶĂĞƐŝŶĐĞ:ƵůLJϮϬϭϴĂŶĚĂƐ>ĞĂĚ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ŽĨĂŶŶĂĞƐŝŶĐĞ&ĞďƌƵĂƌLJϮϬϮϯ ƌŝŬĂDĞŝŶŚĂƌĚƚ ĂŶĚŝƐĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ǁŝƚŚĂƚŽƚĂůƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞd^ZĚƵƌŝŶŐŚĞƌƚĞŶƵƌĞŽĨͲϭϮϴй ŐĞ͗ϲϳ ƒ tŽƌŬĞĚĂƐĂŶĞŵƉůŽLJĞĞŽĨ&E&ĨƌŽŵϭϵϴϯƚŽϮϬϮϰ͕ϰϭLJĞĂƌƐ͕ĂŶĚĂůƐŽƐĞƌǀĞĚŽŶ

20. Slide 20: Cannae's Defensive Actions are Too Little Too Late

    Cannae’s Defensive Actions are Too Little Too Late Despite Company claims of enhancing shareholder value, Cannae’s stock continues to trade near multi- year lows due to shareholder-unfriendly actions that have undermined market confidence : WƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŽĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨLJƚŚĞŽĂƌĚŽǀĞƌϯLJĞĂƌƐƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐŝŶϮϬϮϲŝƐƚŚĞŵĂdžŝ

21. Slide 21: A Plan to Drive Value Creation at CNNE

    A Plan to Drive Value Creation at CNNE <ĞLJ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ /ŶƚĞŶĚĞĚZĞƐƵůƚƐ ƒ dĂƌŐĞƚΕϭ͘ϱйĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽǀĞƌŚĞĂĚĂƐйŽĨhD͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ^ ƒ ŽŶǀĞƌƚD^ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĨĞĞĐĂƐŚƉĂLJŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞͲďĂƐĞĚ ϭ Reduce costs, align incentives ƐƚŽĐŬĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƒ WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƵƉƐŝĚĞŽĨϭϯй͕ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŽǀĞƌŚĞĂĚ͚ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ͛ ƒ ^ŝŐŶĂůƐĐŽŵŵŝƚ

22. Slide 22: A Fit-for-Purpose, Independent Board Refresh

    A Fit-for-Purpose, Independent Board Refresh Electing all four of our experienced and independent nominees provides a mandate for real change and adds desperately needed independence ƒ DĂŶĂŐŝŶŐWĂƌƚŶĞƌŽĨ<ϲ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ>>͕ĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƒ KĂŶĚ&ŽƵŶĚĞƌŽĨŽƌŵŽƌĂŶƚ/sŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĨŝƌŵƐŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶϮϬϭϭ >>͕ĂĨ

23. Slide 23: Potential to Create over 50% Upside

    Potential to Create over 50% Upside We believe CNNE has a unique opportunity to generate significant value for shareholders, but it requires the Board to formulate a specific plan and effectively execute on an accelerated timeline CNNE Shareholder Value Plan: Price Targets ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌsĂůƵĞWůĂŶ ƵƌƌĞŶ

24. Slide 24: Market Performance Demonstrates Need for Change

    Market Performance Demonstrates Need for Change 23

25. Slide 25: Years of Value Destruction Across Every Relevant Benchmark

    Years of Value Destruction Across Every Relevant Benchmark CNNE has significantly underperformed nearly all relevant benchmarks over key historical periods Cannae self-selects and shifts peers between 2022-2024 as the Company claims “the firm’s total assets and business composition changed (2024 Pro

26. Slide 26: Cannae's Own Performance Graph

    Cannae’s Own Performance Graph Cannae’s own financials acknowledge this persistent and severe underperformance against its self- selected and shifting peers, highlighting that the Status Quo has failed and it’s time to redefine Cannae’s strategic focus and investment process ^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗ŽŵƉĂŶLJϮϬϮϰŶŶƵĂůZĞ

27. Slide 27: Abysmal Recent Investment Performance Lags Peers

    Abysmal Recent Investment Performance Lags Peers Cannae’s persistent underperformance over the past 5+ years coupled with disproportionate compensation has deepened shareholders’ crisis of confidence Annual and LTM ROIC (%) ϮϬй ϭϲй ϭϱй ϵй ZĞƚƵƌŶŽŶ/ŶǀĞƐƚĞĚĂƉŝƚĂů ϭϬй ϴй ϳй ϴй ϲй ϱй Ϭй Ͳϭй Ͳϱй Ͳϯй Ͳϲй

28. Slide 28: Shareholder Returns are in the Bottom Tier

    Shareholder Returns are in the Bottom Tier CNNE has a valuable portfolio of assets, yet is consistently a bottom tier performer in TSR WƌŽdžLJWĞĞƌ'ƌŽƵƉƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞZĂŶŬŝŶŐ Consistent ϭϬLJƌ ϵLJƌ ϴLJƌ ϳLJƌ ϲLJƌ ϱLJƌ ϰLJƌ ϯLJƌ ϮLJƌ ϭLJƌ underperformance is ,>E ,>E ,>E ^dW ^dW D/E D/E ^dW ^dW dZ/E the market telling ,d

29. Slide 29: Losses Embedded in Portfolio Weigh on Confidence

    Losses Embedded in Portfolio Weigh on Confidence Shareholders bear the brunt of poor capital allocation decisions, reflected in a large discount to NAV, while management cashed out on the successful investments ůŝŐŚƚ ^LJƐƚĞŵϭ WĂLJƐĂĨĞ ^ŝŐŚƚůŝŶĞ ^W ^W ^W Ψϱϭϵ Ψϰϰϭ ΨϮϳϳ ΨϮϰϴ ΨϮϭϯ Ψ;ϮϮϴͿ Ψϴϵ Ψ;ϰϯϬͿ Ψϯϴ Ψ

30. Slide 30: Persistent and Significant Discount to NAV

    Persistent and Significant Discount to NAV Cannae trades at a discount to disclosed proxy peers and closed-end fund peers with the discount persistently widening after affiliated-party SPAC deals in 2021, implying a repudiation of strategy and loss of confidence from shareholders Public Equity Value

31. Slide 31: Pro Forma NAV Discount Readily Achievable

    Pro Forma NAV Discount Readily Achievable CNNE’s -35% discount to NAV is worse than 99% of publicly listed US Investment Companies, Investment Management firms and Closed End Funds with assets over $500 million Public Equity Value Discount to Net Asset Value ϭϬϬй ϴϬй ϲϬй ϰϬй ϮϬй Ϭй ͲϮϬй ϮϰŵŽŶƚŚƉůĂŶ

32. Slide 32: Market Reaction to Recent Company Updates

    Market Reaction to Recent Company Updates Each time the Company reiterates that it is sticking to the Status Quo, shareholders vote with their feet: YϭϮϱĂƌŶŝŶŐƐWƌŝĐĞZĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ YϮϮϱĂƌŶŝŶŐƐWƌŝĐĞZĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ΨϮϬ͘ϱϬ ΨϮϬ͘ϱϬ 8/11 – earnings after close. Cannae did not provide an 5/12 – earnings update on the ΨϮ

33. Slide 33: Opaque and Stale Disclosure Around Private Assets

    Opaque and Stale Disclosure Around Private Assets /ŵƉƌŽǀĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ^ŽƌĞůLJ EĞĞĚĞĚ &ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůsĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŶĂůLJƐŝƐ : ŝƐĐůŽƐĞŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞŽŵƉĂŶLJ͕ WƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚdƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ& dŚŝƌĚWĂƌƚLJsĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ : ŶŐĂŐĞĞdžƚĞƌŶĂůǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ƚŽůĞŶĚĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚLJƚŽŵĂƌŬƐ zĞĂƌŶĚƵĚŝƚĞĚsĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ : ĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŽŚĂǀĞŵĂƌŬƐĂƵĚŝƚĞĚ ŽŶĐĞ

34. Slide 34: Shareholders are Ready for Change

    Shareholders are Ready for Change : Management’s plan is not working : Buybacks have failed to close the discount : Shareholders expressed they do not want CNNE to invest in small private positions with no disclosure ͞dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŝůů&ŽůĞLJĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚ͙ƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚƵƐYƵŽĚŽĞƐŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ ĂƐƚŚĞŝůů&ŽůĞLJŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚǀĞŚŝĐůĞĂŶĚ

35. Slide 35: Governance Actions Misaligned with Shareholder Interests

    Governance Actions Misaligned with Shareholder Interests 34

36. Slide 36: Board Needs Fresh Perspectives and Agents of Change

    Board Needs Fresh Perspectives and Agents of Change Ϭ ϴϯй EŽZĞĨƌĞƐŚŵĞŶƚ ϳͬϭϬ EŽĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞ ŽĂƌĚŚĂƐŽŶůLJŐƌŽǁŶ͕ /^^ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚt/d,K> ϭϬͬϭϮŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ŽƵƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞWƌŽdžLJ ĂĚĚŝŶŐϯŶĞǁĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŝŶ ǀŽƚĞƐŽŶϳͬϭϬĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐϮ ŽŶƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚĨŽƌϱнLJĞĂƌƐ WĞĞƌĂǀĞƌĂŐĞd^Z ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚϱLJĞĂƌƐϭ ǁŚĞŶůĂƐƚƵƉĨŽƌĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ >ĂƐƚ/^

37. Slide 37: Directors Extensive History and Comp at Foley Entities

    Directors Extensive History and Comp at Foley Entities /ŶĐƵŵďĞŶƚƐƵƉĨŽƌĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽƵŐ &ƌĂŶŬ ŝůů ,ƵŐŚ DĂůĐŽůŵ DĂƌŬ tŽŽĚLJ ƌŝŬĂ ĂƌƌLJ :ĂŵĞƐ &ƌĂŶŬ ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ DĂƌƚŝƌĞ ZŽLJĂŶ ,ĂƌƌŝƐ ,ŽůůĂŶĚ >ŝŶĞŚĂŶ dLJůĞƌ DĞŝŶŚĂƌĚƚ DŽƵůůĞƚ ^ƚĂůůŝŶŐƐ tŝůůĞLJ EEůĂƐƐ ϮϬϮϳ ϮϬϮϳ ϮϬϮϳ ϮϬϮϲ ϮϬϮϲ ϮϬϮϲ ϮϬϮϲ ϮϬϮϱ ϮϬϮϱ ϮϬϮϱ ϮϬϮϱ ƵƌƌĞŶƚŽƌWƌŝŽƌ

38. Slide 38: Detailed Connections Between Incumbent Nominees

    Detailed Connections Between Incumbent Nominees ƌŝŬĂDĞŝŶŚĂƌĚƚ &ƌĂŶŬtŝůůĞLJ tŝůŵĂĐ/// • Meinhardt has worked for Foley for 43 years • Willey has worked for Foley for ~48 years • Director on 4/5 Foley SPACs • Called himself a Foley “Disciple” in 2001 • All board experience from Foley companies • Direct

39. Slide 39: CNNE Directors Often Overlapped at Foley Companies

    CNNE Directors Often Overlaped at Foley Companies ϮϬϬϯ ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϱ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϬϳ ϮϬϬϴ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϭ ϮϬϭϮ ϮϬϭϯ ϮϬϭϰ ϮϬϭϱ ϮϬϭϲ ϮϬϭϳ ϮϬϭϴ ϮϬϭϵ ϮϬϮϬ ϮϬϮϭ ϮϬϮϮ ϮϬϮϯ ϮϬϮϰ ϮϬϮϱ &ŽůĞLJ < ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ tŝůůĞLJ ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ :y DĂƌƚŝƌĞ &ŽůĞLJ DĂƌƚŝƌĞ &/^ ^ƚĂůůŝŶŐƐ ,ĂƌƌŝƐϭ DĂƐƐĞLJ &ŽůĞLJ ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ ,ĂƌƌŝƐ &E& DĞŝŶŚĂƌĚƚ tŝůůĞLJ DĂƐƐĞLJ &

40. Slide 40: Cannae Significantly Delayed its Annual Meeting

    Cannae Significantly Delayed its Annual Meeting Cannae’s 18-month delay pushes up against the outer permissible limits under Nevada law ϭϴDŽŶƚŚƐ ϭϮDŽŶƚŚƐ ĂŶŶĂĞϮϬϮϰ džƉĞĐƚĞĚĂŶŶĂĞ ĂŶŶĂĞϮϬϮϱ ŶŶƵĂů ϮϬϮϱŶŶƵĂů ŶŶƵĂů DĞĞƚŝŶŐ DĞĞƚŝŶŐ DĞĞƚŝŶŐ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞŝŶĂĐƚŝǀĞ ĞůĂǁĂƌĞϭϯͲ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŵŽŶƚŚŵĂdž :ƵŶ :Ƶů

41. Slide 41: Affiliated Transactions are Rife Among Foley Entities

    Affiliated Transactions are Rife Among Foley Entities Mr. Foley’s entities have a long and significant history of engaging in affiliate-related transactions where risk of conflicts of interest are high, and Mr. Foley always appears to win &E&ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚEEĂ EEĨƵŶĚĞĚE &ŽůĞLJĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ<& ΨϭϬϬŵŵƌĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐůŽĂŶ

42. Slide 42: Key Executives Work Across Foley Entities

    Key Executives Work Across Foley Entities Concurrently serving as an executive officer of two unrelated public companies is highly unusual and a red flag for conflicts, in our view – Reality: Cannae Board does not respect corporate separateness 3 year average annual compensation CNNE = $700,000 FNF

43. Slide 43: Foley Outside Business Activities

    Foley Outside Business Activities “We believe that Mr. Foley is able to fulfill his roles and devote sufficient time and attention to his duties as our Vice Chairman and as a director and/or officer of other companies” – CNNE Proxy Materials Despite these time commitments, the Board brought Mr. Fole

44. Slide 44: Foley and Caswell Have Never Bought a Share

    Foley and Caswell Have Never Bought a Share Insiders own ~7 million shares or 14%1, but actual open market purchases only account for 0.6% ŽŵƉĂŶLJ͛ƐĐůĂŝŵƐ͗ ^ŚĂƌĞƐKǁŶĞĚ KƉĞŶDĂƌŬĞƚWƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ;йKǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉͿ ;йKǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉͿ ŝůů&ŽůĞLJ ϰ͕ϴϮϲ͕ϳϭϯ;ϵ͘ϳйͿ Ϭ;ϬйͿ ZLJĂŶĂƐǁĞůů ϲϭϲ͕ϴϰϲ;ϭ͘ϮйͿ Ϭ;ϬйͿ ƵƌƌĞŶƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂǀĞďŽƵŐŚ

45. Slide 45: Cannae's Time Vesting Requirements are a Charade

    Cannae’s Time Vesting Requirements are a Charade Cannae only utilizes time-based vesting for equity awards with no performance criteria ŽŵƉĂŶLJ͛ƐĐůĂŝŵƐ͗ /ŶƌĞĂůŝƚLJ͗ • Not including performance-based conditions effectively means that as long as management hold their positions, they get compensated with

46. Slide 46: Foley and Cannae Directors History of Legal Challenges

    Foley and Cannae Directors History of Legal Challenges We believe Cannae directors exhibit a pattern of testing the limits of fiduciary duty EĞǁŶŐůĂŶĚdĞĂŵƐƚĞƌƐWĞŶƐŝŽŶǀƐ&ŽůĞLJ͕ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ͕ĂŶŶĂĞ,ŽůĚŝŶŐƐ͕ĞƚĂů͘ DŝĂŵŝŵƉůŽLJĞĞƐZĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚdƌƵƐƚǀƐ&ŽůĞLJ͕ŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ͕ ĞƚĂů͘ ^ƚĂƚĞ͕ĞůĂǁĂƌĞŽƵƌƚŽĨŚĂŶĐĞƌLJ͕ŝǀŝů͕ƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ&ŝĚƵĐŝĂƌ

47. Slide 47: Shareholder Suit Contributed to Redomestication

    Shareholder Suit Contributed to Redomestication After settling a shareholder lawsuit in June 2023 accusing Cannae directors of enriching themselves at the expense of shareholders, the Company proposed a vote to redomesticate to Nevada in June 2024 In September 2020, Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & R

48. Slide 48: Redomestication and Fiduciary Duty

    Redomestication and Fiduciary Duty Cannae redomesticated from Delaware to Nevada in June 2024 in a controversial move despite ISS opposition and narrow shareholder support ͞/^^ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǀŽƚĞ'/E^dƚŚĞƌĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĂƚEE͛ƐϮϬϮϰŶŶƵĂů DĞĞƚŝŶŐ͕ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŝŶĂŶ

49. Slide 49: Nevada is a Poor Governance Playground

    Nevada is a Poor Governance Playground EĞǀĂĚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůůLJƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶĞůĂǁĂƌĞŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞŝŶƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĂƌĞŵĂƌŬĚƵƚLJŽĨŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚƵŶĚĞƌEĞǀĂĚĂůĂǁ͘ŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƐŝĚĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶ͞ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ͟ŽƌĞŶƚŝƌĞĨĂŝ

50. Slide 50: What Does Good Governance Look Like?

    What Does Good Governance Look Like? Cannae’s actions are antithetical to the corporate governance principles set out by its largest shareholders 'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ /ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ͞,ĂǀŝŶŐĂŶLJŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ͕ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͕ŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ;ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůͿ : ĂŶŶĂĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚϭϬŽĨŝƚƐϭϮĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶ

51. Slide 51: Independent Voices on Shareholder Misalignment

    Independent Voices on Shareholder Misalignment ͞^ĞǀĞƌĂůďŽĂƌĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŽƌĨŽƌŵĞƌĞdžĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂƚ&ŽůĞLJ͛ƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚŚŽůĚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶLJ Žƌ&ŝĚĞůŝƚLJEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů͘͟ʹ ϯͬϮϬͬϮϱ ͞ůůƚŽůĚ͕&ŽůĞLJŚĂƐĞdžƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚĂƚƚŝŵĞƐŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ͘ĂŶŶĂĞ͛ƐƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂƐŝnjĂďůĞƐƚĂŬĞŝŶĂ&ŽůĞLJͲů

52. Slide 52: Concerning Compensation Practices Disadvantage Shareholders

    Concerning Compensation Practices Disadvantage Shareholders 51

53. Slide 53: Cannae Appears to Be Foley's Personal Fee Machine

    Cannae Appears to Be Foley’s Personal Fee Machine ALIT and DNB as examples to understand the economics to Foley facilitated by Cannae’s investments Alight Dun & Bradstreet ϰ ϰ • ΕΨϭϭŵŝůůŝŽŶĨĞĞ • ΨϮϵŵŝůůŝŽŶ ƚŽĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨĞĞƉĂŝĚ &ŽůĞLJϭ Ψ ϯ ϯ Ψ ƚŽDs • ΕϭϰŵŝůůŝŽŶ • ůĂƐƐĂ

54. Slide 54: SPACs: Founders vs Cannae Shareholders

    SPACs: Founders vs Cannae Shareholders Foley appears to have leveraged over $1.2 billion of CNNE shareholder capital to complete three of his five SPACs (FTAC, Trebia, FTAC II), creating over $500 million of potential value for himself and affiliates outside of the CNNE system EEsĂůƵĞ ^W ĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ E

55. Slide 55: Management's Misaligned Compensation Over Time

    Management’s Misaligned Compensation Over Time CNNE’s financials make it difficult to ascertain how much management is taking out of the business, but at over $650 million since inception, management is grossly overpaid relative to TSR performance Cumulative Management Compensation Since Spin ($ mil

56. Slide 56: Pay for Performance?

    Pay for “Performance”? Poor performance would not be tolerated in the broader investment management industry Pay for Performance1 CNNE ‘Management Fee’ Progression - % of YE AUM2 Ϯϱ͘ϬϬй ϰ͘ϱй WƌŝǀĂƚĞƋƵŝƚLJ ϯ͘ϴй ϮϬ͘ϬϬй ϰ͘Ϭй WƌŝǀĂƚĞĞďƚ ŶŶƵĂůŝnjĞĚWĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͕ŶĞƚ ϯ͘ϱй ϭϱ͘ϬϬй EEDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ&ĞĞ ZĞĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ϯ͘Ϭй

57. Slide 57: Foley and the Board Provide Handouts for Directors

    Foley and the Board Provide Handouts for Directors Directors are given compensation opportunities that are unavailable and adverse to shareholders Foley SPACs Accelerated Vesting if not Re-elected &ŽƵŶĚĞƌн sĂůƵĞƚ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ^W ͚ůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ͛^ŚĂƌĞƐ ΨϭϬƉĞƌ^ŚĂƌĞ ŽƵŐŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ &d/;ůŝŐŚƚͿ Ϯϱ͕ϬϬϬ ΨϮϱϬ͕ϬϬϬ dƌĞďŝĂ;^LJ

58. Slide 58: Employment Agreements Approved by Complicit Board

    Employment Agreements Approved by Complicit Board Off market employment contracts demonstrate the Compensation Committee’s deference and severe lack of independence February 26, 2024: Bill Foley 2024 Employment Agreement March, 17, 2025: Bill Foley 2025 Amended and Restated Employment Agreement EE Ɛ

59. Slide 59: Cannae Externalized, then Re-Internalized Management

    Cannae Externalized, then Re-Internalized Management Cannae initially had an internal management structure, but in 2019 Cannae entered into an external MSA with Trasimene to “create shareholder value” and “provide meaningful protection” 2023 Proxy Materials In 2024, Cannae agreed to pay Foley-contro

60. Slide 60: Comp Structure Driven by Economics, not Alignment

    Comp Structure Driven by Economics, not “Alignment” We believe the real reason for management structure gymnastics are to extract more value for Management History of Management Compensation Programs for FNFV+CNNE Investments ($ million) &E&sĂŶĚ/^/WƌĞĂƚĞĚ EE^ƉůŝƚKĨĨ D^ǁŝƚŚdƌĂƐŝŵĞŶĞ D^dĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ We b

61. Slide 61: Returns in Cannae Proxy Are Overstated by $1 Billion

    Returns in Cannae Proxy Are Overstated by $1 Billion Fixing Company disclosure for true investment cost, mark-to-market GAV and MIP tells a different story: Company Proxy Disclosure Mark-to-Market Adjustments ĂŶŶĂĞ^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚDŽŶĞƚŝnjĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚsĂůƵĞƌĞĂƚŝŽŶDŝůĞƐƚŽŶĞƐ;ŝŶŵŝůůŝŽŶƐͿ KƌŝŐŝŶĂů sĂůƵĞŝŶ ĚĚ ^KdWŽ

62. Slide 62: Selling Stock First is Self-Dealing Before Shareholders

    Selling Stock First is Self-Dealing Before Shareholders Mr. Foley sells his personal stock in Cannae portfolio companies before the Company is allowed to Dun & Bradstreet (DNB) Alight (ALIT) ϭϯ͘ϬϬ ϵ͘ϬϬ 3/25 – Foley sells 11/13 – Foley and Coy 2.5 mm shares sell 5.0 mm shares ϭϮ͘ϬϬ ϴ͘ϱϬ 12/3 – CNNE s

63. Slide 63: A Plan to Drive Value Creation at Cannae

    A Plan to Drive Value Creation at Cannae 62

64. Slide 64: A Plan to Drive Value Creation at CNNE

    A Plan to Drive Value Creation at CNNE <ĞLJ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ /ŶƚĞŶĚĞĚZĞƐƵůƚƐ ƒ dĂƌŐĞƚΕϭ͘ϱйĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽǀĞƌŚĞĂĚĂƐйŽĨhD͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ^ ƒ ŽŶǀĞƌƚD^ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĨĞĞĐĂƐŚƉĂLJŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞͲďĂƐĞĚ ϭ Reduce costs, align incentives ƐƚŽĐŬĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƒ WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƵƉƐŝĚĞŽĨϭϯй͕ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŽǀĞƌŚĞĂĚ͚ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ͛ ƒ ^ŝŐŶĂůƐĐŽŵŵŝƚ

65. Slide 65: Restructure Corporate Costs and Align Incentives

    ϭ Restructure Corporate Costs and Align Incentives Burdensome fees paid to management are misaligned with the overall poor performance of Cannae’s portfolio, perpetuate the discount which the market imputes to the NAV, and need to be streamlined to reflect best-in-class approach History of concernin

66. Slide 66: Spin of public holdings to collapse discount

    Ϯ Spin of public holdings to collapse discount By spinning out a substantial portion of Cannae’s public holdings to shareholders at NAV, the market will be forced to re- rate the remaining portfolio of assets to which it currently ascribes little-to-no value We believe spinning shares of ALIT, SST a

67. Slide 67: Improved Accountability and Governance

    ϯ Improved Accountability and Governance We believe a renewed and demonstrated commitment by management to re-focus strategy and truly align themselves with shareholders supported by improved accountability at the Board level will rebuild investor confidence in Cannae Committing to changing the Stat

68. Slide 68: Fresh, Independent Board Oversight

    Fresh, Independent Board Oversight We believe the following governance improvements are required to drive shareholder value creation Add Carronade’s Truly Independent and Experienced Directors ƒ ĂƌƌŽŶĂĚĞŚĂƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĨŽƵƌŶĞǁ͕ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚƉƌŽǀĞŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞͲĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝ

69. Slide 69: Director Candidates Have Substantial Relevant Experience

    Director Candidates Have Substantial Relevant Experience Carronade’s Director Nominees are additive to the overall skill set of the Cannae Board /ŶĐƵŵďĞŶƚŽĂƌĚŽĨŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶŶĂĞƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶ ŽƵŐůĂƐŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŝŽƌLJĞĂƌϮϬϮϰWƌŽdžLJ͕ƚŚĞ DŽŶĂďŽĞůŶĂŐĂ DĂůĐŽůŵ,ŽůůĂŶĚ ƌŝŬĂDĞŝŶŚĂƌ

70. Slide 70: Detailed Nominee Bios – Mona Aboelnaga

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71. Slide 71: Detailed Nominee Bios – Ben Duster

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72. Slide 72: Detailed Nominee Bios – Dennis Prieto

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74. Slide 74: Conclusions

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75. Slide 75: Summary of Carronade's Perspective

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Cannae Holdings — Proxy Contest (November 2025) on 6ix