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Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Investor Presentation (June 2016)
29 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, Jun 7, 2016
Slide 1: Multiple Equilibria in Open Economy Models with Collateral Constraints: Overborrowing Revisited
Multiple Equilibria in Open Economy Models with Collateral Constraints: Overborrowing Revisited Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martı́n Uribe Columbia University June 7, 2016 1
Slide 2: Starting Point
Starting Point • Open-economy models with collateral constraints typically dis- play a pecuniary externality. • The externality originates in the fact that the price of pledgable objects is endogenous to the model but exogenous to individual agents. • A result stressed in the literature is that thes
Slide 3: This Paper
This Paper • Characterizes multiple equilibria in models with flow collateral constraints. • Shows that open economies with flow collateral constraintshave equilibria featuring self-fulfilling financial crises. • The possibility of multiple equilibria causes the economy to underborrow in equilibrium
Slide 4: A Model with a Flow Collateral Constraint
A Model with a Flow Collateral Constraint Households maximize ∞ 1−σ X c t t −1 E0 β t=0 1−σ subject to 1/(1−1/ξ) 1−1/ξ 1−1/ξ ct = acT t + (1 − a)cN t dt+1 cT t + pt cN + d = yT + p yN + t t t 1+r dt+1 ≤ κ(y T + pty N ) where ct =consumption; cT t , cN =consumption of tradables, non- t tradables; dt
Slide 5: Observations
Observations (1) The last equation is the flow collateral constraint (CC). It says that the amount of debt issued in period t, dt+1 , cannot exceed a fraction κ of income, y T + pt y N . (2) From the individual agent’s point of view, the CC is well behaved: the larger is dt+1 , the closer he gets to
Slide 6: Three Equilibrium Conditions of Interest
Three Equilibrium Conditions of Interest dt+1 ≤ κ(y T + pty N ) !1/ξ 1−a cT t pt = a yN T T dt+1 ct + dt = y + 1+r These three conditions give rise to the following equilibrium collateral constraint " 1/ξ # d 1−1/ξ dt+1 ≤ κ y T + 1−a a y T + 1+r t+1 − dt yN 6
Slide 7: Observations
Observations (1) dt+1 appears on both sides of the equilibrium collateral con- straint. (2) Because ξ > 0, the equilibrium value of collateral increases with the level of debt, giving rise to the possibility that the higher is dt+1 the less tight is the collateral constraint. (3) Moreover, collatera
Slide 8: Some Simplifying Assumptions
Some Simplifying Assumptions (1) σ = 1/ξ = 2. (2) β(1 + r) = 1. (3) a = 0.5. (4) y N = 1. A normalization. The equilibrium collateral constraint then becomes " 2 # d dt+1 ≤ κ y T + y T + 1+r t+1 − dt 8
Slide 9: The Long-Run Equilibrium Collateral Constraint
The Long-Run Equilibrium Collateral Constraint 2 d ≤ κ y T + y T − rd/(1 + r) d¯ ↓ κ[yT + (yT − r/(1 + r)d)2 ] d˜ ↑ 45o 0 0 d˜ d¯ d 9
Slide 10: Observations
Observations (1) the expression under the power of 2 is steady state consump- tion, y T − rd/(1 + r). (3) The LR collateral constraint achieves a minimum when long- run consumption is 0, that is, at the natural debt limit. (4) This means that: (a) for all relevant values of debt (i.e., all values be
Slide 11: The Euler Equation in the Unconstrained Equilibrium
The Euler Equation in the Unconstrained Equi- librium When the collateral constraint does not bind, the Euler equation is cT t+1 = β(1 + r) cT t Recalling the assumption β(1 + r) = 1, we have that cT T t+1 = ct So a constant path of consumption satisfies the Euler equation when the collateral constr
Slide 12: The Short-Run Equilibrium Collateral Constraint and Multiple Equilibria
The Short-Run Equilibrium Collateral Constraint and Multiple Equilibria 2 d −d d ≤ κ y T + y T + 1+r 0 ↓ κ[yT + (yT − rd/(1 + r))2 ] ← κ[yT + (yT + d/(1 + r) − d0 )2 ] A B C o ↑ 45 degree line d1d0 d˜ d 12
Slide 13: Observations
Observations ˜ Thus, from the previous analysis we have that point (1) In the figure, d0 < d. A is an equilibrium featuring dt = d0 for all t ≥ 0. (2) The slope of the short-run (SR) CC is proportional to cT0 . So an equilibrium must be on an upward sloping range of the SR CC. Thus, point C is not a
Slide 14: The Euler Equation in Period 0
The Euler Equation in Period 0 When the collateral constraint binds, like at point B in period 0, the Euler equation is cT 1 1 =q cT 0 1 − µ0(1 + r) where µ0 is the multiplier on the collateral constraint. Is µ0 ≥ 0? Yes, because cT1 > cT0 . From period 1 on, we can use the previous analysis to stat
Slide 15: Are Points Between A and B Equilibria?
Are Points Between A and B Equilibria? Take another look at the figure ↓ κ[yT + (yT − rd/(1 + r))2 ] ← κ[yT + (yT + d/(1 + r) − d0 )2 ] A B C o ↑ 45 degree line d1d0 d˜ d At any such point: (a) The collateral constrain is satisfied (in- deed it is not binding); (b) the resource constraint is satisfi
Slide 16: Three Equilibria
Three Equilibria ↓ κ[yT + (yT − rd/(1 + r))2 ] ← κ[yT + (yT + d/(1 + r) − d0 )2 ] A B C ↑ 45o d1 d0 d˜ d 16
Slide 17: A Unique Equilibrium
A Unique Equilibrium h "1 i ↓ κ y T + 1−a rd ξ ! "! T a y − 1+r A h "1 i κ yT + 1−a d ! "! T a y + 1+r − d0 ξ B ← 45o d1 d˜ d0 d 17
Slide 18: Ramsey-Optimal Capital Control Policy
Ramsey-Optimal Capital Control Policy The government imposes a proportional tax on debt, τt . The budget constraint of the household becomes 1 − τt cT t + pt cN + d = yT + p yN + t t t dt+1. 1+r Suppose that capital control taxes (subsidies if τt < 0) are re- bated (financed) lump-sum or through inc
Slide 19: Underborrowing
Underborrowing ↓ κ[yT + (yT − rd/(1 + r))2 ] ← κ[yT + (yT + d/(1 + r) − d0 )2 ] A B C o ↑ 45 d1 d0 d˜ d The competitive equilibrium at point A can be supported with τt = 0 for all t. It is also the first-best allocation, so it must be Ramsey optimal. Thus, if agents coordinate on equilibrium A, ther
Slide 20: Implementation
Implementation The Ramsey optimal tax rate in this economy is τt = 0 at all times. However, announcing the policy τt = 0 for all t does not guar- antee that the Ramsey optimal equilibrium will emerge. Indeed, this tax policy also supports the deleveraging equilibrium C. What capital control policy c
Slide 21: Implementation (continued)
Implementation (continued) Under this tax-policy rule, the Euler equation in period 0 be- comes: cT 1 1 = cT q 0 1 − τ (d1 − d0) − (1 + r)µ0 (1) In the intended (Ramsey) equilibrium, cT /c 1 0 T = 1, d = d , 1 0 and µ0 = 0, so the Euler equation holds and τ (d1 − d0) = 0. (2) In the unintended equil
Slide 22: Quantitative Analysis
Quantitative Analysis Time unit: one quarter. The economy is driven by endowment and interest-rate shocks. Estimate a bivariate AR(1) process for (ytT , rt) using Argentine data over the period 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q4. κ = 1.2 (⇒upper limit on debt = 30 percent of annual output). r = 0.0316 β = 0.9635 σ
Slide 23: Numerical Algorithm
Numerical Algorithm • The numerical solution must take a stance on how to handle the possibility of indeterminacy. • Failing to address this issue may result in nonconvergence. • In searching for an equilibrium we favor ones with a binding constraint, as follows: • if for the current state (ytT , rt
Slide 24: External Debt Densities With And Without Collateral Constraints
External Debt Densities With And Without Collateral Constraints 2.5 Constrained (b) Constrained (c) Unconstrained 2 1.5 density 1 0.5 0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 dt The collateral constraint severely limits the country’s ability to borrow. More importantly, it highly compresses the debt distribution
Slide 25: The Distribution of Leverage
The Distribution of Leverage 5 4.5 κ→ 4 3.5 Constrained (b) Constrained (c) 3 density 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 dt+1 ytT +pt y N The unregulated economy is less leveraged than the Ramsey economy. 25
Slide 26: Underborrowing
Underborrowing 2.5 Ramsey Constrained (b) Constrained (c) 2 1.5 density 1 0.5 0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 dt t The debt distribution under Ramsey-optimal policy lies to the right of those associated with the unregulated equilibria. 26
Slide 27: Conclusion
Conclusion • This paper characterizes multiple equilibria in models with stock and flow collateral constraints. • It shows that economies prone to self-fulfilling crises underbor- row. Under plausible calibrations, debt is 30 percent below its optimal value. • The underborrowing equilibrium may disp
Slide 28: Impatient Consumers, β(1 + r) < 1
Impatient Consumers, β(1 + r) < 1 . Suppose d0 < d.˜ We believe there is no equilibrium with dt → d. ˜ ˜ the collateral constraint The idea is as follows. As long as dt < d, ˜ the dynamics obey the is never binding. Thus, as long as dt < d, following laws of motion: cT T t+1 t = β(1 + r) /c dt+1 = (
Slide 29: conditions (one initial condition and two terminal conditions) for a system of only 2
conditions (one initial condition and two terminal conditions) for a system of only 2 equations in two unknowns. Now the terminal date T is also a free variable, which adds a degree of freedom. But it has the restriction that it has to be an integer.
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