Mac-Gray Corp

Mac-Gray — Proxy Contest (March 2013)

40 slides from Mac-Gray's proxy contest presentation, Mar 6, 2013

  1. Slide 1: It's time for change at Mac-Gray

    MOAB It’s time for change at since 1927

  2. Slide 2: Proxy solicitation legend

    MOAB CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC ("MOAB CAPITAL") WILL FILE A PROXY STATEMENT REGARDING THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS OF MAC-GRAY CORPORATION (THE "COMPANY") AT THE COMPANY'S 2013 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS. SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISED TO READ THIS PROXY STATEMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOLIC

  3. Slide 3: Moab Capital Partners disclaimer and disclosures

    Moab Capital Partners, LLC ("Moab") is an investment adviser to funds that are in the business of buying and selling securities and other financial instruments. Moab currently has a long position in Mac-Gray Corporation ("Mac-Gray" or the "Company") common stock. We do not own any options on Mac-Gra

  4. Slide 4: Moab's Motivation for a Proxy Contest in 2013

    Moab's Motivation for a Proxy Contest in 2013

  5. Slide 5: Four principal reasons for proposing a slate of directors

    The Company's history of overpriced, dilutive acquisitions (pages 2-3) Mac-Gray's substandard financial performance (pages 4-8) Questionable actions by the Company's current Board of Directors (pages 9-20) Mac-Gray's disappointing stock price (page 21) 1 Moab is proposing a slate of directors for el

  6. Slide 6: Mac-Gray's Costly Acquisition Spree

    Mac-Gray's Costly Acquisition Spree

  7. Slide 7: Mac-Gray has made eight acquisitions totaling $398.2 million since IPO

    Mac-Gray has made eight acquisitions for a total of $398.2 million since its IPO in 1997 (1) The largest acquisitions were bought at EV/EBITDA multiples significantly higher than where Mac-Gray traded at the time the deals were announced Mac-Gray has not shown it is capable of leveraging its increas

  8. Slide 8: Mac-Gray appears to have overpaid for its largest acquisitions

    EBITDA calculated as earnings before net interest expense, income tax expense, depreciation and amortization expense, stock compensation expense and extraordinary gains and losses See revenue and operating margin statistics on pages 5-6 Mac-Gray appears to have overpaid for its largest acquisitions

  9. Slide 9: Mac-Gray's Poor Financial Execution

    Mac-Gray's Poor Financial Execution

  10. Slide 10: Mac-Gray's financial performance leaves much to be desired

    Economies of scale have not been achieved Mac-Gray has failed to generate material organic revenue growth The Company's cash return on invested capital (Cash ROIC) has been declining Mac-Gray's cash return on equity (Cash ROE) has also been falling Mac-Gray's financial performance leaves much to be

  11. Slide 11: Mac-Gray has not leveraged its scale to achieve cost efficiencies

    Mac-Gray has not leveraged its scale to achieve cost efficiencies 5 ($ in millions) LTM Financials Through 6/30/1997 IPO LTM Financials Through 9/30/2012 Revenue $79.2 $322.6 Gross Margin 24.7% 16.6% G&A Expenses $4.8 $21.6 G&A Expenses as a % of Revenue 6.1% 6.7% Adjusted EBITDA $18.0 $69.4 Adjuste

  12. Slide 12: Organic revenue growth of only 0.6% per year

    Despite population expansion and numerous price increases, Mac-Gray has only grown organic revenue at a paltry rate of 0.6% per year! Stewart Gray MacDonald Jr. has been CEO this entire time, and Moab is shocked the Board has rewarded him and other members of management for such performance. Managem

  13. Slide 13: Cash return on invested capital has been declining

    Mac-Gray's cash return on invested capital has been declining Guidance provided in the Company's press release dated 11/7/2012 Moab Adjusted EBITDA: See page 13 Actual cash income taxes paid in 2012 not reported so assumed flat. Assumed constant with 9/30/2012 balance sheet. 7 ($ in millions) 2009 2

  14. Slide 14: Cash return on equity has also been falling

    8 Mac-Gray's cash return on equity has also been falling Guidance provided in the Company's press release dated 11/7/2012 Moab Adjusted EBITDA: See page 13 Actual cash interest and cash income taxes paid in 2012 not reported so assumed flat Assumed constant with 9/30/2012 balance sheet ($ in million

  15. Slide 15: Questionable Acts by the Board of Directors

    Questionable Acts by the Board of Directors

  16. Slide 16: Mac-Gray's Board has committed numerous questionable actions

    Approving expensive acquisitions Restricting stockholder rights Rejecting two opportunities for stockholder value Using corporate funds to entrench the Board Refusing to return adequate free cash flow to stockholders Establishing inappropriate guidelines for executive compensation 9 Mac-Gray's Board

  17. Slide 17: Restricting stockholder rights

    Restricting stockholder rights May 25, 2012 ISS Proxy Advisory Services Report on Mac-Gray 10 "At last year's annual meeting, a shareholder proposal to declassify the Board received affirmative votes from a majority of the Company's shares outstanding. The Board has failed to act on this proposal; i

  18. Slide 18: Rejecting two stockholder-friendly offers

    Rejecting two stockholder-friendly offers December 2006: Board unanimously rejects $13.00-$13.75 per share offer from Coinmach Services Corporation to acquire the Company Coinmach's offer represents a 21% to 28% premium to Mac-Gray's trading price at the time of the proposal Proposal represents a 5%

  19. Slide 19: Using corporate funds to entrench the Board

    After Moab proposes a slate of directors for election at the 2012 annual meeting, representatives of the Company use the Company's entire $2.0 million share repurchase authorization to negotiate a private purchase of stock from a dissident stockholder (supportive of Moab's slate) at $15.00 per share

  20. Slide 20: Refusing to share substantial free cash flow with stockholders

    Refusing to share Mac-Gray's substantial free cash flow with stockholders As defined by the Company in its Form 10-K Actual cash income taxes paid for the quarterly periods not reported so assumed flat 13 Only 6.7% of the cash flow generated in nearly five years has been paid as dividends. ($ in mil

  21. Slide 21: Dividend increase appears defensive and inadequate

    The dividend increase announced on February 25, 2013 appears defensive and remains inadequate The dividend increase to $0.35 per share annually represents an increase of just $1.6 million per year, which is small relative to the Adjusted Free Cash Flow of the business (1) Mac-Gray operates in a matu

  22. Slide 22: Inappropriate guidelines for executive compensation

    15 Establishing inappropriate guidelines for executive compensation The Compensation Committee's list of similarly situated companies is an inappropriate peer group for Mac-Gray Only consists of fourteen companies Has an average market capitalization over five times greater than Mac-Gray's Contains

  23. Slide 23: Inappropriate peer group selection seems to support excessive pay

    See page 21 The Compensation Committee's external model of "similarly situated companies" includes: American Biltrite Inc., Analogic Corporation, Aspen Technology, Inc., CRA International, Inc., Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Dynamics Research Corporation, GSI Group, Inc., Haemonetics Corporation, iR

  24. Slide 24: Performance targets for bonus set too low

    ~0% Revenue or Adjusted EBITDA growth required to earn 100% of target bonus (1) Only ~10% Revenue or Adjusted EBITDA growth needed to earn 150% of target bonus We believe the Compensation Committee has set performance targets too low Target bonus appears as "Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation" i

  25. Slide 25: CEO compensation observations

    See Exhibit C CEO Compensation Observations 18 CEO compensation is completely decoupled from earnings and stock price performance Data from the Small-Cap Service Industry Comparables suggests the CEO is over-earning relative to his peers (1) The CEO's salary in 2011 was 26.8% higher than the median

  26. Slide 26: Is CEO compensation aligned with creating stockholder value?

    (CHART) Is the CEO's compensation really aligned with creating stockholder value? See Exhibit D 19

  27. Slide 27: Series of costly stockholder campaigns

    December 2007: Stockholder Fairview Capital Investment Management, LLC voices concerns regarding Mac-Gray's growth and capital allocation strategy. Fairview urges the Company to consider a high dividend payout model or a sale of the Company 2009: Fairview Capital Investment Management, LLC runs prox

  28. Slide 28: Mac-Gray's Disappointing Stock Price Performance

    Mac-Gray's Disappointing Stock Price Performance

  29. Slide 29: Mac-Gray's common stock price performance has disappointed

    21 Enterprise Value at IPO Enterprise Value at Present Share Price $11.00 $12.42 (1) Shares Outstanding (millions) 11.0 14.8 Market Capitalization $120.8 $180.1 Net Debt $9.0 $190.0 Total Enterprise Value $129.8 $370.1 Total Enterprise Value/LTM EBITDA 7.2x 5.4x As of 2/28/2013 Mac-Gray's common sto

  30. Slide 30: Board Nominees: Background and Plan

    Board Nominees: Background and Plan 22

  31. Slide 31: Current Composition of Mac-Gray's Board of Directors

    23 Current Composition of Mac-Gray's Board of Directors As reported in the Company's most recent proxy statement dated 4/26/2012. Source: Company filings. Excludes shares issuable upon the exercise of options. * Denotes Directors up for reelection at the 2013 annual meeting of stockholders Name Age

  32. Slide 32: Proposed nominee background: Mark Bromberg

    Proposed nominee background Mark L. Bromberg (age 61) has over 35 years of experience as a founder and chief executive of numerous US and Canadian restaurant companies. In addition to being the founder of such Canadian restaurant concepts as Mr. Greenjeans(r), Ginsberg + Wong(r) and Lime Rickey's(r)

  33. Slide 33: Proposed nominee background: James Hyman

    Proposed nominee background (continued) 25 James E. Hyman (age 52) is the President and CEO of TestAmerica Inc., the nation's largest provider of environmental testing services, a role he has held since 2011. In addition to his role at TestAmerica, Mr. Hyman has served as a Board Member of Grosvenor

  34. Slide 34: Proposed nominee background: Michael Rothenberg

    Proposed nominee background (continued) Michael M. Rothenberg (age 39) has spent the past 15 years in the investment management industry. In 2006, he co-founded Moab Capital Partners, LLC, a value-oriented event-driven money management firm. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Rothenberg was a senior investment

  35. Slide 35: Nominees to conduct business review and protect stockholder rights

    Moab expects its nominees to conduct a thorough business review and protect stockholder rights Business review Review market density across the country and address weakest markets with buy/divest/harvest mindset Review contract returns to understand why Cash ROIC and Cash ROE have been declining Det

  36. Slide 36: Opportunities for stockholder value creation

    Moab's nominees see significant opportunities for stockholder value creation 27 Stockholder value creation Implement share repurchase program to take advantage of attractive repurchase opportunities that may arise in the open market Note: The current Board failed to buy back stock while it traded be

  37. Slide 37: Exhibit A - Acquisition Spree Timeline

    Exhibit A - Acquisition Spree Timeline 28 March 1998: Acquisition of Mircrofridge (Intirion Corporation) for 1.6 million shares and $1.0 million of cash, representing $30.6 million of total value. February 2010: Divestiture of Microfridge (Intirion Corporation) for $11.5 million April 1998: Acquisit

  38. Slide 38: Exhibit B - Results of Voting on Stockholder Proposals

    31 Exhibit B - Results of Voting on Stockholder Proposals Source: Company 8-Ks dated 5/26/2010, 5/18/2011, and 6/13/2012 Date Stockholder Proposal % Needed for Approval For Against Abstain % For Result Implemented 5/6/2010 Declassify the Board of Directors 50.1% 7,088,802 6,009,404 39,716 53.8% Appr

  39. Slide 39: Exhibit C - Small-Cap Service Industry Comparables

    Exhibit C - Small-Cap Service Industry Comparables 29 Ticker Name Market Capitalization (1) 2011 CEO Salary Bonus Stock/ Options/ Other Non-equity Compensation Total 2011 CEO Compensation AMRI US Equity Albany Molecular Research, Inc. $249.9 $400,000 $3,829,267 $4,229,267 LOV US Equity Sparks Networ

  40. Slide 40: Exhibit D - CEO Compensation Versus Share Price

    Exhibit D - CEO Compensation Versus Share Price As of February 28, 2013 Source: Company proxy statements and Bloomberg, L.P. 30 Total Mac-Gray Indexed Indexed Indexed Year CEO Compensation Year-End Stock Price CEO Compensation Year-End Stock Price IPO $211,945 $11.00 100.0% 100.0% 1997 $211,945 $15.

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