Alco Stores Inc

Alco Stores — Proxy Contest (July 2014)

63 slides from Alco Stores's proxy contest presentation, Jul 9, 2014

  1. Slide 1: ALCO Needs Change - Investor Presentation

    > ALCO NEEDS CHANGE Cea INVESTOR PRESENTATION > OUR NOMINEES 2014 CONCERNED ALCO STOCKHOLDERS

  2. Slide 2: Our Concerns for ALCO and Our Blueprint

    The secret of change is to focus all of your energy, not on fighting the old, but on building the new -Socrates Our team is ready to build the new ALCO - Concerned ALCO Stockholders Team OUR CONCERNS FOR ALCO We are concerned not only with ALCO’s poor stock price and financial performance, butare al

  3. Slide 3: Agenda

    . ALCO’s poor stock price performance 2. ALCO’s poor operating & financial performance 3. ALCO’s failed and ineffective strategies 4. ALCO’s current Board of Directors is excessively compensated and owns little ALCO stock 5. The CAS blueprint for improving ALCO’s performance and increasing sharehold

  4. Slide 4: Poor Stock Price Performance

    Poor Stock Price Performance

  5. Slide 5: ALCO's Stock Performance Reflects Value Destruction

    ALCO’s Stock Performance Reflects Value Destruction = When current Board Chairman Royce Winsten was elected to the Board in 2007 ALCO’s share price was $35. On June 23", 2014 the stock price was $7.60. Thisis a decline of nearly 80%. = The stock price has declined over several meaningful time period

  6. Slide 6: Poor Stock Price Performance vs. Peer Group

    Poor Stock Price Performance vs. Peer Group Competitors shares have rallied since the 2008 financial crisis— not ALCO. $80.0 $70.0 $60.0 $50.0 $40.0 Share Price (5) $300 1/6/2006 1/6/2007 «1/6/2008 © 1/6/2009 1/6/2010 1/6/2011. «1/6/2012. a/e/2o1s. «1/6/2014 acs —ve ——-00 ——pitr ——sig. ——rrep Footno

  7. Slide 7: Poor Operating and Financial Performance

    Poor Operating and Financial Performance

  8. Slide 8: Poor Operating Performance

    Poor Operating Performance Poor execution at the store and division levels: - higher than industry average out-of-stocks — excessively high shrink Inconsistent marketing and promotion Poor in-store communication of customer value and competitive pricing Lack of customer focus and centricity— ALCO ha

  9. Slide 9: Poor Performance — Long Term

    Poor Performance — Long Term ALCO has been able to increase revenue by more than 26% over the past 10 years. Unfortunately this revenue growth has been unproductive in terms of generating sustainable and consistent profits. Over the past decade: — Gross margins have declined; — Operating income has

  10. Slide 10: Poor/Deteriorating Performance — Short Term

    Poor/Deteriorating Performance — Short Term = While performance has been lagging for 10 years — recently things have gotten worse: FY 2013 4Q FY 2014 4Q %Change = Sales: $143.6 mill $130.9 mill -8.8% = Pre-Tax income: $2.8 mill $-7.9 mill nm FY 2014 1Q FY 2015 1Q %Change = Sales: $109.2 mill $104.7

  11. Slide 11: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance ALCO Stores sales growth has completely stalled— competitors have thrived. $18,000 s Ss ry 5 se000 3 3 3 2008 2005 2006.-«« 2007, «2008.» 2009-2010» 2011.-S««2012- «20132014 *BIG <= FRED —mmmaics Footnote: FDO's FY 2014 wil not end unt August 2014 11

  12. Slide 12: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance ALCO’s Gross Margins are competitive...but... 45% ¥ Gross Profit Margin g 25% 20% 2008 ©2005-2008. «= 2007,-—«S«2008.«S «2009S «2010S «2011S «2012S 20132018 “BIG <= =FRED —mmmaics eee00G == =FD0 = =pITR + 12

  13. Slide 13: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance ... operating margins are poor (and getting worse). Operating Profit Margin 14% 12% 10% 8% 496 “6% 201020112012 2013, 2018 BIG <= @ FRED —mmmalcs

  14. Slide 14: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance Net income has been trending lower over the years and have now deteriorated significantly due to the poor operating results which followed from the Company’s failed strategies and poor execution. ALCO Net Income Margin -- . os. x Z 2 2005 2006, 2007 2008 S . 20094” 2

  15. Slide 15: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance Closest competitors have all experienced increased book values per share — in contrast, ALCO has experienced book value deterioration $35 TaN $30 \ $25 $20 Bv/Share $15 $10 $5 so 2008 «2009-2010 2011S 201220182018 ALCS “-DLTR === 816

  16. Slide 16: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance In spite of no growth in book value and increased borrowing ROE has declined (and is collapsing rapidly). ALCO Return on Equity % 10.0% 5.0% aes : . x ---- 0.0% < < z wo no nome 7 20 Ng? 202 wh a0 ‘ sox -10.0% \ “15.0% -20.0% ‘ 25.0% x -30.0% -35.0% -40.0% 16

  17. Slide 17: Lackluster Operating Performance

    Lackluster Operating Performance ALCO has only generated free-cash flow in three out of the past 10 years (and it is 10 collapsing). ALCO Free Cash Flow wey uN \ ms 2005 2006 \ 2007 2008 2009 how “oi 2012 2013 2014 \ * ' S . v T = aN ¥ \ 3 \ 1 gee \ N \ F . ¥ \ 1 \ s t \ Nd \ “ \ \ \ v

  18. Slide 18: ALCO's Strategies are Ineffective

    ALCO’s Strategies are Ineffective

  19. Slide 19: Lack of Effective Corporate Strategy and P&L Discipline

    Lack of Effective Corporate Strategy and P&L Discipline “My goals in the coming year are two-fold: continue our momentum of successful expense and debt reduction. - Richard Wilson, President and Chief Executive Officer, 10K, FY 2010 The table below makes it abundantly clear that the Board of Directo

  20. Slide 20: Increased Debt Has Weakened the Balance Sheet

    Increased Debt Has Weakened the Balance Sheet Out of the 37 retail and discount stores under $1 billion market cap, ALCO Stores has the second highest Debt/Market capitalization ratio‘. Debt/Market Capitalization Hh... ays — ™— tr — T e CEPI MM MMM ¢ SCoPE < Ss LLP KS a KEEFE CEL EEE LE MLL LS SO SE

  21. Slide 21: Outsized Capital Expenditures Have Not Generated Positive Operational Results

    Outsized Capital Expenditures Have Not Generated Positive Operational Results ALCO spent $43 milion in CAPEX over the last four years — far in excess of the Company’s current market capitalization of approximately $25 million. Investors clearly believe this money was wasted. With no substantive incr

  22. Slide 22: Inconsistent and Haphazard Store Expansion Strategy

    Inconsistent and Haphazard Store Expansion Strategy ALCO has made a number of ill-fated store expansions to locations far from its one distribution center in Abilene KS. More recently, in 2011, ALCO opened stores in densely populated and highly competitive metropolitan locations, in direct contrast

  23. Slide 23: Inconsistent and Haphazard Store Expansion Strategy

    Inconsistent and Haphazard Store Expansion Strategy = One hour of research would have showed that competitive dynamics for these three pilot stores was problematic. Yet we believe ALCO spent in excess of $7 million on these stores. = It is a well known fact that ALCO does not have a national or stro

  24. Slide 24: ALCO's Inadequate Board Composition

    ALCO’s Inadequate Board Composition

  25. Slide 25: Very Low BOD and Insider Share Ownership

    Very Low BOD and Insider Share Ownership = Insider ownership is absurdly low at 0.68% = Amajority (4) of the current Directors do not owna single share * CEO Richard Wilson only owns 6,250 shares and Chairman Royce Winsten owns just 5,000 shares * This explains the reason why board and management in

  26. Slide 26: Excessive Director Compensation

    Excessive Director Compensation The following table provides the details of compensation paid to individuals that served as Directors during Fiscal 2014 Fees Earned or Paid in Director Compensation Cash and Other ($) | Option Awards ($) | Total ($) Richard E. Wilson 0 0 0 Lolan C. Mackey 45,493 152,

  27. Slide 27: Lack Of Shareholder Trust

    Lack Of Shareholder Trust In July 2013, Argonne Capital Group entered into a merger agreement with ALCO to acquire all of the Company’s stock at $14.00 per share On Oct 30, 2013, ALCO Store’s shareholders rejected the merger of ALCO with Argonne Capital Group Only 39.4% of shareholders voted for the

  28. Slide 28: ISS Voting Recommendations

    ISS Voting Recommendations Against ALCO Directors History of WITHHOLD voting recommendations by ISS = In 2013, ISS recommended shareholders to WITHHOLD votes for all 5 ALCO Directors (Royce Winsten, Richard E Wilson, Dennis E Logue, Lolan C Mackey and Terrence M Babilla).

  29. Slide 29: Huge Increase In Withheld Shareholder Votes

    Huge Increase In Withheld Shareholder Votes All Directors have received significant withheld votes in the year 2013 compared to the previous year. Shareholders are upset with the poor oversight of the board members. Neme % of withheld Diference 2012 2013 Dennis E Logue 3.6% 22.4% % of withheld votes

  30. Slide 30: Our Blueprint for Improving Shareholder Value

    OUR BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING SHAREHOLDER VALUE

  31. Slide 31: Operational Assessment

    Operational Assessment = Evaluate organizational capabilities and limitations = Senior management = Gaps (talent, policies & procedures, other resources) and opportunities = Comprehensive financial assessment = Total Company analysis = Store-level historical financial performance (by region, by size

  32. Slide 32: Operational Improvements

    Operational Improvements Insure companywide and retail industry standards and best practices are consistently implemented and monitored by senior management and that employees throughout store operations are appropriately incentivized-—this has apparently been missing with the current board Use the

  33. Slide 33: Exit Money Losing Stores

    Exit Money Losing Stores = Shut down unprofitable stores * Upon review of the financial assessment of the Company (including store-level analysis) we will seek to shut down or otherwise dispose of stores which will not become profitable or benefit from the implementation and execution of a focused r

  34. Slide 34: Focus On Free Cash Flow & Repay Debt

    Focus On Free Cash Flow & Repay Debt = Focus on Free Cash Flow generation * We will cut unnecessary operating expenses = Alco enjoys significant gross profits (nearly $136 million last year). — SG&Ais unreasonably high for this not to generate any operating profit for shareholders. * Until the devel

  35. Slide 35: Improve Governance & Pay-for-Performance

    Improve Governance & Pay-for-Performance = Improve Corporate Governance by removing poison pill ¢ As of now, the Company has Shareholder Rights Plan (Poison Pill). In the current election they are trying to extend it. We will revoke it. = Re-align executive compensation. = As we have demonstrated on

  36. Slide 36: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees Stanley B. Latachais a retail turnaround expert and proven strategic marketing and branding leader with over 30 years of experience, on both the client side and advertising agency side, across all retail categories. Asa retail turnaround expert, he has been involved in assisting five re

  37. Slide 37: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees ‘Singh has served as the general partner of Value Generation Capital Fund LP since December 2013. Mr. Singh also serves as a director of On Track Innovations Ltd. (NASDAQ:OTIV), a company that designs, develops and markets secure contactless microprocessor- based smart card technology,

  38. Slide 38: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees William L. Lechtner has over 30 years of diverse hands-on retail experience across all merchandise, marketing and sales promotion categories. Mr. Lechtner's expertise includes creative brand building and positioning, innovative supply chain solutions and leaders! and team development. S

  39. Slide 39: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees John M. Climaco (J.D.) i: ive record of international business successes and 14 years of experience managing complex business operations and legal strategies worldwide. Mr. Climaco is experienced in major business restructurings, turn-arounds and issues specific to public companies, wit

  40. Slide 40: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees David W. Pointer is the founder and managing partner of VI Capital Management, LLC (“VICM”). VICM was founded on January 1, 2008 and has since been the general partner for the VI Capital Fund, LP (“VICF”) (a Washington State Limited Partnership). VICF is a value oriented investment limi

  41. Slide 41: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees Mark Stolper is the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of RadNet, Inc. (NASDAQ: RDNT). RadNet is the largest owner and operator of freestanding medical diagnostic imaging centers in the United States. RadNet is a publicly traded company with over $700 million of revenu

  42. Slide 42: Our Nominees

    Our Nominees Robert J. Sarlls is the sole member of Food Strategies, LLC, a consulting firm which works with small and mid-sized food companies and private equity firms with active interests in the food, beverage and agribusiness industries. Priorto his current firm he was a Senior Consultantwith Jo

  43. Slide 43: Our Nominees — Track Record

    Our Nominees — Track Record CAS Nominees have an extensive track-record in creating value for shareholders. The following pages highlight the meaningful organizational change, turnaround impact, and value creation effected by CAS’s nominees as a result of their prior efforts as members of Boards and

  44. Slide 44: Pamida Stores (before)

    Pamida Stores (before) Pamida Stores was owned by private equity firm Sun Capital and had $800 million in sales with 193 stores. Like ALCO Pamida targeted small rural towns, and the chain often competed with ALCO. Stan Latacha was hired in early 2011 by the then CEO to help turnaround the business.

  45. Slide 45: Pamida Stores (after)

    Pamida Stores (after) For 2011 Pamida achieved positive main store comp store sales for the first time in 10 years: Comp sales: +3.6% Total Transactions: + 0.6% Average Ticket Size: +2.9% Month trailing June 2011 thru May 2012) Comp sales 46.2% Part of what drove results was making Pamida a Christma

  46. Slide 46: Concurrent Computer Corp (before)

    Concurrent Computer Corp (before) Concurrent Computer Corp 16 14 10 2 ° 01-2002 01-2003 01-2004 01-2005 01-2006 01-2007 01-2008 01-2009 01-2010 01-2011 01-2012

  47. Slide 47: Concurrent Computer Corp

    Concurrent Computer Corp « July 23, 2012: Dilip Singh, operational activist, added to the board http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/749038/000114036112033638/0001140 361-12-033638-index.htm

  48. Slide 48: Concurrent Computer Corp (after)

    Concurrent Computer Corp (after) Concurrent Computer Corp 10 4 Dilip Singh was an influential director who assisted in the development and 3 implementation of this turn-around. 07-2012 01-2013 07-2013 01-2014

  49. Slide 49: Petco Animal Supplies Inc.

    Petco Animal Supplies Inc. William Lechtner joined Petco Animal Supplies Inc. (“PETCO”) as Vice President and General Merchandising Manager in October 1994 when the operation had only 262 stores. Mr. Lechtner was leader in the procurement, sales, brand building and promotional marketing of all merch

  50. Slide 50: PETCO Animal Supplies Inc. (after)

    35 30 25 20 15 10 PETCO Animal Supplies Inc. PETCO Animal Supplies Inc. (after) 03-1995 03-1996 03-1997 03-1998 03-1999 03-2000 50

  51. Slide 51: Barrett Business Services, Inc. (before)

    Barrett Business Services, Inc. (before) Barrett Business Services 30 25 20 a5 10 11-2005 11-2006 11-2007 11-2008 11-2009 11-2010

  52. Slide 52: Barrett Business Services, Inc.

    Barrett Business Services, Inc. SC13D filings: * Oct 06, 2011 ¢ Nov 11, 2011 * Dec 22, 2011 * Dec 30, 2011 * Dec 30, 2012 * Dec 30, 2012 * Dec 30, 2012 * Dec 30, 2012

  53. Slide 53: Barrett Business Services, Inc. (after)

    120 100 80 Barrett Business Services, Inc. (after) Barrett Business Services, Inc Mark Stolper, operational activist, wasa leader in running the 2012 proxy contest that led to a settlement and substantial positive changes at BBSI. 01-2012 04-2012 07-2012 10-2012 01-2013 04-2013 07-2013 10-2013

  54. Slide 54: Metropolitan Health Networks (before)

    Metropolitan Health Networks (before) Metropolitan Health Networks 35 25 os ° 11-2004 04-2005 09-2005 02-2006 07-2006 12-2006 05-2007 10-2007 03-2008 «08-2008 01-2009 06-2008 «11-2008 04-201

  55. Slide 55: Metropolitan Health Networks

    Metropolitan Health Networks April 23, 2010: Mr. Mark Stolper, operational activist, appointed as a director of Metropolitan Health Networks http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1009379/000114420410022044/0001144204-10- 022044-index.htm

  56. Slide 56: Metropolitan Health Networks (after)

    2 10 Metropolitan Health Networks (after) Metropolitan Health Networks Mark Stolper was an influential director who assisted in the development and implementation of this turn-around. 04-2010 10-2010 04-2011 10-2011 04-2012 10-2012

  57. Slide 57: John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. (before)

    John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. (before)

  58. Slide 58: John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc.

    John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. May 11, 2009: Mr. Robert Sarlls joins John B. Sanfilippo & Son as an officer and Vice President of Strategy and Business Development http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090529005592/en/John-B.-Sanfilippo-Son- Appoints-Robert-J.#.U65AovIdXGE

  59. Slide 59: John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. (after)

    John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. (after) 20 rr AL | / : LM A fy wf \, a 5 V 4 Rob Sarlls joined the Company as VP of Strategy and Business Development 5/11/2009 2 ooo FF SSL ITS FE CELE PCE Fg PPO oo herr Fh ah oh WP pe” PP PPP PE APE gh PP PAG gh” oF eT hE ae WA "LW 59

  60. Slide 60: Supporting Data

    Supporting Data Slide 5 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30302/000091600213000029/proxy.htm_(Date of appointment of Mr Wilson — Page 4) Share Price taken from Yahoo Finance - htto://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ALCS+Historical+Prices Slide 6 Share Price taken from Bloomberg Finance. Yahoo Finance

  61. Slide 61: Supporting Data

    Supporting Data le 11, 12, 13, 15, Competitor data taken from company investor relations websites SEC filing data htt http: http://www.dollartreeinfo.com/investors; nvestor.shareholder.com/dollary investor. familydollarcom/i westors-relations/default.aspx http://www.biglots.com/corporate/investor-re

  62. Slide 62: Supporting Data

    Supporting Data Slide 21 Taken from Company filings with the SEC: http://www.alcostoresinc.com/inv investor relations.aspx Note: Source link for all the 10k are available. Slide 22 and 23 Approx ate expense to open one Alco store — Please refer the attached “Alco store transcripts” — Page 24 Please

  63. Slide 63: Supporting Data

    Supporting Data Slide 27 http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/07/25/562392/1004 1824/en/ALCO-Stores-Inc-Enters-Into-Defi ive-Agreement- to-Be-Acquired-by-Argonne-Capital-Group.html http://www.sec.gov/Archi /es/edgar/data/30302/00011046591 3079296/0001104659-13-079296-index.htm http://www.sec.g

Alco Stores — Proxy Contest (July 2014) on 6ix