Oportun Financial Corporation · NASDAQ:OPRT
Oportun Financial — Proxy Contest (June 2025)
66 slides from Oportun Financial's proxy contest presentation, Jun 16, 2025
Slide 1: Item 3: Investor Presentation
ITEM 3: INVESTOR PRESENTATION
Slide 2: The Opportunity at Oportun: How Improved Board Oversight Will Lead to Stronger Operations
The Opportunity at Oportun: How Improved Board Oversight Will Lead to Stronger Operations June 2025
Slide 3: Disclaimer
DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this presentation represent the opinions of Findell Capital Partners, LP and the other participants in its proxy solicitation (collectively, “Findell” or the “Participants”), which beneficially own shares of Oportun Financial Corporation (“Oportun” or the “Company”)
Slide 4: Table of Contents
Table of Contents I Executive Summary 4 II History of Poor Stewardship 9 III Why Governance Matters 31 IV Board Refreshment is Needed to Ensure Changes Materialize 42 V Conclusion 56 3
Slide 5: I. Executive Summary
Presentation to Oportun Financial Stockholders I. Executive Summary
Slide 6: About Findell
About Findell Who We Are • Findell Capital is a value-oriented investment firm focused on U.S. small-cap equities • We invest with a long-term mindset and a strict discipline around valuation and governance • While we prefer to remain passive investors, we will take action when the value of our inve
Slide 7: Why We’re Here
Why We’re Here OPRT’s legacy Board members have overseen an epic mismanagement of costs and capital and we believe cannot be trusted to be good stewards of stockholders. Oportun is in a much better place today because, as it has admitted itself in its letter to stockholders accompanying its proxy st
Slide 8: Oportun Needs Effective Board Oversight
Oportun Needs Effective Board Oversight Oportun was completely Oportun’s legacy Board Oportun’s Board needs to be mismanaged until Findell members serve as an composed of executives with became involved impediment to further change relevant industry experience ¾ Operating expenses ramped to ¾ The Bo
Slide 9: Executive Summary – How We Got Here
Executive Summary – How We Got Here • Findell asked the OPRT Board to improve its governance by re-organizing its committee leadership and lead director roles to allow for greater representation of the three Board members with lending experience (Rich Tambor, Scott Parker and Carlos Minetti). • We t
Slide 10: II. History of Poor Stewardship
Presentation to Oportun Financial Stockholders II. History of Poor Stewardship
Slide 11: Overview of OPRT
Overview of OPRT ¾ Oportun Financial is a lending platform founded in 2005 and headquartered in San Carlos, CA. ¾ Historically, OPRT focused on providing unsecured loans to the underserved Hispanic market – the fastest growing demographic within the United States.4 ¾ These were typically short durat
Slide 12: OPRT Serves a Worthy Purpose
OPRT Serves a Worthy Purpose ~19% of US adults are Credit Invisible/‘Unscorable’ US Hispanics are disproportionately impacted 300 100% Invisible, 16% Invisible, 11% 250 Unscorable, 8% Unscorable, 10% 75% Number of Individuals (MM) Subprime, 22% 200 Subprime, 29% % By Category 150 50% Near prime, 14%
Slide 13: Target Demographic is Growing
Target Demographic is Growing When credit is available, Hispanics have stronger metrics Hispanic Population in US Continues Growing than the other outsized Invisible or ‘Unscorable’ groups 70 100% Invisible Invisible Invisible Invisible 62.1 11% 14% 14% 16% Unscorable 60 8% Unscorable Unscorable Uns
Slide 14: This Simple Lending Business Was Obliterated by an Inept Management Team
In Our View, This Simple Lending Business Was Obliterated by an Inept Management Team That Had No Board Oversight Management apparently decided turn this simple lending business into a money losing fintech platform and destroyed their unit economics by exploding the cost per loan 250% 231% OpEx per
Slide 15: They Were Unique in Their Profligacy
They Were Unique in Their Profligacy – Other Industry-Leading Competitor Did Not Do Anything Remotely This Ill Conceived Competitor One Main Holdings (OMF) Kept Its Cost Structure the Same OPRT’s OpEx Ratio (OpEx/Loans) Elevated vs. Comp 200% 190% 25% 180% 22.2% 160% 20.0% 20% 18.9% 18.3% 18.3% 17.9
Slide 16: To Hide Their Excessive Costs, Oportun Ballooned their Loan Book
To Hide Their Excessive Costs, Oportun Ballooned their Loan Book OMF grew by 8% from 2020 to 2022 OPRT grew by +60% from 2020 to 2022 $20,000 $3,500 3,211 19,442 $3,000 $19,500 $2,500 Average Net Recievables Average Net Recievables $19,000 2,109 1,962 $2,000 $18,500 18,286 $1,500 18,009 $18,000 $1,0
Slide 17: Large Increase in Loans Led to Increase in Charge Offs
This Large Increase In Loans Led to a Large Increase in Charge Offs Lacking risk controls / wide credit box for loan growth drove losses significantly 14% higher than comps 12.8% 12% 10% Reported Net Charge-Offs 8% 7.4% 7.8% 6% 7.1% 4% 2% 0% 1Q'18 2Q'18 3Q'18 4Q'18 1Q'19 2Q'19 3Q'19 4Q'19 1Q'20 2Q'2
Slide 18: To Top It All Off, They Engaged in Disastrous Acquisitions
To Top It All Off, They Engaged in Disastrous Acquisitions Oportun bought an unprofitable digital bank for $211mm that was quickly written off Case Study – Digit Acquisition OPRT Digit Acquisition Presentation ¾ OPRT acquired Digit in late 2021 for ~$211 MM – at the time Digit supposedly had a $40mm
Slide 19: Their Decisions Blew up the Operating Performance…
Their Decisions Blew up the Operating Performance… Post-Digit Acquisition OPRT Revenue and Earnings Collapsed $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $ MM $0 ($50) ($100) First reported quarter post-Digit acquisition ($150) ($200) 3Q19 4Q19 1Q20 2Q20 3Q20 4Q20 1Q21 2Q21 3Q21 4Q21 1Q22 2Q22 3Q22 4Q22 1Q23 Income Bef
Slide 20: …And the Stock Price
…And the Stock Price 80% OPRT Acquires Digit for $211 MM 60% 40% 20% Total Shareholder Return 0% (20%) (40%) (60%) (75.9%) (80%) (100%) Sources: Company financial reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q, Bloomberg 19
Slide 21: Relative to Key Competitor OMF, OPRT Shares Collapsed
Total Shareholder Return (100%) (50%) 0% 50% 100% 150% Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep-20 Oct-20 Nov-20 Dec-20 Jan-21 Feb-21 Mar-21 Apr-21 May-21 OPRT Sources: Company filings financial reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q;OMF financial reports on Fo
Slide 22: In early 2023, Findell Addressed Cost and Capital Allocation Concerns
In early 2023, Findell Addressed Cost and Capital Allocation Concerns We wrote our first public letter to OPRT on March 29th, 20235 calling out Oportun’s expense structure and acquisitions. Our letter addressed the following: 1 The layering on of $200 MM in unnecessary 2 Oportun’s exploding headcoun
Slide 23: Management Pushed Back on Our Claims
Management Pushed Back on Our Claims On our private calls and publicly, management scoffed at the idea that they were running the business with too many expenses. Statement from CEO Raul Vazquez (November 7th, 2022) OPRT’s OpEx Run Rate was more than “So, we feel that the organization is right-sized
Slide 24: Findell Pressure Forced a Pivot
However, With Credit Deteriorating and Pressure Mounting From Findell They Were Forced To Start To Pivot OpEx Improved – Lead by Findell’s Pressure OpEx Per Loan Declined as Headcount was Corrected 200% 190% 250% 231% 180% 160% 200% 139% OpEx as a % of Net Revenue 140% OpEx per Loan Originated vs. 2
Slide 25: Improvements stalled and resumed with Findell’s directors on the board
Improvements stalled and resumed with Findell’s directors put on the board Findell writes first Findell Nominee 39% lower since letter to OPRT Scott Parker Joins candidates the Board recommended by $1,600 $1,461.6 OpEx/Loan Findell joined $1,400 remains ~flat Board Operating Expense per Origination
Slide 26: Share Price Dramatically Improved Following Findell’s Board Additions
Share Price Dramatically Improved Following Findell’s Board Additions 300% 250% 206.1% 200% Total Shareholder Return 150% 100% 50% 0% The appointment of independent lending experts to the boardroom was critical Sources: Company financial reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q, Bloomberg (share price data) 2
Slide 27: Management’s Delays Proved Costly; New Dilutive Financing
Management’s Delays Proved Costly as the Company’s Still-Perilous Financial Situation Forced Them to Engage in a New Dilutive Financing 50,000 Penny Warrant Financing Harms Stockholders 48,000 ¾ Refinanced debt with a $235 MM 4-year secured term loan 46,000 ¾ 15% annual interest rate (~2% improvemen
Slide 28: Oportun is Declaring Victory
Oportun is Declaring Victory The legacy Board thinks they have done a superb job by not bankrupting a Company that they almost bankrupted OPRT Responded to Findell on March 20th Management declared victory so far, applauding themselves But they proceed to list initiatives that Findell explicitly fou
Slide 29: The Value Destruction Engineered by Mr. Vazquez and the Legacy Board
The Value Destruction Engineered by Mr. Vazquez and the Legacy Board Is Astounding CEO Mr. Vazquez incinerated nearly $1.5 billion of stockholder capital trying to turn OPRT into a fintech platform $700 $607 At a 10% OpEx margin structure $600 (which is still ~3% worse than OMF), $534 OPRT would hav
Slide 30: The Future Outlined by Management Is Subpar
The Future Outlined by Management Is Subpar OPRT Has Provided the Below LT Targets for the Company 6 40% 1 2 3 4 5 6 35% 4% (8%) 30% 25% (9-11%) 20% 36% 15% 32% 28% (12.5%) 20-28% 10% 17-19% 5% 3-4% 0% APR Non-Interest Income Total Revenue Yield Cost of Funds Net Interest Margin Net Charge Offs Risk
Slide 31: Oportun Is Still Nowhere Close to OMF on an Opex Ratio Basis
Oportun Is Still Nowhere Close to OMF on an Opex Ratio Basis 3,500 25% 22.2% 3,000 20.0% Average Managed Principal Balance ($MM) 18.9% 20% 18.3% 17.9% 2,500 14.8% 15% OpEx Ratio 2,000 1,500 10% 7.5% 7.3% 7.3% 6.9% 7.0% 6.7% 1,000 5% 500 0 0% 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average Managed Recievables
Slide 32: III. Why Governance Matters
Presentation to Oportun Financial Stockholders III. Why Governance Matters
Slide 33: Oportun is a Case Study in Failed Oversight
Oportun is a Case Study in Failed Oversight Resulting From a Lack of Industry Experience on the Board Not a single legacy Board member has lending experience, let alone subprime lending experience – this may in part explain why they failed to provide much-needed oversight as management careened from
Slide 34: Legacy Board Members Remain Entrenched
Despite Poor Performance, Legacy Board Members Remain Entrenched Legacy Board members have been with OPRT for years (and in some cases over a decade) with minimal turnover and have refused to step down despite their track record Ginny Lee Louis P. Miramontes Raul Vazquez* Mohit Daswani Scott Parker
Slide 35: Unresponsive Board Has Allowed Legacy Directors to Overstay Welcome
Unresponsive Board Has Allowed Legacy Directors to Overstay Welcome Legacy director Jo Ann Barefoot failed to receive a majority of the votes in her favor but remains on the Board; fellow legacy director Sandra Smith barely did better in the same election Ballot Member Votes in Favor Votes Withheld
Slide 36: OPRT’s Entrenched Board Forced Out Scott Parker in May 2025
OPRT’s Entrenched Board Forced Out Scott Parker in May 2025 • In early May, OPRT announced they would reduce the size of their board from 10 members down to 8, which was a welcome change. However, the Board, still controlled by Mr. Vazquez and its majority legacy directors, voted to force Mr. Parker
Slide 37: Apparent Conflicts of Interest are Rampant on the Board
Apparent Conflicts of Interest are Rampant on the Board The Board is stacked with Mr. Vazquez’s colleagues from Intuit, raising serious questions about the degree of independent oversight it can provide Raul Vazquez BOARD MEMBER of Intuit OPRT: Ginny and Neil on Board Intuit: Ginny Reported to Neil
Slide 38: Personal Relationships May Have Helped Drive the Digit Acquisition
These Personal Relationships May Have Helped Drive the Disastrous Acquisition of Digit Ethan appeared on Jo Ann’s podcast in 2016 indicating they knew each other years before the disastrous acquisition Raul Vazquez OPRT CEO / Board Member Jo Ann Barefoot Ethan Bloch BOARD MEMBER of Intuit OPRT purch
Slide 39: Unclear How Much Diligence was Done on Digit
It is Unclear to Us How Much Diligence was Actually Done on Digit Oportun paid $211mm for a company that had nothing to do with their core business – it was an attempt to offer a savings product to customers who definitionally have no savings Digit was doing $40mm in annual run rate revenue and maki
Slide 40: Digit Acquisition Led To Massive Dilution
Digit Acquisition Led To Massive Dilution Oportun’s first dilution occurred in 2023 Oportun has had to go through multiple dilutive financing rounds that they have carefully disguised OPRT 4/27/23 Proxy Statement: Details were buried on page 60 of Oportun’s 4/27/2023 proxy statement Oportun’s second
Slide 41: The Board has Displayed Minimal Risk Control
The Board has Displayed Minimal Risk Control In 2020 ProPublica published an article on how OPRT sued thousands of low-income Latinos during the pandemic OPRT CEO Raul Vazquez was front and center in ProPublica’s discussion of OPRT’s litigious behavior – as a result ORPT imposed a 36% cap on itself
Slide 42: Poor Governance Has Driven Desperate Financing Needs
Poor Governance Has Driven Desperate Financing Needs Early in our engagement this year, Oportun told us they were confident the Company’s warrant holders would convert to shares in order to vote for Mr. Vazquez in a proxy contest, suggesting that dilution of outstanding equity holders by ~20% was wo
Slide 43: IV. Board Refreshment is Needed to Ensure Changes Materialize
Presentation to Oportun Financial Stockholders IV. Board Refreshment is Needed to Ensure Changes Materialize
Slide 44: We Urge Stockholders to Replace Mr. Vazquez
We Urge Stockholders to Replace Mr. Vazquez OPRT told Findell that to avoid a proxy contest Neil Williams would step down. We learned that Neil planned on retiring regardless and their concession was an empty offer. Unfortunately, this deliberate decision to mislead their top stockholder is a microc
Slide 45: Warren Wilcox Is a Highly Qualified and Experienced Director
Warren Wilcox Is a Highly Qualified and Experienced Director Relevant Skillset to Maximize Value at Oportun… Consumer finance expertise Independence as director Public company board experience Subprime lending expertise Track record of value creation …And the Relevant Experience • 5 years at Mercury
Slide 46: Warren Wilcox Is a Highly Qualified and Experienced Director
Warren Wilcox Is a Highly Qualified and Experienced Director • Former member of the board of directors of Encore Capital Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: ECPG), a debt collection and recovery company, and of InfoArmor, Inc., a provider of identity protection solutions • Former Co-Founder and Chief Marketing Off
Slide 47: Instituting Change – What Needs to Happen Next
Instituting Change – What Needs to Happen Next 1 2 3 Reduce Corporate Overhead by Rightsizing Remove the Self-Inflicted Make Clear Governance the Business 36% Interest Rate Cap Changes Given OPRT’s track record over the last few years, we have little confidence that Mr. Vazquez or the legacy Board m
Slide 48: This Business Should be Run at an OpEx Ratio Less Than 12%
1 This Business Should be Run at an OpEx Ratio Less Than 12% After claiming >$700 MM in OpEx (22.2% Opex Ratio) was adequate following 2022, OPRT reported ~$400 MM OpEx in 2024 (15% OpEx ratio). We believe a 12% OpEx ratio is appropriate. While still higher than OMF (which is at 6.7%), a 12% ratio w
Slide 49: Management Comp and Headcount Revisions Yield Additional Savings
1 Management Comp and Headcount Revisions Yield Additional Savings Line Item 2024 Operating Expenditures Means of Improvement 2026E Operating Expenditures Lower tech costs by Technology & Facilities $166 MM focusing on core lending $126 MM Reduce marketing related Sales and Marketing $67 MM to non-c
Slide 50: OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap
2 OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap OPRT themselves point out that alternatives to their services are substantially more expensive By capping their interest rates at 36%, ORPT has been unable to serve large swaths of customers who are forced to use more expensive alternatives Sources: Oport
Slide 51: OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap
2 OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap The rise in OPRT’s net charge offs during a deterioration in the credit market shows management’s inability to properly price for risk – the self-imposed 36% rate cap has been instrumental in OPRT’s underperformance 14% 6% 14% 36% OPRT NCO Rate & 1 Yr Tre
Slide 52: OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap
2 OPRT Must Remove The 36% Interest Rate Cap While the exact impact of a >36% rate cap between 2020-2024 is difficult to determine with provided disclosures, applying the respective delta in the 1-year treasury rate to OPRT’s reported interest quarterly would have generated at least >$40 MM of addit
Slide 53: Clear Strategic Changes – OPRT Targets
3 Clear Strategic Changes – OPRT Targets OPRT Has Provided the Below LT Targets for the Company 7 40% OPRT assumes 6:1 35% leverage to 4% achieve target (8%) 30% 25% (9-11%) 20% 36% 32% 15% 28% (12.5%) 20-28% 10% 17-19% 5% 3-4% 0% APR Non-Interest Income Total Revenue Yield Cost of Funds Net Interes
Slide 54: Clear Strategic Changes – What OPRT Should Target
3 Clear Strategic Changes – What OPRT Should Target 2.5% APR 50 bps expansion from improvement in rate cap removal cost of funds We assume a reasonable 4.5:1 leverage target 45% 40% 100 bps 4% 35% improvement in (8%) operating costs 30% 25% (10%) 20% 41% 38.5% 32% 30.5% 15% (11.5%) 10% 20.5% 5% 9% 0
Slide 55: Clear Strategic Changes – Prudent Capital Allocation
3 Clear Strategic Changes – Prudent Capital Allocation The legacy board has a history of making poor capital allocation decisions – if managed properly, OPRT should be positioned to generate substantial cash for investors Management Should Focus on The Following Initiatives 1 Produce steady and pred
Slide 56: Oportun Under the Right Leadership Has Multi-Bagger Upside
We Believe Oportun Under the Right Leadership Has Multi-Bagger Upside $30 Hypothetical Valuation Scenario $25 ¾ These OpEx initiatives and underlying >8% ROA, >2X P/B operational improvement assumptions would imply a >8% pre-tax return on assets $20 (ROA) OPRT Share Price ¾ This ROA would be rightfu
Slide 57: V. Conclusion
Presentation to Oportun Financial Stockholders V. Conclusion
Slide 58: Oportun is a Case Study of an Entrenched Board
In our analysis, Oportun is a classic case study of an entrenched board and management team with no accountability to stockholders resulting in sustained value destruction and underperformance • Oportun’s core product plays a crucial role in serving underserved communities, but this Company’s attemp
Slide 59: Vote Today to Elect Warren Wilcox on the White Proxy Card
Vote Today to Elect Warren Wilcox on the White Proxy Card If you have any questions about how to vote your shares, please contact: 520 8th Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY, 10018 (212) 257-1311 (888) 368-0379 info@saratogaproxy.com 58 Page: X
Slide 60: Item 4: Materials Published on www.opportunityatoportun.com
ITEM 4: MATERIALS PUBLISHED ON WWW.OPPORTUNITYATOPORTUN.COM
Slide 61: The Opportunity at Oportun website
THE OPPORTUNITY - AT OPORTUN Dg CASEFORCHANGE 2% OURNOMINEE 4> HOWTOVOTE ([2) RESOURCES {2] CONTACT e VW C7 THE OPPORTUNITY_AT. OPORTUN Findell Capital Management believes Oportun-Financial Corporation can achieve its full potential by ending the legacy directors’ majority control of the Board, impr
Slide 62: Findell is the single-largest stockholder of Oportun
Findell is the single-largest stockholder of Oportun with an approximately 9.5% equity stake in the Company. For the past two years, we have advocated for the interests of stockholders by publicly and privately pushing the Company to enhance governance, reduce costs and focus on its core lending bus
Slide 63: Resources
THE OPPORTUNITY . . - _ AT OPORTUN 3g CASEFORCHANGE 2% OURNOMINEE 4> HOWTO VOTE RESOURCES 2) CONTACT Resources Presentations The Opportunity at Oportun: How Improved Board Oversight Will Lead to Stronger Operations JUNE 16, 2025 / FINDELL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC PRESENTATION Shareholder Letters Lett
Slide 64: Findell Capital Management Issues Open Letter to the Board
Findell Capital Management Issues Open Letter to the Board and Shareholders of Oportun (NASDAQ:OPRT) Calling for Leadership Change MARCH 20, 2025 / FINDELL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC Findell Capital Management LLC Issues Statement to the Stockholders of Oportun Financial Corporation DECEMBER 4, 2023 /
Slide 65: Item 5: Social Media
ITEM 5: SOCIAL MEDIA
Slide 66: Social media post by FindellCap
¢ Post FindellCap @ [Jor @fin_capital We urge shareholders of SOPRT to vote for Warren Wilcox and Carlos Minetti and against CEO Raul Vazquez. Time to bring change to SOPRT and provide real board oversight so that this company can be driven to new heights. findell.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Findell+