Osteotech — Proxy Contest (August 2010)
45 slides from Osteotech's proxy contest presentation, Aug 10, 2010
Slide 1: Schedule 14A Proxy Statement - Osteotech, Inc.
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 14A Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 FILED BY THE REGISTRANT o FILED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE REGISTRANT x Check the appropriate box: o Preliminary Proxy Statement o Conf
Slide 2: Filing Information
2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.: 3) Filing Party: 4) Date Filed:
Slide 3: Concerned Osteotech Stockholders solicitation notice
Spencer Capital Opportunity Fund, LP; Boston Avenue Capital LLC and Heartland Advisors, Inc. (the “Concerned Osteotech Stockholders”), together with the other participants named herein, are filing materials contained in this Schedule 14A with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in con
Slide 4: Osteotech, Inc. A Matter of Trust
Confidential The Concerned Osteotech Stockholders Osteotech, Inc. A Matter of Trust Investor Presentation 2010
Slide 5: A Call for Change
A Call for Change The Problem: Poor Board oversight of Management has led to ineffective planning and execution which has significantly eroded shareholder value. Reasons For Failure: 1. The Board has failed in its obligation to oversee Management 2. The financial performance of Osteotech has been tr
Slide 6: Reasons for Failure
Reasons for Failure 1. The Board has failed in its obligation to oversee Management and responsibility for poor management performance rests with the Board. Examples: Poor stock price performance The Company has become unprofitable Loss of major customers Lack of growth initiatives Delayed and faile
Slide 7: Poor Stock Price Performance
Poor Stock Price Performance As of August 5, 2010, the stock price has declined by 28% since Mr. Owusu-Akyaw took over as CEO. Mr. Owusu-Akyaw was previously COO from July 2004 to January 2006, when he was appointed CEO. He has been a member of the board during his entire tenure with Osteotech The s
Slide 8: The Company Has Become Unprofitable
The Company Has Become Unprofitable Osteotech’s poor planning has put it in a position where it has no margin for error: In 2009, the Company became unprofitable and as a result has burned through most of its cash. Osteotech lost $4.0 million in 2009, compared to a profit of $2.2 million in 2008, a
Slide 9: Loss of Major Customers
Loss of Major Customers Current Management headed by Mr. Owusu-Akyaw failed to renew profitable contracts. Loss of Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation (MTF) contract: MTF contract expired in December 2008 and was not renewed. MTF accounted for 20%, 16% and 14% of total revenue in 2006, 2007 and 20
Slide 10: Loss of Major Customers
Loss of Major Customers Loss of Smith & Nephew contract: Smith & Nephew contract expired in March 2009 and was not renewed. Smith & Nephew distributed private label form of the Company’s proprietary Demineralized Bone Matrix (DBM) tissue line. The Company recognized $0.5 million of revenue from this
Slide 11: Lack of Growth Initiative
Lack of Growth Initiative Under the leadership of Mr. Owusu-Akyaw, Osteotech failed to introduce new products and failed to articulate a strategic vision for the Company. The Company introduced only four products from 2006 to 2009. These products are reported under the Hybrid/Synthetic segment, whic
Slide 12: Delayed Launch of Plexur P
Delayed Launch of Plexur P Plexur P failed to gain the expected traction in the market because Management failed to recognize the target area application. Initially, Plexur P was focused on application of the spine, but after approximately two years, Management realized that the product was suitable
Slide 13: Delayed Launch of Plexur M
Delayed Launch of Plexur M What did Management promise? Launch of Plexur M product was initially targeted for release before mid 2007, as commented by Management during Q4 2005 conference call (March 31, 2006). During Q3 2006 conference call (November 3, 2006), launch date of Plexur M was extended t
Slide 14: Failed Launch of Duratech
Failed Launch of Duratech What did Management promise? Launch of Duratech product was initially announced in 2007 10-K (March 12, 2008). During Q1 2008 conference call (May 1, 2008), launch date of Duratech was extended to mid 2009. During Q1 2009 conference call (May 1, 2009), Management stated the
Slide 15: Delayed Launch of Magnifuse
Delayed Launch of Magnifuse What did Management promise? Launch of Magnifuse (Enhanced DBM) product initially announced during Q4 2005 conference call (March 31, 2006). During Q4 2008 Conference Call (March 5, 2009), launch date of Magnifuse was extended to mid 2009 and full commercial launch by Nov
Slide 16: Reasons for Failure: Poor Financial Performance
Reasons for Failure 2. Poor Financial Performance 13
Slide 17: Poor Revenue Generation
Poor Revenue Generation OsTE RTIX 110 180 SYRCAGR~ 1.296 1 105 ” te: 140 + 100 » 120 © 95 zai aad 90 > 60 5 mae | q : 80 - 0 2004 = «2005 2006) 2007S 2008) 2009 2004 ©2005-2006 «= 2007, 2008 «(2009 NUVA exac 400 200 350 7 160 + 300 + et 140 + 250 ot 120 + 200 at 100 - 150 med 6 + 100 - w+ ° os EF -
Slide 18: Inability to Enhance Shareholder Equity
Inability to Enhance Shareholder Equity (1) OSTE RTIX 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 NUVA EXAC 10 12 8 10 8 6 6 4 4 2 2 0 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (1) Shareholder equity on a per share basis 15
Slide 19: Poor Return on Equity
Poor Return on Equity ROE has been virtually nonexistent. ROE 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% MDT (Avg: 21.1%) 0.00% OSTE (Avg: 0.5%) -10.00% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 -20.00% -30.00% Source: Worldscope 16
Slide 20: Poor Return on Assets
Poor Return on Assets ROA has lagged behind competitors for the past several years. ROA 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% MDT (Avg: 13.3%) 0.00% OSTE (Avg: 0.3%) 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 -10.00% -20.00% -30.00% Source: Worldscope 17
Slide 21: Poor Return on Invested Capital
Poor Return on Invested Capital ROIC was abysmally low for the past several years. ROIC 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% MDT (Avg: 16.9%) 0.00% OSTE (Avg: 1.2%) -10.00% -20.00% -30.00% Despite this poor performance the Board raised management's salaries in 2008 and 2009. We do not believe a truly independent Bo
Slide 22: Declining Margins
Declining Margins Margins on Revenue 100.00% 80.00% 60.00% 40.00% 20.00% 0.00% -20.00% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 -40.00% OSTE Gross Margin OSTE Operating Margin MDT Gross Margin MDT Operating Margin Source: Worldscope 19
Slide 23: Underperforming Segments
Underperforming Segments The Company’s largest segments have been underperforming consistently for the past several years. Generated $20.0 million revenue in 2004, which accounted for 22.5% of total revenue. 2009 revenue declined to $7.6 million and accounted for less than 8% of total revenue. Spina
Slide 24: Bumpy Road Ahead For Core Segment
Bumpy Road Ahead For Core Segment Demineralized Bone Matrix (DBM) segment is the largest segment within Osteotech contributing nearly 60% of total revenue. DBM segment, which generated revenue of $57.5 million in 2006, realized revenue of $56.8 million in 2009. DBM segment’s operating income has bee
Slide 25: Reasons for Failure: Board's Interests Not Aligned
Reasons for Failure 3. Board’s Interests Are Not Aligned with Shareholders’ Interests 22
Slide 26: Why the Current Board's Interests Are Not Aligned
Why the Current Board’s Interests Are Not Aligned with Shareholders’ Osteotech’s five non-employee Directors collectively own only 1.8% of the Company’s outstanding shares. No insider buying in the open market by the Board and Senior Management members in 2009. In contrast, the Concerned Stockholder
Slide 27: Reasons for Failure: Corporate Governance
Reasons for Failure 4. The firm has displayed deplorable corporate governance. Examples: Excessive management compensation Outrageous golden parachute Rejection of MTF proposal Poor corporate governance provisions 24
Slide 28: Excessive Management Compensation
Excessive Management Compensation For the last two years in which the Osteotech was profitable, the top four executives’ total salaries were between 62% and 165% of net income. The board approved base salary hikes for all top four executives during 2008, when operating profit declined by 21% and two
Slide 29: Outrageous Golden Parachute
Outrageous Golden Parachute “Termination for good reason after change in control” would cost the Company $5.9 million, while net income for 2009 was $(4.0) million. “Termination without cause after change in control” would cost the Company $7.5 million, which is nearly three times combined net incom
Slide 30: Rejection of MTF proposal
Rejection of MTF proposal On August 29, 2005, MTF proposed to acquire all of the Osteotech's outstanding common stock for $6.25 a share in cash. The board rejected the offer stating that the offer price was low and doesn’t value the future growth prospects of Osteotech fully. On September 2005, MTF
Slide 31: Poor Corporate Governance Provisions
Poor Corporate Governance Provisions The Company postponed the annual meeting. Delaware law requires the company to hold its annual meeting within 13 months of the prior year's meeting, which was held on June 18, 2009. By holding this year's meeting on August 23, 2010, the Company is not complying w
Slide 32: A Call for Change
A Call for Change Our plan would involve an in-depth review of the Company’s business lines. Our first steps would be: 1. Improve balance sheet 2. Maximize returns from core business 3. Reassess all non-core activity 4. Explore all alternatives for maximizing stockholder value 29
Slide 33: Improve Balance Sheet
Improve Balance Sheet Reduce expenses Explore licensing or selling products to a third party to market and distribute Grafton has been a cash-cow for the Company; however, it may have a limited shelf life Explore licensing or selling the product Determine if core business can be better run and remai
Slide 34: Changing the Business Model
Changing the Business Model Pursue opportunities to license intellectual property of Osteotech to larger corporations that benefit from economies of scale and face minimal SG&A costs Benefits of licensing model: Royalty income stream Capital preservation Ability to quickly penetrate new markets Decr
Slide 35: Licensing Model Drives Valuation
Licensing Model Drives Valuation The following companies derive a large percentage of their revenue from royalties: Company Name Mcap ($mm) (1) EV ($mm) (1) EV/Revenue(1) SurModics, Inc. (NASDAQ: SRDX) 364.7 345.4 4.7 Insite Vision Inc. (OTC: INSV) 39.8 77.5 7.9 Unigene Laboratories (UGNE) 81.1 106.
Slide 36: CPEX: Licensing Model Case Study
CPEX: Licensing Model Case Study Prior to April 2010, CPEX was composed of three business segments: Two separate royalty streams (Testim and Serenity) for drug delivery technologies , and R&D for Nasulin, a drug which appeared to be headed for failure. CPEX continued to report losses as the Company
Slide 37: Reassess All Non-Core Activity
Reassess All Non-Core Activity Evaluate costs and benefits of European outreach and distribution Reevaluate financial and operational practicality of launching and distributing new products—shed product lines where launch is not feasible in the near-term Consider divesting non-core assets to increas
Slide 38: Explore Alternatives for Maximizing Shareholder Value
Explore Alternatives for Maximizing Shareholder Value Emphasis on a process that involves true representation of shareholder interests. Management press release issued August 9, 2010 demonstrates continued lack of credibility. 35
Slide 39: Why Us?
Why Us? Our nominees have the business and financial expertise necessary to recover the shareholder value that has been lost during the past several years. Upon their election, the nominees will initiate a strategic plan to improve the company’s overall performance and maximize value for all of the
Slide 40: Nominee: Gary Alexander
Nominee Gary Alexander is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Palomino Capital, a Montreal, Canada based alternative asset manager with interests in privately-held companies, real estate and hedge funds. Prior to founding Palomino in January 1994, Mr. Alexander was an associate at Montreal ba
Slide 41: Nominee: Michelle Rachael Forrest
Nominee Michelle Rachael Forrest served until January 2010 as an associate principal at McKinsey & Corporation, a consulting company, where she worked since October 2000 specializing in pharmaceuticals and medical products, global public health, and organization practices. Ms. Forrest joined McKinse
Slide 42: Nominee: Michael J. McConnell
Nominee Michael J. McConnell is the Chief Executive Officer of Collectors Universe, Inc., a third-party grading and authentication services company. From January 1995 to September 2008, Mr. McConnell was a Managing Director of Shamrock Capital Advisors, Inc., a privately-owned investment company of
Slide 43: Nominee: Dr. Kenneth Shubin Stein
Nominee Dr. Kenneth Shubin Stein is currently a director of MRV Communications, Inc., where he has served since November 2009, as well as the founder of Spencer Capital Management, LLC, an investment management firm that serves as the investment manager of Spencer Capital Opportunity Fund, LP and Sp
Slide 44: Summary for A Call for Change
Summary for A Call for Change By identifying the problems with current Management and implementing effective planning and execution we have outlined in this presentation, we strongly believe our slate of board candidates will improve value for shareholders. 41
Slide 45: Stockholders advised to read the definitive proxy statement
THE CONCERNED OSTEOTECH STOCKHOLDERS STRONGLY ADVISE ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT, DATED AUGUST 4, 2010, BECAUSE IT CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS SOLICITATION. SUCH DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT IS AV