Tegna Inc

Tegna — Proxy Contest (April 2020)

76 slides from Tegna's proxy contest presentation, Apr 7, 2020

  1. Slide 1: Tomorrow's TEGNA: Vote the WHITE Proxy Card

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TOMORROW’S TEGNA APRIL 2020 VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD ENHANCING SHAREHOLDER VALUE WITH STRONG NEW BOARD MEMBERS

  2. Slide 2: Important Information Disclaimer

    IMPORTANT INFORMATION Disclaimer The views expressed in this Presentation represent the opinions of Standard General L.P. (“Standard General”), which benefici all y owns shares of common stock of TEGNA Inc. (“TEGNA”) and are based on publicly available information with regard to TEGNA. Standard Gene

  3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

    3 TABLE OF CONTENTS I Executive Summary 4 II TEGNA’s Assets Have Tremendous Potential 12 III TEGNA’s Stock Has Drastically Underperformed Peers 15 IV Operational Performance Has Been Weak 19 V Value Destructive Acquisitions and Poor Capital Allocation 29 VI TEGNA’s Board Has Actively Discouraged Pot

  4. Slide 4: Executive Summary

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  5. Slide 5: About Standard General

    ABOUT STANDARD GENERAL FIRM OVERVIEW Standard General was founded in 2007 and manages capital for public and private pension funds, endowments, foundations, and high - net - worth individuals Standard General currently owns ~12% of the outstanding shares of TEGNA, making it the Company’s largest sha

  6. Slide 6: Soo Kim and Standard General Are Well Respected

    SOO KIM AND STANDARD GENERAL ARE WELL RESPECTED 6 I had the pleasure to work with Soo Kim for a number of years on the Media General Board of Directors, and I can say with certainty that Soo is a person who is focused on maximizing shareholder returns. Soo is open to others’ perspectives, believes i

  7. Slide 7: Standard General's Commitment to ESG Principles

    STANDARD GENERAL’S COMMITMENT TO ESG PRINCIPLES Standard General believes in diversity, ethical business practices, and good corporate governance ▪ Standard General is a minority - owned and operated organization that maintains the highest ethical and professional standards ▪ Soo Kim, Founder and Ma

  8. Slide 8: About TEGNA

    ABOUT TEGNA ▪ TEGNA owns and operates 62 television stations and two radio stations in 51 US markets ▪ The Company is the largest owner of big four network affiliates in the top 25 markets, reaching approximately one - third of all television households nationwide ▪ The Company was formerly part of

  9. Slide 9: Executive Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TEGNA has the most strategic collection of affiliate stations in top markets… 9 TEGNA stock has under - performed its peers over every relevant time period … yet, TEGNA’s operating metrics lag those of its peers ▪ Large stations in leading markets with a presence in one - third of

  10. Slide 10: Executive Summary (Continued)

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED) Management aside, the Board has failed to exercise capital discipline and accountability… 10 … these actions may have been informed by an entrenched management’s desire to prevent a sale of the Company The Board needs fresh perspectives and new directors ▪ TEGNA has agg

  11. Slide 11: We Have Nominated Four Highly-Qualified Board Candidates

    WE HAVE NOMINATED FOUR HIGHLY - QUALIFIED BOARD CANDIDATES Colleen Brown ▪ Extensive broadcasting experience ▪ Public company CEO / board experience 11 Ellen McClain Haime ▪ Extensive broadcasting experience ▪ Public company CFO / board experience Soohyung Kim ▪ Extensive broadcasting and M&A experi

  12. Slide 12: TEGNA's Assets Have Tremendous Potential

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TEGNA’S ASSETS HAVE TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL

  13. Slide 13: TEGNA Has the Best Collection of TV Stations in the Industry

    TEGNA HAS THE BEST COLLECTION OF TV STATIONS IN THE INDUSTRY 13 ▪ Largest owner of big four affiliates in the largest markets ▪ Largest NBC affiliate group ▪ Presence in one - third of TV households ▪ Significant leadership positions in morning and late news ▪ Important community resource in its loc

  14. Slide 14: What Wall Street Is Saying

    WHAT WALL STREET IS SAYING 14 TEGNA has a strong market position as the #1 NBC affiliate group and as a top CBS and ABC station owner, in addition to fast - growing digital businesses.” Feb 11, 2020 High Quality Stations in Top DMA Markets TEGNA is the largest owner of Big 4 affiliates in top 25 mar

  15. Slide 15: TEGNA's Stock Has Drastically Underperformed Peers

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TEGNA’S STOCK HAS DRASTICALLY UNDERPERFORMED PEERS

  16. Slide 16: TEGNA Stock Has Consistently Underperformed the Market

    60 80 100 120 140 160 180 Aug-14 Nov-14 Feb-15 May-15 Aug-15 Nov-15 Feb-16 May-16 Aug-16 Nov-16 Feb-17 May-17 Aug-17 Nov-17 Feb-18 May-18 Aug-18 Nov-18 Feb-19 May-19 Aug-19 TEGNA STOCK HAS CONSISTENTLY UNDERPERFORMED THE MARKET 16 TEGNA - 14.0% S&P 500 +61.4% Source: FactSet. TEGNA 5 - Year TSR Perf

  17. Slide 17: TEGNA's Stock Has Also Underperformed Peers

    - 6% 44% 32% 62% 60% 23% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% TGNA Local Broadcast Peers Broadcast Peers 2017-2019 Peers 2016-2018 Peers S&P 500 TEGNA’S STOCK HAS ALSO UNDERPERFORMED PEERS 17 Source: FactSet. Percentages represent total shareholder returns until the day prior to the media re

  18. Slide 18: TEGNA's Claim That It Has Outperformed Is Misleading

    TEGNA’S CLAIM THAT IT HAS OUTPERFORMED IS MISLEADING ▪ TEGNA uses a performance period during which TEGNA’s price was inflated due to takeover speculation – Uses calendar year 2019 and 2018 - 19 even though it has been a pure - play local broadcasting company since July 31, 2017 and the stock spiked

  19. Slide 19: Operational Performance Has Been Weak

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN WEAK

  20. Slide 20: TEGNA's Retransmission Rates Have Lagged Leading Peers

    DESPITE MANAGEMENT’S CLAIMS OTHERWISE, IT’S GENERALLY ACCEPTED T HAT TEGNA’S RETRANSMISSION RATES HAVE LAGGED THOSE OF LEADING PEERS 20 Source: Wells Fargo Research (9/23/2019). 2017 2018 2019E 2020E Nexstar (NXST) $2.31 $2.60 $2.85 $3.14 Sinclair (SBGI) $2.16 $2.48 $2.81 $3.16 Gray Television (GTN)

  21. Slide 21: TEGNA's Performance Lags Industry Leading Operators

    TEGNA’S PERFORMANCE LAGS INDUSTRY LEADING OPERATORS 21 TEGNA has 2x the number of employees per station compared to peers, and lags its closest local broadcasting peers on EBITDA margin Source: Company annual reports on full - time employees and station counts; EBITDA margins are actual 2019 and con

  22. Slide 22: Unlike Peers, TEGNA's EBITDA Margins Have Declined

    30% 31% 32% 33% 34% 35% 36% 37% 38% 2016 / 2017 2019 / 2020E UNLIKE PEERS, TEGNA’S EBITDA MARGINS HAVE DECLINED 22 Unlike its peers, TEGNA’s EBITDA margin has declined since 2016 / 2017 TEGNA EBITDA Margin (1) Source: Company reports and consensus 2020 estimates. (1) TEGNA 2016 / 2017 margins adjust

  23. Slide 23: 2021 Guide/Consensus EBITDA Implies No Organic Growth

    2021 GUIDE/CONSENSUS EBITDA IMPLIES NO ORGANIC GROWTH 23 TEGNA EBITDA Bridge 2017 to 2021E Source: Company reports. 2021 Guide/Consensus is the Bloomberg consensus EBITDA, which was based on management guidance fol low ing TEGNA’s Q4 earnings. *See Company presentation dated March 2020 - page 15 ind

  24. Slide 24: TEGNA's Free Cash Flow Conversion Is Worst Among Peers

    TEGNA’S FREE CASH FLOW CONVERSION IS WORST AMONG PEERS 24 Source: Tegna March 2020 investor presentation; Scripps December 2019 Investor Presentation TEGNA claims it has “strong organic and inorganic free cash flow generation…” …but Scripps’ analysis puts TEGNA in last place among peers TEGNA in las

  25. Slide 25: Top Station Rankings Have Declined Under Mr. Lougee

    TOP STATION RANKINGS HAVE DECLINED FROM #1 TO #3 UNDER MR. LOUGEE’S LEADERSHIP ▪ Belo, an owner/operator of TV stations across the US, was purchased by TEGNA in 2013 when Mr. Lougee was President of Gannett Broadcasting ▪ At the time, many of the largest Belo stations ( ¹) were highly ranked, includ

  26. Slide 26: TEGNA Marketing Solutions Has Been a Disappointment

    TEGNA MARKETING SOLUTIONS HAS BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT 26 November 2016 TEGNA launches Premion: Over - the - top advertising business We think that they are going to contribute incremental, about $100 million to the top line and about $50 million to the bottom line ." David Lougee, CEO TEGNA Investor D

  27. Slide 27: TEGNA Was Incorrectly Expecting Regulatory Relief from FCC Cap

    6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 18.00 20.00 01/06/17 04/06/17 07/06/17 10/06/17 01/06/18 04/06/18 07/06/18 10/06/18 01/06/19 04/06/19 07/06/19 10/06/19 01/06/20 TEGNA WAS INCORRECTLY EXPECTING REGULATORY RELIEF FROM FCC CAP 27 CEO’s predictions on the FCC ownership cap and UHF discount have proven

  28. Slide 28: TEGNA Should Have Optimized Its Portfolio for Current Rules

    Converting VHF stations in top 50 markets would allow TEGNA to double in size under current FCC cap TEGNA SHOULD HAVE OPTIMIZED ITS PORTFOLIO FOR CURRENT RULES ▪ FCC rules limit ownership of TV stations; as of 2017, VHF stations “count” more than UHF stations, which have a “discount” ▪ Over 60% of T

  29. Slide 29: Value Destructive Acquisitions and Poor Capital Allocation

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION VALUE DESTRUCTIVE ACQUISITIONS AND POOR CAPITAL ALLOCATION

  30. Slide 30: TEGNA's Capital Allocation Has Been Misguided and Focused on M&A

    TEGNA’S CAPITAL ALLOCATION HAS BEEN MISGUIDED AND FOCUSED ON M&A The Board should have challenged management assumptions and considered return of capital 30 ▪ Board is unfamiliar with affiliate broadcasting business, and has taken management’s lead without checks and balances ▪ Even without industry

  31. Slide 31: CEO Promised a Disciplined Acquisition Strategy

    CEO PROMISED A “DISCIPLINED” ACQUISITION STRATEGY DAVID LOUGEE, TEGNA CEO At TEGNA’s May 2017 Investor Day, Mr. Lougee presented an M&A vision that promised to be “disciplined”, “opportunistic ”, and guided by the “long - term interest” of shareholders INVESTOR MEETING MAY 17, 2017 TEGNA has a prove

  32. Slide 32: TEGNA Instead Pursued an Aggressive and Reckless Strategy

    32 Source: Tegna’s February 2020 investor presentation TEGNA INSTEAD PURSUED AN “AGGRESSIVE” AND RECKLESS STRATEGY Source: Tegna’s March 2020 investor presentation In February 2020, TEGNA describes its M&A strategy as “aggressive” (which was truthful) …but perhaps realizing that “aggressive” is inco

  33. Slide 33: False M&A Rationale Promised Synergies That Never Materialized

    FALSE M&A RATIONALE PROMISED SYNERGIES THAT NEVER MATERIALIZED 33 TEGNA’S M&A RATIONALE REALITY X TEGNA’s “top - of - market” retransmission rates enable the Company to extract significant revenue synergies and pay premium prices for acquired stations TEGNA’s retrans rates have not been top - of - m

  34. Slide 34: False M&A Rationale: Illusory High Retransmission Rates

    FALSE M&A RATIONALE: ILLUSORY HIGH RETRANSMISSION RATES 34 2017 2018 2019E 2020E Nexstar $2.31 $2.60 $2.85 $3.14 Sinclair $2.16 $2.48 $2.81 $3.16 Gray Television $1.84 $2.33 $2.83 $3.00 TEGNA $1.72 $2.02 $2.28 $2.66 Scripps $1.28 $1.55 $1.61 $1.90 Average Retrans Rates per Sub (Wells Fargo Research

  35. Slide 35: TEGNA's M&A Rationale vs. Reality

    TEGNA’S M&A RATIONALE REALITY 35 Despite a stated M&A rationale of buying in - market stations, TEGNA has not executed an in - market acquisition strategy TEGNA’s M&A program did not increase station density, limiting synergies and cost - saving opportunities 2016 Current TEGNA # of Stations 46 62 T

  36. Slide 36: Acquisition Strategy Failed to Enhance In-Market Presence

    TEGNA’S ACQUISITION STRATEGY FAILED TO ENHANCE IN - MARKET PRESENCE AND LEVERAGE SYNERGIES 36 TEGNA’s acquired stations did not increase in - market density as management had promised ▪ TEGNA’s stations are geographically dispersed – Prior to 2017 only a few cities had two stations, the rest were si

  37. Slide 37: False M&A Rationale: Better Operating Model

    FALSE M&A RATIONALE: BETTER OPERATING MODEL 37 # of Stations Net Revenue 2018A/ 2019E Implied BCF 2018A/ 2019E Estimated BCF Margin Acquired from Nexstar 5 $65 $25 38% Acquired from Tribune 6 $140 $35 25% Total Stations Acquired 11 $205 $60 29% Implied BCF after Synergies (1) $205 $96 47% TEGNA’s Ac

  38. Slide 38: TEGNA Has Historically Overpaid for Acquisitions

    38 TEGNA bought Nexstar/Tribune stations for $740 million in 2019 TEGNA HAS HISTORICALLY OVERPAID FOR ACQUISITIONS, DESPITE CLAIMS OF PAYING LOW MULTIPLES ▪ TEGNA initially claimed the transaction was done at 6.7x (1) average 2018A / 2019E EBITDA ▪ Our analysis shows the transaction price actually r

  39. Slide 39: Why Are Multiples Calculated Differently on Each Deal?

    39 WHY ARE MULTIPLES CALCULATED DIFFERENTLY ON EACH DEAL? TEGNA has used four different methods to describe its purchase price multiple on its four deals Curiously, in its January 2020 letter to shareholders (1) , TEGNA implies it always uses trailing two - year calendar EBITDA, without adjustments;

  40. Slide 40: Shifting Disclosures on Acquisitions Erode Credibility

    40 MANAGEMENT’S SHIFTING DISCLOSURES ON ACQUISITIONS FURTHER ERODE MANAGEMENT’S CREDIBILITY ▪ At the time of the deal, TEGNA first quoted a blended multiple consisting of forward periods of “6.6 times average expected 2017E / 2018E EBITDA , including run rate synergies and tax benefits.” (1) ▪ Howev

  41. Slide 41: Expensive Acquisitions Have Generated Marginal EPS Accretion

    EXPENSIVE ACQUISITIONS HAVE GENERATED MARGINAL EPS ACCRETION 41 2017 2019 2021E Calculation Basis (1) Tax rate adj. Actual Consensus Tax Rate 23% 23% 23% Adjusted Earnings Before Tax $344 $391 $488 Taxes - $79 - $89 - $115 Adjusted Net Income $266 $302 $373 Shares Outstanding 216 218 217 Adjusted EP

  42. Slide 42: Capital Allocation Focused on Overly Aggressive Acquisition Strategy

    TEGNA’S CAPITAL ALLOCATION FOCUSED ON AN OVERLY AGGRESSIVE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 42 TEGNA's Acquisitions Total Cash Paid ($ mm) Stock Price at Time Potential Buyback (mm shares) % of Shares out Stations from Nexstar / Tribune $769 $13.82 56 25% Stations from Dispatch $554 $14.78 37 17% Justice / Ques

  43. Slide 43: Prudent M&A Correctly Executed Creates Value

    PRUDENT M&A CORRECTLY EXECUTED CREATES VALUE 43 BUYER Target Nexstar/Tribune Divestitures RSN Tribune Raycom LIN (Revised Offer) Date Announced May 20, 2019 May 3, 2019 December 3, 2018 June 25, 2018 August 20, 2014 Change in Stock Price (1) (2.9%) 34.5% 11.2% (2) 16.0% 7.0% Change in Stock Price Re

  44. Slide 44: TEGNA Disclosures Around M&A Have Been Misleading

    TEGNA DISCLOSURES AROUND M&A HAVE BEEN MISLEADING 44 TEGNA’S CLAIM THE FACTS X TEGNA transaction multiples have been below TEGNA’s trading multiple “Over the past three years, the transactions we have completed have been at or below market trading multiples of approximately 7.8x (6.7x on a tax - adj

  45. Slide 45: The Results of TEGNA's Capital Allocation Have Been Dismal

    THE RESULTS OF TEGNA’S CAPITAL ALLOCATION HAVE BEEN DISMAL ▪ Pursued “aggressive” M&A , acquiring stations of ~$1.8 billion (representing over 80% of the current market cap) after promising a “disciplined” strategy 45 ▪ Pursued out - of - market deals after promising a strategy of in - market consol

  46. Slide 46: TEGNA's Board Has Actively Discouraged Potential Buyers

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TEGNA’S BOARD HAS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED POTENTIAL BUYERS

  47. Slide 47: TEGNA Acquisition Offers & Board Entrenchment Timeline

    TEGNA ACQUISITION OFFERS & BOARD ENTRENCHMENT TIMELINE 47 Feb. 28, 2019 Apollo sent private letter to TEGNA expressing acquisition interest at a premium Aug. 20, 2019 Management stated Apollo had NOT made an offer Aug. 21, 2019 TEGNA announces Apollo had expressed interest but had not specified a pr

  48. Slide 48: TEGNA's Board Has Failed to Take Advantage of Multiple Offers

    TEGNA’S BOARD HAS FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MULTIPLE OFFERS The Board appears to have taken a classic series of defensive actions during 2019 48 Only an unprecedented series of publicly - leaked, unsolicited bidding interest has cajoled the Board to engage with suitors Board appears to have forced

  49. Slide 49: Shifting and Contradictory Descriptions of Apollo's 2019 Interest

    SHIFTING AND CONTRADICTORY DESCRIPTIONS OF APOLLO’S 2019 INTERES T 49 ▪ TEGNA management issued a statement admitting to the approach from Apollo: “….Apollo was interested in acquiring TEGNA without specifying a price ” – August 21, 2019 TEGNA press release ▪ Following our 13D filing, TEGNA added a

  50. Slide 50: TEGNA Sought to Fend Off Bidders Through Nexstar/Tribune Acquisition

    TEGNA APPEARS TO HAVE SOUGHT TO FEND OFF POTENTIAL BIDDERS THROUGH ACQUISITION OF STATIONS FROM NEXSTAR / TRIBUNE ▪ TEGNA acquired stations from Nexstar / Tribune soon after Apollo showed interest ▪ Acquired stations at over 12x EBITDA, even though TEGNA was trading at 7x EBITDA – Among other things

  51. Slide 51: TEGNA's Debt Refinancing Made an Acquisition Harder and More Expensive

    TEGNA’S DEBT REFINANCING WAS SUBOPTIMAL AND MADE AN ACQUISITION OF TEGNA SIGNIFICANTLY HARDER AND MORE EXPENSIVE ▪ TEGNA’s suboptimal $2.1 billion debt financing in 2019 increased the cost of acquiring TEGNA for a buyer – The new bonds are not callable for a period of years (one for 5 years and the

  52. Slide 52: TEGNA Received Multiple Indications of Interest in Early 2020

    TEGNA RECEIVED MULTIPLE INDICATIONS OF INTEREST IN EARLY 2020 52

  53. Slide 53: Shareholders Should Be Concerned About Board's Approach

    SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT BOARD’S APPROACH 53 We do not believe this Board can be trusted to objectively review TEGNA’s best path forward ▪ With four well - respected and credible suitors, TEGNA should have been able to negotiate an attractive transaction for shareholders – All four sui

  54. Slide 54: TEGNA's Board Lacks Relevant Experience and Has Poor Governance

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TEGNA’S BOARD LACKS RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND HAS ADOPTED POOR GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

  55. Slide 55: TEGNA's Board Members Lack Critical Skills and Experience

    TEGNA’S BOARD MEMBERS LACK CRITICAL SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE 55 Source: FactSet, Company filings; Shares Outstanding as of January 31, 2020 Recent Industry Experience TEGNA % Ownership Last Open Market Purchase Local Affiliate Broadcasting Experience Broadcast M&A Experience Media Experience Years Tenu

  56. Slide 56: CEO, Like the Board, Owns Very Little Stock

    CEO, LIKE THE BOARD, OWNS VERY LITTLE STOCK ▪ After 13 years as a senior executive of the Company , we find it alarming that CEO Lougee owns just 0.2% of TEGNA’s total shares outstanding ▪ Mr. Lougee has sold more than $6.3 million of stock in the open market in the last ten years ▪ Mr. Lougee has n

  57. Slide 57: CEO Compensation Continues to Increase Despite Poor Performance

    -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% $0 $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000 $4,000,000 $5,000,000 $6,000,000 $7,000,000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 CEO COMPENSATION CONTINUES TO INCREASE, DESPITE POOR PERFORMANCE ▪ Since Mr. Lougee took over leadership

  58. Slide 58: Directors We Are Targeting Have Overseen Poor Performance

    DIRECTORS WE ARE TARGETING HAVE OVERSEEN POOR PERFORMANCE 58 ¹ TSR Data through March 31, 2020. BOARD MEMBER Experience Board Tenure Local Affiliate Broadcasting Experience TEGNA TSR Relative to Avg TSR for Gray and Nexstar During Tenure* TEGNA TSR Relative to S&P 500 During Tenure HOWARD ELIAS Comp

  59. Slide 59: Standard General's Nominees Are Committed to Improving TEGNA

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION STANDARD GENERAL’S NOMINEES ARE COMMITTED TO IMPROVING TEGNA

  60. Slide 60: Our Nominees Are More Qualified

    OUR NOMINEES ARE MORE QUALIFIED 60 STANDARD GENERAL NOMINEES TEGNA NOMINEES OPPOSED BY STANDARD GENERAL Colleen Brown Ellen McClain Haime Soohyung Kim Deborah McDermott Skills / Experience / Qualifications Howard Elias Scott McCune Bruce Nolop Neal Shapiro ✔ ✔ ✔ Local Affiliate Broadcast Ops Experie

  61. Slide 61: Our Nominees Are Highly Qualified, Diverse and Independent

    OUR NOMINEES ARE HIGHLY QUALIFIED, DIVERSE AND INDEPENDENT 61 Colleen Brown Extensive Broadcasting Experience x Ms. Brown will bring to the Board extensive executive experience in strategic planning, operations, finance, and technology. Her leadership as a public company CEO, as well as a senior off

  62. Slide 62: Our Nominees Will Focus on Maximizing Shareholder Value

    OUR NOMINEES WILL FOCUS ON MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER VALUE Review prior engagement with potential buyers and evaluate all alternatives to maximize value, including stand alone and M&A alternatives 62 Review current capital allocation priorities and the Company’s acquisition strategy Evaluate management

  63. Slide 63: The Right Independent Nominees for TEGNA's Board: Colleen Brown

    THE RIGHT INDEPENDENT NOMINEES FOR TEGNA’S BOARD 63 ▪ Served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Fisher Communications, Inc. (NASDAQ: FCSI) from 2005 to 2013 and as a director of Fisher Communications, Inc. from 2006 to 2013 ▪ Founder of Marca Global, LLC, a marketing technology company ▪ Se

  64. Slide 64: The Right Independent Nominees for TEGNA's Board: Ellen McClain Haime

    THE RIGHT INDEPENDENT NOMINEES FOR TEGNA’S BOARD 64 ▪ Chief Financial Officer of Year Up, Boston, MA, a not - for - profit provider of job training services ▪ Previously served as Vice President, Finance of Hearst - Argyle Television, Inc.(NYSE:HTV), a publicly - traded owner/operator of 29 televisi

  65. Slide 65: The Right Independent Nominees for TEGNA's Board: Soohyung Kim

    THE RIGHT INDEPENDENT NOMINEES FOR TEGNA’S BOARD 65 ▪ Founding Partner of Standard General L.P., an investment firm, and is the firm's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer ▪ Served as a director of New Young Broadcasting Holding Co., Inc. and Media General (NYSE:MEG) from 2011 to its

  66. Slide 66: The Right Independent Nominees for TEGNA's Board: Deborah McDermott

    THE RIGHT INDEPENDENT NOMINEES FOR TEGNA’S BOARD 66 ▪ Chief Executive Officer of Standard Media Group LLC. ▪ Over twenty years of experience leading broadcast groups, most recently as Chief Operating Officer of Media General and as Chief Executive Officer and President of Young Broadcasting. In thes

  67. Slide 67: Standard General Has Attempted to Engage with TEGNA

    Standard General Actions STANDARD GENERAL HAS ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE WITH TEGNA August 2019 Standard General discloses a 9.2% economic interest in TEGNA October 2019 Standard General presents its perspectives on TEGNA to the Company and requests Board representation January 2020 TEGNA refuses to offer

  68. Slide 68: TEGNA Is Misleading Shareholders

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION TEGNA IS MISLEADING SHAREHOLDERS

  69. Slide 69: TEGNA's Claim vs. The Facts: Conflicting Investments

    TEGNA’S CLAIM THE FACTS X X Standard General has “conflicting” investments in other media operations Standard General has “several competing broadcasting businesses” ▪ We are disappointed that TEGNA has attempted to discredit our successful and tenured track record of investing in across the media l

  70. Slide 70: TEGNA's Arguments Are Misleading: Nexstar and Meredith

    TEGNA’S ARGUMENTS ARE MISLEADING 70 TEGNA’S CLAIM THE FACTS X Mr. Kim discouraged a Nexstar deal and was “ reportedly biased towards” a transaction with Meredith ▪ The Media General board unanimously determined to reject Nexstar’s initial proposal ▪ The Media General board also unanimously approved

  71. Slide 71: TEGNA's Arguments Are Misleading: Returns and Acquisitions

    TEGNA’S ARGUMENTS ARE MISLEADING 71 TEGNA’S CLAIM THE FACTS X Since becoming a pure - play broadcasting company, TEGNA has delivered strong shareholder returns and made acquisitions that are compelling both strategically and financially ▪ From the time TEGNA became a pure - play in mid 2017 (followi

  72. Slide 72: TEGNA's Arguments Are Misleading: Board Openness and M&A

    TEGNA’S ARGUMENTS ARE MISLEADING 72 TEGNA’S CLAIM THE FACTS X TEGNA’s board is open to all paths to create value for all of TEGNA’s shareholders ▪ We believe TEGNA has repeatedly taken steps to discourage or thwart suitors ▪ Did not engage with Apollo in 2019 ▪ Made large acquisitions and levered th

  73. Slide 73: TEGNA Has Underperformed Closest Peers Since the Spin

    60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 DESPITE WHAT MANAGEMENT CLAIMS, COMPARED TO ITS CLOSEST PEERS SINCE THE SPIN, TEGNA HAS UNDERPERFORMED 73 TEGNA +16% S&P 500 +41% Source: FactSet. TEGNA TSR from Cars.com / Appointment of Dave Lougee as CEO Spin on June 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019 (Underperform

  74. Slide 74: Vote for Change

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION VOTE FOR CHANGE

  75. Slide 75: Vote for Change

    VOTE FOR CHANGE Despite great assets, TEGNA has lagged its peers 75 TEGNA’s Board lacks critical skills and experience and has failed shareholders Standard General has nominated four exceptional candidates for the Board ▪ We believe TSR underperformance is the result of poor operating results and su

  76. Slide 76: Vote the WHITE Card

    VOTE THE WHITE CARD 76 If you have any questions regarding your WHITE proxy card or need assistance in executing your proxy, please contact: Okapi Partners LLC 1212 Avenue of the Americas, 24 th Floor New York, NY 10036 Shareholders may call toll - free: (855) 208 - 8902 Banks and brokers call: (212

Tegna — Proxy Contest (April 2020) on 6ix