Hess — Proxy Contest (March 2013)
71 slides from Hess's proxy contest presentation, Mar 13, 2013
Slide 1: Elliott Management's Perspectives: Accountability Needed to Recoup Shareholder Value
Elliott 0DQDJHPHQW¶V Perspectives: Accountability Needed to Recoup Shareholder Value March 2013 www.ReassessHess.com
Slide 2: Additional Information
Additional Information (OOLRWW$VVRFLDWHV/3DQG(OOLRWW,QWHUQDWLRQDO/3 ³(OOLRWW´ LQWHQGWRPDNHDILOLQJZLWKWKH6HFXULWLHVDQG([FKDQJH Commission of a proxy statement and an accompanying proxy card to be used to solicit proxies in connection with the 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (including any adjourn
Slide 3: Quote from Rodney Chase on performance
³,WKLQNZHKDYHWRVWDUWE\UHPHPEHULQJWKDWWKHEDVLFUHTXLUHPHQW for any business hasn't changed. The fundamental test of success and sustainability is performance - the delivery of real results, TXDUWHUE\TXDUWHU\HDUE\\HDUDJDLQVWSURPLVHV«´(1) Rodney Chase, Shareholder Nominee Former Deputy CEO BP, May 2000
Slide 4: I. Executive Summary
I. Executive Summary
Slide 5: Hess Intrinsic Value $128 per Share But Accountability Needed
Hess Intrinsic Value $128 per Share But Accountability Needed Shareholders recognize the stock price potential and the need for accountability Since Elliott involvement made public, stock has outperformed by 18% (1)²creating an additional $3.5 billion in market capitalization Shareholders want
Slide 6: Unrelenting Underperformance
Unrelenting Underperformance ³Since July 24, 2012, the last day of trading before we ³<RXFDQ WMXGJHXVRQDone-year basis. You have to do it announced our updated strategy, Hess shares have RYHUWKHORQJWHUP´ LQFUHDVHG´ - John Hess, January 28 2013(1) - John Hess, January 2010(2) Relative Performance(3)
Slide 7: Unchecked Due to Lack of Accountability
Unchecked Due to Lack of Accountability Accountability? «1RWDW+HVV Materially underperform peers then go on to deny by pointing to last 6 months of stock performance Contradict HDUOLHUDFWLRQVE\DOOHJLQJUHFHQWDQQRXQFHPHQWVSDUWRIORQJVWDQGLQJ³´\HDUSODQ Construct false excuses VXFKDVWD[IXQGLQJDQG³V
Slide 8: Unending and Ineffective Restructurings
Unending and Ineffective Restructurings ³:LOOSHUSHWXDOUHVWUXFWXULQJPRGHHYHUHQG"´ - Goldman Sachs, October 2003(1) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Span of Announced Restructuring 2001 to 2006 2009 to 2014 2010 to ? 1996 to 1999 2001 to 20
Slide 9: Unresponsive to Value Enhancing Ideas; History of False Excuses
Unresponsive to Value Enhancing Ideas; History of False Excuses Value Enhancing Idea Jan 2013 Hess Excuses Reality Brand is valuable for Oil & gas are commodities; brand adds no value to Spin-off Retail upstream upstream Marketing useful if we Oil & gas are commodities; marketing adds no value t
Slide 10: Shareholders are Frustrated
Shareholders are Frustrated Withholding votes on directors Trying to de-stagger board Objecting via Say on Pay Most Recent Votes Withheld From Directors(1) % of Total Shares Voted for Declassification(3) Say on Pay Support(4) Brady 2012 S&P 500 2010 Kean Olson Energy 2008 Companies 2011 Holiday Bodm
Slide 11: Hess Needs Substantial Change and Accountability
$IWHU« (40+)% underperformance over the last 2 years and (460)% over the last 17 $4 billion (20% of market capitalization) lost in exploration Substantial operational missteps in development of the Bakken Nearly no return of capital over past decade despite oil price quadrupling Selecting
Slide 12: Hess Needs Directors That Are Independent
Hess Needs Directors That Are Independent Management Nominees: Shareholder Nominees: Rubber Stamp? Independent ³7KHVHindependent directors agreed to join our board, because they believe in our outstanding plan, and they recognize that our plan is the ³:KLOHWKLVOHWWHUSUHVHQWV(OOLRWW¶V right plan IRUD
Slide 13: Great Value-Creating Independent Directors
Great Value-Creating Independent Directors Experience Hess Needs Rodney Chase Former Deputy Group Chief Direct experience managing every major business at global integrated Executive, BP energy company Restructuring Midstream Former Chairman/CEO of Significant public oil & gas corporate boar
Slide 14: Great Assets = $39 to $50 billion in Value
Great Assets = $39 to $50 billion in Value / $96 to 128 per Share(1) Bakken Value Continues to Increase (2) Elliott Estimates(1) $92 Unconventionals Large, un-replicable and highly desirable position $90 in core of premier US oil resource play W.D. Von Gonten study concluded Hess has higher $88 TE
Slide 15: Tremendous Potential for Increase in Share Price
Tremendous Potential for Increase in Share Price Instead of an opaque, unmanageable conglomerate Unlock great companies that will be accountable to shareholders Create Hess Resource Co. Unconventional Bakken, Eagle Ford and Utica with dropdown of midstream assets 725,000 net acres in the Bakken
Slide 16: II. Lack of Accountability at Hess
II. Lack of Accountability at Hess
Slide 17: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
March 4th SUHVHQWDWLRQDQGVXEVHTXHQWOHWWHUIURP&(2HYLGHQFHGWKHERDUG¶VGLVUHJDUGIRU their responsibility to provide oversight of management and accountability to shareholders: Ignored history of underperformance, asking shareholders to only remember last 6 months ² and even then excluded dividends to
Slide 18: Hess Tells Shareholders to Only Remember Last Six Months
Despite a 17 year tenure CEO and 13 year Average Tenure Board, Hess Tells Shareholders to Only Remember Last Six Months ³Since July 24, 2012WKHODVWGD\RIWUDGLQJEHIRUHZHDQQRXQFHGRXUXSGDWHGVWUDWHJ\+HVVVKDUHVKDYHLQFUHDVHG´ - John Hess, January 28 2013(1) 120 1/25/13 date before 110 (OOLRWW¶VLQWHQWLRQWR
Slide 19: Hess Tells Shareholders March 4th Announcement Part of a Long Standing Plan
Hess Tells Shareholders March 4th Announcement Part of a Long Standing Plan Really? When will it end? 6RZKHQGLGWKLV³´\HDUUHVWUXFWXULQJEHJLQDQGHQG" What? ³WKHPDMRUPRYHVWRUHVKDSHRXU Ignore comments from It began in 2010? 2010 and 2011 SRUWIROLR«ZLOOKDYHEHHQFRPSOHWHG We thought it began in by the end o
Slide 20: If Recent Divestments Part of 5-Year Plan, Why Defend Opposite Weeks Ago?
,I5HFHQW'LYHVWPHQWV+DYH/RQJ%HHQ3DUWRI³´<HDU3ODQ Why Was Management Defending the Opposite Only Weeks Ago? ³«WKHstrategic infrastructure we have in North Dakota, having control of that DGGVDORWRIYDOXH«WKDW¶Vnot something we would be interested in MLPing«(QHUJ\Marketing and Retail Marketing remain a l
Slide 21: Why Are Independent Nominees Signing Off on This Plan?
:K\$UH³,QGHSHQGHQW´1RPLQHHV6LJQLQJ2II2Q7KLV³´<HDU3ODQ%HIRUH They Have Sat as Directors and Thoroughly Evaluated All Options? Management Nominees: Shareholder Nominees: Rubber Stamp? Independent ³7KHVHindependent directors agreed to join our board, because they believe in our outstanding plan, and th
Slide 22: Hess's Boardroom Deems This Appropriate
+HVV¶V%RDUGURRP'HHPV7KLV$SSURSULDWH On March 4th +HVVDQQRXQFHGWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIDQHZOHDG³LQGHSHQGHQW´GLUHFWRU« Former Lead Independent Director New Lead Independent Director Nicholas Brady John Mullin III Lead Independent Director Lead Independent Director AND AND Joint-Executor, Hess estate Joint-Exe
Slide 23: How Can Hess Insist Search for New Directors Started in August?
+RZ&DQ+HVV,QVLVW6HDUFKIRU1HZ'LUHFWRUV6WDUWHGLQ$XJXVW:KHQ« In August, in the face of: Plummeting stock price Out of control well-costs(1) Exploration value destruction(2) 90 $13.0 85 $12.5 25% Peer Average $12.0 Value Creation from Exploration 80 $11.5 15% 75 $11.0 70 $10.5 5% $millions 65 $10.0 60 $
Slide 24: Disingenuous for Hess to Claim it is a Low Cost Bakken Operator
Disingenuous for Hess to Claim it is a Low Cost Bakken Operator; Like for Like, Hess Remains Higher Cost Plug and Perf Completion Design(1) Sliding Sleeve Completion Design(2) Hess well costs 39% above Continental Hess well costs 17% to 38% above Whiting +¶GULOOLQJWKHVDPHW\SHRIZHOO 4¶GULOOLQJWKHVDPH
Slide 25: Hess Claims Conglomerate Funded Bakken Opportunity
Hess Claims Conglomerate Funded Bakken Opportunity; Instead It Made a Mess of It Reality ³«RXUFRQYHQWLRQDOSRUWIROLRJHQHUDWH>V@WKHFDVKQHHGHGWRIXQGWKHXQFRQYHQWLRQDO JURZWKWKDWZHKDYHLQWKH%DNNHQDQGWKH8WLFD´ Management unaware how business funds itself - John Hess, Chairman & CEO Hess, January 2013(1) He
Slide 26: Where Did Cash From Conventional Assets Go?
Where Did Cash From Conventional Assets Go? 1RWWRVKDUHKROGHUV« 2002-2012 Cash Return as % of Current Market Cap (1) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% BP 92% COP 89% TOT 76% XOM 75% RDSA 56% DVN 42% STL 41% MRO 38% TLM 38% CVX 35% ,QVWHDGFDVKXVHGRQ« OXY 22% MUR 19% Exploration Value Creatio
Slide 27: With Disclosure Comes Accountability: Hess's Scant Disclosure Hides Failures
:LWK'LVFORVXUH&RPHV$FFRXQWDELOLW\+HVV¶V6FDQW'LVFORVXUH+LGHV)DLOXUHV No Analyst Day for nearly 7 years Number of Analyst Days or Update Calls 2007-2013(1) 8 Lack of disclosure allows Management to 7 avoid answering basic questions 6 What is the total capital spent in Australia? in Ghana? 5 What is
Slide 28: What is Going on with Hess's Hedging and Prop Trading?
«$QG:KDWLV*RLQJRQZLWK+HVV¶V+HGJLQJ":LWK+(7&2":LWK3URS7UDGLQJ" Why Does Prop Trading Even Exist at Corporate? In the last decade, Hess has lost $6.7bn through hedging Realized Hedging Performance 2002-2012(1) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 +HVV¶VFXPXODWLYHUHDOL]HG $0 hedging losses since 2002 ($200) e
Slide 29: Hess Hides Behind Price Targets That Price in Management Mediocrity
Hess Hides Behind Price Targets That Price in Management Mediocrity +HVV¶VUHFHQWSUHVHQWDWLRQSRLQWVWR:DOO6WUHHWSULFHWDUJHWVDVMXVWLILFDWLRQWKDWQRWKLQJLVZURQJ«<HW WKHVHWDUJHWVPHUHO\UHIOHFW+HVV¶VSRRUH[HFXWLRQ 7ZR\HDUVDJR+HVV¶VSULFHWDUJHWZDV$100 / share Poor execution drove that price target down 35%
Slide 30: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
:K\LV+HVV« Constructing stock charts focused on the last 6 months and excluding dividends? Announcing perpetual restructurings without effecting material change? Entrenched behind a staggered board with persistent corporate governance malpractice? Misrepresenting Bakken well cost data to cla
Slide 31: Lack of Accountability: Failure to Meet Promises to Shareholders
Lack of Accountability Æ Failure to Meet Promises to Shareholders ³It should be obvious that we have made a lot of moves with a multi-year strategy to put our company in a position to generate long-term shareholder value, WKDWZHORRNDWWKLQJVIRUDOOVKDUHKROGHUVEHQHILW´- John Hess, January 2013(1) John
Slide 32: But Buried Within Are Great Assets
But Buried Within Are Great Assets :KHUHKDYH+HVV¶VFURZQMHZHODVVHWVFRPHIURP" Asset Highlights Asset Origin Bakken Large, unreplicable and highly desirable position in core of premier US oil resource play 1969 Amerada acquisition: legacy W.D. Von Gonten study concluded Hess has higher predating curr
Slide 33: III. Delivering Accountability at Hess
III. Delivering Accountability at Hess
Slide 34: Elliott's Recommendations for Change
(OOLRWW¶V5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRU&KDQJH Great Stewards of Capital Manageable Enterprises Accountable to Shareholders [ 33 ]
Slide 35: Quote on Harvey Golub from Douglas Conant
³+DUYH\Golub is everything that you would want in a director. And one of the things that I appreciate most about him is that he has always respected the space between the Non-Executive Chairman and the CEO roles. He challenged me. He held me accountable%XWKHGLGQRWWU\WRGRP\MREIRUPH« «$QGKHKDVFKDOOHQJ
Slide 36: An Independent, Experienced Slate of Directors to Provide Oversight
An Independent, Experienced Slate of Directors to Provide Oversight Rodney Chase Experience Hess Needs Former Deputy Group Chief Direct experience managing every major business at global integrated Executive, BP energy company Restructuring Midstream Former Chairman/CEO of Significant public
Slide 37: History of Persistent Governance Failures at Hess
History of Persistent Governance Failures at Hess &DOOV,QWR4XHVWLRQ%RDUG¶V$ELOLW\WR1RPLQDWH1HZ'LUHFWRUV )DLOXUHVXQGHU-RKQ+HVV¶VWHQXUH Current board continues the trend.. Name Age Tenure Total Return Oil & Gas Background (1) (1) Over Tenure(2) Operating Director tenure Experience 17 year average
Slide 38: History of Compensating for Underperformance Needs to Change
History of Compensating for Underperformance Needs to Change Elliott Compensation Aligned with Long-Term Shareholder Interest Return Cumulative Non-Management Tenure Over Compensation Directors (1) Tenure(2) Over Tenure(3) Thomas H. Kean 23 (1,022%) $5.4 million Hess has paid current directors mor
Slide 39: Shareholder Nominees Have Relevant Oil & Gas Operating and Restructuring Experience
Shareholder Nominees Have the Relevant Oil & Gas Operating and Restructuring Experience Needed at Hess Shareholder Nominees Management Nominees No Which nominees are Senior Management 20% Yes Upstream Oil & Gas 40% better suited for a No Operating Experience Yes 60% pure-play E&P 80% company? No Whi
Slide 40: Shareholder Nominees Have Unparalleled Operating Experience
Shareholder Nominees Have Unparalleled Operating Experience Shareholder Nominees Management Nominees Former Deputy Group Chief Executive, BP Former COO, TNK-BP joint venture Rodney Chase Former Chairman/CEO of BP America, CEO William Schrader of Marketing & Refining, CEO of E&P Former Chairm
Slide 41: Shareholder Nominees Do Not Rubber Stamp Plans
Shareholder Nominees Do Not Rubber Stamp Plans ³7KHVHindependent directors agreed to join our board, because they believe in our outstanding plan, and they recognize that our plan is the right plan IRUDOORIRXUVKDUHKROGHUV´ Management Nominees: ³:HKDYHKDGthis strategic transformation, as my remarks n
Slide 42: Why Didn't Hess Let Shareholders Decide on the 6th Director?
:K\'LGQ¶W+HVV/HW6KDUHKROGHUV'HFLGHRQWKHth Director? Management Nominee Former CEO, Deloitte John Quigley Upstream Oil & Gas Restructuring Experience Operating Experience None None Shareholders have been asking to vote on directors annually for over 5 years % of Total Shares Voted for Declassificat
Slide 43: Here's a Thought: Let Management Nominees Replace Remaining Directors
+HUH¶V$7KRXJKW/HW0DQDJHPHQW1RPLQHHV5HSODFH5HPDLQLQJ'LUHFWRUV +HVV¶V³:RUOG&ODVV/HDGHUV´(1) ³1R6DFUHG&RZV´(2) Name Age Return Tenure Background (3) Over (3) William Schrader Tenure(4) John Hess 58 (460%) 35 / 17 Hess Chairman & CEO John Krenicki Jr. Edith Holiday 61 (589%) 20 Government; Worked direct
Slide 44: All Directors Could Have Been Accountable But for the Estate Shares
$OO'LUHFWRUV&RXOG+DYH%HHQ$FFRXQWDEOH%XWIRUPP6KDUHV« How did John Hess vote in 2008? How will John Hess vote this year? % of Total Shares Voted for Declassification(1) De-staggering the Hess board requires 80% In 2012, Shareholders again backed de- of outstanding (not just voting) shares staggeri
Slide 45: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
:K\LV+HVV« 5HIXVLQJWRDFFHSW6KDUHKROGHUV¶H[FHSWLRQDO1RPLQHHV" Proposing nominees that have less oil & gas operating experience and less restructuring experience than Shareholder Nominees? 6HOHFWLQJQRPLQHHVWKDW5XEEHU6WDPSPDQDJHPHQW¶VSODQZLWKRXWHYDOXDWLQJDOWHUQDWLYHV" Naming John Mullin III, jo
Slide 46: Elliott's Recommendations for Change
(OOLRWW¶V5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRU&KDQJH Great Stewards of Capital Manageable Enterprises Accountable to Shareholders [ 45 ]
Slide 47: Quote from Karl Kurz on meeting forecasts
³2QHWKLQJWKDWZHDUHFRPPLWWHGWRGRDVDQH[HFXWLYHWHDPLV make sure we can meet our forecasts and deliver on our SURPLVHV«´(1) Karl Kurz, Shareholder Nominee February 2009(1) [ 46 ] 1. Anadarko, 4Q2008 Earnings call
Slide 48: Create Hess Resource Co. via Tax-free Spinoff
1 Create Hess Resource Co. via Tax-free Spinoff Instead of an opaque, unmanageable conglomerate Unlock great companies that will be accountable to shareholders Create Hess Resource Co. Unconventional Bakken, Eagle Ford and Utica with dropdown of midstream assets 725,000 net acres in the Bakken 1
Slide 49: Create Premier US Resource Play Focused Company
1 Create Premier US Resource Play Focused Company Hess Resource Co. would be premier resource play focused company: Flagship Other Assets % Oil / % Liquid Premier position in Bakken Play Production(2) Promising position in Utica Hess Resource Co. Bakken Utica/Eagle Ford 85% / 85%(3) W.D. Von G
Slide 50: Standalone Hess Resource Co. Could Easily Fund Itself in the Capital Markets
1 Standalone Hess Resource Co. Could Easily Fund Itself in the Capital Markets Management either has not done its homework or does not understand the credit markets Numerous examples of US resource focused companies with negative free cash flow All able to fund themselves in the public markets a
Slide 51: Resource Co. Would Be One of the Best Funded US Unconventional Pure Plays
1 Resource Co. Would Be One of the Best Funded US Unconventional Pure Plays Given ability to raise capital via debt markets or raise proceeds from infrastructure, Hess Resource Co. has ample cash to standalone Bakken Standalone Unit 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (1) Bakken Production MBOE/D 68 87 105 120
Slide 52: Value of Tax Savings from Deductions is Immaterial
1 Value of Tax Savings from Deductions is Immaterial Impact of Tax Shield from Bakken = $0.13 per share Tax Calculations Unit 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Hess Bakken should (1) Bakken Production MBOE/D 68 87 105 120 131 become a taxpayer in (2) 2017 per management Bakken EBITDA $mm $1,432 $1,853 $2,218
Slide 53: Like for Like, Hess Conglomerate Remains Higher Cost Bakken Operator
1 Like for Like, Hess Conglomerate Remains Higher Cost Bakken Operator By 4Q 2012, Hess had switched to a Sliding Sleeve completion design (1) 4Q 2012 Drilling Costs(1) 4Q 2012 Well Configuration(1,2) $9.5 $9.0 Sanish Only $8.5 +38% +17% Frac Method Sliding Sleeve Sliding Sleeve Sliding Sleeve $8.0
Slide 54: Hess Conglomerate Unable to Reap Full Potential of Bakken
1 Hess Conglomerate Unable to Reap Full Potential of Bakken NPV Impact from Reducing Bakken Rig Program(1) $2.0 $1.5 Production Growth(2) Bakken $1.0 Operator 2012 2013E $0.5 $2.5 billion Continental 80% 38% Impact on Hess NAV $0.0 $ billions Oasis 110% 42% ($0.5) Kodiak 267% 109% ($1.0) ($1.5) Hess
Slide 55: While Bakken Competitors Are Focused on Maximizing Asset Potential, Hess Is Burdened
While Bakken Competitors Are Focused on Maximizing Asset Potential, Hess 1 &RQJORPHUDWHLV%XUGHQHGE\<HVWHUGD\¶V,VVXHV Continental Accelerating Lower Three 20 wells to define the productivity of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Forks Exploration Program benches of the Three Forks across 75x60 miles(1) High Density
Slide 56: Management Has Lost Sight of the Big Picture
1 Management Has Lost Sight of the Big Picture Tax Reduced including Well Cost Rig Multiple :K\LV+HVV« Tax(1) Utica (1) Overruns(2) Program(3) Discount(4) $1 Constructing tax and funding excuses that $0 are demonstrably false? ($1) Claiming they are a low cost operator in ($2) Impact on Hess NAV
Slide 57: Create Hess International
2 Create Hess International Instead of an opaque, unmanageable conglomerate Unlock great companies that will be accountable to shareholders Create Hess Resource Co. Unconventional Bakken, Eagle Ford and Utica with dropdown of midstream assets 725,000 net acres in the Bakken 177,000 net acres in
Slide 58: Create High Cash Flow, Oil-Linked Conventional Portfolio: Hess International
2 Create High Cash Flow, Oil-Linked Conventional Portfolio: Hess International Great Assets Undervalued in Conglomerate Portfolio Asset by Asset NAV Valuations(4) Exploration failures, high hedging costs, and opacity $40 around capital intensity has resulted in severe undervaluation of assets $30
Slide 59: Market Valuation Today Implies Little to No Value for Assets Worth $20 to $30bn
2 Market Valuation Today Implies Little to No Value for Assets Worth $20 to $30bn NAV-%DVHG9DOXHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO« 0DUNHW,PSOLHG9DOXHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO« CLR Asset by Asset NAV Valuations(1) Elliott Valuation $40 Implied Low High Bakken(2) Hess Enterprise Value (March 8, 2013)(3) $30 $28.7bn Pro forma for
Slide 60: No Demonstrated Synergies Between Unconventional and Global Offshore
2 No Demonstrated Synergies Between Unconventional and Global Offshore ,I+HVVLV³UHDOL]LQJV\QHUJLHVIURPWKHWUDQVIHURIWHFKQLFDOVNLOOVDQGRSHUDWLQJ FDSDELOLWLHVJOREDOO\´(1) WKHQ« Why is Hess a less efficient operator in unconventional plays than independents without global offshore assets? Continental
Slide 61: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
:K\LV+HVV« Claiming financing and financial flexibility concerns that are clearly false? $OOHJLQJV\QHUJLHVWKDWREYLRXVO\GRQ¶WH[LVW" Talking down the value of its international assets? Avoiding real action when its stock price reflects substantial discount to NAV? Hess Does Not Want to be Acco
Slide 62: Monetize Midstream and Divest Downstream
3 Monetize Midstream and Divest Downstream Instead of an opaque, unmanageable conglomerate Unlock great companies that will be accountable to shareholders Create Hess Resource Co. Unconventional Bakken, Eagle Ford and Utica with dropdown of midstream assets 725,000 net acres in the Bakken 177,00
Slide 63: MLP: Shareholders Do Not Need to Wait Until 2015
3 0/36KDUHKROGHUV'R1RW1HHGWR:DLW8QWLO« First +HVVZRXOGQHYHU0/3WKHP« «1RZ Hess wants shareholders to wait until 2015 ³«WKHVWUDWHJLFLQIUDVWUXFWXUHZHKDYHLQ1RUWK'DNRWD ³«ZHQHHGVRPHKLVWRULFDOSHUIRUPDQFHWKHUHRIFDVK KDYLQJFRQWURORIWKDWDGGVDORWRIYDOXH«WKH7LRJD*DV flow, of the EBITDA, from these midstream as
Slide 64: Best-In-Class Operator Created Substantial Value from Midstream MLPs 3 Years Ago
Best-In-Class Operator Created Substantial Value from Midstream MLPs 3 <HDUV$JR« Anadarko has created $6.7 billion of value for shareholders through midstream monetization(1) Anadarko completed an initial public offering of Western Gas Partners LP (WES) in 2008 with assets generating $79 mm in EBI
Slide 65: Divesting Downstream Distractions: Only $2 Out of $27 Billion
Divesting Downstream Distractions²Long Overdue 3 But Only $2 Out of $27 Billion that Could Be Achieved for Shareholders Out of everything that could be achieved, this is all that management and its hand-SLFNHGQRPLQHHVDUHZLOOLQJWRGR« Potential Uplift to Current Enterprise Value(1) Outstanding Questio
Slide 66: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
:K\LV+HVV« Constructing false arguments about how to best finance and build infrastructure? Avoiding MLP monetization timelines or commitments? Announcing incremental change in an attempt to preserve status quo? Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders [ 65 ]
Slide 67: IV. Conclusion
IV. Conclusion
Slide 68: Hess Does Not Want to be Accountable to Shareholders
:K\LV+HVV« Constructing stock charts focused on the last 6 months and Constructing tax and funding excuses that are demonstrably excluding dividends? false? Announcing perpetual restructurings without effecting material Claiming they are a low cost operator in the Bakken when the change? rea
Slide 69: Lack of Accountability: A Vicious Cycle
Lack of Accountability: A Vicious Cycle Poor Capital Allocation & Poor Execution Low Returns No Substantial Change & Value Destruction Lack of Accountability Stock No Responsibility Taken Underperformance [ 68 ]
Slide 70: Truly Independent and Highly Qualified Directors Will Restore Accountability
Truly Independent and Highly Qualified Directors Will Restore Accountability and Deliver Returns to Shareholders Underperformance of this magnitude and duration demands substantial change Hess Over (Under) Performance(1) John Hess Tenure 17 Years 5-Year 4-Year 3-Year 2-Year 1-Year Proxy Peers (Under
Slide 71: Contacts & Additional Information
Contacts & Additional Information Investors Bruce H. Goldfarb / Pat McHugh / Geoff Sorbello Okapi Partners LLC Tel: +1-212-297-0720 info@okapipartners.com Press John Hartz Tel: +1-212-446-1872 Tel 2: +1-718-926-3503 jhartz@sloanepr.com For Additional Information www.ReassessHess.com [ 70 ]