PLX Technology Inc

PLX Technology — Proxy Contest (November 2013)

51 slides from PLX Technology's proxy contest presentation, Nov 20, 2013

  1. Slide 1: PLX Technology, Inc. Investor Presentation

    PLX Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: PLXT) Investor Presentation November 20, 2013 Potomac Capital Partners II, LP Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  2. Slide 2: Overview of Potomac Capital Partners

    Overview of Potomac Capital Partners  Potomac Capital Partners II, LP (“PCP II”) is a New York-based investment partnership that, together with its affiliates (“Potomac”), invests in deeply undervalued publicly-traded U.S. small-cap companies.  Potomac works alongside management and company boards

  3. Slide 3: Business Overview

    Business Overview  PLXT, founded in 1986, develops integrated circuits and complimentary software.  The Company operates two business segments: PCI Express (67% of FY12 revenue) and Connectivity (33% of FY12 revenue).  The Company’s chips focus on interconnection and communication. PLXT’s chips a

  4. Slide 4: Why Change is Needed?

    Why Change is Needed? With the IDTI merger terminated, PLXT stockholders must ensure that the incumbent Board and management focus on PLXT’s core business (PCI Express), seriously evaluate strategic alternatives, and do not repeat past mistakes.  Poor Total Stockholder Return (TSR) – Five year peri

  5. Slide 5: Why Change is Needed? (contd.)

    Why Change is Needed? (contd.)  Board is Reactive; Not Proactive – Activist pressure in 2011 and 2012 not only pressured PLXT to seriously negotiate with IDTI but it appears to have pushed the Company to implement many value enhancing suggestions, including PLXT decision to cut operating costs, sel

  6. Slide 6: Poor Financial Performance

    Poor Financial Performance 6 Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  7. Slide 7: Long-Term TSR Underperformance

    Long-Term TSR Underperformance  Over the long-run, PLXT share price has underperformed its peers and benchmark indices. Short term (1-year) TSR is less relevant as it is heavily impacted by the defunct IDTI merger and activist involvement (most notably Potomac’s activism and its purchases of over 1

  8. Slide 8: Long-Term TSR Underperformance (contd.)

    Long-Term TSR Underperformance (contd.) The following graph shows the performance of PLXT as compared to NASDAQ, the Russell 2000 Index, and the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index over the 5 year period ending on the trading day immediately preceding the date we publicly announced our nomination of No

  9. Slide 9: Poor Cumulative Total Return

    Poor Cumulative Total Return PLXT shares have severely underperformed the Russell 2000 Index and the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index for the past five fiscal years. Cumulative Total Return 12/07 12/08 12/09 12/10 12/11 12/12 PLX Technology, Inc. 100.00 18.49 34.73 38.82 30.86 39.03 Russell 2000 100

  10. Slide 10: We Believe Recent Share Price Performance Is Due to Activist Involvement

    We Believe Recent Share Price Performance Is Due to Activist Involvement  Since termination of the IDTI transaction, PLXT’s share price has outperformed its peers and benchmark indices. Such outperformance is not supported by improved expectation of top-line growth, which, in fact, has declined sin

  11. Slide 11: Board Lacks Credibility

    Board Lacks Credibility We have serious doubts about the Board’s ability to create stockholder value, if left unchecked. TSR 1-day prior to Potomac's director nominations TSR Total Shareholder Return as of 03/05/2013 1-year 3-year 5-year Cavium Inc 11.8% 15.2% 19.1% Mellanox Technologies Ltd 41.4% 3

  12. Slide 12: Challenging Fundamentals – Poor Revenue Growth

    Challenging Fundamentals – Poor Revenue Growth  PLXT has failed to show sustained revenue growth. LTM 3Q 2013 revenue of $102MM is 11.5% less than what the Company achieved in 2010. Moreover, revenue fell 4.3% year over year.. More troublesome is PCI Express’s revenue, PLXT’s growth driver, has dec

  13. Slide 13: Poor Segment Growth Rates

    Poor Segment Growth Rates  Slow aggregate revenue growth is largely due to double digit declines in Connectivity segment and single digit growth for PCI Express. To reiterate, PCI Express revenue declined 9.3% sequentially in 3Q13.  We wonder what is the Board’s plan for Connectivity segment? Has

  14. Slide 14: Poor Expense Management

    Poor Expense Management  PLXT has had a bloated cost structure relative to its size, until activist stockholder encouraged the Company to sell off money losing divisions and rationalize the remainder. Total operating expenses $65.0 Operating expense $63.0 Trend in operating expense reduced in befor

  15. Slide 15: Low Profitability and History of Losses

    Low Profitability and History of Losses  Low organic revenue growth, a failed R&D and acquisition strategy, coupled with inability to manage operating costs, has resulted in sustained losses and very low level of profitability.  Note that the chart below does not include losses from discontinued o

  16. Slide 16: Failed R&D and Acquisition Strategy

    Failed R&D and Acquisition Strategy  Despite spending approximately $216MM on acquisitions and R&D since FY08, revenue has increased by only $21MM.  With a consensus revenue estimate of $117MM for FY14, we ask the Board, how long will stockholders have to wait before realizing the benefit of this

  17. Slide 17: Massive Losses from Failed Acquisitions

    Massive Losses from Failed Acquisitions  We estimate stockholders incurred a loss of $122MM (60% of market cap at the time of Potomac’s initial Schedule 13D) due to failed acquisitions. Additionally, they suffered 59% dilution. Acquisition cost Shares issued US$MM (MM) Oxford Semiconductor Value of

  18. Slide 18: Who Was Held Accountable for the Teranetics Fiasco? Not the Board

    Who Was Held Accountable for the Teranetics Fiasco? Not the Board  9/23/2010, PLXT announced the acquisition of Teranetics for $53.2MM in cash, stock, and assumed debt.  Teranetics was a privately-held fabless maker of 10GBase-T PHY chips.  Prior to the acquisition, Teranetics burned through ~$10

  19. Slide 19: Under the Same Seven Board Members, Stockholders Have Suffered Massive Dilution

    Under the Same Seven Board Members, Stockholders Have Suffered Massive Dilution  PLXT’s share count rose from 28MM to 45.7MM, diluting* stockholders by 63% Shares Outstanding MM Shares Outstanding 47 45 43 41 39 37 35 33 31 29 27 2008Q1 2013Q1  This dilution primarily resulted from wasteful M&A, h

  20. Slide 20: Under the Same Seven Board Members PLXT Rapidly Depleted Cash

    Under the Same Seven Board Members PLXT Rapidly Depleted Cash  Net cash fell from $38.9MM to $5.6MM, a decline of over 85% Net Cash $MM Net Cash $ 45 $ 40 $ 35 $ 30 $ 25 $ 20 $ 15 $ 10 $5 $0 2008Q1 2013Q1  Much of the cash was squandered on dilutive and wasteful M&A 20 Source: Capital IQ Potomac C

  21. Slide 21: Under the Same Seven Board Members Stockholder Equity Was Destroyed

    Under the Same Seven Board Members Stockholder Equity Was Destroyed  PLXT’s accumulated deficit rose from $5.5MM to $139.9MM, a staggering 2398% increase Accumulated Deficit $MM Accumulated Deficit $ 160 $ 140 $ 120 $ 100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $0 2008Q1 2013Q1  Much of the increase was due to operat

  22. Slide 22: Destruction of Stockholder's Equity

    Destruction of Stockholder’s Equity  Due to large losses and low level of profitability, ROE/ROIC (based on income from continuing operations) has remained negative or lower than the Company’s cost of capital (Deutsche Bank used 15-20% discount rate for PLXT in its fairness opinion for the IDTI tra

  23. Slide 23: Analysts Do Not Expect Significant Upside

    Analysts Do Not Expect Significant Upside Craig Hallum research report dated July 23, 2013 – “We are lowering our 2013 revenue estimate to $106 million from $108 million and lowering our EPS estimate to $0.23 from $0.24.” – “We are lowering our 2014 revenue estimate to $124 million from $126 million

  24. Slide 24: PLXT's Track Record of Forecasting Revenue Is Not Credible

    PLXT’s Track Record of Forecasting Revenue Is Not Credible  PLXT’s revenues have fallen far short of the forecast provided to IDTI last year. This raises doubts about the Company’s credibility with respect to future growth prospects. US$ millions 2012 2013 2014 PLXT Revenue Forecast excluding Satel

  25. Slide 25: Board Reactive – Not Proactive

    Board Reactive – Not Proactive 25 Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  26. Slide 26: History is important....

    History is important....  In late 2011, when an activist stockholder initiated its campaign for change, PLXT’s share price had been a sustained underperformer over both short and long term periods, closing at a two-year low of $2.69 on Dec 14, 2011.  The activist stockholder contended that PLXT sh

  27. Slide 27: Timeline

    Timeline  Jun. – Jul. 2011 – IDTI and PLXT discussed a potential strategic transaction between the companies. PLXT Board did not wish to pursue a transaction at such time.  Nov. – Dec. 2011 - Balch Hill Capital, LLC (“Balch Hill”) had several conversations with PLXT regarding opportunities for the

  28. Slide 28: Stockholder Pressure Was Critical in Forcing PLXT to Consider IDTI Offer

    Stockholder Pressure Was Critical in Forcing PLXT to Consider IDTI Offer and Focus on PCI Express  The IDTI transaction provided an opportunity for PLXT stockholders to exit an underperforming stock at a significant premium. Despite sustained long term performance concerns, PLXT Board opposed the t

  29. Slide 29: Stockholder Pressure Forced PLXT to Consider IDTI Offer (contd.)

    Stockholder Pressure Forced PLXT to Consider IDTI Offer and Focus on PCI Express (contd.) – On March 7, 2012, PLXT received a letter from Balch Hill nominating a slate of directors – On March 7, 2012, Mr. Guzy, Chairman of the PLXT Board of Directors met with Mr. John Schofield, Chairman of the Pare

  30. Slide 30: What Stockholder Pressure Accomplished

    What Stockholder Pressure Accomplished  “The combination of the emergences of PCI Express as the dominant high speed inter-connect, the strategic value of the Issuer’s dominant position in PCI Express switches, and the cost synergies a large acquirer could recognize, will enable the issuer to achie

  31. Slide 31: Board and Corporate Governance

    Board and Corporate Governance 31 Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  32. Slide 32: Incumbent Board Has History of Poor Decision Making & Value Destruction

    Incumbent Board Has History of Poor Decision Making & Value Destruction  Incumbent Board suffers from long tenure and a history of poor decision making which has resulted in failure to create stockholder value.  We question the rationale for having two former CEOs serve on the Board.  Board has b

  33. Slide 33: PLXT Nominees: Long Tenure - No Vested Interest

    PLXT Nominees: Long Tenure - No Vested Interest PLXT Nominees D. James Guzy • 27 year incumbent as Chairman of (Age 77) the Board • 0.02% ownership of PLXT stock after 27 years Thomas Riordan • 9 year incumbent (Age 57) • 0.0% ownership of PLXT stock after 9 yrs Robert H. Smith • 11 year incumbent (

  34. Slide 34: Independent Directors Have No Investment Risk At Stake

    Independent Directors Have No Investment Risk At Stake Whose interests are most aligned with PLXT stockholders? Independent directors who own less than 1.0% of PLXT stock or Potomac, who currently owns over $29 million worth of stock? – Only two (2) of the Board’s six (6) independent directors – D.

  35. Slide 35: Questionable Corporate Governance

    Questionable Corporate Governance Corporate Governance  Plurality vote standard with no director resignation policy  Board is authorized to increase or decrease the size without stockholder approval  All vacancies on board are to be filled by remaining directors, including vacancies as a result o

  36. Slide 36: Our Plan and Nominees

    Our Plan and Nominees 36 Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  37. Slide 37: Our Plan

    Our Plan Operational  Confirm right CEO and senior management team are in place to lead PLXT forward  Ensure PLXT remains focused on developing the PCI Express business. On last conference call, Company indicated expenses would be lower this quarter due to product development delays for the import

  38. Slide 38: Significant Technological Risk

    Significant Technological Risk Interconnect Standards have Undergone Rapid Change During the PC Era Optical ISA PCI AGP PCIe Gen 1 PCIe Gen 2 PCIe Gen 3 PCIe Gen 4? Interconnect? 1981 1993 1996 2003 2007 2010 2014-2015? 2018?  Key Strategic Questions For PLXT’s Board • Will PCIe be the dominant int

  39. Slide 39: Consolidating Industry

    Consolidating Industry  While PLXT is currently the acknowledged leader in PCI Express, the semiconductor industry is consolidating, and PLXT is below critical mass. Given its reliance on a single product line, it faces significant risks, two of which were highlighted previously (competitive threat

  40. Slide 40: Process challenges at subscale fabless companies

    Process challenges at subscale fabless companies  Fabless manufacturers are undergoing a paradigm shift to 3-D transistors. First Year of Mass Production at TSMC 65nm 40nm 28nm 20nm 16nm 10nm Planar Planar Planar Planar 3D 3D 2007 2009 2011 2014 2015 2016?  Smaller process nodes offer higher perfo

  41. Slide 41: Our Nominees Have the Relevant Skills to Maximize Stockholder Value

    Our Nominees Have the Relevant Skills to Maximize Stockholder Value  Significant Industry Experience and Contacts Martin  Extensive Management Oversight Colombatto  New Market Expansion (PCI express (Age 55) and Express Fabric)  M&A + Acquisition Integration  Credibility With Market Stephen Dom

  42. Slide 42: Our Nominees Have Relevant Experience

    Our Nominees Have Relevant Experience Industry and operational expertise PLXT plans to enter the PCI Fabric market and considering that none of the incumbent nominees have any prior experience of growing businesses, it is imperative that someone with Martin and Steve’s background be on the Board. It

  43. Slide 43: Martin Colombatto

    Martin Colombatto Significant Industry Experience and Contacts – 30+ years of experience in semiconductor and electronics industry – Expertise in engineering, product development, sales, marketing and M&A – Deep industry knowledge, relationships, and perspective though numerous economic cycles and i

  44. Slide 44: Stephen Domenik

    Stephen Domenik Significant Financial and Investment Experience – General Partner of Sevin Rosen Funds, a venture capital fund, since 1995 Significant Public Board Experience – Currently serves on the Board of Directors of Pixelworks, Inc. (NASDAQ:PXLW) – Currently serves on the Board of Directors o

  45. Slide 45: Eric Singer

    Eric Singer Significant Financial and Investment Experience – Currently, co-managing member of Potomac Management II and III Significant Public Board Experience – Current Chairman of the Board of Sigma Designs (NASDAQ:SIGM) • Within six months on Board, returned SIGM to profitability after five stra

  46. Slide 46: The Time for Change is Now

    The Time for Change is Now  Board has been incapable of returning capital to stockholders. – PLXT has significantly underperformed not only its peers but also NASDAQ, Russell 2000 and Philadelphia Semiconductor Index  PLXT has failed to show sustained revenue growth  Board’s Failed Acquisitions H

  47. Slide 47: Appendix

    Appendix – Settlement Discussions – Peer Group Selection 47 Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.

  48. Slide 48: PLXT Lacked Interest in Settlement

    PLXT Lacked Interest in Settlement PLXT showed early on its lack of interest in meeting with a large stockholder  Chairman of the Board, D. James Guzy, has refused to meet with Potomac despite repeated requests  April 2013 – Potomac made a special, cross-country trip to PLXT's headquarters with th

  49. Slide 49: PLXT Lacked Interest in Settlement (contd.)

    PLXT Lacked Interest in Settlement (contd.) PLXT Cuts Off Dialogue When We Request Say in Which Directors Step Down  Late October – Potomac reaches out to PLXT again and receives in response a proposal with two existing directors identified by PLXT agreeing not to stand for re-election at the Annua

  50. Slide 50: Peer Group Selection

    Peer Group Selection We used the following criteria to select peer group for PLXT.  Same GICS Industry group as PLXT – Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment.  Companies with storage, networking broad analog and interconnect technologies.  Mentioned in Deutsche Bank’s fairness opinion as public

  51. Slide 51: Legal Disclaimer

    Legal Disclaimer • This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability or the particular need of any specific person who reads this presentation, and should not be taken as advice

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