Taubman Centers — Proxy Contest (May 2017)
39 slides from Taubman Centers's proxy contest presentation, May 9, 2017
Slide 1: Don’t be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Claims
Don’t be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Claims May 2017 www.SaveTaubman.com Please email questions or comments to: SaveTaubman@LandandBuildings.com
Slide 2: Don’t be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Claims
Don’t be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Claims • On May 8, 2017, Taubman Centers (“TCO” or the “Company”) issued a letter and presentation to Taubman shareholders in connection with the upcoming 2017 Annual Meeting and responding, in part, to the presentation that Land and Buildings filed
Slide 3: Table of Contents
Table of Contents 1. Don’t Be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Statements – L&B Comments on Select Slides from Taubman Presentation 2. What Taubman’s Response Ignores 3. Land and Buildings’ Director Nominees and the Incumbent Directors We Are Opposing 3 www.SaveTaubman.com
Slide 4: 1. Don’t Be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Statements
1. Don’t Be Fooled by Taubman’s False and Misleading Statements – L&B Comments on Select Slides from Taubman Presentation 4
Slide 5: Taubman’s Apparent Confusion With the Meaning of Enhanced Corporate Governance
Taubman’s Apparent Confusion With the Meaning of Enhanced Corporate Governance Taubman’s commitment to enhancing corporate governance must not be very strong as Green Street Advisors has given Taubman the worst corporate governance score in the REIT sector Should the Board be touting that it has a “
Slide 6: The Skill the Taubman Board has Perfected Most is Disenfranchising Shareholders
The Skill the Taubman Board has Perfected Most is Disenfranchising Shareholders, In Our View Taubman Board earns “9 out of 9” for disenfranchising shareholders for the following “skills” ✓ Maintaining over- 9/9 tenured Board ✓ Maintaining dual-class 9/9 share structure ✓ Maintaining worst 9/9 corpor
Slide 7: Taubman Fails to Justify its New York Offices or Subsidizing Bobby’s Use of Corporate Jet
Taubman Fails to Justify its New York Offices or Subsidizing Bobby’s Use of Corporate Jet at Shareholder Expense Does anyone really believe that the cost in a private jet for a trip from NYC to LA is only $2,099? SIFL Aircraft Rates as of 2016(2) LA to NYC (~2,500 miles) Cents/mile (up to 500) $ 0.2
Slide 8: TCO Cherry-Picking and Constantly Changing Peer Group
TCO Cherry-Picking and Constantly Changing Peer Group Here Using Here Using Class A Malls Comparable REITs by Asset Size Make up your mind on mall peers… Industry experts have! Here Using Here Using All Public REITs All Mall REITs Taubman’s “peers” change depending on the story the Company wants to
Slide 9: TCO Cherry-Picking and Constantly Changing Time Period
TCO Cherry-Picking and Constantly Changing Time Period Here Using 11 Years Here Using 3 Years Here Using 10 Years Make up your mind on time periods… Industry experts have! Here Using Here Using 20 Years 24 Years What is the appropriate time period to evaluate TCO? TCO clearly prefers that the indust
Slide 10: Total Shareholder Returns Consistent with ISS’ Typical Methodology
Land and Buildings’ Total Shareholder Returns Consistent with Institutional Shareholder Services’ Typical Methodology The 1-,3- and 5-year time periods are Cherry-picking time periods again: now consistent with how ISS, a leading proxy Taubman is using a 10-year time period advisory firm, typically
Slide 11: TCO Total Shareholder Returns Are Not Calculated Prior to Investor Engagement
TCO Total Shareholder Returns Are Not Calculated Prior to Investor Engagement As is Industry Norm, In Our View The Company shows performance through December 31, 2016, likely improving absolute and relative (1) performance following pubic shareholder engagement Taubman TSR Outperformance Following I
Slide 12: Taubman Earnings Growth Disappoints, So They Focus on Other Metrics
Taubman Earnings Growth Disappoints, So They Focus on Other Metrics Sales growth for 11 years is misleading given asset sales Core FFO Per Share Growth and tenant mix Trailing 3 Trailing 5 Years Years TCO -2% 17% Class A Mall Peer Avg. 23% 53% TCO Slower Earnings Growth -25% -36% Taubman ignores ear
Slide 13: Taubman’s Underperforming Margins: No Response to Our Strategic Plan
Taubman’s Underperforming Margins: No Response to Our Strategic Plan to Enhance Operations Taubman failed to address why they have not focused on the missed revenue opportunities and bloated costs we highlighted Taubman malls have the highest rents and sales per square foot that should translate int
Slide 14: TCO Does Not Refute Our Analysis that Undisciplined Capital Allocation Has Cost Shareholders
TCO Does Not Refute Our Analysis that Undisciplined Capital Allocation Has Cost Shareholders Dearly What about the 4 developments we highlighted and believe destroyed $1 billion in value? ▪ TCO makes no mention in the 2017 Annual Meeting investor presentation of St. Louis Prestige Outlets, The Mal
Slide 15: Taubman’s Misleading Statements Regarding Mr. Elson and Mr. Litt’s Experience
Taubman’s Misleading Statements Regarding Mr. Elson and Mr. Litt’s Experience 89% of investors surveyed by Citi would vote Bobby and/or Myron out at 2017 Annual Meeting Mr. Elson and Mr. Litt are widely regarded as industry leaders in their respective fields and Taubman is woefully understating rele
Slide 16: Mr. Litt Would Provide a Fresh Perspective and Deep Industry Expertise
Mr. Litt Would Provide a Fresh Perspective, Deep Industry Expertise and Work to Hold Management Accountable Mr. Litt was the #1 Institutional Investor All American Real Estate Research Team for 8 years and was top ranked for 13 years Taubman found one out of 20 malls they developed which outperforme
Slide 17: Mr. Elson’s Corporate Governance Expertise Has Effected Change and Created Value
Mr. Elson’s Corporate Governance Expertise Has Effected Change and Created Value As a board member, Mr. Elson oversaw turnarounds through instilling best-in-class corporate governance practices and enhancing operating performance, management changes and strategic alternatives 92% return 49% return s
Slide 18: 2. What Taubman’s Response Ignores
2. What Taubman’s Response Ignores 18
Slide 19: What Taubman’s Response Ignores
What Taubman’s Response Ignores Taubman has significantly underperformed Class A Mall Peers over the 1-, 3- and 5- year periods, the most relevant timeframe typically used by ISS and other institutional investors Taubman maintains a highly conflicted Board with decades of history between Taubman Fam
Slide 20: Taubman Centers’ Chronic Underperformance
Taubman Centers’ Chronic Underperformance • Taubman’s total shareholder return has materially and consistently lagged its Class A Mall Peers, Proxy Peers, and the REIT Total Return Index over the 1-, 3-, and 5-year trailing time periods • Taubman’s stock has underperformed peer Simon’s by 145%(1) si
Slide 21: Cobweb of Interconnections Among Board Members Demonstrates Questionable Independence
Cobweb of Interconnections Among Board Members Demonstrates Questionable Independence, In Our View A. Alfred Taubman 16-year(1) average William S. Taubman (deceased) Jerome A. Chazen Cia Buckley Marakovits board tenure! Ronald W. Tysoe Taubman Family William U. Macy’s/Federated Parfet Fashionmall.co
Slide 22: Taubman Family and Myron Ullman: Decades of History
Taubman Family and Myron Ullman: Decades of History Myron Ullman appointed Lead Director without having ever been elected by shareholders! (1) Source: The Guardian, “LVMH to bid for Sotheby's”, September 30, 2000 22 www.SaveTaubman.com
Slide 23: We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B”
We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B” • The “Killer B” is the Taubman Family’s M.O. to maintaining control and disenfranchising shareholders, in our view - The Taubman Family has used the “Killer B” share structure on multiple occasions - The family used its “Killer
Slide 24: Taubman Family “Killer B” and Abysmal Governance
Taubman Family “Killer B” and Abysmal Governance – A Path Rejected by Celebrated CEOs • The Taubman Family primarily owns minority non-voting partnership units of the Taubman Realty Group Limited Partnership, NOT common stock of Taubman Centers, Inc., the REIT(1) Mort Zuckerman Board Grants “Killer
Slide 25: Bobby Taubman Repeatedly Ignores Shareholders Voices
Bobby Taubman Repeatedly Ignores Shareholders Voices In 1998, the Board unilaterally issued “Killer B” shares without common shareholder vote In 2003, 85% of common shareholders tendered for Simon acquisition offer In 2007, 89% of common shareholders voted to de-stagger Board In 2008, 85% of common
Slide 26: Bobby is Out of Touch on Development – Misleading Investors
Bobby is Out of Touch on Development – Misleading Investors, and Likely His Board, In Our View What Bobby Says… But in Reality… International “…we estimate total project cost to be about $400M, Taubman has spent roughly $500M on the project to Market Place with an expected return of 8% - 8.5%” date
Slide 27: Management’s Ill-fated Developments Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion
Management’s Ill-fated Developments The Past Five Years Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion • Horrible 5-year capital allocation record is littered with value-destroying developments Taubman Value Destruction totaling an estimated $1 billion that illustrate a Estimated Loss % Loss lack of pro
Slide 28: Woodfield Mall: Get Rid of Taubman Mall Management and NOI Rose 8%
Woodfield Mall: Get Rid of Taubman Mall Management and NOI Rose 8% • Background: Taubman developed and managed Woodfield Mall in Schaumburg, IL for over 40 years - New management took over the asset in 2013 • NOI rose approximately $4 million(1), or 8%, increasing asset value by $100 million driven
Slide 29: Bobby is Out of Touch with Mall Trends – Missing the Shift from Apparel
Bobby is Out of Touch with Mall Trends – Missing the Shift from Apparel to Food and Dining, In Our View • The optimal retail mix is evolving: Sandeep Mathrani (Class A Mall Peer GGP) recently said that clothing stores, which used to be 70% of the average shopping center, are now closer to 50%, while
Slide 30: 3. Director Nominees and the Incumbent Directors We Are Opposing
3. Land and Buildings’ Director Nominees and the Incumbent Directors We Are Opposing 30
Slide 31: Kryptonite Could Not Protect Lex Luther From Superman
Kryptonite Could Not Protect Lex Luther From Superman, Nor Should “Killer B” Protect Bobby From Shareholder Voices My family has Staggered “Killer B” – don’t board, you We will pledge mess with us! can’t get us! our shares to keep control! Old Boys Club on Board, 16 year tenure – you don’t stand a J
Slide 32: Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees
Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees Charles Elson – Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware – Current Director of HealthSouth Corporation, a healthcare services prov
Slide 33: Our Nominees: The Right Mix of Governance Expertise and Sector Experience
Our Nominees: The Right Mix of Governance Expertise and Sector Experience Shareholder Value Creation Our Highly-Qualified Director Nominees Shareholder Value Destruction ✓ Mr. Elson would immediately leverage his strong corporate governance expertise and experience to push for Incumbent Directors We
Slide 34: Charles Elson: Proven Leader in Corporate Governance
Charles Elson: Proven Leader in Corporate Governance • Expert in the fields of corporations, securities regulation and corporate governance - Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware -
Slide 35: Jonathan Litt
Jonathan Litt • Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Land and Buildings - Mr. Litt founded Land and Buildings in the summer of 2008 to take advantage of the opportunities uncovered by the global property bubble - Exclusively invests in real estate public equities, with a significant focus on acti
Slide 36: Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman
Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman Bobby has a demonstrated history of running roughshod over the Taubman Centers independent Board members and common shareholders, in our view Dual-class structure repeatedly used to ignore shareholder voices Focuses on Taubman Family’s interests, not all
Slide 37: Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman
Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman Myron Ullman’s repeated support of preserving the status quo at Taubman Centers and long history with the Taubman Family seriously calls into question his independence, in our view On his second stint on the Board that began 14 years ago Overlapping with
Slide 38: The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision
The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision We believe that our nominees have the right experience and expertise to help correct the course of Taubman and drive strong shareholder value creation – without fresh voices, history has proven change will not happen Charles Elson Jonathan Litt ~65% up
Slide 39: Disclosures
Disclosures This presentation with respect to Taubman Centers, Inc. (“TCO” or, the “Company”) is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, tax, investment, financial or other advice or a recommendation to enter into or conclude any transaction or buy or sell any security