Taubman Centers Inc

Taubman Centers — Proxy Contest (May 2017)

159 slides from Taubman Centers's proxy contest presentation, May 1, 2017

  1. Slide 1: Addressing Abysmal Corporate Governance and Chronic Underperformance at Taubman Centers

    Addressing Abysmal Corporate Governance and Chronic Underperformance at Taubman Centers May 2017 www.SaveTaubman.com Please email questions or comments to: SaveTaubman@LandandBuildings.com

  2. Slide 2: The Taubman History of Abysmal Corporate Governance

    The Taubman History of Abysmal Corporate Governance • Taubman Centers, Inc. (“Taubman”, “TCO” or the “Company”) owns the most productive class A public mall portfolio • Completed its initial public offering in 1992 • Owns 24 malls across the United States, Puerto Rico, China and South Korea • Despit

  3. Slide 3: Overview of Land and Buildings

    Overview of Land and Buildings • Firm Background - Land & Buildings Investment Management, LLC (“Land and Buildings”) is an SEC-registered investment advisor founded in 2008 and located in Stamford, Connecticut - Invests in the publicly traded shares of global REITs and real estate related companies

  4. Slide 4: Situation Overview – Why We Are Here

    Situation Overview – Why We Are Here We have known the Taubman Family(1) since the IPO roadshow of the Company in 1992 We covered the Company for decades both as research analysts and investors, and held countless discussions with management over the years regarding the grave concerns highlighted in

  5. Slide 5: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance and Chronic Underperformance Under Leadership of Bobby Taubman 3. Taubman Centers’ Worst in Class Corporate Governance 4. Taubman’s Chronic Operating Underperformance Squandering Shareholder Assets 5. Taubman

  6. Slide 6: 1. Executive Summary

    LANDandBUILDINGS 1. Executive Summary

  7. Slide 7: What’s Wrong with Taubman? Abysmal Governance and Chronic Underperformance

    What’s Wrong with Taubman? Abysmal Governance and Chronic Underperformance Governance Operations Capital Allocation The “Worst of the Worst” Run like an unaccountable private Undisciplined approach resulting in company for the benefit of Bobby inferior returns on investments • Disenfranchising gover

  8. Slide 8: Taubman Centers’ Chronic Underperformance

    Taubman Centers’ Chronic Underperformance • Taubman’s total shareholder return has materially and consistently lagged its Class A Mall Peers, Proxy Peers, and the REIT Total Return Index over the 1-, 3-, and 5-year trailing time periods • Taubman’s stock has underperformed peer Simon’s by 145%(1) si

  9. Slide 9: Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 5 Years

    Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 5 Years • Shareholders worse off investing in Taubman vs. all other Class A Mall Peers over trailing 5 years $3,000 TCO Total Shareholder Return vs. Class A Mall Peers Trailing 5 Years $2,800 $2,600 $2,400 $2,200 $2,000 $1,800 $1,60

  10. Slide 10: Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 3 Years

    Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 3 Years • Shareholders worse off investing in Taubman vs. all other Class A Mall Peers over trailing 3 years $1,900 TCO Total Shareholder Return vs. Class A Mall Peers Trailing 3 Years $1,800 $1,700 $1,600 $1,500 $1,400 $1,300 $1,20

  11. Slide 11: Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 1 Year

    Taubman Has Underperformed Each Class A Mall Peer Over the Trailing 1 Year • Shareholders worse off investing in Taubman vs. all other Class A Mall Peers over trailing 1 year $1,300 TCO Total Shareholder Return vs. Class A Mall Peers Trailing 1 Year $1,250 $1,200 $1,150 $1,100 $1,050 $1,000 $950 -4%

  12. Slide 12: Taubman’s Abysmal Corporate Governance Structure

    Taubman’s Abysmal Corporate Governance Structure Taubman’s governance disenfranchises common shareholders…  Dual class voting to Taubman Family benefit  Classified Board  Over-tenured Board at 16 years on average(1)  Combined Chairman/CEO  Ability of the Taubman Family to block any acquisition

  13. Slide 13: Taubman’s Abysmal Corporate Governance in Practice

    Taubman’s Abysmal Corporate Governance in Practice …and the Board’s actions speak volumes  Dual class structure and 30% “Killer B” vote likely a $500M windfall to Taubman Family, for which they only paid $38,400(1)  Allowed Taubman Family to pledge one-third of their OP Units and “Killer B” for ow

  14. Slide 14: Cobweb of Interconnections Among Board Members Demonstrates Questionable Independence

    Cobweb of Interconnections Among Board Members Demonstrates Questionable Independence, In Our View A. Alfred Taubman 16-year(1) average William S. Taubman (deceased) Jerome A. Chazen Cia Buckley Marakovits board tenure! Ronald W. Tysoe Taubman Family William U. Macy’s/Federated Parfet Fashionmall.co

  15. Slide 15: We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B”

    We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B” • The “Killer B” is the Taubman Family’s M.O. to maintaining control and disenfranchising shareholders, in our view - The Taubman Family has used the “Killer B” share structure on multiple occasions - The family used its “Killer

  16. Slide 16: 1998 Board Cements Taubman Family Control – Issues “Killer B” to Taubman Family

    1998 Board Cements Taubman Family Control – Issues “Killer B” to Taubman Family All in favor of issuing Taubman Taubman Centers Board of Directors Family a 30% voting “Killer B” preferred, say “Aye” Aye Aye Aye Aye Aye Aye Aye Bobby Taubman President & CEO The Taubman Family owned minority non-votin

  17. Slide 17: Taubman Family “Killer B” and Abysmal Governance – A Path Rejected by Celebrated CEOs

    Taubman Family “Killer B” and Abysmal Governance – A Path Rejected by Celebrated CEOs • The Taubman Family primarily owns minority non-voting partnership units of the Taubman Realty Group Limited Partnership, NOT common stock of Taubman Centers, Inc., the REIT(1) Mort Zuckerman Board Grants “Killer

  18. Slide 18: Kryptonite Could Not Protect Lex Luther From Superman, Nor Should “Killer B” Protect Bobby

    Kryptonite Could Not Protect Lex Luther From Superman, Nor Should “Killer B” Protect Bobby From Shareholder Voices My family has Staggered “Killer B” – don’t board, you We will pledge mess with us! can’t get us! our shares to keep control! Old Boys Club on Board, 16 year tenure – you don’t stand a J

  19. Slide 19: Bobby Taubman Repeatedly Ignores Shareholders Voices

    Bobby Taubman Repeatedly Ignores Shareholders Voices In 1998, the Board unilaterally issued “Killer B” shares without common shareholder vote In 2003, 85% of common shareholders tendered for Simon acquisition offer In 2007, 89% of common shareholders voted to de-stagger Board In 2008, 85% of common

  20. Slide 20: Bobby Prioritizing Grand Developments Over Low Hanging Fruit Has Likely Cost Investors Billions

    Bobby Prioritizing Grand Developments Over Low Hanging Fruit Has Likely Cost Investors Billions  The Board is taking on ~$1 billion ~$1.7 billion exorbitant risk and in losses value creation astronomical costs on opportunity new development missed while leaving money on the table across Taubman’s d

  21. Slide 21: Bobby Leaving $20 per share on the Table Due to Massive Operational Underperformance

    Bobby Leaving $20 per share on the Table Due to Massive Operational Underperformance Missed Revenue Bloated Horrible Operating Opportunities Expenses Results  Out of touch focus on high-  Lavish marketing and other • Taubman’s EBITDA margins end retailers owner expenses relative to underperformed

  22. Slide 22: Management’s Ill-fated Developments The Past Five Years Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion

    Management’s Ill-fated Developments The Past Five Years Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion • Horrible 5-year capital allocation record is littered with value-destroying developments  Taubman Value Destruction  totaling an estimated $1 billion that illustrate a Estimated Loss % Loss lack of pro

  23. Slide 23: Bobby is Out of Touch on Development – Misleading Investors, and Likely His Board

    Bobby is Out of Touch on Development – Misleading Investors, and Likely His Board, In Our View What Bobby Says… But in Reality… International “…we estimate total project cost to be about $400M, Taubman has spent roughly $500M on the project to Market Place with an expected return of 8% - 8.5%” date

  24. Slide 24: Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman

    Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman Bobby has a demonstrated history of running roughshod over the Taubman Centers independent Board members and common shareholders, in our view  Dual-class structure repeatedly used to ignore shareholder voices  Focuses on Taubman Family’s interests, not all

  25. Slide 25: Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman

    Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman Myron Ullman’s repeated support of preserving the status quo at Taubman Centers and long history with the Taubman Family seriously calls into question his independence, in our view  On his second stint on the Board that began 14 years ago  Overlapping with

  26. Slide 26: Taubman Family and Myron Ullman: Decades of History

    Taubman Family and Myron Ullman: Decades of History   Myron Ullman appointed Lead Director without having ever been elected by shareholders! (1) Source: The Guardian, “LVMH to bid for Sotheby's”, September 30, 2000 26 www.SaveTaubman.com

  27. Slide 27: REIT Investor Survey Highlights Need and Support for Change at Taubman Centers

    REIT Investor Survey Highlights Need and Support for Change at Taubman Centers • An investor survey with nearly 100 respondents highlights broad support for L&B’s campaign for change at Taubman: - 80% of respondents either completely agree or somewhat agree with the L&B assessment of concerns surrou

  28. Slide 28: Taubman Centers Needs New Leadership and Culture: Shareholders Deserve a Board Refreshment

    Taubman Centers Needs New Leadership and Culture: Shareholders Deserve a Board Refreshment Current Board Refreshed Board FFO $3.75/share $4.50/share NAV Destruction Enhancement G&A Bloated & growing In-line with peers Up to $1bn across four Value creation through Impairments recent developments upgr

  29. Slide 29: The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision

    The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision We believe that our nominees have the right experience and expertise to help correct the course of Taubman and drive strong shareholder value creation – without fresh voices, history has proven change will not happen Charles Elson Jonathan Litt ~65% up

  30. Slide 30: Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees

    Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees Charles Elson – Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware – Current Director of HealthSouth Corporation, a healthcare services prov

  31. Slide 31: Key Questions for Shareholders in This Proxy Contest

    Key Questions for Shareholders in This Proxy Contest  Is the Chairman and CEO a lifetime  Why is Myron Ullman on his second stint on appointment that is passed down in the the Board? Is he focused on the interests of Taubman Family regardless of performance all shareholders or just the Taubman Fam

  32. Slide 32: 2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance and Chronic Underperformance Under Leadership of Bobby Taubman

    2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance and Chronic Underperformance Under Leadership of Bobby Taubman 32

  33. Slide 33: Bobby Taubman Has Sought to Maintain Control, Not Maximize Value

    Bobby Taubman Has Sought to Maintain Control, Not Maximize Value • Our efforts to work collaboratively with Taubman’s management team and Board have proven futile, solidifying our belief that Bobby’s primary goal is to preserve the status quo rather than embrace the need for change Dual Class Struct

  34. Slide 34: Bobby Taubman – The Apple Does Fall Far from the Tree

    Bobby Taubman – The Apple Does Fall Far from the Tree • Bobby is not successfully carrying on his father’s legacy as steward of Taubman Centers, in our view • Bobby has served as Chairman for over 15 years, which begs the question, is the CEO title hereditary? Alfred’s Legacy(1):  Founded Taubman C

  35. Slide 35: Bobby is Apparently Afraid to be Held Accountable by Shareholders – Limited Share Issuances

    Bobby is Apparently Afraid to be Held Accountable by Shareholders – Limited Share Issuances to Keep Control • The Taubman Family appears focused on maintaining its control of the Company, rather than gain scale and operating efficiencies through prudent portfolio growth TCO vs. Class A Mall Peers –

  36. Slide 36: Taubman Family Surreptitiously Acquired a 30% vote at Taubman Centers For a Mere $38,400

    Taubman Family Surreptitiously Acquired a 30% vote at Taubman Centers For a Mere $38,400 • In 1998, without shareholder approval, the Board Disclosure of Series B Preferred Stock(2) authorized the creation of Series B Preferred Stock for partners of Taubman Realty Group(1) - “Killer B” Series B Pref

  37. Slide 37: We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B”

    We’ve Seen This Movie Before: Taubman Family’s Attack of the “Killer B” • The “Killer B” is the Taubman Family’s M.O. to maintaining control and disenfranchising shareholders, in our view - The Taubman Family has used the “Killer B” share structure on multiple occasions - The family used its “Killer

  38. Slide 38: Bobby Always Wins: “Killer B” Could Net an Extraordinary $500M for the Taubman Family

    Bobby Always Wins: “Killer B” Could Net an Extraordinary $500M for the Taubman Family While Shareholders Left Holding the Bag "Killer B" could net Taubman Meanwhile, TCO common shareholders are Family a cool $500M on a left holding the bag and have seen ~$2.5 $38,400 investment(1) billion of underpe

  39. Slide 39: Bobby Gives Simon Heisman – Taubman Family Does Not Want to Sell

    Bobby Gives Simon Heisman – Taubman Family Does Not Want to Sell 85% of common shareholders tendered their shares for 2003 SPG offer to Bobby acquire TCO Myron Taubman Ullman Taubman’s shares have underperformed Simon’s by 145% since the 2003 acquisition offer was rejected!  Taubman Family declared

  40. Slide 40: The Taubman Family is Entrenched

    The Taubman Family is Entrenched • Taubman Family has indicated to the investment community that the Company is unilaterally not for sale, a stark contrast to our view that a well managed company should be for sale every day at the right price “The Taubman Family and other shareholders, with combine

  41. Slide 41: Taubman’s shares have underperformed Simon’s by 145% since the 2003 offer was rejected

    Taubman’s shares have underperformed Simon’s by 145% since Bobby, Myron and the rest of the TCO board rejected the 2003 acquisition offer against shareholders’ will Source: Bloomberg data 41 www.SaveTaubman.com

  42. Slide 42: Many of the Top REIT Investors Have Voted With Their Feet and Avoided Taubman Centers

    Many of the Top REIT Investors Have Voted With Their Feet and Avoided Taubman Centers • The Top 10 REIT active money managers own a mere 15% of Taubman shares, which is half of the level they own on average of the Company's Class A Mall Peers • In fact, Taubman is not owned at all by four of the top

  43. Slide 43: Taubman’s Discount to NAV Has Grown as Investors Avoid Abysmal Corporate Governance

    Taubman’s Discount to NAV Has Grown as Investors Avoid Abysmal Corporate Governance Under Bobby’s Leadership 15% Taubman Discount to NAV 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% -35% -34.2% -40% Nov-11 May-12 Nov-12 May-13 Nov-13 May-14 Nov-14 May-15 Nov-15 May-16 New Board members necessary to help B

  44. Slide 44: Court Highlights Taubman Family Control over Taubman Centers

    Court Highlights Taubman Family Control over Taubman Centers • In a 2003 federal case captioned Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Taubman Centers Inc.(1), the Court highlighted items that illustrate the control the Taubman Family has over matters of the Company • Taubman Family made Board decisions with

  45. Slide 45: Taubman Lobbies Michigan Legislature to Change Law to Allow the Taubman Family to Block the Acquisition

    Taubman Lobbies Michigan Legislature to Change Law to Allow the Taubman Family to Block the Acquisition • After a US District Court judge ruled that the Taubman’s would not be allowed to vote their Series B Preferred Stock, the Taubman Family lobbied the Michigan legislature to retroactively codify

  46. Slide 46: Legislation Becomes Law and Simon Property Group Abandons Takeover Attempt

    Legislation Becomes Law and Simon Property Group Abandons Takeover Attempt • In September 2003, the Michigan Senate passed the legislation which allowed the Taubman Family to vote their Series B Preferred Stock(1) “This is a great day for Michigan shareholders… and hundreds of thousands of employees

  47. Slide 47: Wall Street Journal excerpt on Taubman political donations

    “[F]ew companies seeking State House help have the heft of the Taubman name in Michigan. The Taubman Family has contributed more than $100,000 in political donations since 1998, most to Republican candidates or causes, according to Federal Election Commission records. Mr. Taubman also is a leading d

  48. Slide 48: Taubman Contributions to Michigan Politicians

    Taubman Contributions to Michigan Politicians “Contributions from… Robert Taubman ($5,000)… were not noted or not noted in full.” Source: OpenSecrets.org; Andrea Goodell, “U.S. Rep. Huizenga clearing up campaign discrepancies - from 2008”, Holland Sentinel, March 29, 2015 48 www.SaveTaubman.com

  49. Slide 49: “The legislation could hardly be more anti-shareholder.”

    “The legislation could hardly be more anti-shareholder. How do you price expropriation risk?” Jim Corl, Cohen & Steers Dean Starkman, “Taubmans Take Law Into Their Own Hands”, The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2003 49 www.SaveTaubman.com

  50. Slide 50: 3. Taubman Centers’ Worst in Class Corporate Governance

    3. Taubman Centers’ Worst in Class Corporate Governance 50

  51. Slide 51: Egregious Corporate Governance: Where Have the Independent Directors Been?

    Egregious Corporate Governance: Where Have the Independent Directors Been?  Graham T. Jerome A. Craig M. Peter Ronald W. Myron E. Cia Buckley Allison Chazen Hatkoff Karmanos, Jr. Tysoe Ullman, III Marakovits  Why has the Board continued to have a  Why has the Board allowed the Taubman classified

  52. Slide 52: Green Street Advisors Gives Taubman the Lowest Governance Rating Among All REITs

    Green Street Advisors Gives Taubman the Lowest Governance Rating Among All REITs Green Street Governance Rating: Overall Score Taubman 14/100 Mall REIT Average 53/100 REIT Average 57/100 The REIT industry is known for egregious corporate governance practices broadly, so for Taubman to be the industr

  53. Slide 53: Why Do the Independent Directors Appear to Tolerate Such Poor Corporate Governance Practices?

    Why Do the Independent Directors Appear to Tolerate Such Poor Corporate Governance Practices? Each independent director has spent an entire career to build their existing reputation and have each served in important roles at iconic organizations Graham T. Jerome A. Craig M. Peter Ronald W. Myron E.

  54. Slide 54: The Board Is Long-Tenured, Stale and Clubby, In Our View

    The Board Is Long-Tenured, Stale and Clubby, In Our View • The average age of the Board is 70 years old Director Age Tenure (years) • Only two directors have a board tenure of less Robert S. Taubman 63 25 than a decade Jerome A. Chazen 90 25 - The Board’s second “newest” appointee, Graham T. Allison

  55. Slide 55: Why Did the Board Support Taubman Family’s Pledging of Units?

    Why Did the Board Support Taubman Family’s Pledging of Units? • A total of 975,513 shares of common stock, 8,338,496 shares of “Killer B” Series B Preferred Stock and 8,338,496 units of TRG were previously pledged as collateral for several loans with various financial institutions(1) - In 2015, Taub

  56. Slide 56: Audit Committee Members Should Not Allow Taubman Shares to Be Pledged

    Audit Committee Members Should Not Allow Taubman Shares to Be Pledged “WITHHOLD votes are warranted for audit committee members… due to the board's failure to establish a policy to mitigate or prevent the risks caused by share pledging.” Institutional Shareholder Services Proxy Research Report on Ta

  57. Slide 57: Why Did the Board Ignore Majority-Supported Shareholder Proposals to De-Classify Two Years in a Row?

    Why Did the Board Ignore Majority-Supported Shareholder Proposals to De-Classify Two Years in a Row? Taubman shareholders and a leading proxy advisory firm dismissed Taubman’s Board’s argument that a classified board structure is in the best interests of shareholders “At the company’s 2008 and 2007

  58. Slide 58: Can Myron Ullman Be Trusted to Act on Behalf of Shareholders Given Ties to the Taubman Family?

    Can Myron Ullman Be Trusted to Act on Behalf of Shareholders Given Ties to the Taubman Family? • Alfred Taubman’s board tenure and investment at Macy’s coincided with Myron’s ascent at Macy’s and a merger that netted Myron millions(1) - Ullman was CEO/Chairman of R.H. Macy Co. from 1992 to 1996 and

  59. Slide 59: Why Did the Board Allegedly Breach Fiduciary Duties by Appointing Myron Ullman?

    Why Did the Board Allegedly Breach Fiduciary Duties by Appointing Myron Ullman After the Annual Meeting? • Myron Ullman was first appointed to Simon Property Group and Westfield America Schedule 14A Taubman’s Board in 2003 in alleged breach April 30, 2003 of fiduciary duties by the Board - Alfred Ta

  60. Slide 60: Independent Directors Vote with Their Wallet – De-minimus Ownership of Taubman Centers

    Independent Directors Vote with Their Wallet – De-minimus Ownership of Taubman Centers “Multiple board members, including insiders and independents, should hold sizable investments in the company.” Green Street Advisors Independent Director Share Ownership Director % S/O Owned Jerome Chazen 0.099% G

  61. Slide 61: The Board Has a Reputation of Abysmal Corporate Governance Practices

    The Board Has a Reputation of Abysmal Corporate Governance Practices “Reputation matters. This variable is subjective, but it is very important. Some boards have been stress tested on change-of-control questions, many have dealt with issues where shareholder and managerial interests diverge, and all

  62. Slide 62: The “Killer B” Gives the Taubman Family Near Total Power to Block an Acquisition

    The “Killer B” Gives the Taubman Family Near Total Power to Block an Acquisition “Companies where insiders control a large stake can, for all practical purposes, only be taken over if management agrees. And in many instances, management will never agree. Our scoring system penalizes companies where

  63. Slide 63: Taubman Centers Onerous Anti-Takeover Provisions That Disenfranchise Shareholders

    Taubman Centers Onerous Anti-Takeover Provisions That Disenfranchise Shareholders “It is fair to assume that boards that avail themselves of more potential anti-takeover devices are more likely to use them in a manner adverse to the interests of outside shareholders.” Green Street Advisors (emphasis

  64. Slide 64: “[W]e have a terrific board….”

    “[W]e have a terrific board….” Robert S. Taubman, Chairman & CEO of Taubman Taubman Q3 2015 Earnings Call, October 27, 2015 (emphasis added) 64 www.SaveTaubman.com

  65. Slide 65: Audit Committee Failed to Respond to Whistleblower Complaint

    Audit Committee Failed to Respond to Whistleblower Complaint • On December 6, 2016 Land and Buildings utilized the Whistleblower policy to alert and urge Taubman’s Audit Committee to retain its own advisors separate and apart from the Company’s advisors and from the Taubman Family and/or their advis

  66. Slide 66: The independent directors need to be truly independent of the Taubman Family

    The independent directors need to be truly independent of the Taubman Family in order for the Board to have the credibility to end the persistent underperformance, in our view 66 www.SaveTaubman.com

  67. Slide 67: The Board Has a Non-Independent Chairman Which Places Too Much Power In the Hands of Management

    The Board Has a Non-Independent Chairman Which Places Too Much Power In the Hands of Management “The Company has neither appointed an independent chairman nor an independent lead or presiding director. We view an independent chairman as better able to oversee the executives of the Company and set a

  68. Slide 68: Board Likely Oversaw Years of Charter Violations From the Taubman Family’s Ownership

    Board Likely Oversaw Years of Charter Violations From the Taubman Family’s Ownership • The Board has failed to exert proper oversight of the Taubman Family’s ownership of the Company having overseen years of likely significant Charter violations, putting at risk TCO’s REIT status, in our view - The

  69. Slide 69: Taubman’s egregious corporate governance during Simon’s attempted acquisition

    For an example of Taubman’s egregious corporate governance, one needs to look no further than the actions the Board took when Simon Property Group attempted to acquire the Company during 2002 through 2003 69 www.SaveTaubman.com

  70. Slide 70: Simon Property Group Makes Offer to Acquire Taubman

    Simon Property Group Makes Offer to Acquire Taubman • In late 2002, Simon Property Group made an unsolicited offer to acquire Taubman at an 18% premium(1) • Without engaging with Simon Property Group, the Board stated that "the Company has no interest whatsoever in pursuing a sale transaction....“(2

  71. Slide 71: Large Investor Disposes Entire Stake In Reaction to Taubman Stonewalling Simon Tender Offer

    Large Investor Disposes Entire Stake In Reaction to Taubman Stonewalling Simon Property Group Tender Offer • The largest institutional investor in REITs had been a long-time owner of Taubman shares(1) • As of November 2002, the firm owned a 9.9% stake in Taubman common stock(2) • After the legislati

  72. Slide 72: Where Was the Board During This Fiasco?

    Where Was the Board During This Fiasco? “Effective corporate governance depends upon the board being accountable to shareholders. Although the tender offer received the clear mandate of a majority of company's shares, the board did not act on the offer in accordance with the desires of shareholders.

  73. Slide 73: “The value of TCO stock could be permanently impaired…”

    “The value of TCO stock could be permanently impaired in the eyes of the public if a fair offer was made and turned down.” Jonathan Litt Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Two Families, Two Empires and One Big Brawl at the Mall”, The New York Times, December 1, 2002 73 www.SaveTaubman.com

  74. Slide 74: Resignation of William Parfet From the Board

    Resignation of William Parfet From the Board William U. Parfet • On August 1, 2016, William Parfet was sued by a former employee for a number of complaints, including sexual harassment, and accused him of fathering two of her children(1) • On August 31, 2016, Mr. Parfet resigned from the boards of S

  75. Slide 75: Mr. Parfet resigned from Monsanto and Stryker boards a month before Taubman

    Mr. Parfet resigned from the boards of Monsanto and Stryker nearly a full month before he resigned from the Taubman Board Did Mr. Parfet’s apparent connections to the Taubman Family embolden him to refrain from immediately resigning from the Taubman Board? 75 www.SaveTaubman.com

  76. Slide 76: Taubman Changes Since L&B’s Engagement Have Been Reactive and Fall Well Short of Real Change

    Taubman Changes Since L&B’s Engagement Have Been Reactive and Fall Well Short of Real Change, In Our View • The reactions by the Company since our initial Taubman Reverses Course on Shrinking engagement have been cosmetic in nature Board Size, a Charter Violation, Following • Myron Ullman, who has n

  77. Slide 77: $6.5 million in shareholder capital burned to defend against shareholders

    The only change that is not cosmetic is the $6.5 million in shareholder capital Taubman burned since the fourth quarter of 2016 to defend themselves from their own shareholders 77 www.SaveTaubman.com

  78. Slide 78: Corporate Governance: Investment Community Has Expressed Concerns

    Corporate Governance: Investment Community Has Expressed Concerns “The governance structure puts control of a potential sale of the company in the hands of the Taubman family, which has shown no interest in selling, making NAV a theoretical exercise.” Deutsche Bank October 19, 2016 “TCO's corporate

  79. Slide 79: 4. Taubman’s Chronic Operating Underperformance Squandering Shareholder Assets

    4. Taubman’s Chronic Operating Underperformance Squandering Shareholder Assets 79

  80. Slide 80: Horrible Operating Performance: Where Have the Independent Directors Been?

    Horrible Operating Performance: Where Have the Independent Directors Been? Graham T. Jerome A. Craig M. Peter Ronald W. Myron E. Cia Buckley Allison Chazen Hatkoff Karmanos, Jr. Tysoe Ullman, III Marakovits  Why has the Board allowed Taubman’s clear  Why has the Board not pressed to reduce operati

  81. Slide 81: Bobby Prioritizing Grand Developments Over Low Hanging Fruit Has Likely Cost Investors Billions

    Bobby Prioritizing Grand Developments Over Low Hanging Fruit Has Likely Cost Investors Billions  The Board is taking on ~$1 billion ~$1.7 billion exorbitant risk and in losses value creation astronomical costs on opportunity new development missed while leaving money on the table across Taubman’s d

  82. Slide 82: Bobby Leaving $20 per share on the Table Due to Massive Operational Underperformance

    Bobby Leaving $20 per share on the Table Due to Massive Operational Underperformance Missed Revenue Bloated Horrible Operating Opportunities Expenses Results  Out of touch focus on high-  Lavish marketing and other • Taubman’s EBITDA margins end retailers owner expenses relative to underperformed

  83. Slide 83: Woodfield Mall: Get Rid of Taubman Mall Management and NOI Rose 8%

    Woodfield Mall: Get Rid of Taubman Mall Management and NOI Rose 8% • Background: Taubman developed and managed Woodfield Mall in Schaumburg, IL for over 40 years - New management took over the asset in 2013 • NOI rose approximately $4 million(1), or 8%, increasing asset value by $100 million driven

  84. Slide 84: Bobby is Out of Touch with Mall Trends – Missing the Shift from Apparel to Food and Dining

    Bobby is Out of Touch with Mall Trends – Missing the Shift from Apparel to Food and Dining, In Our View • The optimal retail mix is evolving: Sandeep Mathrani (Class A Mall Peer GGP) recently said that clothing stores, which used to be 70 % of the average shopping center, are now closer to 50%, whil

  85. Slide 85: Where Are the Kiosks? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table

    Where Are the Kiosks? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table Lost revenue No kiosks! opportunity! Beverly Center (Taubman) Mall at Millenia (Taubman) Source: Google Kiosks! Short Hills Mall (Taubman) Just empty space! No money left on the table! Sources: Land and Buildings’ and Forsite LLC’s analyses and

  86. Slide 86: Where is the Short-Term Leasing? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table

    Where is the Short-Term Leasing? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table Lost revenue opportunity! Short Hills Mall (Taubman) International Market Place (Taubman) Too many vacancies in the best malls! No money left Cherry Creek Mall (Taubman) Temporary on the table! Pretty pictures tenant! don’t pay rent!

  87. Slide 87: Where is the Advertising? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table

    Where is the Advertising? Bobby Leaving Money on the Table Rules of conduct don’t make $$$ Mall at San Juan (Taubman) Mall at Short Hills (Taubman) Lots of Unsponsored movie ads! International Market Place (Taubman) Unused prime Sponsored advertising space! charging stations! $$$ Sources: Land and B

  88. Slide 88: Taubman’s Inferior Margin Profile Demonstrates Near Disregard For Keeping Costs Under Control

    Taubman’s Inferior Margin Profile Demonstrates Near Disregard For Keeping Costs Under Control • We believe Board and management are out of excuses for failing to address Taubman’s inferior margin profile, given that Class A Mall Peers have instituted successful plans to improve EBITDA margins Taubma

  89. Slide 89: “…we think our margins are generally in line with mall REIT sector…”

    “…we think our margins are generally in line with mall REIT sector…we feel like our margins are in line at the moment.” Simon J. Leopold, CFO of Taubman November 2, 2016 89 www.SaveTaubman.com

  90. Slide 90: Taubman’s G&A Costs Are Bloated Due to Excessive Spending on a Risky Development Platform

    Taubman’s G&A Costs Are Bloated Due to Excessive Spending on a Risky Development Platform • We believe Bobby needs to significantly reign in his excessive spending and that a new culture of cost discipline must be instilled G&A as a % of Revenue Taubman is an 5 Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average

  91. Slide 91: Taubman Centers Subsidizes Bobby Taubman’s Personal Use of Corporate Jet

    Taubman Centers Subsidizes Bobby Taubman’s Personal Use of Corporate Jet • Bobby apparently reimburses Taubman Centers only for incidentals when traveling for personal reasons on the Company’s private jet, saddling the Company with exorbitant cost - Disclosures are so poor around the aircraft that i

  92. Slide 92: Fourth Quarter 2016 and First Quarter 2017 Earnings: More Disappointments

    Fourth Quarter 2016 and First Quarter 2017 Earnings: More Disappointments • Taubman’s fourth quarter 2016 earnings report and conference call with the investment community was a stark reminder of why shares of Taubman are severely undervalued: - Initial 2017 FFO guidance was 4% below consensus, the

  93. Slide 93: Wall Street Analysts Continue to Vent Their Frustration

    Wall Street Analysts Continue to Vent Their Frustration • The poor fourth quarter 2016 results and 2017 outlook surprised and frustrated sell-side analysts “It's tough to see the shares regaining traction on the ““Guidance misses... again. For the third straight year, report given the headline miss…

  94. Slide 94: Investment Community Outcry Over Poor Operations

    Investment Community Outcry Over Poor Operations “Taubman indeed operates at much lower margins than its peers and there is likely some room for improvement.” Green Street Advisors October 19, 2016 “On the overhead front, Taubman’s G&A is the highest when measured as a percentage of asset value comp

  95. Slide 95: 5. Taubman’s History of Abysmal Capital Allocation

    5. Taubman’s History of Abysmal Capital Allocation 95

  96. Slide 96: Abysmal Capital Allocation: Where Have the Independent Directors Been the Past Five Years?

    Abysmal Capital Allocation: Where Have the Independent Directors Been the Past Five Years? Graham T. Jerome A. Craig M. Peter Ronald W. Myron E. Cia Buckley Allison Chazen Hatkoff Karmanos, Jr. Tysoe Ullman, III Marakovits  Why is the Board resting on 20 year old  Why did the Board not consider ot

  97. Slide 97: We Have Been Highlighting Taubman’s Capital Allocation Issues for Over 20 Years

    We Have Been Highlighting Taubman’s Capital Allocation Issues for Over 20 Years November 2000 February 2001 “Overall, we were disappointed to hear that “[W]e believe that Taubman bit off more than it could chew trying to juggle four major mall Taubman is having problems with two of its developments

  98. Slide 98: Management’s Ill-fated Developments The Past Five Years Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion

    Management’s Ill-fated Developments The Past Five Years Likely to Cost Shareholders $1 Billion • Horrible 5-year capital allocation record is littered with value-destroying developments  Taubman Value Destruction  totaling an estimated $1 billion that illustrate a Estimated Loss % Loss lack of pro

  99. Slide 99: St. Louis Prestige Outlets (2013) – $70M Loss

    St. Louis Prestige Outlets (2013) There Bobby Goes Again $70M Loss Development Misadventure #1 What Bobby Says… But in Reality… “Retailer interest is extremely high. There's wide Taubman’s project cost 80% more per square foot than recognition that the market is superb and that our its competitor’s

  100. Slide 100: Green Street comment on St. Louis Prestige Outlets

    “…the Prestige Outlet in St. Louis (10% of pipeline) is a black eye on the domestic pipeline track record…In an industry where projects have lately opened almost full or full, the outcome for Taubman is disappointing.” Green Street Advisors June 2. 2013 (emphasis added) 100 www.SaveTaubman.com

  101. Slide 101: St. Louis Prestige Outlets – Why Did the Board Allow Bobby to Go Head to Head With Competitor?

    St. Louis Prestige Outlets – Why Did the Board Allow Bobby to Go Head to Head With Competitor? Taubman St. Louis Development Competitor St. Louis Development ($130M cost; $70M loss) ($83M cost; $80M+ gain) St. Louis Prestige Outlets cost an A competitor’s project astronomical $430psf, Bobby Taubman’

  102. Slide 102: The Mall at San Juan (2015) – $260M Loss

    The Mall at San Juan (2015) There Bobby Goes Again $260M Loss Development Misadventure #2 What Bobby Says… But in Reality… “We continue to expect 8% to 8.5% unlevered Massive vacancies, barren inventory in stores open returns…” and lack of traffic suggest breakeven at best Q2 2012 Earnings Call, Jul

  103. Slide 103: Morgan Stanley comment on Puerto Rico development

    “TCO's Puerto Rico development (Mall of San Juan) has been a sore spot for TCO investors, given twice-reduced expected project returns…we are incrementally concerned on the project's outlook nearer-term…cost overruns as the REIT works to open the mall on schedule as well as continued leasing challen

  104. Slide 104: The Mall at San Juan: What Was Bobby Thinking?

    The Mall at San Juan: What Was Bobby Thinking?  Background: The Mall of San Juan is a 627,000 square unoccupied foot ultra luxury mall located in central San Juan, Puerto Rico, which ultimately cost nearly $900/sf ($550 million or 35% above initial estimates of $405M) and suffered unoccupied many d

  105. Slide 105: Mall of San Juan: Wrong Product, Wrong Market = Competitors Eating Their Lunch

    Mall of San Juan: What Was the Board Thinking? Wrong Product, Wrong Market = Competitors Eating Their Lunch • The Competitors Are Vastly Outperforming Taubman - Plaza Carolina: low to middle-market focus on local customer base  Excellent traffic on a Wednesday morning in March, particularly at bank

  106. Slide 106: International Market Place (2016) – $160M Loss

    International Market Place (2016) There Bobby Goes Again $160M Loss Development Misadventure #3 What Bobby Says… But in Reality… “…we sit on the 50-yard line of one of the best The location of the only two IMP storefronts actually on high streets in the world” Kalakaua Avenue; most stores are in the

  107. Slide 107: International Market Place (Honolulu, HI): Wrong Location, Wrong Product

    International Market Place (Honolulu, HI): Wrong Location, Wrong Product  Background: International Market Place (“IMP”) is a 344,000 square foot mall in Waikiki, Hawaii - The re-development is subject to a ground lease and ultimately cost an astonishing ~$500M (nearly $1,500/sf, 25% over budget) a

  108. Slide 108: International Market Place (Honolulu, HI): Wrong Location, Wrong Product

    International Market Place (Honolulu, HI): Wrong Location, Wrong Product  We believe Bobby Taubman either misunderstood the merits of this location or deliberately misled investors  Taubman’s CFO stated the projected yield went from 8.5%(1) to “a bit of an unknown path”(2)  Bobby claims the disap

  109. Slide 109: International Market Place (Honolulu, HI) Location, Location, Location

    International Market Place (Honolulu, HI) Location, Location, Location (1) Company SEC filings (3) Per the Q4 2016 earnings call transcript, “…we anticipate we'll be 75% to 80% (2) Estimate based on measurements from Google Maps. occupied by the end of June” 109 www.SaveTaubman.com

  110. Slide 110: International Market Place – 50 Yard Line or Parking Lot?

    International Market Place – 50 Yard Line or Parking Lot? Waikiki Beach Street Taubman Retail Rents International Market Place Street rents are “Our site is on the 50- <$60 PSF “consistently…over $400” yard line of Waikiki's with many “at $500 to primary retail shopping $600 a square foot” area” $60

  111. Slide 111: Beverly Center (Ongoing) – $500M Loss

    Beverly Center (Ongoing) There Bobby Goes Again $500M Loss Development Misadventure #4 What Bobby Says… But in Reality… “Over the next two-and-a-half years, [Beverly Taubman’s lack of attention to the asset led to Center] will go through a comprehensive $500 deferred maintenance and competitors gain

  112. Slide 112: Beverly Center (Los Angeles, CA) – A $500 Million Disaster

    Beverly Center (Los Angeles, CA) – A $500 Million Disaster • On March 8, 2016, Taubman announced that a $500 million investment in Beverly Center in Los Angeles was necessary with little to no return expected • The investment community howled in protest given significant unanswered questions “Yet An

  113. Slide 113: Why did Bobby Seemingly Let A Competitor Dominate the Los Angeles Market?

    Why did Bobby Seemingly Let A Competitor Dominate the Los Angeles Market? And Where was the Board Oversight? • Westfield’s successful ongoing Century City  Westfield Century City redevelopment is in stark contrast to Beverly Center - We believe management unwittingly allowed competitors to dominate

  114. Slide 114: Beverly Center: $500 Million “Reimagination” of a Mall or an Ego-Gratifying Art Exhibition?

    Beverly Center: $500 Million “Reimagination” of a Mall or an Ego-Gratifying Art Exhibition? • Bobby’s pursuit of airplanes, art and Ironic Choice? swanky offices has come at the expense of common shareholders, “Untitled (Can Money Buy You Love?)” in our view • Taubman announced temporary artwork thr

  115. Slide 115: Analyst comments on discounted valuation and Asia expansion

    “The stock trades at a discounted valuation relative to NAV and Class A mall peers largely due to stumbles on the development front and the company's foray into Asia/China.” UBS September 28, 2016 (emphasis added) “TCO is building malls in China and South Korea…. Expected yields are skinny given the

  116. Slide 116: The Company’s Venture Into Asia Has Failed to Serve as Anything but a Distraction

    The Company’s Venture Into Asia Has Failed to Serve as Anything but a Distraction to Management, In Our View • Taubman opened its Asia office in 2005 with high hopes,(1) however, 12 years later, the Company’s experiment in Asia has been underwhelming - The ~$700 million Taubman has invested in China

  117. Slide 117: Bobby Taubman’s Response to Concerns On Expanding Into Asia

    Bobby Taubman’s Response to Concerns On Expanding Into Asia Ross Nussbaum, UBS: “The broader related question, I guess, with Asia development, particularly your comments around potentially starting something else in Korea late next year. Your stock is, obviously, trading well below where most of us

  118. Slide 118: Taubman Has Recorded More Than $300 Million in Impairment Charges

    Taubman Has Recorded More Than $300 Million in Impairment Charges for Five Poorly Executed Investments Since 2008, Taubman has recorded more than $300 million in impairment charges  “[W]e recognized impairment charges of $117.9 million and $8.3 million related to our Oyster Bay and Sarasota project

  119. Slide 119: Past Management Development Debacles: The Pier Shops

    Past Management Development Debacles: The Pier Shops • The Pier Shops is a luxury shopping mall located in Atlantic City, New Jersey across the Boardwalk from Caesars • In 2005, the Company agreed to purchase a 30% interest in the development, which was spearheaded by Gordon Group Holdings LLC • The

  120. Slide 120: Is management repeating past mistakes by increasing ownership in Asia joint ventures?

    By increasing the Company’s ownership stake in its joint ventures in Asia, is management repeating the same mistakes they’ve made in the past? 120 www.SaveTaubman.com

  121. Slide 121: Assets Sold to Starwood Highlight Further Development Missteps

    Assets Sold to Starwood Highlight Further Development Missteps • In 2014, Taubman sold seven malls that it had developed for $1.4 billion to Starwood • Taubman shareholders earned a disappointing 10% appreciation above the total undepreciated cost basis despite significant cap rate compression that

  122. Slide 122: Development Returns on Malls Sold to Starwood – Not Something to Be “Proud” Of

    Development Returns on Malls Sold to Starwood – Not Something to Be “Proud” Of, In Our View • We believe the Starwood sale portfolio clearly illustrates Taubman’s mixed track record of development value creation • A mere 10% gross return on costs for these developments (during a spectacular 10-year

  123. Slide 123: Starwood example highlights need for more scrutiny of capital allocation

    The Starwood example highlights that there needs to be more scrutiny about the capital allocation decisions of management by the independent directors of Taubman 123 www.SaveTaubman.com

  124. Slide 124: Capital Allocation: Investment Community Has Expressed Concerns

    Capital Allocation: Investment Community Has Expressed Concerns “We suspect that concerns around the Company's development pipeline may linger until visibility around initial and stabilized returns becomes more clear; this is unlikely in the near term, in our view. Interestingly, the Company's core

  125. Slide 125: 6. Land and Buildings’ Director Nominees and the Incumbent Directors We Are Opposing

    6. Land and Buildings’ Director Nominees and the Incumbent Directors We Are Opposing 125

  126. Slide 126: Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees

    Land and Buildings’ Highly-Qualified Director Nominees Charles Elson – Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware – Current Director of HealthSouth Corporation, a healthcare services prov

  127. Slide 127: Our Nominees: The Right Mix of Governance Expertise and Sector Experience

    Our Nominees: The Right Mix of Governance Expertise and Sector Experience Shareholder Value Creation Our Highly-Qualified Director Nominees Shareholder Value Destruction  Mr. Elson would immediately leverage his strong corporate governance expertise and experience to push for Incumbent Directors We

  128. Slide 128: Charles Elson: Proven Leader in Corporate Governance

    Charles Elson: Proven Leader in Corporate Governance • Expert in the fields of corporations, securities regulation and corporate governance - Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware -

  129. Slide 129: Charles Elson Case Study: AutoZone

    Charles Elson Case Study: AutoZone 600% • Mr. Elson served as an independent director on the AutoZone Board from August 2000 through December 500% 2008 400% • During his Board tenure, the company created 300% corporate governance guidelines including term limits that were considered leading edge in

  130. Slide 130: Charles Elson Case Study: HealthSouth

    Charles Elson Case Study: HealthSouth • Mr. Elson has served as an independent director on 100% the HealthSouth Board since September 2004 60% • Mr. Elson helped turn around governance of company that was previously plagued by accounting fraud 20% charges in 2003 • Mr. Elson was instrumental in esta

  131. Slide 131: Charles Elson Case Study: Bob Evans

    Charles Elson Case Study: Bob Evans • Mr. Elson has served as an independent director 60% on the Bob Evans Board since August 2015 • Mr. Elson was instrumental in establishing revised 40% governance standards as Chairman of Nominating and Corporate Governance 20% Committee that were well received by

  132. Slide 132: Jonathan Litt

    Jonathan Litt • Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Land and Buildings - Mr. Litt founded Land and Buildings in the summer of 2008 to take advantage of the opportunities uncovered by the global property bubble - Exclusively invests in real estate public equities, with a significant focus on acti

  133. Slide 133: Jonathan Litt Case Study: Associated Estates

    Jonathan Litt Case Study: Associated Estates • Mr. Litt followed Associated Estates Realty Corporation 70% (“Associated Estates”), an apartment REIT, since before its IPO in 1993 and identified significant undervaluation relative to real estate value that had persisted 50% throughout the company’s h

  134. Slide 134: Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali

    Jonathan Litt Case Study: Mack-Cali • Mr. Litt followed Mack Cali Realty Corp (“Mack-Cali”), 60% an office and apartment REIT, since before its IPO in 1994 and identified significant undervaluation relative 40% to real estate value that had persisted throughout the company’s history 20% - Mack-Cali’

  135. Slide 135: Jonathan Litt Case Study: MGM Resorts International

    Jonathan Litt Case Study: MGM Resorts International • Mr. Litt ran a public campaign in the Spring of 2015 60% outlining a strategic plan at MGM Resorts International (NYSE: MGM) to unlock long-term shareholder value 40% with key elements including: - Unlocking real estate value by pursuing a REIT 2

  136. Slide 136: Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman

    Directors We Are Opposing – Bobby Taubman Bobby has a demonstrated history of running roughshod over the Taubman Centers independent Board members and common shareholders, in our view  Dual-class structure repeatedly used to ignore shareholder voices  Focuses on Taubman Family’s interests, not all

  137. Slide 137: Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman

    Directors We Are Opposing – Myron Ullman Myron Ullman’s repeated support of preserving the status quo at Taubman Centers and long history with the Taubman Family seriously calls into question his independence, in our view  On his second stint on the Board that began 14 years ago  Overlapping with

  138. Slide 138: 7. The Plan to Unlock Value at Taubman

    7. The Plan to Unlock Value at Taubman 138

  139. Slide 139: The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision

    The Path Forward – A New and Independent Vision We believe that our nominees have the right experience and expertise to help correct the course of Taubman and drive strong shareholder value creation – without fresh voices, history has proven change will not happen Charles Elson Jonathan Litt ~65% up

  140. Slide 140: Taubman Centers Needs New Leadership and Culture: Shareholders Deserve a Board Refreshment

    Taubman Centers Needs New Leadership and Culture: Shareholders Deserve a Board Refreshment Current Board Refreshed Board FFO $3.75/share $4.50/share NAV Destruction Enhancement G&A Bloated & growing In-line with peers Up to $1bn across four Value creation through Impairments recent developments upgr

  141. Slide 141: Value Creation Strategies: Modernized Corporate Governance

    Value Creation Strategies: Modernized Corporate Governance  Enact best-in-class governance structure  Declassify the Board so that all directors stand for re- election annually  Commit to reduce the tenure of the Board  Separate Chairman and CEO roles  Put Series B Preferred Stock voting rights

  142. Slide 142: Value Creation Strategies: Enhanced Operations

    Value Creation Strategies: Enhanced Operations  Fully explore capitalizing on the following potential missed revenue opportunities:  Embrace service tenants (e.g. wireless carriers, health & beauty, and banking) which can improve occupancy and NOI and draw additional traffic to Taubman malls  Gre

  143. Slide 143: Value Creation Strategies: Disciplined Capital Allocation

    Value Creation Strategies: Disciplined Capital Allocation  Develop a rigorous capital allocation policy to ensure shareholders earn attractive returns  Embrace a more flexible growth and design philosophy to ensure the right product is built in the right market as the highly-amenitized, luxury Tau

  144. Slide 144: REIT Investor Survey Highlights Need and Support for Change at Taubman Centers

    REIT Investor Survey Highlights Need and Support for Change at Taubman Centers • An investor survey with nearly 100 respondents highlights broad support for L&B’s campaign for change at Taubman: - 80% of respondents either completely agree or somewhat agree with the L&B assessment of concerns surrou

  145. Slide 145: Shareholders Can Make a Difference at the 2017 Annual Meeting

    Shareholders Can Make at Difference at the 2017 Annual Meeting • The Taubman Family’s 30% vote cannot suppress shareholders’ voices at the 2017 Annual Meeting given the Company’s plurality voting standard in contested elections More than 85% of Taubman Centers’ common shares were tendered in the Sim

  146. Slide 146: Investment Community Skeptical of Change Despite Broad Support for L&B’s Strategy

    Investment Community Skeptical of Change Occuring Despite Broad Support for L&B’s Strategy to Unlock Value • We believe the lack of positive share price reaction since our initial public involvement in October 2016 is a function of an entrenched and complacent Board controlled by the Taubman Family,

  147. Slide 147: The choice comes down to this: change is needed now

    The choice comes down to this: should shareholder value destruction, a blatant disregard for corporate governance and operational failures be rewarded? Or should a clear message be sent that the interests of all shareholders need to be placed ahead of those of the Taubman Family? The answer is clear

  148. Slide 148: 8. Appendix

    LANDandBUILDINGS 8. Appendix 148

  149. Slide 149: Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures

    Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures 1998 2002 2005 1992 • Creation of Series B Preferred • A. Alfred Taubman sentenced • Taubman opened Asia office • Taubman IPOs as the Stock without shareholder to prison for price fixing while to develop real estate(4), w

  150. Slide 150: Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures (cont.)

    Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures (cont.) 2016 2013 • Announced $500 million capital project on Beverly Center (3) with little to • Investor Day held which, we no expected returns(4) 2012 believe, focused overly on • International Market Place opens for b

  151. Slide 151: Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures (cont.)

    Taubman’s Timeline of Governance Failures and Capital Allocation Misadventures (cont.) December 2016 March 2017 September 2016 • Appointment of Myron Ullman as Lead Director, who is on his • Appointed Cia Buckley Marakovits Apparent Charter second stint on the Taubman Board after his first appointme

  152. Slide 152: Land and Buildings’ Selection of Most Comparable Taubman Peers

    Land and Buildings’ Selection of Most Comparable Taubman Peers Land and Buildings believes the Company’s most comparable peers are high quality mall peers GGP, Inc. (NYSE: GGP), The Macerich Company (NYSE: MAC) and Simon Property Group Inc. (NYSE: SPG), which are the only U.S. publically traded regi

  153. Slide 153: Limitations on Land and Buildings’ Valuations and Path to Unlock Value

    Limitations on Land and Buildings’ Valuations and Path to Unlock Value • The valuations referenced in this presentation are estimates and therefore there can be no assurance that such estimates are reflective of actual realizable value. The valuations are also subject to market change, including cha

  154. Slide 154: Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses

    Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses • For each Mall Peer, Land and Buildings identified what it believes to be the most comparable figures to arrive at such company’s share of income statement figures, including consolidated figures as well as estimated percentages of unconsolidated figu

  155. Slide 155: Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses

    Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses • To arrive at the Company’s EBITDA margin, Land and Buildings first determined the Company’s pro rata EBITDA by adding the Company’s disclosed beneficial interest in consolidated EBITDA and the Company’s disclosed beneficial interest in unconsolidated

  156. Slide 156: Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses

    Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses Notes Source Revenue 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 5 Year Average a 1 TCO consolidated revenue $747,974 $767,154 $679,129 $557,172 $612,557 b 1 TCO beneficial interest in $368,170 $402,003 $299,561 $285,670 $320,757 consolidated EBITDA before gains (pro rat

  157. Slide 157: Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses

    Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses Notes Source EBITDA 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 5 Year Average a 1 TCO beneficial interest in $368,170 $402,003 $285,670 $320,757 consolidated EBITDA b 1 TCO beneficial interest in $107,044 $114,939 $136,151 $178,009 unconsolidated EBITDA c=a+b 2 TCO - L&

  158. Slide 158: Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses

    Calculations of EBITDA Margins and G&A Expenses Source G&A % of Revenue 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 5 Year Average 2 TCO 4.8% 5.6% 5.9% 6.4% 5.7% 5.7% 2 GGP 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 2 MAC 1.6% 2.1% 2.2% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2 SPG 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 2 High Quality Peer Avg. 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%

  159. Slide 159: Disclosures

    Disclosures This presentation with respect to Taubman Centers, Inc. (“TCO” or, the “Company”) is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, tax, investment, financial or other advice or a recommendation to enter into or conclude any transaction or buy or sell any security

Taubman Centers — Proxy Contest (May 2017) on 6ix