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Balchem — Gebhardt Real Science webinar (November 2024)

47 slides from Balchem's conference presentation, November 2024

  1. Slide 1: Biosecurity Imperatives and the Feed Supply Chain

    Biosecurity Imperatives and the Feed Supply Chain Jordan Gebhardt, DVM, PhD Assistant Professor Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Kansas State University

  2. Slide 2: Why biosecurity?

    Why biosecurity? Merriam-Webster • Bi-directional: – Bio-exclusion – keeping pathogens out – Bio-containment – preventing pathogens from spreading

  3. Slide 3: Biosecurity

    Biosecurity • Practices of biosecurity have been widely implemented in the swine industry – Entry benches – Shoe covers – Downtime – Shower in/shower out – Disinfection of incoming supplies

  4. Slide 4: Pathogens capable of surviving in feed and/or feed ingredients

    Pathogens capable of surviving in feed and/or feed ingredients • Bacteria • Salmonella spp. • Escherichia coli • Viruses • Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) • African swine fever virus (ASFV) • Senecavirus A (SVA) • Classical swine fever virus (CSF) • Pseudorabies virus (PRV) • Foot and mouth d

  5. Slide 5: Biosecurity is very complicated!

    Biosecurity is very complicated!

  6. Slide 6: Structure of feed supply chain

    Structure of feed supply chain Ingredient Ingredient Ingredient Facility Facility Facility Farm Farm Farm Farm Farm Feed Mill Feed Mill Farm Farm Farm Farm Farm Farm Farm

  7. Slide 7: Kansas State University Feed Safety

    lied Kansas State | applied Unive rsity Nutrition, Applied Swine Nutrition Feed Safety Wy, Feed NG cn : NYG RAIN SCIENCE Science FF & INDUSTRY pa K-STATE a Research and Extension

  8. Slide 8: Addressing Feed Safety

    Addressing Feed Safety 1. Is it likely to get Prevention contaminated? 2. Can it survive? Intervention 3. Is it infectious?

  9. Slide 9: Risk of contamination depends on

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? • Risk of contamination depends on: – Geographical considerations • Countries/regions with active disease outbreaks • Location of pigs with disease relative to location of ingredient production – Agricultural practices – Packaging • Single use bags or totes vs. r

  10. Slide 10: Understand where ingredients are coming from

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? • Understand where ingredients are coming from • Are alternative sources available and cost effective? • BIOSECURITY during manufacture, storage, and delivery https://www.swinehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Feed-Ingredient-Safety.pdf

  11. Slide 11: Areas where improvement would be beneficial

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Areas where improvement would be beneficial

  12. Slide 12: Research partnership

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Research partnership Production system located in Vietnam Goal: Use diagnostic testing capabilities to understand the risk of ASFV spread within their production system 1. Feed production system a. Feed mill b. Ingredients and finished feed c. Feed trucks 2. Live

  13. Slide 13: Feed delivery vehicles sample count

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Feed delivery vehicles 350 3 300 Sample count 250 200 0 150 100 0 0 0 4 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 2019 2020 Month Gebhardt et al., 2021

  14. Slide 14: Feed delivery vehicles: 1,027 total samples

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Feed delivery vehicles 350 3 300 1,027 total samples Sample count 250 7 PCR-positive samples 6 from cab surfaces 200 0 1 from exterior surfaces 150 100 0 0 0 4 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 2019 2020 Month Gebhardt et al

  15. Slide 15: How can this be accomplished?

    How can this be accomplished? Step 1: Step 2: Step 3: Remove organic material Dry Apply disinfectant Gebhardt et al., 2021

  16. Slide 16: How can this be accomplished?

    How can this be accomplished? Avoid this Gebhardt et al., 2021

  17. Slide 17: Feed mill surfaces sample count

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Feed mill surfaces Worker clothing 250 Feed contact surface (2) 1 200 Non-feed contact surface (2) Non-feed Sample count contact surface Driver resting area Worker clothing 150 4 1 Feed contact surface 1 0 100 1 0 1 0 0 50 0 0 0 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Ap

  18. Slide 18: Feed mill surfaces: 1,159 total samples

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Feed mill surfaces Worker clothing 250 Feed contact surface (2) 1 200 Non-feed contact surface (2) Non-feed 1,159 total samples Sample count contact surface Worker 9 PCR-positive Driver resting area clothing samples 150 1 contact from surface driver resting 4 are

  19. Slide 19: Feed and ingredients

    1. Is it likely to get contaminated? Feed and ingredients 142 total samples so far 40 ingredient and water samples 102 complete feed samples 0.7% PCR positive 1 complete feed sample PCR positive • Batch of feed did not contain added formaldehyde-based product PCR-negative PCR-positive Gebhardt et al

  20. Slide 20: Where is the contamination at?

    1. Is it likely to get Where is the contaminated? contamination at? • 17 of 2,328 samples (0.7%) from the feed supply chain Feed contain ASFV DNA as determined by PCR 6% Mill Surface o 3 Feed-Contact Surfaces in Mill (feed contact) o 4 Non-Feed-Contact Surfaces in Mill 18% o 2 Employee clothing in M

  21. Slide 21: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Batch Ingredients 1 Negative 2 ASFV Inoculated 3 Negative 4 Negative 5 Negative 6 Negative NPB #20-018 Elijah et al., 2021

  22. Slide 22: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV) p72 DNA in feed samples Batch of feed 1 2 3 4 5 6 Batch Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Non-detected 10 0 0 0 0 0 Suspect 0 0 0 1 1 3 ASFV

  23. Slide 23: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV) p72 DNA in feed samples Batch of feed 1 2 3 4 5 6 Batch Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Non-detected 10 0 0 0 0 0 Suspect 0 0 0 1 1 3 ASFV

  24. Slide 24: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV) p72 DNA in feed samples Batch of feed 1 2 3 4 5 6 Batch Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Non-detected 10 0 0 0 0 0 Suspect 0 0 0 1 1 3 ASFV

  25. Slide 25: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV) p72 DNA in feed samples Batch of feed 1 2 3 4 5 6 Batch Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Non-detected 10 0 0 0 0 0 Suspect 0 0 0 1 1 3 ASFV

  26. Slide 26: Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated batch

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover if feed after contaminated? contaminated batch Detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV) p72 DNA in feed samples Batch of feed 1 2 3 4 5 6 Batch Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Non-detected 10 0 0 0 0 0 Suspect 0 0 0 1 1 3 ASFV

  27. Slide 27: Risk of ASFV carryover on feed surfaces and within environment

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover on feed surfaces contaminated? and within environment after contaminated batch Zone C Zone B 1 meter Zone A Zone D NPB #20-018 Elijah et al., 2021

  28. Slide 28: Prevalence of ASFV on surfaces

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover on feed surfaces contaminated? and within environment after contaminated batch Feed Contact Surface <1m >1m Shoes 100% Prevalence of ASFV on surfaces 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Negative Positive After Sequence After Sequence After Sequence After Sequence 1 2 3 4

  29. Slide 29: Key findings

    1. Is it likely to get Risk of ASFV carryover on feed surfaces contaminated? and within environment after contaminated batch • Key findings: – ASFV has similar characteristics to PEDV within a feed mill • It goes everywhere! – Contamination of feed and surfaces can be detected after multiple batches

  30. Slide 30: 2. Can it survive

    2. Can it survive • Pathogen has to survive on surface to cause infection – Viruses do not replicate outside of host – Naturally decay over time (lose infectivity) • Time, temperature, humidity, environment • Greatest survival in: o Choline o Soybean meal o Soy oil cake Stoian et al., 2019

  31. Slide 31: Detection of ASFV in contaminated feed over time

    Detection of African swine fever virus 2. Can it survive in contaminated feed over time 40 Quantity of ASFV in batch 2, Ct 35 30 25 20 DNA very stable up to 180 days 15 Need to confirm whether virus still infectious 10 5 0 0 3 7 14 28 60 90 180 Days after feed manufacture Elijah et al., 2021

  32. Slide 32: Feed as vector for disease

    3. Is it infectious? Feed as vector for disease Multiple exposures increases risk of infection Niederwerder et al., 2019

  33. Slide 33: Feed as vector for disease

    3. Is it infectious? Feed as vector for disease • For PEDV, 1 gram of feces from an acutely infected pig can contaminate 500 tonnes of feed – with EACH GRAM being infective Schumacher et al., 2016

  34. Slide 34: Feed Biosecurity: Hurdles to Prevent Pathogen Transfer

    Feed Biosecurity: Hurdles to Prevent Pathogen Transfer through feed supply chain Prevention Intervention Ingredient sourcing Point-in-time Biosecurity Residual 34

  35. Slide 35: Biosecurity at feed mills

    4. How can it Prevention be prevented? • Biosecurity at feed mills

  36. Slide 36: Extend biosecurity to feed mills

    4. How can it bePrevention prevented? • Extend biosecurity to feed mills to limit contamination from trucks and people – Use receiving mats/funnels – When possible, don’t let drivers out of trucks • Use your own employees to unload • Start treating your mill like your farm – physical barriers, foot

  37. Slide 37: Point-in-Time vs Residual Intervention

    Intervention Point-in-Time Residual – Susceptible to recontamination – Have some level of residual activity • Time to help combat possible • Irradiation recontamination • Thermal processing • Acids and alkalis • Essential oils • Formaldehyde-based products • Medium chain fatty acids

  38. Slide 38: Point in time: Holding time

    Intervention Point in time: Holding time • Based on half-life estimates, recommended holding times have been established 1. Temperature 2. Humidity 3. Ingredient matrix https://www.swinehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Holding-Time-Calculations-for-Feed- Ingredients-to-Mitigate-Virus-Transmissi

  39. Slide 39: Point in time: Thermal processing

    Intervention Point in time: Thermal processing 7 dpi Feed 0 dpi 2 dpi 4 dpi 6 dpi 7 dpi Cecum No PEDV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38°C 9/9 0 1/9 3/9 3/9 3/9 3/9 46°C 9/9 0 3/9 3/9 3/9 3/9 3/9 54°C 9/9 0 0 0 0 0 0 63°C 8/9 0 0 0 0 0 0 71°C 8/9 0 0 0 0 0 0 No infectivity in diets pelleted ≥ 54°C (129°F) Cochrane et

  40. Slide 40: Addressing Feed Safety

    Addressing Feed Safety 1. Is it likely to get Prevention contaminated? 2. Can it survive? Intervention 3. Is it infectious?

  41. Slide 41: Keys to a successful biosecurity program

    Keys to a successful biosecurity program Culture Training Biosecurity Continuous Infrastructure improvement

  42. Slide 42: Culture

    Culture • Any biosecurity program cannot be successful without the proper culture – Support and feedback from management – Financial support • Consistent expectations and accountability at all levels of organization

  43. Slide 43: Training

    Training • SOP’s are worthless if employees don’t know how to implement • Routine reinforcement • Focus on the WHY • Glo-Germ fluorescent powder

  44. Slide 44: Infrastructure

    Infrastructure • Facility designs must accommodate biosecurity practices – Minimize inconvenience = more consistent implementation Entry benches - Too convenient to Perimeter barriers – Can we include in mills? sweep dust into mixer control traffic flow

  45. Slide 45: Continuous improvement

    Continuous improvement • Routine biosecurity audits of mills and mills – Change the paradigm and negative perception – Getting better helps everybody • Sampling and diagnostic testing

  46. Slide 46: What have we learned

    What have we learned • Biosecurity is: – Inconvenient – Expensive • Modern swine production is continuously moving towards high health • Biosecurity as a whole is critical to long-term success of swine businesses – Feed biosecurity is becoming a critical component

  47. Slide 47: Kansas State University Feed Safety Team

    Kansas State University Feed Safety Team Dr. Jordan Gebhardt – Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Dr. Cassie Jones – Animal Sciences & Industry Dr. Chad Paulk – Feed Science Dr. Jason Woodworth – Animal Sciences & Industry www.ksuswine.org → Feed Safety Resources

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