Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated · NYSE:PEG
Public Service Enterprise — Corporate Update (March 2011)
32 slides from Public Service Enterprise's corporate update, Mar 28, 2011
Slide 1: United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness
United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness March 22, 2011 United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness March 22, 2011 Exhibit 99
Slide 2: Forward Looking Statement
Forward Looking Statement Forward Looking Statement Readers are cautioned that statements contained in this presentation about our and our subsidiaries' future performance, including future revenues, earnings, strategies, prospects, consequences and all other statements that are not purely historica
Slide 3: Disclaimer
DISCLAIMER: DISCLAIMER: “While PSEG Nuclear has made every attempt to assure that the information included herein, including the information about the situation in Japan, is up to date, the event is dynamic and only Tokyo Electric or its authorized representatives can confirm the accuracy or currenc
Slide 4: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Six BWR units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, 3 in operation prior to event Units 4, 5, 6 in outage prior to event Unit 1
Slide 5: Boiling Water Reactor – Three Barriers to Radiation Release
1 2 3 Boiling Water Reactor – Three Barriers to Radiation Release Fuel Cladding Boiling Water Reactor – Three Barriers to Radiation Release
Slide 6: Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake
Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake Steam vented to Torus Water returned to Pressure Vessel
Slide 7: Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami
Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami Cooling capability lost due to high Torus water temps Fuel uncovered as steam vented to Torus Hydrogen produced from fuel damage Pressure builds up in containment Hydrogen builds up in containment Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami
Slide 8: Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions
Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions Operators attempt to vent containment Hydrogen buildup explodes in Unit 1, 3 Reactor Building Hydrogen buildup explodes in Unit 2 Torus
Slide 9: United States Plant Designs
United States Plant Designs United States Plant Designs
Slide 10: United States Plant Designs
United States Plant Designs United States Plant Designs Site – specific designed criteria developed for each site Based on historical information with added conservatism (flood, hurricane, earthquake, etc) Based on geography Plant designed to withstand severe events and maintain design basis Plant m
Slide 11: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements 23 Boiling Water Reactors in the United States utilize the Mark I Containment United States Design Improvements
Slide 12: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Significant Control Room Modifications after TMI – 1980
Slide 13: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Control Room TMI – 1980 Strengthened Torus following NRC Regulation – 1980-83
Slide 14: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Physical Separation of safety systems following Browns Ferry Fire – 1979
Slide 15: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Hardened Containment Vent to prevent H2 Buildup – 1992
Slide 16: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Containment Vent - 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Enhanced Battery Capability for Station Black Out – 1988
Slide 17: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Station Black Out – 1988 Containment Vent – 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Redundant Generator and Pumps following 9/11 – 2002
Slide 18: United States Design Improvements
United States Design Improvements Spare Diesel / Pump – 2002 Station Black Out – 1988 Containment Vent – 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 United States Design Improvements
Slide 19: Used Fuel Pool Protection
Used Fuel Pool Protection Used Fuel Pool Protection Used Fuel Pools designed to station Design Bases criteria Redundant pumps available to ensure used fuel pool cooling Alternative fuel pool cooling capability added post 9/11 Multiple sources of water and power for cooling beyond design bases
Slide 20: Emergency Planning
Emergency Planning Emergency Planning
Slide 21: Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi
Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi Site Boundary 50 mrem/hr – spikes up to 1200 mrem/hr Between Reactor Buildings 10,000 mrem/hr – 40,000 mrem/hr (Likely spikes following Unit 2 explosion) Controlled venting of containment and
Slide 22: United States Emergency Planning
United States Emergency Planning United States Emergency Planning 1978 – 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) deemed appropriate Limited offsite agency participation – Site driven 1980 – Post TMI – NRC NUREG 0654 implemented Determined appropriate emergency response program • number required on shi
Slide 23: Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information
Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information
Slide 24: Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design
Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design Design Basis levels for environmental events are determined independently for every plant in the US Based on geographic and historic information Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design – 6.5 Richter Scale All structures, systems, and comp
Slide 25: Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design
Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design Designed for flood level 22.9 ft above ground level Water-tight doors Exterior walls reinforced concrete Max. flood predicted for Tsunami – 5.6 ft above ground level Coincident with High Tide and High Winds Max. flood predicted for Hu
Slide 26: Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design
Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design Salem 1 & 2 Hope Creek Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design Salem 1 & 2 Hope Creek 22.9 ft above ground level
Slide 27: Site Flooding Actions
Site Flooding Actions Site Flooding Actions Worst Case flooding event for site is Hurricane Surge Expect forecast >24hrs from event Site actions planned at specific river levels, including Emergency Plan staffing if required 93.0 ft Local Area Road Flooding may restrict access to site and to EOF/ENC
Slide 28: Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design
Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design Hope Creek 4 Dedicated Emergency Diesel Generators protected from flooding up to 31 feet above site grade Hope Creek Diesel Combustion Air Intakes 31 feet above site grade Hope Creek EDG Combustion Air Intakes
Slide 29: Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design
Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design Salem Diesels protected from flooding up to 25 feet above site grade. Starting Air, Fuel and control systems in flood protection area. Salem Diesel Combustion Air intake 25 feet above site grade
Slide 30: Industry Mark Containment Modifications
Industry Mark 1 Containment Modifications Industry Mark 1 Containment Modifications US Industry response to Severe Accident Management Program (SAMP 1988 ) required implementation of hardened external torus vent to prevent hydrogen infiltration into reactor building during venting.
Slide 31: Alternate Makeup Fire Pump
Alternate Makeup Fire Pump Alternate Makeup Fire Pump Post 9/11 regulatory requirements included development of alternate fire protection, fuel pool and reactor vessel makeup strategies. Photo of dedicated site portable diesel fire pump utilized in post accident event.
Slide 32: Our five unit nuclear fleet
Our five unit nuclear fleet Operated by PSEG Nuclear PSEG Ownership: 100% Technology: Boiling Water Reactor Total Capacity: 1,197MW Owned Capacity: 1,197MW License Expiration: 2026 Filed for license extension, August 2009 Next Refueling 2012 Operated by PSEG Nuclear Ownership: PSEG – 57% Exelon – 43
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