Tandy Brands Accessories Inc

Tandy Brands Accessories — Proxy Contest (October 2007)

30 slides from Tandy Brands Accessories's proxy contest presentation, Oct 11, 2007

  1. Slide 1: Schedule 14A

    UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 14A Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Filed by the Registrant ¨ Filed by a Party other than the Registrant x Check the appropriate box: ¨ Preliminary Proxy Statement ¨ Conf

  2. Slide 2: Filing party and proxy statement advisory

    (3) Filing Party: (4) Date Filed: Mr. Summitt provided the attached slide presentation to certain corporate governance organizations today and may use it to make presentations to these organizations and Tandy Brands Accessories, Inc. stockholders on a going forward basis. SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISE

  3. Slide 3: Shareholder Advocacy and Proxy Contest at Tandy Brands Accessories, Inc.

    Golconda Capital Portfolio, LP Shareholder Advocacy and Proxy Contest at Tandy Brands Accessories, Inc. October 11, 2007 wsummitt@golcondalp.com | www.tandybrandsvalue.com

  4. Slide 4: What We Are Trying to Accomplish at Tandy Brands

    What We Are Trying to Accomplish at Tandy Brands • A greater sense of responsiveness to stockholders • A greater sense of urgency regarding Tandy Brands’ poor financial performance and languishing stock price • Institute a share repurchase program • Management accountability for performance • An emp

  5. Slide 5: Who We Are

    Who We Are • Golconda is a small, private investment partnership • We take a long-term, fundamental approach to investing • Golconda is not an activist fund – We did not go out looking for a “target” • But if we think we can contribute in a productive way we will step up as we have done at Tandy Bra

  6. Slide 6: Why We're Waging a Proxy Contest

    Why We’re Waging a Proxy Contest • In 2005 we took a hard look at our investment in Tandy Brands – We felt that we could contribute to the discussion of various value maximizing alternatives • We began to advocate for specific initiatives taking our case to the Board, management and fellow stockhold

  7. Slide 7: Our History at Tandy Brands

    Our History at Tandy Brands • Bill Summitt has been a Tandy Brands shareholder since 2000 • Attended annual meetings and corresponded with the Company over the years • Made various suggestions from time to time but remained a passive investor • In 2005, we began to advocate for specific initiatives

  8. Slide 8: Operating Margins and Returns on Equity Have Been Declining

    Tandy Brands’ Operating Margins and Returns on Equity Have Been Declining For Several Years . . . Tandy Brands Operating Margins* 12.0% 10.4% 10.0% 8.0% 8.0% 6.5% 6.8% 6.4% 5.5% 6.0% 4.0% 3.3% 2.0% 2.0% -1.1% 0.0% -2.0% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Tandy Brands Return on Beginning Eq

  9. Slide 9: Valuation Ratios Fall At The Bottom End of Its Peer Group

    . . . And Tandy Brands’ Valuation Ratios Fall At The Bottom End of Its Peer Group Price/Book* Price/Sales* Fossil 3.9 Fossil 2 Swank 2 Kenneth Cole 0.8 Liz Claiborne 1.7 Liz Claiborne 0.7 Kenneth Cole 1.5 Swank 0.4 Tandy Brands 0.7 Tandy Brands 0.4 Tandy Brands stock is trading below book value, whi

  10. Slide 10: Three- and Five-Year Total Returns Trail Peers and Market

    Over Three- and Five-Year Periods, Tandy Brands’ Total Returns Have Significantly Trailed Those of Its Peer Group and the Broader Market Over three years, Tandy Brands has underperformed the S&P Apparel, Accessories, and Luxury Goods index by a cumulative 64.9 percentage points Over five years, Tand

  11. Slide 11: Ten-Year Total Returns Trail Peer Group and Market

    Over a Ten-Year Horizon, Tandy Brands’ Total Returns Have Significantly Trailed Those Of Its Peer Group & the Broader Market Over ten years, Tandy Brands has underperformed the S&P Apparel, Accessories, and Luxury Goods index by a cumulative 85.4 percentage points! A $100 investment in Tandy Brands

  12. Slide 12: Golconda's Influence to Date at Tandy Brands

    Golconda’s Influence to Date at Tandy Brands • Tandy Brands has taken several steps in recent months that Golconda has been advocating for, including: – Acceleration of the expiration of the poison pill and adoption of a policy to put future pills to a vote of stockholders – Declassification of the

  13. Slide 13: Timelines: Eliminate Unprofitable Product Lines; Eliminate Poison Pill

    Timelines: Eliminate Unprofitable Product Lines Eliminate Poison Pill Golconda sends letter to Mr. Summitt meets with Tandy In a letter to the full Board of Company announces it is Tandy Brands Board with Brands management and Directors, Golconda recommends eliminating several recommendations, inclu

  14. Slide 14: Timelines: Declassify Board; Explore Strategic Alternatives

    Timelines: Declassify Board of Directors Explore Strategic Alternatives Golconda sends letter Golconda sends second Tandy Brands Chairman sends Golconda nominates The same day Golconda to Tandy Brands Board letter to Tandy Brands letter to Golconda indicating two candidates for publicly announces it

  15. Slide 15: Are the Incumbents Committed to Strong Corporate Governance?

    Are the Incumbents Committed to Strong Corporate Governance Principles? Board Declassification Example: In a February 9, 2007 letter, the Tandy Brands Chairman explicitly In a notice to shareholders rejected Golconda’s dated August 8, 2007—just six recommendation to declassify months later—the Board

  16. Slide 16: The Board's Declassification Proposal Leaves Something to Be Desired

    The Board’s Declassification Proposal Leaves Something to Be Desired • Declassification doesn’t begin until 2008 • The declassification will be phased in • This is a phased in declassification with a one year lag • If a declassified board is good corporate governance, why not have the entire Board s

  17. Slide 17: What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees?

    What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees? • They might say: “The Golconda nominees have no industry experience” – We don’t plan to run the Company - that’s management’s job – We have the experience and knowledge necessary to represent the interests of Tandy Brands stockholders

  18. Slide 18: What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees?

    What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees? • They might say: “The Golconda Nominees will be replacing two valuable incumbent Board members” – The incumbent board is lacking in the owner-director perspective that the Golconda Nominees will add – We tried to avoid an outright pro

  19. Slide 19: What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees?

    What Objections Might the Company Have to the Golconda Nominees? Nominees • They might say: “We are already doing the things that the shareholders are requesting” – Many of the steps Tandy Brands has taken have come only after Golconda continued to apply pressure • Corporate governance changes were

  20. Slide 20: We Will Be Valuable Contributors to Board Deliberations

    We Will Be Valuable Contributors to Board Deliberations • The Company’s actions in the face of our advocacy effort indicates that we are in tune with the issues facing the Company – We will be valuable contributors to Board deliberations and work constructively with the incumbent Board members – We

  21. Slide 21: The Golconda Nominees Will Bring an Owner's Perspective

    The Golconda Nominees Will Bring an Owner’s Perspective to Board Deliberations • Golconda owns more shares than the six non-management directors combined – Golconda and the Golconda nominees own 78,421 shares • 1.14% of shares outstanding – The six non-management directors combined own less than 1%

  22. Slide 22: Golconda's Continuing Plan for Tandy Brands

    Golconda’s Continuing Plan for Tandy Brands • Explore strategic alternatives – Emphasis on a possible sale of the Company – Discontinue major acquisition activity until a possible sale of the Company has been fully explored • Establish a more liberal policy of returning free cash flow to the stockho

  23. Slide 23: Appendix

    Appendix • Exhibit A: Golconda Letter to Board following 2006 Vote on Poison Pill Proposal • Exhibit B: Response letter from Chairman Gaertner regarding Proposed Corporate Governance changes Golconda Capital Portfolio, LP • page 21

  24. Slide 24: Golconda letter to Board, December 6, 2006

    Golconda Capital Management, LLC Bill Summitt • Managing Member P.O. Box 570507 • Dallas, TX 75357 Phone: 214-367-0784 • Fax: 214-853-4733 E-mail: wsummitt@golcondalp.com December 6, 2006 Board of Directors* Tandy Brands Accessories c/o Assistant Secretary 690 East Lamar Blvd. Suite 200 Arlington, T

  25. Slide 25: Golconda letter continued: classified board and majority vote

    Another problem with a classified board is that shareholders cannot select specific directors that they wish to replace, if any, each year. With our classified board, shareholders could be required to wait up to three years to replace board members that they feel are no longer representing their int

  26. Slide 26: Chairman response letter, February 9, 2007

    February 9, 2007 Mr. Bill Summitt Managing Member Golconda Capital Management, LLC P.O. Box 570507 Dallas, TX 75357 Re: Letter to Board of Directors of Tandy Brands Accessories, Inc. Dear Mr. Summitt: Thank you for your letter of December 6, 2006, to the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Tandy Bra

  27. Slide 27: Chairman response letter, page 2

    Mr. Bill Summitt February 9, 2007 Page 2 You further state that, by eliminating the staggered board terms, shareholders could “disrupt continuity.” The Board was understandably concerned as to why you, a shareholder of the Company, would want to “disrupt continuity.” Nonetheless, the Board was advis

  28. Slide 28: Chairman response letter, page 3

    Mr. Bill Summitt February 9, 2007 Page 3 “Resolved, that the shareholders of Tandy Brands Accessories Inc. (“the Company”) urge the Board of Directors to take the necessary steps to rescind the Company’s Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan....” (Emphasis added.) The shareholders passed a resolution

  29. Slide 29: Poison pill proposal and Board response

    Poison pills amount to a major defacto shift of voting rights away from the shareholders on matters pertaining to a sale of the company. Accordingly, shareholders should be asked if they want to temporarily relinquish such power before a poison pill is implemented. Additional information regarding t

  30. Slide 30: Board response on rights plan, continued

    could leave the Company with a highly compressed time frame for considering alternatives and no meaningful bargaining power to seek a higher price or better terms for stockholders. • Creeping Tender Offer — By use of the so-called “creeping tender offer,” a potential hostile acquirer, through select

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