DSP Group Inc

DSP — Proxy Contest (May 2013)

50 slides from DSP's proxy contest presentation, May 13, 2013

  1. Slide 1: Investor Presentation DSP Group, Inc.

    Investor Presentation DSP Group, Inc. May 13, 2013

  2. Slide 2: Overview of Starboard Value LP

    Overview of Starboard Value LP Starboard Value LP is a deep value oriented investment firm that specializes in investing in underperforming companies and analyzing alternative strategies to unlock value for the benefit of all shareholders. − Our approach to investment research begins with a deep fun

  3. Slide 3: Why We Are Involved With DSP Group

    Why We Are Involved With DSP Group We first invested in DSP Group (“DSP” or the “Company”) because our research indicated that an opportunity existed to create significant value for DSP shareholders based on actions within the control of management and the Board of Directors (the “Board”). We strong

  4. Slide 4: Additional Change is Necessary and Our Nominees are More Qualified

    Additional Change is Necessary and Our Nominees are More Qualified to Effect that Change and Add Value in the Boardroom Additional change is necessary since the Board has essentially cast aside the two directors elected pursuant to last year’s settlement. The current Board has prevented the two dire

  5. Slide 5: Real Change Is Necessary Now

    Real Change Is Necessary Now 5

  6. Slide 6: Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance

    Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance DSP’s stock price has dramatically underperformed the broader equity markets and the S&P Information Technology Index over the last three and five year periods Summary Returns Five-Year Stock Price Chart As of June 20, 2011 Starboard 13D Filing (1) 200% Prior to

  7. Slide 7: Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance

    Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance DSP Group’s enterprise value has been close to zero for several years. Share price performance has normalized over the past three years as the Company’s large cash balance has provided downside support. Five-Year Stock Price Chart ($ in millions) Starboard 13D F

  8. Slide 8: DSP Has Failed To Generate Consistent Operating Income

    DSP Has Failed To Generate Consistent Operating Income Since 2007, DSP has failed to generate consistent operating income due to significant spending in R&D and SG&A Historical Financial Performance (1) ($ in millions) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 Revenue $248.8 $305.8 $212.2 $225.5 $193.

  9. Slide 9: Historical Investments Have Failed to Produce Revenue Growth

    Historical Investments Have Failed to Produce Revenue Growth Since 2007, DSP has spent over $557 million, or $26.65 per share (vs. current price of $8.03), on R&D and acquisitions, yet revenue has declined by approximately 35% during this period Historical R&D and Acquisitions ($ in millions) $600 $

  10. Slide 10: Significant Spending in R&D and Acquisitions Have Destroyed Shareholder Value

    Significant Spending in R&D and Acquisitions Have Destroyed Shareholder Value Despite spending approximately $557 million, or $26.65 per share (vs. current price of $8.03), in R&D and acquisitions from 2007 to 2012, enterprise value declined by 77% Historical R&D and Acquisitions ($ in millions) $60

  11. Slide 11: DSP's Core Digital Telephony Business Has Been in Decline

    DSP’s Core Digital Telephony Business Has Been in Decline DSP’s core Digital Telephony business, which develops semiconductor chips for cordless home telephones, represents over 80% of total revenue. As consumers continue to shift toward greater cell phone usage, the upgrade cycle for cordless home

  12. Slide 12: However, DSP's Core Digital Telephony Business is Highly Profitable

    However, DSP’s Core Digital Telephony Business is Highly Profitable While DSP does not specifically break out its core Digital Telephony business, an analysis of its closest competitor, SiTel Semiconductor, confirms that the business is highly profitable. In 2005, SiTel Semiconductor disclosed the f

  13. Slide 13: Core Profitability Overshadowed by Substantial Spending on New Products

    The Profitability in the Core Digital Telephony Business has Been Overshadowed by Substantial Spending on New Products In an effort to offset the decline in the Digital Telephony business, DSP has chosen to invest a substantial amount of its R&D in new products with the hope that these new products

  14. Slide 14: New Product Revenue has Failed to Meet Projections Every Year

    New Product Revenue has Failed to Meet Projections Every Year Over the last 5+ years, DSP has spent a significant amount of money attempting to develop new products to offset the declines in the Digital Telephony business. These new products include: − Enterprise VOIP − Mobile (HDClear/Bonetone) − M

  15. Slide 15: DSP Dramatically Missed its VOIP Market Share Projections

    DSP Dramatically Missed its VOIP Market Share Projections DSP dramatically missed its goal of reaching 25% Enterprise VOIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) market share by 2012, recently estimating only 9% market share for 2012 and pushing out its plan to reach 25% market share to 2014. 2011 VOIP Mark

  16. Slide 16: We Question Whether DSP's VOIP Business will Achieve Profitability

    We Question Whether DSP’s VOIP Business will Achieve Profitability DSP has projected an increase in market share from approximately 9% today to 25% by 2014 (in 2011 it projected reaching 25% market share by 2012). Even if we assume that DSP can achieve its lofty and seemingly unrealistic expectation

  17. Slide 17: DSP Continues to Overestimate the DECT Home Gateway Market

    DSP Continues to Overestimate the DECT Home Gateway Market Over the last two years, DSP’s expectations for DECT Home Gateways have declined dramatically from expecting total market shipments of approximately 13 million units in 2012 to estimating approximately 5 million units shipped in 2012. 2011 D

  18. Slide 18: Projections For HDClear Continue To Be Pushed Out

    Projections For HDClear Continue To Be Pushed Out Since DSP acquired Bonetone (now called HDClear) in 2011, it has continued to push out the timing of its revenue projections Goal Post for Revenue 2012 2013 2014 Q4 2011 call: “We anticipate BoneTone's business will generate modest revenues starting

  19. Slide 19: We Question DSP's Decision To Develop A Chip for Mobile Phones

    We Question DSP’s Decision To Develop A Chip for Mobile Phones Rather Than License Its Solution Over The Long Term We believe that DSP’s differentiating factor for its HDClear solution lies in its noise cancellation algorithms. DSP has stated that HDClear has “robust and powerful noise cancellation

  20. Slide 20: DSP's XpandR Multimedia Smart Phone Product Has Failed

    DSP’s XpandR Multimedia Smart Phone Product Has Failed To Achieve Expected Results DSP’s XpandR multimedia products, which we believe represented a significant amount of the Company’s total R&D spending from 2007 to 2010, has failed to generate any meaningful revenue. ■ During 2008 and 2009, DSP int

  21. Slide 21: DSP's Track Record for Developing New Products Has Been Abysmal

    DSP’s Track Record for Developing New Products Has Been Abysmal Management and the Board have little credibility for predicting the outcome of their businesses DSP Commitment Failed Reality Enterprise VOIP: DSP forecasted 25% market share by 2012. Enterprise VOIP: Actual 2012 market share is estimat

  22. Slide 22: New Independent Board Members are Needed to Analyze DSP's Investment Spend

    New Independent Board Members are Needed to Analyze DSP’s Investment Spend with an Open Mind for the Benefit of All Shareholders ■ DSP’s core Digital Telephony revenue is highly profitable but has declined by approximately 40% over the last five years. Given the move away from home cordless phones,

  23. Slide 23: There Are Serious Corporate Governance Concerns at DSP

    There Are Serious Corporate Governance Concerns at DSP 23

  24. Slide 24: The Board Has Failed to Honor the Spirit of Our Settlement Agreement

    The Board Has Failed to Honor the Spirit of Our Settlement Agreement In connection with the 2012 Annual Meeting, Starboard reached a settlement with DSP that provided for the election of two independent and highly qualified directors to the Board, Thomas Lacey and Kenneth Traub. Each of these direct

  25. Slide 25: The Board Has Essentially Cast Aside These Highly Qualified Independent Directors

    The Board Has Essentially Cast Aside These Highly Qualified Independent Directors Despite both Mr. Lacey’s and Mr. Traub’s substantial industry experience, and the fact that the Company and Board has recognized, both publicly and privately on numerous occasions, the significant value and numerous su

  26. Slide 26: Numerous Interrelationships Between DSP and CEVA Create Conflicts of Interest

    We Are Highly Concerned by the Numerous Interrelationships Between DSP and CEVA that Create Conflicts of Interest for Certain DSP Directors and Advisors In November 2002, DSP spun out its IP licensing division, which, along with Parthus Technologies, created CEVA, Inc. (NASDAQ: CEVA). CEVA is a lice

  27. Slide 27: Significant Overlap Between the Board, Management, and Legal Counsel of DSP and CEVA

    There is Significant Overlap Between the Board, Management, and Legal Counsel of DSP and CEVA DSP’s current Chairman and former CEO, Eliyahu Ayalon, was the former Chairman of CEVA and currently is a CEVA Board member. Zvi Limon, a current DSP Board member, is a member of the Board of CEVA. Louis Si

  28. Slide 28: The Non-Compete Agreement Between CEVA and DSP Expired In 2007

    The Non-Compete Agreement Between CEVA and DSP From The Spinoff Expired In 2007 According to CEVA’s Registration Statement on Form S-1 filed with the SEC on July 30, 2002, as amended, DSP and CEVA entered into a noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement which stated that DSP would agree to not co

  29. Slide 29: DSP Executives and Counsel Had Substantial Economic Interests in CEVA

    At the Time the DSP Agreement Expired, the CEO, Board, And Legal Counsel of DSP Had Substantial Economic Interests in CEVA ■ At the time the noncompetition agreement between DSP and CEVA expired in 2007, the CEO of DSP, its outside legal counsel and two other DSP Board members were also on the Board

  30. Slide 30: CEVA Has Outperformed DSP

    CEVA Has Outperformed DSP Since the expiration of the noncompetition agreement in 2007, CEVA’s share price has dramatically outperformed DSP’s CEVA Share Price Performance Since 2007 Price (USD) 35.00 30.00 25.00 118% increase 20.00 in share price 15.00 10.00 5.00 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09

  31. Slide 31: DSP Insiders Made Significant Money from CEVA Stock and Options

    The CEO, Outside Legal Counsel and Two Board Members of DSP Made a Significant Amount of Money from CEVA Stock and Options ■ Based on publicly available filings, the CEO of DSP, Eliyahu Ayalon, its outside legal counsel, Bruce Mann, and two Board members, Zvi Limon and Louis Silver, realized gains o

  32. Slide 32: DSP's License Agreement With CEVA for HDClear Chip Raises More Questions

    DSP’s Decision to Sign a License Agreement With CEVA to Develop its Own Chip For HDClear Raises Even More Questions On February 26, 2013, DSP announced that it is licensing CEVA’s audio core to couple with DSP’s HDClear solution to develop its own voice processing chip for mobile phones. As is custo

  33. Slide 33: The Overlap Between DSP and CEVA Raises Material Questions

    The Overlap Between the Board and Legal Counsel of DSP and CEVA Raises Material Questions How have these DSP directors and outside counsel handled decisions that could benefit DSP, like re-entering the licensing business, when such decisions could directly affect and compete with CEVA? Did the Board

  34. Slide 34: Questions About Independence, Ownership and Experience of the DSP Board

    We Have Serious Questions About the True Independence, Lack of Ownership And Lack of Experience of the DSP Board ■ Other than the two independent directors that were added to the Board following last year's settlement agreement, and Yair Shamir’s replacement, the current Board of DSP has an average

  35. Slide 35: The Recent Board Change is Reactionary

    The Recent Board Change is Reactionary and Fails to Address Our Serious Concerns ■ On May 2, 2013 DSP announced that Gabi Seligsohn would be joining the Board of Directors in replace of Yair Shamir, who had resigned due to his new job in politics. ■ As we understand, Mr. Seligsohn was recommended by

  36. Slide 36: The Board Continues to Issue False and Misleading Statements About Starboard

    The Board Continues to Issue False and Misleading Statements About Starboard and its Intentions for DSP On March 8, 2013, Eliyahu Ayalon, the Chairman of DSP, and Ofer Elyakim, the CEO of DSP, issued a letter to shareholders that contained a number of false statements about the settlement conversati

  37. Slide 37: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan and are Better Suited to Oversee DSP for the Benefit of All Shareholders 37

  38. Slide 38: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value Implement clear milestones for R&D projects and only focus on projects that will result in a positive risk adjusted return on invested capital over time: DSP has continued to invest substantial money in R&D without any measurable return for

  39. Slide 39: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value Focus on improving the operating performance of the Company: Over the last five years, despite having a significantly profitable core Digital Telephony business, DSP appears to have managed itself to a slight operating loss (and slight EBIT

  40. Slide 40: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value Focus on improving the operating performance of the Company: DSP’s closest competitor, SiTel Semiconductor, prior to its acquisition by Dialog Semiconductor, generated far higher profitability on substantially less revenue, despite also inv

  41. Slide 41: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value Consider licensing the HDClear (Bonetone) technology: We believe that HDClear may represent a best in class noise cancellation technology algorithm and that DSP should be actively looking to license this technology to smartphone companies,

  42. Slide 42: Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value

    Our Independent Nominees Have a Better Plan to Create Value Assess the Company’s intellectual property position and determine whether to enter into any licensing businesses or explore alternatives for any of its intellectual property: Evaluate whether DSP can re-enter any parts of the licensing busi

  43. Slide 43: Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen Highly Successful Turnarounds

    Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen a Number of Highly Successful Companies and Turnarounds Michael Bornak: Tollgrade Communications Scenario: Hired as interim CFO in September 2009 and then permanent CFO November 2009 – company was losing approximately $5 million in operating income, revenue had

  44. Slide 44: Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen Successful Turnarounds

    Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen a Number of Successful Companies and Turnarounds Norman J. Rice: Aprisma Management Technologies, Inc. Scenario: Aprisma was a subsidiary of Enterasys Inc (NYSE: ETS). When Aprisma filed its S-1 in 2001, the SEC and Department of Justice launched investigations

  45. Slide 45: Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen Successful Turnarounds

    Our Independent Nominees Have Overseen a Number of Successful Companies and Turnarounds Norman P. Taffe: Cypress Semiconductor (EVP 2005-2012) Scenario: Became General Manager of the Consumer and Computation Division in 2005 after successfully turning around and growing the wireless business unit. T

  46. Slide 46: Appendix

    Appendix Director Nominees − Michael Bornak − Norman Rice − Norman Taffe 46

  47. Slide 47: Michael Bornak

    Michael Bornak Michael Bornak, age 51, until recently was the Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President, Finance and Administration, Treasurer and Secretary of SeaChange International, Inc. (NASDAQ: SEAC), a company that enables transformative multi-screen video services through an open, cloud-

  48. Slide 48: Norman J. Rice, III

    Norman J. Rice, III Norman J. Rice, III, age 39, has been the Managing Partner of New Castle Capital Group, LLC, a private equity firm specializing in divestiture, management buyout and exit opportunities for organizations in the middle market, since July 2010. From June 2005 until March 2009, Mr. R

  49. Slide 49: Norman P. Taffe

    Norman P. Taffe Norman P. Taffe, age 47, was formerly the Executive Vice President of Consumer and Computation Division of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (NASDAQ: CY) (“Cypress”), a provider of high-performance, mixed-signal, programmable solutions that provide customers with rapid time-to-market

  50. Slide 50: This Presentation Is For Discussion and General Informational Purposes Only

    THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERIT

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