Perot Systems Corp

Perot Systems — Technical Presentation (June 2002)

18 slides from Perot Systems's technical presentation, Jun 24, 2002

  1. Slide 1: Consequences of the Imbalance Energy Market Protocols

    Consequences of the Imbalance Energy Market Protocols Paul Gribik

  2. Slide 2: Impact of the Structure of the Imbalance Energy Market

    Impact of the Structure of the Imbalance Energy Market The ISO's protocols for buying, selling, and pricing imbalance energy may invite strategies that could destabilize the market Points covered in this presentation The operation of the market A simple example of a strategy to take advantage of the

  3. Slide 3: ISO Real Time Dispatch

    ISO Real Time Dispatch To minimize the cost of providing imbalance energy: If additional energy output ... is needed, the ISO shall dispatch additional output or reduce demand from generating units, loads or system resource in ascending order of their incremental ... bids. If the ISO is required to

  4. Slide 4: Merit Order Stack

    Merit Order Stack Decremental Supplemental Energy Bids If ISO must reduce energy output $/MWh +MWh - -MWh Incremental Supplemental Energy Bids and Energy Prices from Reserves If ISO must increase energy output

  5. Slide 5: Pricing Imbalance Energy

    Pricing Imbalance Energy The five minute ex post price shall be based on the bid of the marginal generating units, loads and system resources dispatched by the ISO ... in each five minute period. The marginal generating unit, load or system resource dispatched in the five minute period is: if genera

  6. Slide 6: Ex Post Price when Output is Increased

    Ex Post Price when Output is Increased Additional energy of DQ is needed ISO dispatches the incremental resources with available energy in order of increasing bid price Ex Post price is price of most expensive resource dispatched $/MWh +MWh - -MWh +DQ Ex Post Price

  7. Slide 7: Ex Post Price when Output is Decreased

    Ex Post Price when Output is Decreased Reduction of energy (-DQ) is needed ISO dispatches the decremental resources with available reduction in order of decreasing bid price Ex Post price is price of least expensive resource dispatched downward $/MWh +MWh - -MWh - -DQ Ex Post Price

  8. Slide 8: Output Increases then Decreases in Hour

    Output Increases then Decreases in Hour Increased output of +DQ1 followed by decrease of - DQ2 within the hour with DQ1 < DQ2 $/MWh +MWh - -MWh +DQ1 (-DQ2 + DQ1)

  9. Slide 9: Controlling the Real-Time Market

    Controlling the Real-Time Market The structure of the real-time imbalance energy market permits strategies by which a participant can control the ex post price dump power on the real time market cause wild swings in the ex post price

  10. Slide 10: Simplified Example

    Simplified Example Participant P1 has three generation units Unit 1 with operating limits of [100 MW, 2000 MW] Unit 2 with operating limits of [100 MW, 2000 MW] Unit 3 with operating limits of [50 MW, 100 MW] P1 bids to sell 2150 MWh in the forward market (for 1 hour) P1 intentionally forgoes the ch

  11. Slide 11: Schedule and Supplemental Bids

    Schedule and Supplemental Bids Supplemental Energy Bids Unit 1: Decremental only $10,000/MWh for 100 £ x £ 2000 Unit 2: No Bid Unit 3: Incremental Micro Bids $ 0/MWh for 50 £ x £ 55 $10/MWh for 55 £ x £ 60 Suppose that Unit 1 submits highest priced decremental bid to ISO MWh Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 200

  12. Slide 12: Case 1: ISO Needs Additional Energy

    Case 1: ISO Needs Additional Energy Suppose ISO needs 1,000 MW more ISO will use incremental bids (including Unit 3 which gives P1 information) P1 starts to increment Unit 2 on its own ISO first backs down previously incremented units Unit 2 reaches a point at which ISO will have decremented all pre

  13. Slide 13: Case 2: ISO Must Reduce Output

    Case 2: ISO Must Reduce Output Suppose ISO must reduce by 1,000 MW ISO will use decremental bids and back Unit 1 down by 1000 MW P1 would have to pay the ISO $10,000,000 to replace Unit 1's output P1 eliminates this risk by simultaneously increasing Unit 2 by 1000 MW P1's total real-time output is a

  14. Slide 14: Disguising the Strategy

    Disguising the Strategy P1 can disguise this strategy in different ways, e.g. Schedule more load in the forward market than it expects to serve in real-time Schedule increased generation in the forward market to serve the increased load If P1 wants to dump energy on the real-time imbalance energy ma

  15. Slide 15: Effects on Market Participants

    Effects on Market Participants Suppose that a participant usually experiences appreciable error in forecasting its real-time load The participant may have to buy and sell energy on the imbalance energy market due to forecasting errors If ex post price can rise to very high levels, the participant ma

  16. Slide 16: Effects on PX

    Effects on PX PX participants exposed to swings in ex post price PX participants can insure themselves against effects but at a cost By grouping participants (some of whom will likely over-forecast and some under-forecast), amount of extra energy scheduled in forward market to insure the group can b

  17. Slide 17: Effects on ISO

    Effects on ISO Parties may at times try to dump considerable energy on the ISO's imbalance energy market ISO will need to decrement energy production more than anticipated Decremental supplemental energy bids are voluntary No concept of the ISO buying "negative reserves" to insure that it will have

  18. Slide 18: Possible Basis for a Fix

    Possible Basis for a Fix Clear the real-time imbalance energy market Schedule all supplemental energy bids and reserves to minimize costs Replace BEEP by an economic dispatch or a transmission constrained economic dispatch Insure that the ISO will have sufficient decremental supplemental energy bids

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