Visa Inc. · NYSE:V
Visa — Technical Presentation (June 2016)
27 slides from Visa's technical presentation, Jun 28, 2016
Slide 1: Threat Landscape: Skimming at the Point of Sale
Threat Landscape: Skimming at the Point of Sale Tia D. Ilori, Sr. Director, Visa, Global Fraud & Breach Investigations Chris Forsythe, Sr. Risk Analyst, Visa, Payment Fraud Disruption & Intelligence 28 June 2016 Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 1
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer The information or recommendations contained herein are provided "AS IS" and intended for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon for operational, marketing, legal, technical, tax, financial or other advice. When implementing any new strategy or practice, you should cons
Slide 3: Agenda
Agenda • Global Data Compromise Landscape • Modus Operandi of a Typical Skimming Attack • Safeguarding Against Skimming • Detecting, Responding and Reporting a Skimming Incident • Key Takeaways Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 3
Slide 4: Global Data Compromise Landscape
Global Data Compromise Landscape Tia D. Ilori Senior Director, Global Fraud and Breach Investigations Visa Inc. Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 4
Slide 5: Visa Security Pillars
Visa Security Pillars Remove sensitive data Prevent fraud Devalue Protect Harness Empower Data Data Data Consumers Identify fraud before Render data useless it occurs and increase Engage cardholders for criminals, Safeguard confidence in as an underutilized reducing incentive for payment data approv
Slide 6: Transactional Threat Intelligence
Transactional Threat Intelligence Breach Detection Cycle Intelligence comes from recognizing fraud patterns, predicting fraud activity – Cardholders report fraud to their bank – Banks report fraud to Visa (CPP) Cardholder Issuing Bank – Visa reports fraud to other banks – Breach found, stopped One m
Slide 7: Global Fraud and Breach Investigation Trends
Global Fraud and Breach Investigation Trends Breach Events by Entity Type and Merchant Level Level 1 Level 2 Entity Type 2013 2014 2015 2016* % % % % +17% Level 1 1% 1% <1% 0% Level 2 1% 1% <1% 1% -29% Level 3 4% 4% 5% 9% Level 4 92% 93% 91% 87% Agent 1% 1% 3% 2% Other <1% 0% 0% 0% Total 100% 100% 1
Slide 8: Global CAMS Distribution
Global CAMS Distribution Compromise Account Management System (CAMS) - Alerts Distributed by Region 1% • In 2015, total CAMS alerts increased to the highest level in 3 years Percentage of Compromises 8% 1% • The sheer magnitude of the number of small 17% merchants worldwide, especially in the United
Slide 9: Fraud Migration to Other Channels
Fraud Migration to Other Channels Fraud migrating to e-commerce, automated fuel dispensers, and ATMs • Fraud and attacks will continue in CNP / e- commerce channels • Scan for vulnerabilities • Attackers will exploit insecure websites and • Be aware of OWASP Top 10 mis-configured security settings •
Slide 10: Card Skimming: ATM Trends
Card Skimming: ATM Trends Skimming continues to be the #1 cause of fraud loss on ATMs • Criminal techniques have grown increasingly sophisticated and diversified to avoid anti-skimming defenses • An arms race: - Industrialization - Avoidance techniques - Sabotage - Side Channels Skimming at the Poin
Slide 11: Rise in Skimming Attacks
Rise in Skimming Attacks Criminals are targeting mag stripe data • Criminals are shifting their attacks to skimming • Increase in report skimming attacks in the news • Criminals are targeting: – Self-checkout terminals – Automated fuel dispensers – White-label ATMs • Increasing in sophistication of
Slide 12: Modus Operandi of a Typical Skimming Attack
Modus Operandi of a Typical Skimming Attack Chris Forsythe Senior Risk Analyst, Payment Fraud Disruption and Intelligence Visa Inc. Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 12
Slide 13: Modus Operandi of a Typical Attack
Modus Operandi of a Typical Attack • Suspects will operate in groups of 2 to 3 – 1st suspect places device – 2nd suspect provides cover - shielding any view of the device placement; may utilize large items at checkout – 3rd suspect acts as lookout and providing counter surveillance – Suspects may sc
Slide 14: Overlay Examples
Overlay Examples Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 14
Slide 15: Criminal Lab Raid: Germany
Criminal Lab Raid: Germany Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 15
Slide 16: Safeguarding Against Skimming
Safeguarding Against Skimming Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 16
Slide 17: Device Inventory Management
Device Inventory Management • Daily checks of POS terminals – Use teams when inspecting devices • Maintain a log of devices and their locations within the business • Use unique markings/stickers on your devices to quickly identify overlays • Utilize tamper screws or cable locks • Identify key risk a
Slide 18: Use of Contactless Card Readers to Minimize Skimming Risks
Use of Contactless Card Readers to Minimize Skimming Risks Magnetic Stripe Vulnerabilities Contactless Security Benefits • Markets that use magnetic stripe are more • Reduces the risk for card data to be vulnerable to counterfeit skimmed since there is no dip or swipe • EMV chip cards reduce the ris
Slide 19: Always Use PCI Approved Devices
Always Use PCI Approved Devices • Follow Visa deployment requirements for use of only PCI approved PIN Entry Devices • As a best practice: – Use only PCI approved Unattended Payment Terminals (UPT) – Use devices that are PCI approved for Secure Reading and Exchange of Data (SRED) • Switch to EMV ter
Slide 20: Detecting, Responding and Reporting a Skimming Incident
Detecting, Responding and Reporting a Skimming Incident Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 20
Slide 21: Responding to a Skimming Incident
Responding to a Skimming Incident What to do if a skimmer is found Do not approach or confront anyone Document and take pictures of the who looks suspicious skimming device as-is Might be installing or removing a Document before and after removal skimming device Document date/time May be armed and d
Slide 22: How to Report a Compromise to Visa
How to Report a Compromise to Visa Review Compromised Guidelines Complete Questionnaire Send to Visa / Acquirer 1. Complete Incident Questionnaire • Issuers send to Visa Fraud and Breach Investigations • Merchants send to Acquirer (who will forward to Visa) 2. Skimming incidents often involve the co
Slide 23: Key Takeaways
Key Takeaways Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 23
Slide 24: Conclusion and Recap: What to Expect
Conclusion and Recap: What to Expect • Be aware that due to EMV liability shift, fraud and compromises will likely migrate to other channels … • Recognize that criminals are targeting mag stripe data and transactions • Skimming devices are becoming more sophisticated • Increase inspections and under
Slide 25: Visa Security Alerts
Visa Security Alerts Information on the latest Skimming Attacks Visit www.visa.com/cisp for recent Skimming Security Alerts from Visa Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 25
Slide 26: Upcoming Events and Resources
Upcoming Events and Resources Resources • PCI Standards Council: Skimming Prevention • Visa’s “What To Do If Compromised” guidelines • Visa’s “Payment Acceptance Best Practices for U.S. Retail Petroleum Merchants” guidelines Visa Data Security Website – www.visa.com/cisp • Alerts, Bulletins • Best P
Slide 27: Questions?
Questions? Skimming at the Point of Sale I 28 June 2016 Visa Public 27