Qualys, Inc. · NASDAQ:QLYS
Qualys — Technical Presentation (2012)
52 slides from Qualys's technical presentation, Oct 18, 2012
Slide 1: Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls
Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls USA2012 Ivan Ristic Director of Engineering
Slide 2: True Evasion Story
True Evasion Story Once, a long time ago, I evaded a web application firewall by adding a single character to a valid request. Can you spot it below? GET /myapp/admin.php?userid=1001 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.example.com. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:13.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/13.
Slide 3: True Evasion Story
True Evasion Story Once, a long time ago, I evaded a web application firewall by adding a single character to a valid request. Can you spot it below? GET /myapp/admin.php?userid=1001 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.example.com. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:13.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/13.
Slide 4: Why Do I Care?
Why Do I Care? Spent years developing WAFs and related software: − Built ModSecurity (2002-2009) − Built libhtp (2009-2010) − Now working on IronBee (not coding, though) libhtp WAF concepts are powerful, but the field needs more research and the market needs more transparency 3 BLACK HAT USA 201
Slide 5: Introduction to Protocol-Level Evasion
INTRODUCTION TO PROTOCOL-LEVEL EVASION Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 6: Impedance Mismatch
Impedance Mismatch Impedance mismatch, in the context of security monitoring, refers to the problem of different interpretations of the same data stream − The security tool sees one thing − The backend server sees another Possible causes: − Ambiguous standards − Partial and “Works for me” backen
Slide 7: Protocol-Level Evasion Overview
Protocol-Level Evasion Overview HTTP − Message parsing Method Path Query string Protocol − Request line − Request headers Header name Header value − Cookies SP Header value Hostname Path Header name Header value Parameters Header name Header value Request body − Urlencoded Request body − M
Slide 8: Protocol-Level Evasion Overview
Protocol-Level Evasion Overview HTTP − Message parsing Method Path Query string Protocol − Request line − Request headers Header name Header value − Cookies SP Header value Hostname Path Header name Header value Parameters Header name Header value Request body − Urlencoded Request body − M
Slide 9: Virtual Patching
Virtual Patching Virtual patching is probably the most widely used WAF feature 1. You know you have a problem 2. You can’t resolve it, or can’t resolve it in a timely manner 3. You deploy a WAF as a short-term mitigation measure Challenge: − To support the narrow focus of virtual patches, WAFs h
Slide 10: Path Evasion
PATH EVASION Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 11: Attacking Patch Activation
Attacking Patch Activation An application entry point might look like this: /myapp/admin.php?userid=1001 And the virtual patch, using Apache and ModSecurity, like this: <Location /myapp/admin.php> # Allow only numbers in userid SecRule ARGS:userid "!^\d+$" </Location> BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 12: PATH_INFO and Path Parameters
PATH_INFO and Path Parameters Surprisingly, some WAFs* still don’t know about PATH_INFO: /myapp/admin.php/xyz?userid=X If PATH_INFO is not supported by the backend server, you might want to try path parameters (e.g., works on Tomcat): /myapp/admin.php;random=value?userid=X (*) Neither approach w
Slide 13: Self-Contained ModSecurity Rules
Self-Contained ModSecurity Rules Rules written like this are very easy to find: SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /myapp/admin.php“ \ "chain,phase:2,deny" SecRule ARGS:userid "!^\d+$" Problems: − The use of @streq misses PATH_INFO and path parameters attacks − Apache may not handle all obfuscatio
Slide 14: Self-Contained ModSecurity Rules
Self-Contained ModSecurity Rules Here’s a better version of the same patch: SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \ "@beginsWith /myapp/admin.php" \ "chain,phase:2,t:normalizePath,deny" SecRule ARGS:userid "!^\d+$“ Improvements: − Use @beginsWith (@contains is good, too) − Use transformation function normali
Slide 15: Backend Feature Variations
Backend Feature Variations In a proxy deployment, you have to watch for impedance mismatch with various backend features: /myapp\admin.php /myapp/AdMiN.php Using Apache and ModSecurity: <Location ~ (?i)^[\x5c/]+myapp[\x5c/]+admin\.php> SecRule ARGS:userid "!^\d+$" </Location> BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 16: Backend Feature Variations
Backend Feature Variations In a proxy deployment, you have to watch for impedance mismatch with various backend features: /myapp\admin.php /myapp/AdMiN.php ModSecurity only: SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \ "@beginsWith /myapp/admin.php" \ "chain,phase:2,t:lowercase,t:normalizePathWin,deny" SecRule AR
Slide 17: Path Parameters Again
Path Parameters Again Path parameters are actually path segment parameters, and can be used with any segment: /myapp;param=value/admin.php?userid=X New patch version: <Location ~ (?i)^[\x5c/]+myapp(;[^\x5c/]*)? [\x5c/]+admin\.php(;[^\x5c/]*)?> SecRule ARGS:userid "!^\d+$" </Location> ModSecuri
Slide 18: Short Filenames on Windows
Short Filenames on Windows Windows uses short filenames to support legacy applications. For example: admin.aspx becomes ADMIN~1.ASP Ideal for virtual patch evasion under right circumstances: − Does not work with IIS − But does work with Apache running on Windows BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 19: Path Evasion against IIS 5.1
Path Evasion against IIS 5.1 IIS 5.1 (and, presumably, earlier) are very flexible when it comes to path processing: 1. Overlong 2- or 3-byte UTF-8 representing either / or \ 2. In fact, any overlong UTF-8 character facilitates evasion 3. Best-fit mapping of UTF-8 characters; for example U+0107 bec
Slide 20: Path Handling of Major Platforms
Path Handling of Major Platforms BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 21: Path Handling of Major Platforms
Path Handling of Major Platforms 42 TESTS BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 22: Parameter Evasion
PARAMETER EVASION Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 23: Parameter Cardinality and Case
Parameter Cardinality and Case In the simplest case, supplying multiple parameters or varying the case of parameter names may work: /myapp/admin.php?userid=1&userid=2 /myapp/admin.php?uSeRiD=1&userid=2 However, these techniques are more likely to work against custom-coded defenses; WAFs will hav
Slide 24: PHP's Cookies as Parameters
PHP’s Cookies as Parameters PHP can be configured to treat cookies as parameters, and place them in the $_REQUEST array: GET /myapp/admin.php Cookie: userid=X This is still the default behaviour in the code, with an override in the default php.ini (which can easily be misconfigured). BLACK HAT U
Slide 25: HTTP Parameter Pollution
HTTP Parameter Pollution Depending on the backend and the code used, the WAF may not know exactly that the application sees: /myapp/admin.php?userid=1&userid=2 Technology Behaviour Result ASP Concatenate userid=1,2 PHP Last occurrence userid=2 Java First occurrence userid=1 A better overview is av
Slide 26: Tricks with PHP Parameter Names
Tricks with PHP Parameter Names PHP will change parameter names when they contain some characters it does not like: − Whitespace at the beginning is removed − Whitespace, dot, and open bracket characters in the middle converted to underscores /myapp/admin.php?+userid=X BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 27: Invalid URL Encoding
Invalid URL Encoding Different platforms react differently to invalid encoding. ASP removes a % character that is not followed by 2 hexadecimal digits: /myapp/admin.php?user%id=X In the old days, many C-based applications had incorrect decoding routines, which lacked error detection. /myapp/ad
Slide 28: Content Type Evasion
Content Type Evasion When parameters are transported in request body, you can attack the encoding detection mechanism − Attack applications that hard-code processing: Omit the Content-Type request header Place an arbitrary value in it Use multipart/form-data, and craft the request body to be
Slide 29: ModSecurity Bypass
ModSecurity Bypass By default, ModSecurity ignores unknown MIME types − With Apache Commons FileUpload, send a request body with multipart/whatever MIME type − Request bodies using encodings other than Urlencoded and Multipart are completely ignored Possible improvements to ModSecurity: − Fail c
Slide 30: Multipart Evasion
MULTIPART EVASION Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 31: Multipart Format Overview
Multipart Format Overview POST / HTTP/1.0 1 2 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=0000 Host: www.example.com Content-Length: 10269 --0000 3 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name" 4 John Smith 5 --0000 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email" john.smith@example.com --0000 Content-Dis
Slide 32: Apache Commons FileUpload
Apache Commons FileUpload Define constant for later use: public static final String MULTIPART = "multipart/"; Determine if Multipart request body is present: if (contentType.toLowerCase(). startsWith(MULTIPART)) { return true; } 31 BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 33: ModSecurity CRS Bypass
ModSecurity CRS Bypass ModSecurity Core Rules will attempt to restrict MIME types, but not always successfully: − With Apache Commons FileUpload, send a request body with multipart/ MIME type. − Reported as fixed in CRS 2.2.5. The flaw was in this rule, where the check was not strict enough: Sec
Slide 34: Content-Type Evasion
Content-Type Evasion Trick the WAF into not seeing a Multipart request body Examples: Content-Type: multipart/form-data ; boundary=0000 Content-Type: mUltiPart/ForM-dATa; boundary=0000 Content-Type: multipart/form-dataX; boundary=0000 Content-Type: multipart/form-data, boundary=0000 Content-Type
Slide 35: PHP Source Code
PHP Source Code 1 boundary = strstr(content_type, "boundary"); if (!boundary) { /* 2 Lowercase header and try again */ } if (!boundary || 3 !(boundary = strchr(boundary, '='))) { /* Return with error */ } 34 BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 36: Boundary Evasion
Boundary Evasion Trick the WAF into seeing a different boundary Examples: Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary =0000; boundary=1111 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundaryX=0000; boundary=1111 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=0000; boundary=1111 Content-Type: multipart/form
Slide 37: Part Evasion
Part Evasion Boundary evasion leads to part evasion, but even when you get the boundary right you can still miss things In 2009, Stefan Esser reported that PHP continues to process the parts that appear after the “last” part --0000 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name" John Smith --0000--
Slide 38: Parameter Name Evasion
Parameter Name Evasion Focuses on differences in parameter name parsing. Example attacks: Content-Disposition: form-data; name="n1"; name="n2" Content-Disposition: form-data; name="n1"; name ="n2" How PHP parses parameter names: Content-Disposition: form-data; name="n1"; name="n2" Content-Disp
Slide 39: Parameter Type Evasion
Parameter Type Evasion WAFs may treat files differently. For example: − ModSecurity has different inspection controls for files − No file inspection in the CRS ModSecurity bypass reported by Stefan Esser in 2009 − Thought to have been fixed (I was not involved) − Stefan’s original payload below
Slide 40: Parameter Type Evasion
Parameter Type Evasion This is what ModSecurity saw: Content-Disposition: form-data; name=';filename="';name=payload;" name filename This is what PHP sees: Content-Disposition: form-data; name=';filename="';name=payload;" name (ignored) name 39 BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 41: Parameter Type Evasion
Parameter Type Evasion Flaw thought to have been fixed I rediscovered the problem during my evasion research The original problem had been misunderstood and addressed incorrectly: ModSecurity added support for single quotes in parameter values PHP supports single-quote escaping anywhere wi
Slide 42: Multipart Evasion Summary
Multipart Evasion Summary Complex and vaguely specified format Implementations are often: − Quick & dirty (whatever works) − Focused on real-life use cases (not the specification) Rife opportunities for evasion There are 37 tests available in the repository 37 − Tested against ModSecurity an
Slide 43: What Next?
WHAT NEXT? Protocol-Level Evasion of Web Application Firewalls BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 44: Future Work
Future Work At this time: − Path handling has good coverage (tests + results) − Parameter handling and multipart test cases in good shape Need to test major platforms Future activity − Complete other areas of protocol-level evasion HTTP parsing Character set issues Hostname evasion − Doc
Slide 45: Where to Go From Here
Where to Go From Here More information in the accompanying whitepaper >100 Get the tools and docs from GitHub: TESTS https://github.com/ironbee/waf-research − Path handling research − Baseline, path, and multipart test cases Test your security products Contribute your results 44 BLACK HAT US
Slide 46: Thank You
USA2012 Thank You Ivan Ristic iristic@qualys.com Twitter: @ivanristic
Slide 47: How to Write a Good Virtual Patch
How to Write a Good Virtual Patch Take these steps to write a good virtual patch: 1. Study the problem, ideally by reading source code If the source code is not available, do what you can by analyzing the advisory, the exploit, and by attacking the application 2. Use a path that can withstand ev
Slide 48: Baseline Tests
Baseline Tests In the repository, there is a set of baseline tests designed to determine if all parts of a HTTP requests are inspected by a WAF Instructions: 1. Find one payload that is blocked by the WAF 2. Submit payload in every different logical location 3. Determine locations that are not m
Slide 49: Why Should You Care?
Why Should You Care? Researchers: − Fascinating new data, and effort to systematically and collaboratively analyse how WAFs perform in this area Testers (breakers): − Lots of practical assessment techniques Defenders: − Lots of practical information about Apache and ModSecurity − A better pict
Slide 50: Donald Knuth on Email
Donald Knuth on Email “Email is a wonderful thing for people whose role in life is to be on top of things. But not for me; my role is to be on the bottom of things.” 49 BLACK HAT USA 2012
Slide 51: Previous Work
Previous Work A look at whisker’s anti-IDS tactics Rain Forest Puppy (1999) Bypassing Content Filtering Software 3APA3A (2002) HTTP IDS Evasions Revisited Daniel J. Roelker (2003) Snort's README.http_inspect Sourcefire et al (2005) Shocking News in PHP Exploitation Stefan Esser (2009) HT
Slide 52: About Ivan Ristic
About Ivan Ristic Ivan is a compulsive developer, application security researcher, writer, publisher, and entrepreneur. Apache Security, O’Reilly (2005) ModSecurity, open source web application firewall SSL Labs, SSL/TLS, and PKI research ModSecurity Handbook, Feisty Duck (2010) IronBee, a