FBR & — Proxy Contest (May 2016)
21 slides from FBR &'s proxy contest presentation, May 27, 2016
Slide 1: A voice for value
capital A voice for value © Voce Capital Management LLC; May 2016 (7
Slide 2: Forgotten Years? Rebuttal Materials
Forgotten Years? Rebuttal Materials May 27, 2016 vocecapital
Slide 3: Disclaimer
Disclaimer ‘The views expressed herein represent the subjective opinions of Vooe Capital Management LLC and certain of is affiates and controling persons (collectively, “Voce"), who Beneficially own shares of FBR & Co. (the “Company. Thess views are based on publicly available formation with respect
Slide 4: Executive Summary
Executive Summary + FBR’s long-awaited reply to Voce’s detailed critique is incomplete, misleading and largely beside the point, in our view + Single biggest flaw is FBR’s exclusion of negative periods (2009 - 2011 and 2015 - 2016) and apparent belief that Mr. Hendrix’s 7.5 year tenure can be judged
Slide 5: Executive Summary (cont’d)
Executive Summary (cont’d) : FBR has shamelessly manipulated its peer set repeatedly — Once again completely excludes the advisory peers that it formerly invoked for valuation support : FBR appears badly confused about the elements of Voce’s campaign — FBR is shadow-boxing the idea of a “one-time re
Slide 6: Executive Summary (cont’d)
Executive Summary (cont’d) » Management DID NOT EVEN MENTION the advisory business in its response — Less than a month ago the CEO claimed advisory was “the most important” growth opportunity — Itnot only failed to respond to Voce's critique of its long-term mishandling of advisory, it has now dropp
Slide 7: Cherry-picking
Cherry-picking ‘A. FBR’s retum since its IPO is -72% vs. +52% and +65% for the IWM and SPY, respectively. CEO Hendrix was FBR’s President and a Director at the time of the IPO. Also, half of the current Board, including Messrs. Reimers and Hynes, were Directors at that time. 20.00 B. Since Mr. Hendr
Slide 8: Selective Memory
Selective Memory Business Transformation iim FBR oa ae onenainne O Annual mt milion dolar PA event sponsorship eee Private ar wave i ‘A sub-seale and unprofitable Asset Management platform i When our restructuring was compete atthe beginning of 2012, we had reduced our non-<ompensation ‘xed costs by
Slide 9: 2016 run rate is shaping up to be Mr. Hendrix's worst
2016 runrateis | shaping up to be | Mr.Hendri’s | + Operating come was $17 aM 2014 aos of near $200 n 2008 on ‘ea sential net revere 2008 praising produced ‘Staxtinmercian bank patents ‘Sih ler on MS trae; 54 write down on mal on eed t ' t I I 1 t t Il rem 2008 10 2015, neem ted i expenses dened hay
Slide 10: Musical Peers
Musical Peers | ee It It | analyzes only tree | | | ofMr.Hendrix's75 \, FBR vs. Close Peers Analysis iE | years (2009-2011) |} ae acai * The appropriate time frame for analysis and comparison begins in 2012 afer FBR ‘management had completed restructuring Following restructuring, FBR delivered three
Slide 11: Musical Peers II
Musical Peers Il ‘Year ondou 120413 DELIVERING RESULTS SIMILAR TO ADVISORY PEERS FOR EVR GHL Laz Revenue / Head $810k $765k «$803k $830k Comp / Revenue Sex 63 SAK BH Operating Margin 16% 189% 28% 21% ROE ase | 1% 166 ae Total Capital $280mm $503mm —$277mm — $630mm bis ell * Appropriate valuation com
Slide 12: Musical Peers III
Musical Peers Ill roxy Compensation Peers fi FBR Compensation vs. ‘Executive compensation at FBR directly accountable to performance. Highest TSR among proxy peers. Dramatic reductions in 2014 and 2015 (down 6736 and 77%, respectively, from 2033) (Top 5) Compensation vocecapital
Slide 13: Questions About Mr. Reimers’ Role in Crestview Transactions
Questions About Mr. Reimers’ Role in Crestview Transactions Remain Unanswered and Are Gravely Concerning » Voce’s previous communications detailed serious concerns it has about Lead Director Reimers and his role in negotiations concerning Crestview Partners — Mr. Reimers held an LP interest in the C
Slide 14: Misleading Board Compensation Analysis
Misleading Board Compensation Analysis Board Composition & Compensation im FBR wildly overstated — ieckites doveriae, "BR's Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee hes proactively refreshed the Board with 3 new pacioes ba oon Independent dvectors on our & member 800d. i 1 1 Compensation” is |} i
Slide 15: Insider Ownership
Insider Ownership ‘ownership as of May 6, 2016) Independent Board Members 43% Executive Committee - 10.0% Non-Executive Employees ~10.7% 1 1 1 1 1 © Ownership guidelines ensure that executives are appropriately motivated to increase share 1 value 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Executive commitie ownership to exceed
Slide 16: Is FBR Confused by Our Platform?
Is FBR Confused by Our Platform? eo i Problems with Voce Campaign - Their Nominees Would I Dilute the Capabilities and Expertise of Our Board fi FBR i 1 1 t l I t I i + The Company's nominees represent a diverse mix of talents and backgrounds and deep leadership i experience It t I It t t t + Wehave
Slide 17: William F. Strome ... Independent? More like “Mr. Insider”
William F. Strome ... Independent? More like “Mr. Insider” Oct. 17, 2014 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — FBR & Co., a leading investment bank serving the middle market, announced today that William F. Strome joined the Company's Board of Directors as of Monday, October 13, 2014. "Bill has a long history with FBR
Slide 18: Historical Capital Return Plan In Perspective
Historical Capital Return Plan In Perspective Earnings and Capital Allocation Decisions Produced 76% H i | Growth in Tangi Book Value Per Share ule ‘massive share dilution through | i 1 | equity grant, which has a -34% | 1 Tangible book value has grown by $12.03 per share since 2011 reflecting the p
Slide 19: Conclusion
Conclusion + FBR shareholders have suffered negative returns under management's 7.5 year tenure — Incredibly, management is now asking shareholders to hold it accountable for only three of those years + We believe FBR’s strategy has been an abject strategic, operational and financial failure — FBR h
Slide 20: The hardest years, the darkest years, the roarin' years, the fallen years
“The hardest years, the darkest years, the roarin' years, the fallen years These should not be forgotten years The hardest years, the wildest years, the desperate and divided years We will remember, these should not be forgotten years” — Midnight Oil vocecapital
Slide 21: Disclaimer
Disclaimer VOCE CATALYST PARTNERS LP, VOCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC, VOCE CAPITAL LLC, JARL BERNTZEN, MICHAEL J. MCCONNELL AND J. DANIEL PLANTS (TOGETHER, THE “PARTICIPANTS’) HAVE FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (THE “SEC") ON SCHEDULE 144 ON MAY 9, 2016 A DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT