Topps — Proxy Contest (May 2007)
22 slides from Topps's proxy contest presentation, May 31, 2007
Slide 1: The Committee to Enhance Topps Presentation
THE COMMITTEE TO ENHANCE TOPPS PRESENTATION TOPPS SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS June 28, 2007 at 2:00PM Contact Info: Arnaud Ajdler or Eric Rosenfeld (212) 319 7676
Slide 2: Our Objective
Our Objective As the largest TOPP stockholder, our goal is to maximize stockholder value for ALL of the Company’s stockholders “Step 1: Vote down the ill-advised, proposed transaction with Michael Eisner and Madison Dearbom Partners >The $9.75 merger consideration is inadequate >A better alternative
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Slide 4: The $9.75 Consideration is Inadequate
The $9.75 Consideration is Inadequate Premium of 3% is unacceptable -Average closing price for the 20 trading days preceding the announcement of the Merger Agreement was $9.45 > This amounts to a meager 3% premium! -The Company suggests that $8.02, the closing price for the 2 weeks leading up to the
Slide 5: The $9.75 Consideration is Inadequate (cont'd)
The $9.75 Consideration is Inadequate (conrd) At $9.75 per share, Eisner and Madison Dearborn are buying Topps for around 10 times forward EBITDA + Median forward EV/EBITDA of confectionary comps’ is approximately 13. + On the entertainment side, there are no good comparables. Only true comp is Uppe
Slide 6: Lehman Brothers' Fairness Analysis Was Flawed
The $9.75 Consideration is Inadequate i, \ Lehman Brothers’ Fairness Analysis Was Flawed +The Use of LTM numbers instead of forward numbers According to management, fiscal 2008 EBITDA (ending February 29, 2008) is 44% higher than 2007 EBITDA. Yet Lehman's comparable company analysis and comparable t
Slide 7: A better alternative exists for maximizing stockholder value
A better alternative exists for maximizing sto A conservative recapitalization of the company and a more competent senior management + A modified “Dutch Auction” tender offer for approximately 28% of the outstanding shares at arange between $10 and $10.50/share > Borrow $45 million of debt or 1.5 ti
Slide 8: Sale Process Was Flawed
Sale Process Was Flawed <= _ During a period of unprecedented liquidity, the Board decided not to s shop the company! + The board effectively negotiated a sale of the company exclusively with Michael Eisner who was aware of tl Therefore, there was zero deal tension! Given the ‘trophy’ nature of the
Slide 9: Sale Process Was Flawed: Conflicts of Interest
Sale Process Was Flawed (Conta) Conflicts of interest May Have Tainted the Process -Arthur Shorin ¥ Future employment of his son-in-law, Scott Silverstein, the COO & President of the Company, depends on who purchases the Company. + Scott Silverstein ¥COO & President and son-in-law of Arthur Shorin w
Slide 10: Sale Process Was Flawed: Go-Shop Insufficient
Sale Process Was Flawed (conta) ant The “go-shop” did not provide for a sufficient, post-signing market check + Eisner signed an NDA on July 24, 2006. Therefore he had 9 months to work on this acquisition. Yet other private equity firms or strategic buyers had only 40 days! -According to the Merger
Slide 11: Half truths, half truths and more half truths
Half truths, half truths and more half truth: \e \ + From the company’s proxy statement: “In his presentation, among other things, Mr. Brog acknowledged that the second committee (including Messrs. Ajdler and Brog) unanimously recommended the payment of a special dividend of $1.25 per share because,
Slide 12: What the Company Says Vs. The Facts
Half truths, half truths and more half rune What the Company Says Vs. The Facts: Whom Should You Trust? The Company's senior management and Board would have the stockholders believe that Mr. Ajdler is opposing the transaction so that he can take control of the Company without having to pay a premium
Slide 13: Why sell at the beginning of the turnaround?
Why sell at the beginning of the turnar: We agree with Arthur Shorin’s statement in his letter to stockholders sent on July 24, 2006 during last year’s proxy contest. “We are committed to completing the turnaround of the Company by following through on our strategic plan. We are convinced that attem
Slide 14: Public stockholders voting down private equity deals
+ More public stockholders are starting to realize that they do not need to sell to private equity firms on the cheap and then watch from the sidelines as the private equity investors make a multiple on their investments in a very short amount of time. There is no reason why public companies can not
Slide 15: Step 2: Election of new slate of directors
Step 2: Election of new slate of directors who are committed and qualified to take the necessary steps to maximize stockholder value
Slide 16: Why our nominees should replace the current directors
Why our nominees should replace the current Committee to Enhance Topps has incentive to maximize stockholder value + Assuming the Eisner deal is voted down, we intend to propose a new slate of directors at Topps’ 2007 annual meeting ¥ Aggregate skills and experience include: prior experience on Topp
Slide 17: This board has a track record of poor decisions
This board has a track record of making deci best interests of stockholders The ill-advised sale of the company to Mr. Eisner follows a pattern of poor decision making Capital allocation > Board has kept too much cash and has never shown any willingness to fix its capital structure and return cash t
Slide 18: Director nominees
A better alternative exists for maximizing sh > Michael Rowe > President and CEO of Positive Impact, a sports and entertainment management consulting firm, since 1998. > President, Chief Operating Officer and part owner of the New Jersey Nets professional basketball franchise from 1995 to 2000. > Je
Slide 19: Director nominees (cont'd)
A better alternative exists for maximizing : > Michael Appel > Managing Director of Quest Turnaround Advisors, a firm that provides turnaround and crisis management for companies experiencing financial and operational difficulties (since 1991). > Thomas Hyland » Retired Senior Partner from Pricewate
Slide 20: A better alternative exists for maximizing stockholder value
A better alternative exists for maximizing sto A conservative recapitalization of the company and a more competent senior management + A modified “Dutch Auction” tender offer for approximately 28% of the outstanding shares at arange between $10 and $10.50/share > Borrow $45 million of debt or 1.5 ti
Slide 21: Aggressive focus on improving operations
A better alternative exists for maximizing shar Aggressive focus on improving operations: sub par EBITDA margins compared to comps (6.3% vs. 20.4%) Afew examples of the opportunities include: Confectionary bove average COGS as a % of Sales (9.9% higher than with comps). + Significant top-line opport
Slide 22: Certain Information Concerning the Participants
CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS The Committee to Enhance Topps (the “Committee”), together with the other participants named below, has made a definitive filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) of a proxy statement and an accompanying proxy card to be used to solic