FBL Financial Group Inc

FBL Financial — Proxy Contest (April 2021)

53 slides from FBL Financial's proxy contest presentation, Apr 5, 2021

  1. Slide 1: Fight For A Fair Price

    INVESTOR PRESENTATION Fight For A Fair Price VOTE AGAINST ADOPTING THE PROPOSED MERGER April 2021 CAPITAL RETURNS

  2. Slide 2: Important Information

    Important Information Disclaimer The materials contained herein (the “Materials”) represent the opinions of Capital Returns Management, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, “Capital Returns”) and are based on publicly available information with respect to FBL Financial Group, Inc. (the “Company”).

  3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents I. Executive Summary II. Conflicts of interest III. Inadequate process IV. Flawed analysis V. Insufficient value VI. Recommendation VII. Appendix 3 CAPITAL RETURNS

  4. Slide 4: I. Executive Summary

    I. Executive Summary 4 CAPITAL RETURNS

  5. Slide 5: About Capital Returns Management

    About Capital Returns Management  Long short equity hedge fund founded by Ronald Bobman in 2003  Insurance specialist with industry operating, acquisition and investing experience spanning 30+ years  Patient, long-term investor with a typical investment horizon of multiple years  History of succ

  6. Slide 6: Overview of Parties Involved

    Overview of Parties Involved Overview of Interested Parties FBL Financial Group, • Class A common stock trades on NYSE (FFG) Inc. (FBL) • Manages all aspects of P&C affiliate FBPCIC • Sells life, annuity and investment products • Significant board overlap with FBPCIC & IFBF Farm Bureau P&C • Sells P

  7. Slide 7: Synopsis of the Situation

    Synopsis of the Situation  FBL has agreed to be acquired by FBPCIC, an affiliate with which it shares directors, management and employees, for a price of $56 per share  FBPCIC’s initial interest in acquiring FBL became public in September 2020  Special Committee formed to negotiate with FBPCIC fa

  8. Slide 8: Transaction Value is Inadequate

    Transaction Value is Inadequate We believe the raised / revised terms from FBPCIC to buyout the minority shareholders at $56.00 per share is not sufficiently adequate to warrant a vote in favor of the transaction. We believe the offer doesn’t reasonably account for the company’s conservative asset l

  9. Slide 9: Process Was Flawed

    Process Was Flawed  Conflicts of interest  FBL and FBPCIC have overlapping board members and executive management, meaning the same executives sit at both sides of the negotiating table  Abbreviated process  Special Committee decided not to actively solicit outside interest, determined executing

  10. Slide 10: Price is Inadequate

    Price is Inadequate  The price is too low  Comparable take private deals and recently completed life transactions imply a valuation between $66 and $91 per share  Transaction fails to adequately compensate shareholders for the rare, critically dependent relationship between FBL and FBPCIC  The t

  11. Slide 11: Implied Price Ranges

    Implied Price Ranges Life Sector Stock Performance Implied trading price without transaction Prior FBL Trading Prices FBL Buybacks Takeover Premium Precedent Transactions Director Stock Sales Special Committee Deal Experience $40 $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100 $110 $120 Deal Price Source: Bloomberg, Compa

  12. Slide 12: II. Conflicts of Interest

    II. Conflicts of Interest 12 CAPITAL RETURNS

  13. Slide 13: Transaction Overview

    Transaction Overview FBL Financial Group, Inc. Current Ownership Take Private Proposal Iowa Farm Bureau Federation (IFBF) 60.5% 60.5% Farm Bureau P&C Insurance Co. (FBPCIC) 0.8% 39.5% Public & Other Stockholders 38.7% Source: Company reports, Capital Returns Management 13 II. Conflicts of Interest C

  14. Slide 14: Background of Intertwined Relationship

    Background of Intertwined Relationship 1. IFBF members have access to insurance products sold by Farm Iowa Farm Bureau 6 Federation (IFBF) Bureau Financial Services (FBFS) 2. FBFS sells life and annuity products FBL Financial 4 through Farm Bureau Life and P&C Group (NYSE: FFG) 7 insurance products

  15. Slide 15: Operational Overlap

    Operational Overlap FBPCIC Relies Entirely Upon FBL to Operate Its Business Equipment lease Business, admin and Investment advisory agreements management services services FBL Financial Office Space Farm Bureau Group, Inc. Executive Management P&C Insurance Employees Agency force development and man

  16. Slide 16: Overlapping Board Seats

    Overlapping Board Seats Director Tenure FBL FBPCIC IFBF Craig D. Hill 14 years ✔ ✔ ✔ Joe D. Heinrich 8 years ✔ ✔ ✔ Richard W. Felts 6 years ✔ ✔ Kevin D. Paap 3 years ✔ ✔ Scott E. VanderWal 10 years ✔ ✔ Half of FBL’s Roger K. Brooks 12 years ✔ Board overlaps with FBPCIC Paul A. Juffer 4 years ✔ Paul

  17. Slide 17: Overlapping Executive Management

    Overlapping Executive Management Director FBL FBPCIC Daniel D. Pitcher CEO CEO Donald J. Seibel CFO CFO Kelli A. Eddy COO Life VP P&C Jay W. Seiboldt COO P&C COO P&C Jeffrey A. Whitehead CIO CIO Lori K. Geadelmann GC CCO Daniel M. Koster VP Marketing VP Marketing Ronald L. Mead VP Sales VP Sales Sou

  18. Slide 18: Executive Projections are Unreliable

    Executive Projections are Unreliable  Same executives sit at both sides Adjusted Operating Earnings of the negotiating table Operating Income Operating ROE (ex. AOCI)  FBL and FPCIC have common 115.0 10.5% executive management 10.0%  FBL’s executives were responsible for 105.0 9.5% preparing FBPC

  19. Slide 19: III. Inadequate Process

    III. Inadequate Process 19 CAPITAL RETURNS

  20. Slide 20: Conflicted Special Committee

    Conflicted Special Committee  Special Committee should consist solely of independent and disinterested directors, yet members of FBL’s Board serve with IFBF’s approval  The two companies share a management team and have several overlapping board members thus we do not believe this transaction was

  21. Slide 21: Failure to Solicit Outside Interest

    Failure to Solicit Outside Interest  Special Committee did not authorize its financial advisor to solicit, and its financial advisor did not solicit, any indications of interest from any third party with respect to the purchase of all or a part of the Company’s business  Special Committee let IFBF

  22. Slide 22: Pressure to Transact

    Pressure to Transact  IFBF publicly and privately stated the only outcome it will support is the Take Private Proposal  Special Committee members serve on FBL’s Board with IFBF approval thus the Special Committee has incentive to satisfy IFBF’s Board  Special Committee decision to focus on going-

  23. Slide 23: Suspect Negotiating Tactics

    Suspect Negotiating Tactics  Special Committee named the price at which it would be willing to support a transaction – “in the mid $50’s” – to FBPCIC’s financial advisor early in the negotiations and before completing its analytical work  FBPCIC Executive Committee recommended an increased offer o

  24. Slide 24: Lack of Pushback to Valuation Analysis

    Lack of Pushback to Valuation Analysis  Special Committee accepted its financial advisor’s valuation analysis despite only including two comparable transactions (only one of which was an actual transaction) and excluding the most recent comparable transaction  Special Committee named the price at

  25. Slide 25: Improved Offer Smoke and Mirrors

    Improved Offer Smoke and Mirrors  Transaction presentation notes “negotiations secured a significantly improved offer” for shareholders and cites the 19% premium over the initial offer of $47 per share as evidence the Special Committee adequately performed its duty to maximize shareholder value  F

  26. Slide 26: Exaggerated Review Process Rigor

    Exaggerated Review Process Rigor  Special Committee claims of a rigorous review process prior to making its recommendation to FBL’s Board do not mesh with reality  Special Committee indicated a valuation supporting an offer price “in the mid $50s” after meeting just 6 times, 4 of which were proced

  27. Slide 27: IV. Flawed Analysis

    IV. Flawed Analysis 27 CAPITAL RETURNS

  28. Slide 28: Fundamentally Flawed Valuation Analysis

    Fundamentally Flawed Valuation Analysis P/B Implied Date Buyer Target ex. AOCI Price Sep ’20 MassMutual/Athene AEL 1.25x $56.45 July ’20 KKR Global Atlantic 1.00x $45.16 Feb ’20 Fidelity National FG Holdings 1.65x $74.51 Inexplicably included Inexplicably excluded rejected takeover bid most relevant

  29. Slide 29: V. Insufficient Value

    V. Insufficient Value 29 CAPITAL RETURNS

  30. Slide 30: Comparable Take Private Transactions

    Comparable Take Private Transactions P/B Date Buyer Target Business Mix Price ($B) ex. AOCI P/B Feb '20 Fidelity National FG Holdings Annuities, Life $2.7 1.65x 1.25x Aug '15 Sumitomo Life Symetra Life, Benefits, Annuities $3.7 1.56x 1.19x July '15 Meiji Yasuda StanCorp Benefits, Life $5.0 2.24x 2.1

  31. Slide 31: Comparable Recent Life Transactions

    Comparable Recent Life Transactions P/B Date Buyer/Investor Target Business Mix Price ($B) ex. AOCI P/B Oct '20 Brookfield (9.9%) AEL Annuities $0.3 1.28x 0.78x July '20 KKR Global Atlantic Annuities, Life $4.4 1.00x 1.08x Feb '20 Fidelity National FG Holdings Annuities $2.7 1.65x 1.25x Average 1.31

  32. Slide 32: Minority Buy-In Transactions

    Minority Buy-In Transactions Price/Book Value Implied Price High 2.08x $93.99 Mean 1.48x $66.86 Median 1.31x $59.32 Low 1.05x $47.49  Minority buy-in transaction multiples elevated relative to whole company and other comparable transactions, reflecting premium for strategic importance  Average buy

  33. Slide 33: Special Committee Experience

    Special Committee Experience Special Committee Members Have Experience In Sale of Life Businesses Target Multiple Implied Price Roger Brooks AmerUS Group 1.64x $74 Price / BVPS ex. AOCI Per Share Paul Larson Equitable of Iowa 2.62x $118 Price / BVPS ex. AOCI Per Share  Transactions are older, but w

  34. Slide 34: Strategic Importance Demands Premium

    Strategic Importance Demands Premium  FBPCIC employs no personnel and relies entirely upon FBL’s employees, management and executives to operate its business  FBL’s employees perform nearly every task, function and operation of FBPCIC, including providing general administrative and management serv

  35. Slide 35: Price Ignores Superior Capitalization

    Price Ignores Superior Capitalization Risk-Based Capital Ratio 550% 516% 528% 485% 498% 452% 460% 426% 430% 440% 411% 365% 370% 372% 309% GL UNM MET AEL CNO PRU AIG PFG LNC ATH BHF VOYA AMP FFG AFL  FBL’s capital and liquidity positions are strong, and it continues to pay quarterly dividends and re

  36. Slide 36: Ignores Board's View of Intrinsic Value

    Ignores Board’s View of Intrinsic Value $90 1.80x Price/BVPS ex. AOCI of repurchase Transaction Price Avg. repurchase price per share $80 1.60x $70 1.40x $70.07 $68.32 $68.85 $60 $56.77 1.20x $50 1.00x $40 0.80x FBL’s share repurchase activity $30 0.60x indicates Board’s view of intrinsic $20 0.40x

  37. Slide 37: Ignores Director Sales at Higher Prices

    Ignores Director Sales at Higher Prices $100 Paul Larson sold 3,000 No director sold stock even when $90 shares @ $79.82 shares were trading in the $80s $80 Stock Price (FFG) $70 $60 $50 Scott Vanderwal sold $40 2,000 shares @ $64.87 $56 Take Private $30 Proposal Scott Vanderwal sold $20 2,000 share

  38. Slide 38: Ignores Insurance Index Stock Performance

    Ignores Insurance Index Stock Performance 20% Indexed Stock Performance Since Year-End 2019 S&P500 Life 0% Insurer Index Deal Premium (S5LIFE) -20% Unaffected FBL share price (9/3/20) $37.25 -40% Life Insurer Index performance +46.1% COVID FFG implied price $54.43 -60% 12/31/19 3/31/20 6/30/20 9/30/

  39. Slide 39: Deal Price Ignores Trading History

    Deal Price Ignores Trading History $90 $80 $70 Stock Price (FFG) $60 $50 $40 $56 Take Private $30 Proposal $20 $10 $0 3/22/16 3/22/17 3/22/18 3/22/19 3/22/20 3/22/21  The average closing price of FBL stock over the three and five years prior to March 1, 2020 was $68 per share and $66 per share, res

  40. Slide 40: Stock Trading Above Deal Price

    Stock Trading Above Deal Price $60 $55 Avg spread: ~2% Stock Price (FFG) $50 $45 Avg spread: ~9% $40 $35 $30 9/3/20 10/3/20 11/3/20 12/3/20 1/3/21 2/3/21 3/3/21 Series1 Initial offer ($47) Series3  Market appears similarly skeptical that FBPCIC’s proposal represents maximum value for FBL’s sharehol

  41. Slide 41: Missing Takeover Premium

    Missing Takeover Premium FBL Price / Earnings Multiple Proposed Transaction 5 Year Average 3 Year Average 14.1x 13.6x 14.6x Takeover Premium (+20%) 16.3x 17.5x Implied Takeover Price $65 $69 Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, Raymond James Research, Capital Returns Management 41 Note: Implied takeo

  42. Slide 42: Price-to-Book Multiple Disconnect

    Price-to-Book Multiple Disconnect FBL Price / Book Value ex. AOCI Multiple Proposed Transaction 5 Year Average 3 Year Average 1.24x 1.47x 1.60x Takeover Premium (+20%) 1.76x 1.92x Implied Takeover Price $80 $87  Transaction multiple is materially lower than FBL’s pre-COVID valuation multiple and is

  43. Slide 43: Inexplicable Special Dividend Stoppage

    Inexplicable Special Dividend Stoppage Dividend History Average 2016-2020 2021E Ordinary & Special Dividends $3.45 $2.08 Dividend Payout Ratio 82% 53%  FBL’s Board removed $1.50 special dividend for June 30, 2021 from 2021-2023 Financial Plan despite strong capital and liquidity positions  Removal

  44. Slide 44: VI. Recommendation

    VI. Recommendation 44 V. Insufficient Value CAPITAL RETURNS

  45. Slide 45: Vote AGAINST this Flawed Transaction

    Vote AGAINST this Flawed Transaction  Transaction is rife with conflicts of interest  Special Committee tasked with negotiating against FBL Board colleagues with limited access to objective data that was not already in the hands of the buyer  Special Committee received flawed analysis  Financial

  46. Slide 46: Vote AGAINST this Flawed Transaction

    Vote AGAINST this Flawed Transaction  Consideration fails to reflect FBL’s strategic importance to FBPCIC  Simple comparable valuation analysis fails to capture and value the rare, critically dependent, and richly valued relationship between FBL and FBPCIC  Stock continues to trade above the prop

  47. Slide 47: VII. Appendix

    VII. Appendix 47 CAPITAL RETURNS

  48. Slide 48: Business Mix Details

    Business Mix Details FBL Protective Symetra F&G StanCorp Fixed annuities 54% 50% 55% 95% 20% Life Insurance 46% 50% 15% 5% 0% Employee Benefits 0% 0% 30% 0% 80% Transaction Multiples Price/Book ex. AOCI 1.24x 1.68x 1.56x 1.65x 2.24x Price/Book 0.81x 1.29x 1.19x 1.25x 2.17x Source: Company reports, K

  49. Slide 49: Minority Buy-In Transactions

    Minority Buy-In Transactions Date Acquirer Target P/B Nov ‘18 Employers Mutual Casualty EMC Insurance Group 1.27x Mar ’16 American Financial Group Inc. National Interstate Corp. 1.76x Apr ’11 CNA Financial CNA Surety Corp. 1.10x Sep ’09 Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. Odyssey Re 1.25x Dec ‘08 Fairfa

  50. Slide 50: FBL's P/E Closely Tracks 10Y Yields

    FBL’s P/E Closely Tracks 10Y Yields 20.0 3.50 3.00 17.5 2.50 15.0 Treasury Yields Forward P/E 2.00 12.5 1.50 10.0 1.00 7.5 FFG P/E UST10Y 0.50 5.0 0.00 4/1/16 4/1/17 4/1/18 4/1/19 4/1/20 4/1/21 Source: Bloomberg, Capital Returns Management 50 VII. Appendix CAPITAL RETURNS

  51. Slide 51: FBL's Record of Capital Return to Shareholders

    FBL’s Record of Capital Return to Shareholders Cumulative Dividends Last 10 Years Payout of Operating Earnings $30 250% $25 200% $20 150% $15 100% $10 50% $5 $0 0% 2011 2014 2017 2020 2011 2014 2017 2020 Ordinary dividend Special dividend Dividend payout Buybacks Source: Company reports, Capital Ret

  52. Slide 52: Organizational Chart

    Organizational Chart Farm Bureau Mutual Public & Other Iowa Farm Bureau Holding Company Stockholders Federation (IFBF) 38.7% 60.5% Farm Bureau Farm Bureau Multi- Management State Services, Inc. Corporation 0.8% FBL Financial Group, Inc. (FFG) Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (FBPCIC) FB

  53. Slide 53: Brief Overview

    Brief Overview FBL Financial Group, Inc. Company Farm Bureau Life Insurance Greenfields Life Insurance Farm Bureau P&C Co. (FBLIC) Co. Insurance Co. (FBPCIC) Relationship Wholly-owned subsidiary Subsidiary of FBLIC Managed by FBL Group Brand Farm Bureau Financial Greenfields Farm Bureau Financial Se

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