YuMe — Proxy Contest (May 2016)
59 slides from YuMe's proxy contest presentation, May 9, 2016
Slide 1: YuMe, Inc. Investor Presentation
YuMe, Inc. (NYSE:YUME) Investor Presentation May 9, 2016 VIEX Capital Advisors, LLC
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability, or the particular need of any specific person who may receive this presentation, and should not be taken as advice o
Slide 3: Overview
Overview 2
Slide 4: Why We Are Here
Why We Are Here VIEX is the largest stockholder of YuMe owning ~15.8% of the outstanding common stock. Direct stockholder representation is desperately needed on the YuMe Board due to: • Poor Total Stockholder Return (TSR) ~68% decline since IPO (8/7/13) until one day prior to VIEX’s initial S
Slide 5: VIEX Nominees Will Drive Positive Change
VIEX Nominees Will Drive Positive Change Elias N. Nader (50) • Currently Chief Financial Officer of Sigma Designs (NASDAQ: SIGM), a provider of intelligent media platforms for use in the home entertainment and control markets • Significant experience in cost cutting and capital allocation • Extensiv
Slide 6: YuMe's Second Largest Stockholder Supports VIEX
YuMe’s Second Largest Stockholder Supports VIEX Despite having a director recently appointed to the YuMe Board, the Company’s second largest stockholder, AVI Management, who owns more than 10% of YuMe’s outstanding stock, has lost confidence in the YuMe Board and publically endorsed the VIEX nomin
Slide 7: Why is YuMe Board So Opposed to the Appointment of Its Largest Stockholder?
Why is YuMe Board So Opposed to the Appointment of Its Largest Stockholder to the Board? Prior to nominating directors on March 4, 2016, VIEX attempted to engage with management and the Board for over 6 months, publicly and privately: • September 16, 2015 • October 7, 2015 • November 5, 2015 • Nov
Slide 8: About VIEX Capital Advisors, LLC
About VIEX Capital Advisors, LLC VIEX Capital Advisors, LLC is a New York private investment manager focused on small and mid cap technology companies. In 2015, VIEX generated gross returns of +24%, largely through constructive engagements with boards, management, and stockholders of portfolio c
Slide 9: VIEX Seeks to Work with Management and Boards to Create Value
VIEX Seeks to Work with Management and Boards to Create Value for Stockholders Regarding the appointment of Eric Singer and another independent director nominated by VIEX* to the Board of Directors of Numerex Corp: “We believe VIEX’s* involvement at Numerex has contributed to a positive change to
Slide 10: Overview of YuMe
Overview of YuMe Founded in 2004, YuMe is a provider of digital video brand advertising solutions. The business has two major products: • A “Demand Platform” that helps brand advertisers find and place digital video advertisements across digital properties – online, mobile and smart TV. • A “Sup
Slide 11: YuMe Has Potential If the Board Is Reconstituted
YuMe Has Potential If the Board Is Reconstituted YuMe’s underlying business has significant potential, but lacks execution VIEX’s nominees have no intention of changing YuMe’s core business model, but will focus on cost control and profitability This process should not in any way disrupt the har
Slide 12: Poor Total Stockholder Return
Poor Total Stockholder Return 11
Slide 13: YuMe Stock Has Massively Underperformed Since Its IPO
YuMe Stock Has Massively Underperformed Since Its IPO 68% Loss of Value Since IPO Source: CapitalIQ Period: 8/7/2013 (IPO Date) to 10/7/2015 (Date VIEX Filed Its Initial Schedule 13D) 12
Slide 14: YuMe Stock Has Meaningfully Underperformed Ad Tech Peers
YuMe Stock Has Meaningfully Underperformed Ad Tech Peers Before VIEX Publicly Called For Change CEO Kadambi explaining why YuMe has repeatedly missed guidance: “I mean, frankly, I didn’t manage this closely enough.” – 2Q15 August 10, 2015 Source: CapitalIQ Period: 10/8/2014 to 10/7/2015 (Date VIEX F
Slide 15: Disastrous Operational Performance
Disastrous Operational Performance 14
Slide 16: Rapid Decline in Revenue and Astounding Cumulative Losses
Rapid Decline in Revenue and Astounding Cumulative Losses $ Since YuMe’s first quarter following its IPO (September 30, 2013) through December 31, 2015, retained earnings have fallen over 40% from approximately -$27.1 million to approximately -$47.2 million. YuMe has also incurred approximately $20.
Slide 17: Industry Peers Are Experiencing Revenue Growth
Industry Peers Are Experiencing Revenue Growth YuMe’s trend notably contrasts that of industry peers: • TRMR (March 3, 2016): “We delivered record results this quarter, including revenue of $51.8 million on total spend of $67.9 million, up 24% and 62%, respectively, year-over-year.” • TUBE (Februa
Slide 18: Management Has Failed to Deliver Both Topline and Bottom Line Growth
Management Has Failed to Deliver Both Topline and Bottom Line Growth in a Fast Growing Industry RUBI, TUBE, FUEL, TRMR are Emerging Growth Companies (EGC) under the JOBS Act. Source: CapitalIQ 17
Slide 19: Poor Capital Allocation
Poor Capital Allocation 18
Slide 20: YuMe Needs Urgent Board Oversight in Non-Core Investments
YuMe Needs Urgent Board Oversight in Non-Core Investments $ Millions In 2015, YuMe generated $148MM, or 85% of its revenues in the United States. Management has indicated that its core U.S. operations have been generating EBITDA margins in the teens.* If we assume a 10% EBITDA margin for U.S operati
Slide 21: YuMe Needs Urgent Board Oversight Over Return on Investments
YuMe Needs Urgent Board Oversight Over Return on Investments Using OUR money, management opened ELEVEN foreign offices. • These eleven offices generated $25.7MM of revenues in 2015, DOWN from $28.2MM in 2014. That’s $2.3MM per office. • $25.7MM of revenues translates into an EBITDA margin for its
Slide 22: Despite 48% of Revenues Poured into SG&A, Customer Acquisition Lags
Despite 48% of Revenues Poured into SG&A, Management Has Not Delivered on Customer Acquisition/Retention # of Average # of Average Customers Spend ($) Customers Spend ($) Several important, large customers walked away in 2Q15: • “Our execution issues negatively impacted Q2 spend from a small numbe
Slide 23: Missed Opportunity With Stock BuyBack
Missed Opportunity With Stock BuyBack Analyst: “You sound very Board finally approved a $ confident about the trajectory in meager $10MM buyback 2016 in terms of the EBITDA and program without a clear VIEX publicly called for the bottom line, why not buy back mandate of execution. a self-tender of 3
Slide 24: Repeatedly Missed Self-Imposed Financial Targets
Repeatedly Missed Self-Imposed Financial Targets 23
Slide 25: YuMe has Consistently Missed Guidance
YuMe has Consistently Missed Guidance Source: Company earnings calls 24
Slide 26: After Losing Credibility, Management Withdrew Annual Guidance
After Losing Credibility, Management Withdrew Annual Guidance and Widened the Guidance Range Quarterly Guided Revenues ($MM) The difference between the lower end and higher end of guidance widened to $6MM – against shrinking revenues The reason given for withdrawing annual guidance was: “Due to ty
Slide 27: Analysts Were Shocked by the Magnitude of the Miss in 2Q15
Analysts Were Shocked by the Magnitude of the Miss in 2Q15 – Well, CEO Kadambi Took His Eye Off the Ball PiperJaffray “The company's outlook is disappointing given that we had previously expected that revenue could accelerate into the back half of the year with the roll-out of programmatic. Where
Slide 28: Six Months Later, Analysts Still Remain Skeptical
Six Months Later, Analysts Still Remain Shell-Shocked and Thus Skeptical PiperJaffray “If the company can show another quarter or two of revenue upside, we believe investors may start to give the company credit for the potential of accelerating growth in 2H16. We maintain our Neutral rating with a
Slide 29: Lack of Alignment of Interests with Stockholders
Lack of Alignment of Interests with Stockholders - Poor Compensation Practices - Massive Dilution - No Skin in the Game 28
Slide 30: YuMe's Executive Compensation Practices Not Aligned with Stockholders
YuMe’s Executive Compensation Practices are Clearly Not Aligned with Stockholders Fiscal Year 2015 ended up being the worst year in the Company’s history. $5,000,000,000 Company Loss N.E.O. $0 2014 2015 Pay -$5,000,000,000 -$10,000,000,000 -$15,000,000,000 -$20,000,000,000 Source: Company filings 29
Slide 31: 2015 – Worst Year in Company's History but Management Rewarded
2015 – Worst Year in Company’s History but Management is Rewarded Handsomely In 2015, the Company’s three named executive officers earned, in the aggregate, approximately $3.94 million, despite the Company suffering net losses of approximately $16.75 million – the worst year in the Company’s histo
Slide 32: Despite ~40% Drop in Stock Price, Board Gave CEO a 38% Raise
Despite ~40% Drop in Stock Price in 2015, the Board Decided to Give CEO Kadambi a 38% Raise Stock ($) Price ($) Source: CapitalIQ 31
Slide 33: Stock Compensation Ballooned While Stock Price Declined
Stock Compensation Ballooned +177% While Stock Price Extended Its Precipitous Decline -65% Stock Comp Price ($) ($) Source: CapitalIQ 32
Slide 34: Management Continues to Dilute Stockholders
Management Continues to Dilute Stockholders Despite Failing to Grow the Business Total Revenue Shares ($) Outstanding Source: CapitalIQ 33
Slide 35: Evergreen Provision in Equity Incentive Plan Leads to Massive Dilution
Evergreen Provision in Equity Incentive Plan Leads to Massive Dilution of Stockholders YuMe initially reserved 2,000,000 shares of its common stock for issuance under the 2013 Equity Incentive Plan, but shares reserved for issuance increase on January 1 of each year until 2023 by the lesser of: (i)
Slide 36: We Are Confounded by the Board's Rationale
We Are Confounded by the Board’s Rationale Board nominee Craig Forman serves on the Compensation Committee (since July 2015) “In 2015, the Compensation Committee reviewed and assessed our general compensation philosophy, which is intended to align with our core values, yearly performance, and ou
Slide 37: YuMe Doesn't Disclose Any Compensation Targets
YuMe Doesn’t Disclose Any Compensation Targets… ….yet CEO Kadambi keeps hitting them despite piling up operating losses! “Mr. Kadambi was eligible to receive a discretionary cash bonus in 2013 as determined by the Compensation Committee, based on our achievement of revenue, adjusted EBITDA, margin
Slide 38: Independent Directors Have No Real Skin in the Game
Independent Directors Have No Real “Skin in the Game” YuMe’s Board’s six independent directors own approximately 1.6% of the Company’s outstanding stock, primarily acquired through equity awards granted to them. The incumbent board lacks a meaningful economic interest in holding management accou
Slide 39: Independent Directors Also Paid Handsomely Despite Underperformance
Independent Directors Also Paid Handsomely Despite Significant Underperformance 2015 compensation includes cash compensation, restricted awards and stock options. Director Total Compensation Mitchell Habib $ 135,788 Adriel Lares $ 129,164 Christopher Paisley $ 138,164 Daniel Springer $ 129,664 Craig
Slide 40: Peers Have More Specific Disclosures on Compensation Structures
Peers Have More Specific Disclosures on Compensation Structures • RUBI (EGC, IPO 4/2/2014): “For 2015, the performance measures and their weightings were 50% revenue and 50% adjusted EBITDA. The adjusted EBITDA target for 2014 was reduced from the 2013 targets because of a strategic decision by our
Slide 41: Poor Corporate Governance
Poor Corporate Governance 40
Slide 42: Certificate of Incorporation & Bylaws Contain Stockholder-Unfriendly Provisions
YuMe’s Certificate of Incorporation & Bylaws Contain a Number of Stockholder-Unfriendly Provisions • The Board is classified into three separate classes, meaning Classified Board only one-third of directors are subject to election by stockholders every three years • Limits the ability of stockholder
Slide 43: YuMe's Corporate Governance is Weak Compared to Other EGCs
YuMe’s Corporate Governance is Weak Compared to other Emerging Growth Companies YuMe’s governance structure is less stockholder-friendly than its peers: YuMe does not have a majority voting requirement for uncontested elections • 69% of 579 EGCs that completed their IPOs from 1/1/13 through 12/31/
Slide 44: Reactive Board
Reactive Board 43
Slide 45: Stockholder Friendly Policies Have Been Knee Jerk Reactions
Any Stockholder Friendly Policies Instituted Recently Have Been Entirely Knee Jerk Reaction to Stockholder Demands Let’s set the records straight: What happened in What YuMe touts as What stockholders did 2Q15/3Q15 their achievements On 9/16/2015, VIEX met with CEO In 2Q15, GAAP Operating in Las Veg
Slide 46: YuMe Takes Stockholder-Friendly Actions ONLY When Confronted with a Proxy Contest
YuMe Takes Stockholder-Friendly Actions ONLY When Confronted with a Proxy Contest …and those actions have been insufficient half-measures Board’s decision to pursue a stock repurchase program, which we believe was largely the result of our engagement falls significantly short of the range of $25 m
Slide 47: VIEX Nominees
VIEX Nominees 46
Slide 48: Our Nominees Have the Relevant Skills to Maximize Stockholder Value
Our Nominees Have the Relevant Skills to Maximize Stockholder Value Elias N. Nader • Significant Public Company CFO/Controller Experience (Age 50) • Understands Capital Allocation • Experienced with Segment Reporting and Performance Tracking • Experienced with Financial Forecasting • Extensive Globa
Slide 49: Elias N. Nader
Elias N. Nader Substantial public company audit and accounting experience • Currently CFO of Sigma Designs (NASDAQ: SIGM), a provider of intelligent media platforms for use in the home entertainment and control markets • Previously, Corporate Controller of Dionex Corporation, a chromatography compa
Slide 50: Eric Singer
Eric Singer Significant Financial and Investment Experience • Founder and managing member of VIEX • Former co-managing member of Potomac Capital Management III, L.L.C. and Potomac Capital Management II, L.L.C. Significant Public Board Experience • Current Director Numerex (NASDAQ: NMRX). Joined
Slide 51: VIEX Nominees' Plan to Increase Stockholder Value for YuMe
VIEX Nominees’ Plan to Increase Stockholder Value for YuMe Reduce cost structure • Discuss the current process of tracking segment costs; delineate the core profitability of the US operations; outline the path to profitability in international operations • Implement stringent metrics to ensure tha
Slide 52: The Company's Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance at Other Public Companies
The Company’s Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance as Directors at Other Public Companies Stock Price $ Derek Harrar joined the BCOV Board on 1/9/2014 Stock Down 46% Derek Harrar was AVI Partners’ (the second largest stockholder of YuMe) nominee to the YuMe Board. They expressed their disappointm
Slide 53: The Company's Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance (Cont'd)
The Company’s Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance as Directors at Other Public Companies (Cont’d) Stock Price $ Craig Forman joined the MNI Stock Down 63% Board on 7/23/2013 52
Slide 54: The Company's Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance (Cont'd)
The Company’s Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance as Directors at Other Public Companies (Cont’d) Stock Price $ Craig Forman joined the APPS Board on 3/9/2015 through the Appia/Digital Turbine deal Stock Down 75% 53
Slide 55: The Company's Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance (Cont'd)
The Company’s Nominees Oversaw Disastrous Performance as Directors at Other Public Companies (Cont’d) Stock Price $ Craig Forman joined the Board on Stock Down 38% 7/6/2015 VIEX filed 13D Fellow stockholders, do you want to own another $1 stock? 54
Slide 56: Why is Change Needed Now?
Why is Change Needed Now? Board Has Been Incapable of Generating Stockholder Return • On August 7, 2013, YuMe began trading at $9.00 per share. From that date until October 6, 2015, one trading day prior to the filing of our Schedule 13D, YuMe’s stock price had declined by ~68%. • Since the IPO th
Slide 57: Appendix
Appendix 56
Slide 58: VIEX Nominee Biographies
VIEX Nominee Biographies Eric Singer, age 42, has served as the managing member of each of VIEX GP, LLC, the general partner of VIEX Opportunities Fund, LP – Series One (“Series One”) and VIEX Opportunities Fund, LP – Series Two (“Series Two”); VIEX Special Opportunities GP II, LLC, the general part
Slide 59: VIEX Nominee Biographies
VIEX Nominee Biographies Elias N. Nader, age 50, has served as chief financial officer and secretary of Sigma Designs, Inc. ("Sigma Designs"), a provider of intelligent media platforms for use in the home entertainment and control markets, since April 2014. Mr. Nader previously served as Sigma Desig