Fiesta Restaurant — Proxy Contest (May 2017)
60 slides from Fiesta Restaurant's proxy contest presentation, May 23, 2017
Slide 1: Poor Corporate Governance led by an Unengaged & Entrenched Board
May 2017 FIESTA RESTAURANT GROUP Poor Corporate Governance led by an Unengaged & Entrenched Board JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 1 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 2: Disclaimer
DISCLAIMER This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability, or the particular need of any specific person who may receive this presentation, and should not be taken as advice o
Slide 3: Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Executive Summary 2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance Under Jefferies Affiliates Watch 3. Failed Strategy – Another New Plan? 4. Fiesta: The Opportunity to Unlock Value 5. Time for Change: JCP Nominees vs. Jefferies Directors We Are Opposing 6. Appendix JCP INVE
Slide 4: 1. Executive Summary
1. Executive Summary JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 4 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 5: Why Change Is Warranted
WHY CHANGE IS WARRANTED Significant VALUE DESTRUCTION and CHRONIC UNDERPERFORMANCE At Fiesta Restaurant Group, Inc. (“Fiesta”, “FRGI” or the “Company”) and its 2. 4. brands ABYSMAL TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS Fiesta’s 1, 2 and 3 year Total Shareholder Returns are negative, whereas the Russell 2000 Res
Slide 6: Underperforming Total Shareholder Return
PROBLEM NO. 1 UNDERPERFORMING TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN Fiesta has produced NEGATIVE RETURNS for the last 3 years. Share Price Performance (1) 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year Buffalo Wild Wings Inc 11% -3% 9% 85% Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen Inc 52% 40% 116% 350% Panera Bread Co 51% 68% 104% 119% El Pollo L
Slide 7: Fiesta Underperforms the Peer Group Selected by the Board
Fiesta Underperforms the Peer Group Selected by the Board Fiesta has consistently lagged its comparable companies with regards to Total Shareholder Return 1 Year Total Return 2 Year Total Return 3 Year Total Return 5 Year Total Return RRGB 53% PNRA ME «68% PLKI ME 116% PLKI 350% PLKI Ma 52% TXRH Mm
Slide 8: Fiesta's Governance Structure Insulates and Entrenches the Incumbents
PROBLEM NO. 2 Fiesta’s Governance Structure Insulates and Entrenches the Incumbents X Classified Board with 3 year terms X No action by written consent X Shareholders cannot call special meetings X Supermajority voting requirement to amend organizational documents (1) X Directors may only be removed
Slide 9: Jefferies Maintains Outsized Influence Over the Board
Jefferies Maintains Outsized Influence Over the Board Why is 1/3 of the Board affiliated with Jefferies after it sold and distributed all of its shares? Up for re-election this year Chairman of Jefferies LLC, President of Jefferies Capital Partners LLC, President and director of Leucadia Director of
Slide 10: Potential Conflicts of Interests
PROBLEM NO. 2 Potential Conflicts of Interests Jefferies affiliate directors – BRIAN FRIEDMAN AND BARRY ALPERIN appear to have represented Jefferies and its parent, Leucadia National Corporation (“Leucadia”), in opportunistically buying and selling Fiesta stock August 2011, Senior Notes May 2012 Jef
Slide 11: Poor Capital Allocation at Both Brands
PROBLEM NO. 3 Poor Capital Allocation at Both Brands Fiesta has spent $330 million in capital expenditures (more than half its current market capitalization) over the past 5 years, producing less than 9% return on capital during the period Total Capital Expenditures 100,000 $87,570 $82,365, 80,000 $
Slide 12: Poor Operating Performance At Pollo Tropical
PROBLEM NO. 4 Poor Operating Performance At Pollo Tropical Operating performance has been troubling at Pollo Tropical DECLINING EBITDA Margins have been declining at Pollo Tropical, hurting the Company’s EBITDA MARGINS ability to generate higher free cash flow Rent expense has increased materially a
Slide 13: Troubling Traffic Declines at Both Brands
Troubling Traffic Declines at Both Brands Traffic has fallen dramatically over the last two years Pollo Tropical SSS have performed worse than Taco Cabana given the ill- fated expansion into new markets While Taco Cabana trends have not been as bad recently, the traffic was flat to down over many ye
Slide 14: Paradise Lost – Capital Destroyed
PROBLEM NO. 4 continued… “PARADISE LOST” – CAPITAL DESTROYED In Houston, at the corner of Voss and Westheimer, a store closed approximately 4 weeks ago. Fiesta has announced that 30 stores will close. “I would say that, overall, the new restaurants in Texas continue to perform very, very well. There
Slide 15: Uncertainty with Taco Cabana
PROBLEM NO. 5 Uncertainty with Taco Cabana Company lacks a strategic plan for Taco Cabana “In addition, the Company announced that as the next step in its long-term strategy, it intends to separate the Pollo Tropical and Taco Cabana businesses in 2017 or 2018 through February 24th, 2016, a tax-effic
Slide 16: Out of Control Operating Expenses at Taco Cabana
continued... Out of Control Operating Expenses at Taco Cabana Expenses at Taco Cabana are increasing Typically as the store base grows, the company should be able to get leverage from increased size with suppliers As an example, other expenses on a per store basis at Taco Cabana have risen even when
Slide 17: The Unengaged Board
PROBLEM NO. 6 The Unengaged Board Lofty aspirations and a lack of execution and accountability • “…In addition, we continue to refine our restaurant prototype and service model, which will help us lower UNSUCCESSFUL our cost of equity into new markets.” Q2 2012, Tim Taft • “…We continued to pursue i
Slide 18: The Unengaged Board: Where was the oversight?
PROBLEM NO. 6 continued… The Unengaged Board Where was the oversight? “As I said on our last call, our direction will be to cluster Pollo Tropical in DMA’s like Dallas, Houston and Austin until we achieve media efficiency” Q2 2013, former CEO Tim Taft An actively engaged Board with the proper qualif
Slide 19: Real Economic Consequences
PROBLEM NO. 6 continued… Real Economic Consequences Bad corporate oversight & governance caused gross underperformance Conflicted Board Members Failed Board Oversight Failed Strategy / Capital Allocation Stock Price Down 37% Over 3 years(1) Massive Store Closures (1) Calculated as of May 19, 2017. J
Slide 20: Change Is Urgently Needed
CHANGE IS URGENTLY NEEDED After years of executing the wrong strategic plan, the Board has repeatedly failed to produce shareholder value VOTE THE GOLD CARD ELECT JOHN MORLOCK AND JAMES PAPPAS We have nominated director candidates who are highly qualified and offer a better plan for the future of Fi
Slide 21: Illustrative 2021 Opportunity
SOLUTION ILLUSTRATIVE 2021 OPPORTUNITY It is time for change and a financial plan – shareholders deserve representatives with a clear sense of accountability to serve as stewards of their capital Illustrative Plan 2021E Taco Cabana Pollo Tropical Consolidated Revenues 377,937 420,006 797,943 Restaur
Slide 22: Elect JCP's Nominees
SOLUTION ELECT JCP’S NOMINEES JCP’s nominees will drive positive change • Effectively Oversee Capital Allocation • Focus on Achieving a Precise Plan to Increase EBITDA • Focus on the Customer Alignment with • Focus on Atmosphere Shareholders • Focus on Great Food JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 22 Co
Slide 23: Drive Positive Change
—— SOLUTION DRIVE POSITIVE CHANGE Vote for Change. Vote for John Morlock and James Pappas JOHN MORLOCK (61) ¢ Chief Operating Officer for Sbarro since May 2016 ¢ Chief Operating Office of Potbelly (Nasdaq: PBPB) for 13 years ¢ President of Clubhouse International - an owner of themed restaurants, 19
Slide 24: 2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance Under Jefferies Affiliates Watch
2. Troubling History of Abysmal Corporate Governance Under Jefferies Affiliates Watch JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 24 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 25: Jefferies Maintains Outsized Influence Over the Board
Jefferies Maintains Outsized Influence Over the Board Why is 1/3 of the Board affiliated with Jefferies after it sold and distributed all of its shares? Up for re-election this year Chairman of Jefferies LLC, President of Jefferies Capital Partners LLC, President and director of Leucadia Director of
Slide 26: Shareholders Lost Faith in 2014
Shareholders Lost Faith in 2014 Shareholders vote against the incumbent nominee 1. Jefferies Conflicts of Interests 2. 3. 2014 Annual Meeting shows significant votes withheld Member of Board that oversaw tremendous value destruction at Fiesta 2014 Annual Meeting Name For Withheld Broker Non-Vote Bar
Slide 27: Potential Conflicts of Interests
PROBLEM NO. 2 Potential Conflicts of Interests Jefferies affiliate directors – BRIAN FRIEDMAN AND BARRY ALPERIN appear to have represented Jefferies and its parent, Leucadia, in opportunistically buying and selling Fiesta stock August 2011, Senior Notes May 2012 Jefferies Lead Manager Spin off occur
Slide 28: Jefferies Directors Do Not Appear Independent
Jefferies Directors Do Not Appear Independent Members of the Board Didn’t Personally Buy Stock. Instead, Leucadia purchased stock days after reporting weak earnings. 31 29 27 25 Why didn’t Brian, Nicholas 23 and Barry (Jefferies Affiliates) personally purchase shares? 21 No director has ever made pu
Slide 29: Jefferies Directors Do Not Appear Independent
Jefferies Directors Do Not Appear Independent Jefferies has made money off of Fiesta shareholders August 2011: Jefferies was the Lead Manager of the $200 million 144a Senior Unsecured Notes • “Permitted Holders” provision only allowed Jefferies Capital Partners and selected insiders and others to ow
Slide 30: We Bring Independent Directors
We Bring Independent Directors How are Brian Friedman and Barry Alperin considered completely independent directors given their relationship to Jefferies? xX Shareholders deserve truly INDEPENDENT directors xX In the last 5 years Jefferies has received underwriting fees from Fiesta. Jefferies receiv
Slide 31: 3. Failed Strategy – Another New Plan?
3. Failed Strategy – Another New Plan? JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 31 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 32: Can We Get a Re-Do?
CAN WE GET A “RE-DO”? • It is our belief that the Company’s “Renewal Plan” amounts to a request for a “do over” of the previous plan designed by the same directors we seek to replace • The “Renewal Plan” largely consists of repairing the damage done from the directors we are seeking to replace, Mr.
Slide 33: CEO Offers Damaging Assessment of Board and Prior Management
CEO Offers Damaging Assessment of Board and Prior Management Board Was Not Monitoring the Prior Management : WE WILL BRING OVERSIGHT “Investments in core markets have suffered over the past few years as a result of the expansion of Pollo Tropical into other markets. Therefore, it is imperative that
Slide 34: 4. Fiesta: The Opportunity to Unlock Value
4. Fiesta: The Opportunity to Unlock Value JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 34 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 35: Margin Expansion Opportunities
SOLUTION MARGIN EXPANSION OPPORTUNITIES • G&A costs are trending higher and are excessive compared to peers, exhibiting poor execution CORPORATE G&A • Inability to create synergies across 2 concepts offers low-hanging fruit • Poor execution has potentially led to poor food quality leading to COST OF
Slide 36: Increase Annual EBITDA by $30 MM
SOLUTION INCREASE ANNUAL EBITDA BY $30 MM We have identified $30 million in cost savings opportunities at both the store and corporate level We believe getting improved food quality and strong customer satisfaction by spending on Cost of Sales is necessary to a great turnaround plan. As such, our im
Slide 37: Bloated G&A and Corporate Offices
BLOATED G&A AND 3 CORPORATE OFFICES We believe there is more than $10 million in savings at the G&A level FRGI CHUY G&A as a % of G&A as a % of Revenue ($) G&A ($) Revenue Revenue ($) G&A ($) Revenue 2011 474,968 37,459 7.9% 130,583 7,478 5.7% 2012 509,726 43,870 8.6% 172,640 9,358 5.4% 2013 551,337
Slide 38: Inability to Gain Operating Leverage
INABILITY TO GAIN OPERATING LEVERAGE We are concerned with the trend in G&A as the Company has not managed to leverage G&A in the last 5 years • Bojangles (BOJA) has ~300 corporate stores and ~200 franchisees – a similar size in company stores but also an entire franchise base. • Yet, for 2016, BOJA
Slide 39: Achieve $10 Million in G&A Savings
SOLUTION ACHIEVE $10 MILLION IN G&A SAVINGS • Create the steps and plan to decrease corporate offices from 3 to 1 • Set goals to get to a smaller corporate expense footprint • Incentive payments should be set up around achieving precise cost goals • Focus on productivity enhancements with operating
Slide 40: Bloated Advertising
BLOATED ADVERTISING We believe there is more than $5 million in savings from a generally lower level of advertising • Fiesta advertising is less effective than believed and the Company could do quite well without it – as seen through peers TXRH’s and CHUY’s regional focus and lower advertising spend
Slide 41: Achieve $5 Million in Ad Savings
SOLUTION ACHIEVE $5 MILLION IN AD SAVINGS 2016 Advertising • Chuy’s Restaurants has 80 stores across 16 States $2.4 million with $330 million of Revenue and is based out of Austin, Texas • Bojangles has 309 company owned stores ($505 Less than $10 million Revenue) and 207 franchises ($26 million mil
Slide 42: Restaurant Wage Expense Increasing
RESTAURANT WAGE EXPENSE INCREASING Restaurant Wages and Related Expenses are far off trend at both Pollo Tropical and Taco Cabana Excuse: Wages have been going up. Reality: A good restaurant operator that closely monitors real-time data can manage headcount to offset weakness in industry trends. Pol
Slide 43: Achieve $7.5 Million Wage Savings
SOLUTION ACHIEVE $7.5 MILLION WAGE SAVINGS • Turnover: There has been significant turnover at the executive level. Typically, this leads to significant turnover at the store level – focus on keeping the best • Training: Empowering your cooks and counter people to be efficient starts with proper trai
Slide 44: Pollo Tropical Operating Expenses Are Increasing
POLLO TROPICAL OPERATING EXPENSES ARE INCREASING... The Board should have been more focused on operations and management strategy. We believe there are millions of savings at the opex level Pollo Tropical Operating Expense Trends are Troubling — The significant increase in per store rents, with bett
Slide 45: ...And Taco Cabana Is Just as Bad
…AND TACO CABANA IS JUST AS BAD We believe there are significant savings opportunities at the opex level Taco Cabana Operating Expense Trends are Bad – Other Operating Expenses have increased significantly over the last several years – which doesn’t make sense given the store growth – What’s really
Slide 46: Achieve $7.5 Million in Opex Savings
SOLUTION ACHIEVE $7.5 MILLION IN OPEX SAVINGS • El Pollo Loco operates at 11.7% of operating expenses on sales • Pollo Tropical operates at 13.6% of operating expenses on sales El Pollo Loco 2016 Revenues 355,468 Occupancy and other operating expenses 78,263 22.0% 2% = ~$7 million Advertising (14,70
Slide 47: Franchise Opportunity
SOLUTION FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITY • Focus on creating a Taco Cabana and Pollo Tropical model that has a Sales to Investment Ratio of at least 1.5x and margins north of 17.5% at the restaurant level • On an unleveraged basis this would produce +20% returns to the Franchisee – and many companies of simil
Slide 48: Unlocking Margin — Execution
Unlocking Margin — Execution CATEGORY COST OF SALES RESTAURANT WAGES & RELATED EXPENSES RESTAURANT RENT EXPENSE OTHER RESTAURANT OPERATING EXPENSES (fiscal year ended) Cost of sales Restaurant Wages and Related Expenses Restaurant rent expense Other Restaurant Operating Expenses Store Level Margin C
Slide 49: Illustrative 2021 Opportunity
ILLUSTRATIVE 2021 OPPORTUNITY It is time for change – shareholders deserve representatives with a clear sense of accountability to serve as stewards of their capital Illustrative Plan 2021E Taco Cabana Pollo Tropical Consolidated Revenues 377,937 420,006 797,943 Restaurant Level EBITDA before Ads 88
Slide 50: Incumbent Directors Appear to Lack Precise Targets/Plan
Incumbent Directors Appear to Lack Precise Targets/Plan Shareholders must hold Messrs. Alperin and Friedman accountable this June, otherwise we will have no means to replace these directors till 2020 Revenue ~$800 million ~$800 million ? 2 Adj EBITDA ~$150 million ~$150 million 2 2 Stores and ~350 C
Slide 51: We Bring Capital Allocation Discipline
We Bring Capital Allocation Discipline The prior Board was not focused on capital allocation given its failed $70 million Pollo Tropical expansion into Texas ✓ Focus on high return investments by assessing sales to investment ratio and restaurant level margins ✓ Formulate optimal capital structure i
Slide 52: 5. Time for Change: JCP Nominees vs. Jefferies Directors We Are Opposing
5. Time for Change: JCP Nominees vs. Jefferies Directors We Are Opposing JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 52 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 53: Why Change Is Warranted
WHY CHANGE IS WARRANTED Significant VALUE DESTRUCTION and CHRONIC UNDERPERFORMANCE 2. 4. At Fiesta and its brands ABYSMAL TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS Fiesta’s 1, 2 and 3 year Total Shareholder Returns are negative, whereas the Russell 2000 Restaurant Index, the Average of Most Similar Competitors and
Slide 54: Replace Directors Responsible for Failed Strategy and Failed Oversight
REPLACE DIRECTORS RESPONSIBLE FORA FAILED STRATEGY AND FAILED OVERSIGHT CURRENT / PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AND AFFILIATIONS FRGI / CARROLS BOARD TENURE CEO and Founding Member at JCP Investment Management, LLC v Current Director: US Geothermal (HTM), Jamba Juice (JMBA) and Tandy Leather Factory (TLF) v F
Slide 55: Replace Directors Responsible for Failed Strategy and Failed Oversight
REPLACE DIRECTORS RESPONSIBLE FORA FAILED STRATEGY AND FAILED OVERSIGHT Destruction Does NOT represent Personally built Restaurants in or Lives in Texas No concerns about independence Focus on Restaurant Companies JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC
Slide 56: James C. Pappas
—— SOLUTION JAMES C. PAPPAS Selected Experience: Managing Member JCP Investment Management J ye Board of Directors at US Geothermal, 2016 — Present Factory Board of Directors at Jamba Juice, 2015 — Present Board of Directors at The Pantry, 2014 — 2015 Morgon’s Eos. INC. Chairman of the Board at Morg
Slide 57: JCP – Working with Incumbent Board Members
JCP – Working with Incumbent Board Members JCP has a history of creating value and working with incumbent directors THE PANTRY, INC. A distressed operator of 75 restaurants under KFC, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut and A&W brands with significant refi risk Getting on the Board Creating Value Concerned Pantry
Slide 58: John Morlock
JOHN MORLOCK Vv Chief Operating Officer for Sbarro since May 2016 v Chief Operating Officer of Potbelly (Nasdaq: PBPB) for 13 years v Initial Investor in Boston Chicken at 16 stores. Started as SVP of Operations, overseeing growth plan. Then become CEO and largest shareholder of the mid-west franchi
Slide 59: 6. Appendix
6. Appendix JCP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 59 Copyright © 2017 JCP Investment Management, LLC
Slide 60: Historical Financials
HISTORICAL FINANCIALS INCOME STATEMENT 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Restaurant sales 473,249 507,351 548,980 608,540 684,584 708,956 Franchise royalty revenues and fees 1,719 2,375 2,357 2,603 2,808 2,814 Total revenues 474,968 509,726 551,337 611,143 687,392 711,770 Cost of sales 152,711 163,514 1