Forest Laboratories Inc

Forest Laboratories — Proxy Contest (July 2012)

85 slides from Forest Laboratories's proxy contest presentation, Jul 31, 2012

  1. Slide 1: Forest Laboratories Shareholder Presentation July 2012

    Forest Laboratories Shareholder Presentation July 2012

  2. Slide 2: Key Conclusions of Report

    Key Conclusions of Report * Key Conclusion Pages Today, We Believe Forest is in Crisis – CEO Solomon Was Wrong in the Past With His Overly Optimistic Predictions Results: Forest’s stock is down 11% in the past 10 years and more than 50% from the peak – The company was completely unprepared for the L

  3. Slide 3: Presentation Summary

    Presentation Summary We believe Change is Needed as the Board has overseen: significant stock underperformance (p. 7 – 11) and massive destruction of value (p. 12) an inadequate and flawed company strategy (p. 15 – 28) significant corporate waste and cost structure inefficiency (p. 27 – 28) ineffici

  4. Slide 4: Company Background

    Company Background Founded in 1956 - Howard Solomon has been CEO since 1977 Develops, manufactures and markets drugs with sales derived primarily from neurology FY12A total revenues of $4.6 B; FY13E total revenues of $3.3 B; FY16E total revenues of $3.7 B Lexapro for depression/anxiety was ~49% of F

  5. Slide 5: Why We Believe Meaningful & Sustainable Change is Needed at Forest Labs

    Why We Believe Meaningful & Sustainable Change is Needed at Forest Labs

  6. Slide 6: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed For Years (10 Years)

    Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed For 10 Years Notes: Data from 5/29/02 – 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, B

  7. Slide 7: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed For Years (5 Years)

    Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed For 5 Years Notes: Data from 5/29/07 – 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Br

  8. Slide 8: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 3 Years

    Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 3 Years Notes: Data from 5/29/09 – 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca,

  9. Slide 9: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 1 Year

    Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 1 Year Notes: Data from 5/29/11 – 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca,

  10. Slide 10: And It Hasn't Gotten Better Since Last Year's Annual Meeting

    …And It Hasn’t Gotten Better Since Last Year’s Annual Meeting Notes: Data from 8/18/11 – 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca, Eli L

  11. Slide 11: Share Buyback Masked True Extent of Value Destruction Over 10 Years

    Share Buyback Masked True Extent of Value Destruction Over 10 Years Source: Company documents; all data measured from fiscal YE02 to fiscal YE12; Enterprise value = Market Cap + Debt-Cash While Forest’s stock declined 15% (end of FY02 – end of FY12), its enterprise value declined $7.9 B or 55% Stock

  12. Slide 12: While Shareholders Lost Billions, CEO Solomon Made A Fortune

    While Shareholders Lost Billions of Dollars, CEO Solomon Made A Fortune Paid Over $80 MM Sold Stock Worth $572 MM; Ownership Reduced by 82% Source: Company documents CEO enjoyed an accelerated option vesting schedule vs. others at Forest… …And, he took advantage of it by unloading massive amounts of

  13. Slide 13: Management Claims it Has Done a Great Job

    Management Claims it Has Done a Great Job Then, Why has the stock underperformed its peer indices for 1, 3, 5 and 10 years? And, (2) Why has so much value been destroyed during that same period of time? We believe the answer is: Strategic Failure by the Management & Board *

  14. Slide 14: Inadequate & Flawed Strategy That Destroyed Shareholder Value

    We Believe Forest Had an Inadequate & Flawed Strategy That Destroyed Shareholder Value Inadequate Strategy: Management and the Board implemented a strategy that we believe was inadequate to offset declining revenues and profits due to generic competition for Lexapro and Namenda The strategy was impl

  15. Slide 15: Management Had Plenty of Time to Prepare For the Patent Cliff

    Management Had Plenty of Time to Prepare For the Patent Cliff, But Started Too Late Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies consist of Valeant, Teva, Shire, Endo, Warner Chilcott & Allergan ; Peer large pharmaceutical companies consist of AstraZe

  16. Slide 16: More Capital Had to be Put at Risk to Obtain Each Additional Product

    More Capital Had to be Put at Risk to Obtain Each Additional Product Source: Company documents Notes: Capital at-risk is calculated for each product based on up-front payments + acquisition payments; Each year is calculated based on a cumulative capital at-risk divided by the cumulative number of pr

  17. Slide 17: Despite All the Money Spent on Products, Massive Value Has Been Destroyed

    Despite All the Money Spent on Products, Massive Value Has Been Destroyed During the last 10 years, Forest spent $8.3 B on R&D, licensing/milestone payments and product/rights acquisitions. At the same time, $7.9 B of Enterprise Value was destroyed During the last 5 years, Forest spent more than $6.

  18. Slide 18: Hard to See How the Next Nine Drugs Will Fill the Revenue Holes

    It’s Hard For Us to See How the “Next Nine” Drugs Will Fill the Revenue Holes Source: Company documents Notes: Combined product launch curves are measured for the combined drugs assuming that the 1st year is for the 1st product launched; additional launches are added as they occur -$554 MM *

  19. Slide 19: Even If All Pipeline Drugs Were Successful, Sales Wouldn't Have Been Enough in FY2013

    Even If All Pipeline Drugs Were Successful, Sales Probably Wouldn’t Have Been Enough in FY2013 Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development for average peak drug sales, average time to peak sales and average clinical development time by therapeutic

  20. Slide 20: Pipeline Planning for FY2016 Was Not Much Better

    It Doesn’t Appear to Us That Pipeline Planning for FY2016 Was Much Better… Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development for average peak drug sales, average time to peak sales and average clinical development time by therapeutic class; FDAReview.org

  21. Slide 21: Next Nine Pipeline Sales Not Projected to Offset Revenue Declines

    According to Analysts, Sales from “Next Nine” Pipeline Products Not Projected to Offset Revenue Declines Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Quote from presentation filed by company during 2011 proxy contest Note: Lexapro sales decline is measured from FY12; Namenda sales decline is mea

  22. Slide 22: Revenues Projected to Decline But Profits Hit Even Harder

    Revenues Are Projected to Decline But Profits Are Expected to Get Hit Even Harder Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Frank Perrier quote from Oct. 13, 2011 Total revenues are not expected by analysts to regain the FY12 peak until after FY17 Even worse, net income is not expected by ana

  23. Slide 23: Forest Has Consistently Missed Guidance on Launched Products

    While Forest Has Launched Multiple Products, They Have Consistently Missed Guidance Source: Company documents; company press releases for fiscal year end results, which provide next fiscal year product sales guidance; See APPENDIX A for actual sales guidance for each product *

  24. Slide 24: Opportunistic Business Development Has Led to a Lack of Focus

    We Believe “Opportunistic” Business Development Has Led to a Lack of Focus TTP399 Dutogliptin FY13 Sales: $0 MM Linaclotide FY13 Sales: $40 MM GRT6005/6006 RGH-896 FY13 Sales: $0 MM Teflaro Avibactam BC-3781 Faropenam FY13 Sales: $58 MM Daliresp Colostin Aclidinium LAS100977 Oglemilast FY13 Sales: $

  25. Slide 25: Lack of Therapeutic Focus is Hurting Sales Rep Productivity

    We Believe Lack of Therapeutic Focus is Hurting Sales Rep Productivity Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: see page 82; Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies include Valeant (VRX), Shire (SHP), Endo (ENDP) and Allergan (AGN); other peers are not available in SEC filings; FRX oper

  26. Slide 26: Loss of Lexapro Exposed Corporate Inefficiency

    We Believe Loss of Lexapro Sales Has Further Exposed Massive Corporate Inefficiency & Lack of Cost Synergies SG&A/Revenues (Forest vs. Peers) Lack of Critical Mass Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies include Valeant, Teva, Shire, Endo, Warner

  27. Slide 27: Operating Margins Are Trending in the Wrong Direction

    Operating Margins Are Trending in the Wrong Direction Operating margins have been and analysts expect them to continue getting compressed as SG&A and R&D as a percentage of revenues increases Source: Company documents; analyst estimates; FRX operates on a March fiscal year (FY12 ended in March 2012)

  28. Slide 28: Poor Track Record of Allocating Capital

    We Believe Management & Board Have a Poor Track Record of Allocating Capital Cash used for share repurchases Cash used for licensing or acquiring products Decline in Enterprise Value Source: Company documents; 10 year values measured from YE 2002 through YE 2012; 5 Year values measured from YE07 thr

  29. Slide 29: Management Has Not Efficiently Used Forest's Balance Sheet

    We Believe Management & Board Have Not Efficiently Used Forest’s Balance Sheet Management Has Not Efficiently Used Its Cash To Create Value Cash As Pct Of Market Cap Management Is Not Efficiently Using Leverage To Create Value Debt As Pct Of Market Cap Source: Company documents and analyst estimates

  30. Slide 30: Concerned About How Management May Use the Cash

    We Are Concerned About How Management May Use the Cash Given Its Track Record Given its history of destroying significant value during the last 10 years, we are very concerned about how management may choose to use the company’s $3.2 B of cash Because of the current & projected revenue shortfalls fr

  31. Slide 31: We Remain Concerned About Corporate Governance Issues

    We Remain Concerned About Corporate Governance Issues At least 50% of the Board continues to lack true independence, in our opinion The Presiding “Independent” Director (Kenneth Goodman) lacks true independence yet he still remains in this important role The Chair of the Compensation Committee (Dan

  32. Slide 32: At Least 50% of the Board Continues to Lack True Independence

    We Believe At Least 50% of the Board Continues to Lack True Independence (5 out of 10 Directors) Source: Company documents *

  33. Slide 33: Compensation Policies Have Been Flawed But Chairman Remains at Helm

    Compensation Policies Have Been Flawed But Chairman Remains at Helm Chair of Compensation Committee (Dan Goldwasser – Board member for 35 years) presided over serious problems related to compensation policy Policy changes during the last year confirm these problems Vesting schedules of equity awards

  34. Slide 34: CEO's Preferential Option & Stock Vesting Schedule

    CEO’s Preferential Option & Stock Vesting Schedule * Source: 2011 proxy statement; CEO = Howard Solomon; CFO = Frank Perier; CCO (chief commercial officer) = Elaine Hochberg

  35. Slide 35: Fortunately Timed Stock Sales by CEO

    Fortunately Timed Stock Sales by CEO * Nov ‘04: CEO Solomon sold 2.5 MM shares at $43.26 per share for proceeds of $108.2 MM Feb ‘07: CEO Solomon sold 4.3 MM shares at $52.60 per share for proceeds of $226.2 MM Source: SEC filings; three largest sales by CEO during period

  36. Slide 36: CEO Stock Sales of $205 MM in 2004

    CEO Stock Sales of $205 MM in 2004; $108 MM Sold Shortly After Company Repurchased “Our financial performance for the remainder of the fiscal year ending March 31, 2004 should result in earnings per share for the year at the high end of our previously issued guidance [$1.92]. Regarding fiscal 2005 E

  37. Slide 37: CEO Sells Stock Worth $226 MM All On One Day in 2007

    CEO Sells Stock Worth $226 MM All On One Day in 2007 And Says It Was For Estate Planning Purposes CEO Howard Solomon sells 4.3 MM shares at $52.60 for proceeds of $226 MM on 2/12/07; Solomon states, “I have reached an age when it is necessary for me to further an estate plan... These share dispositi

  38. Slide 38: CEO Succession Is Long Overdue

    We Believe CEO Succession Is Long Overdue & Should Equitably Include External Candidates Howard Solomon is currently 84 years old, has been CEO for 35 years and the government considered excluding Solomon from government contracts as recently as 1 year ago so succession planning is long overdue Inst

  39. Slide 39: CEO's Son Promoted to Key Role of Strategic Planning

    CEOs Son Promoted to Key Role of Strategic Planning Business development and strategic planning involve building the company’s pipeline for future growth In Forest’s case, because of the huge revenue holes being generated by the patent expirations of Lexapro and Namenda, which represent 80% of reven

  40. Slide 40: Poor Risk Management & Compliance Resulted in $423 MM in Legal Settlements

    Poor Risk Management & Compliance Has Resulted in $423 MM in Legal Settlements We do not see how Lester Salans, a Clinical Professor and physician, as Chair of the Compliance Committee has any qualifications as a compliance expert These payments may be representative of a lax culture and complacency

  41. Slide 41: Management Has Not Delivered on Its Word

    We Do Not Believe Management Has Delivered on Its Word What They Said … What Happened … Management said, they were “in a good place in managing the next two patent expirations in Lexapro and Namenda…“ -- Frank Perrier, CFO quote from Oct. 13, 2011 FY13 guidance was for revenues to decline by more th

  42. Slide 42: Icahn Nominee Plan For Meaningful Change at Forest Labs

    Icahn Nominee Plan For Meaningful Change at Forest Labs

  43. Slide 43: Icahn Recommendations: How to Get the Forest Growing Again

    Icahn Recommendations How to Get the Forest Growing Again Independently evaluate current business development strategy, which we believe is unfocused Develop a clear strategy focused on creating shareholder value Assess potential divestiture of non-core assets Evaluate ways to reduce SG&A spending E

  44. Slide 44: Independently Evaluate and Potentially Change Business Development Strategy

    Independently Evaluate and Potentially Change Current Business Development Strategy We believe the “Opportunistic” approach by the company has caused it to lose its focus and has resulted in an inefficient cost structure Engage an independent consultant to evaluate the company’s business strategy an

  45. Slide 45: Focus on Specific Therapeutic Categories Likely to Provide Best Returns

    Focus on Specific Therapeutic Categories Likely to Provide The Best Returns Source: company documents; analyst projections; capital at risk = upfront cash payments as part of licensing deals and cash acquisitions of companies or product rights *

  46. Slide 46: SG&A Efficiencies Could Increase EBITDA By Almost $500 MM

    SG&A Efficiencies Could Increase EBITDA By Almost $500 MM Greater focus within a few key therapeutic categories should allow for greater cost synergies Potential G&A cuts including procurement efficiencies, head count reductions and consolidation of existing properties Increase efficiency of sales a

  47. Slide 47: Evaluate Current Pipeline for Development Program Rationalization

    Evaluate Current Pipeline for Potential Development Program Rationalization Identify existing projects that do not fit within the new business development strategy or do not achieve pre-determined return on investment (IRR) criteria Reduce R&D spending Terminate poorly performing R&D programs Evalua

  48. Slide 48: Evaluate Capital Allocation Decisions and Optimize Balance Sheet

    Evaluate Capital Allocation Decisions and Optimize Balance Sheet Potentially increase company leverage while maintaining strong Net Debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/Interest Expense ratios Evaluate the best potential uses for excess cash on the balance sheet that are most likely to enhance shareholder value *

  49. Slide 49: Corporate Governance Changes

    Corporate Governance Changes Replace four current Board members with Icahn Nominees who we believe will continually hold management accountable Split CEO and Chairman roles Appoint new Chairs to Compensation and Compliance Committees Replace the current Presiding “Independent” Director with an indep

  50. Slide 50: Four Directors Who Have Trouble Seeing the Forest For the Trees

    Four Directors That We Believe Have Trouble “Seeing the FOREST For the Trees” Source: Company documents * Potential lack of independence due to length of Board tenure Need for fresh perspective after 35 years on the Board Lack of any biopharma experience outside of Forest Oversaw flawed compensation

  51. Slide 51: Icahn Nominees Are Highly Qualified to Help Produce Positive Change

    Icahn Nominees Are Highly Qualified to Help Produce Positive Change

  52. Slide 52: Collective Experience of Icahn Slate Will Help Create Shareholder Value

    We Believe the Collective Experience of Icahn Slate Will Help Create Shareholder Value A history of helping create shareholder value & stock price appreciation Value-enhancing capital allocation & efficient use of balance sheet Successful turnarounds of underperforming business operations Implemente

  53. Slide 53: Icahn Slate Will Improve Oversight and Bring Fresh Perspective

    We Believe the Icahn Slate Will Improve Oversight and Bring a Fresh & Independent Perspective Nominee Background and Experience Eric J. Ende, MD As biopharmaceutical analyst for 11 years, he analyzed hundreds of companies with respect to financial statements, cost structure, drug markets, acquisitio

  54. Slide 54: Eric Ende's Highly Relevant Experience

    We Believe Eric Ende’s Highly Relevant Experience Will Help Resolve Forest’s Issues Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Long-tenured Directors that lacked independence Replace long tenured Directors and work constructively with remaining Board Genzyme Board contai

  55. Slide 55: Drew Fromkin's Highly Relevant Experience

    We Believe Drew Fromkin’s Highly Relevant Experience Will Help Resolve Forest’s Issues Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Business development strategy is not enhancing shareholder value Evaluate current business development strategy for potential modification Id

  56. Slide 56: Pierre Legault's Highly Relevant Experience

    We Believe Pierre Legault’s Highly Relevant Experience Will Help Resolve Forest’s Issues Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Business development strategy is not enhancing shareholder value Evaluate current business development strategy for potential modification

  57. Slide 57: Dan Ninivaggi's Highly Relevant Experience

    We Believe Dan Ninivaggi’s Highly Relevant Experience Will Help Resolve Forest’s Issues Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Long-tenured Directors that lacked independence Replace long tenured Directors and work constructively with remaining Board Worked with exis

  58. Slide 58: Icahn's Track Record of Board Representation in Biopharma

    Icahn’s Track Record of Board Representation in Biopharma Shows Impressive Creation of Shareholder Value Source: Market Data Note: All time periods are measured from the day that Icahn gained (or announced gaining) Board representation until the most recent date of update or when an acquisition pric

  59. Slide 59: Icahn is Fully Aligned With Shareholders

    Icahn is Fully Aligned With Shareholders Despite the Board and executive officers having a combined 197 years at the company, they only own 1.95% of the company versus Icahn’s 9.81%. Who do you think is better aligned with the best interests of shareholders? Source: Company documents; proxy statemen

  60. Slide 60: Ende Agreement Fully Aligns Performance With All Shareholders

    We Believe Ende Agreement Fully Aligns Performance With All Shareholders Icahn & Ende have an agreement that compensates for performance related to Forest Lab’s stock The agreement provides for a payout structure like a 2 ½ year call option on 263,617 shares of Forest with a strike price of $47.50.

  61. Slide 61: Appendix A: Pipeline Strategy

    Appendix A: Pipeline Strategy

  62. Slide 62: New Pipeline Drug Sales vs. Guidance

    New Pipeline Drug Sales vs. Guidance Source: Company documents and SEC Filings *

  63. Slide 63: Average Drug Development Timelines By Therapeutic Class

    Average Drug Development Timelines By Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development *

  64. Slide 64: Average Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class

    Average Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development *

  65. Slide 65: Average Time Until Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class

    Average Time (years) Until Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development *

  66. Slide 66: Clinical Development Probabilities

    Clinical Development Probabilities Source: FDAReview.org; odds of product approval assuming entrance into each stage of development *

  67. Slide 67: Pipeline Chart

    Pipeline Chart Pipeline Drug Odds of Launch Proj. Dev Time Projected FY of Launch FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 Savella 58% 4.7 FY09 29 58 87 116 145 174 203 203 203 CCR1 17% 9.2 FY15 46 92 137 Oglemilast 21% 8.2 FY14 46 92 137 183 Cariprazine 21% 8.8 FY14 85 170 255 340 Desmoteplase

  68. Slide 68: Appendix B: Capital Deployment

    Appendix B: Capital Deployment

  69. Slide 69: Capital Put At-Risk By Year

    Capital Put At-Risk By Year Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 – FY13; Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights *

  70. Slide 70: Number of Products Licensed By Year

    Number of Products Licensed By Year Notes: All products licensed FY04 – FY13; SEC filing and company documents *

  71. Slide 71: Capital Put At-Risk By Therapeutic Class

    Capital Put At-Risk By Therapeutic Class Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 – FY13 (includes Lexapro and Namenda, which were licensed 1998 and 2000, respectively); Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights *

  72. Slide 72: Capital Put At-Risk By Product

    Capital Put At-Risk By Product Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 – FY13 (includes Lexapro and Namenda, which were licensed 1998 and 2000, respectively); Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights *

  73. Slide 73: Share Repurchases

    Share Repurchases Source: SEC filings *

  74. Slide 74: Forest Properties

    Forest Properties Location Type of facility Approximate Square Footage Owned properties (US) Commack, NY Administration and Research & Development 20,000 Commack, NY Administration and Research & Development 103,000 Commack, NY Administration and Sales Training 387,000 Commack, NY Leased to tenants

  75. Slide 75: Appendix C: CEO Compensation & Stock Sales

    Appendix C: CEO Compensation & Stock Sales

  76. Slide 76: CEO Stock Sales

    CEO Stock Sales Shares Sold (& Price) By Year Total Proceeds ($MM) Source: SEC filings *

  77. Slide 77: CEO Compensation by Year

    CEO Compensation by Year Source: SEC filings *

  78. Slide 78: Appendix D: Comparative Companies

    Appendix D: Comparative Companies

  79. Slide 79: SG&A/Revenues

    SG&A/Revenues Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings *

  80. Slide 80: R&D/Revenues

    R&D/Revenues Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings *

  81. Slide 81: Operating Margins

    Operating Margins Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings *

  82. Slide 82: Revenues/Sales Rep

    Revenues/Sales Rep Source: SEC filings *

  83. Slide 83: Cash as a Percent of Market Cap

    Cash as a Percent of Market Cap Source: SEC filings *

  84. Slide 84: Vote the GOLD Proxy Card

    Vote the GOLD Proxy Card IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ON HOW TO VOTE CONTACT D.F. KING & CO., INC. BY TELEPHONE AT THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS: STOCKHOLDERS CALL TOLL−FREE: (800) 697−6975 BANKS AND BROKERAGE FIRMS CALL: (212) 269−5550 OR CALL EDWARD MCCARTHY OF D.F. KING DIRECTLY AT (212) 493-6952

  85. Slide 85: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer Special note regarding this presentation This presentation includes information based on data found in filings with the SEC, independent industry publications and other sources. Although we believe that the data is reliable, we do not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this informa

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