Bank Of Greece Sa · ATHEX:TELL
Bank Of Greece Sa — Investor Presentation
19 slides from Bank Of Greece Sa's investor presentation
Slide 1: Lessons from the Crisis for International Financial Surveillance
Lessons from the Crisis for International Financial Surveillance Dimitri G Demekas Assistant Director Monetary & Capital Markets Department, IMF
Slide 2: Lessons from the crisis; International financial surveillance
Lessons from the crisis What have SE European countries learned? International financial surveillance What has the IMF learned? 2
Slide 3: Lessons from the crisis
Lessons from the crisis Financial regulation Macroeconomic policies Global financial architecture Initial Lessons from the Crisis (http:// www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4315 ) Lessons from the Crisis for Future Regulation ( http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/02 0409.pdf ) 3 L
Slide 4: Lessons from the crisis I
Lessons from the crisis I Financial regulation Perimeter (regulation, information) Procyclicality (accounting, regulation) Prudential rules (capital requirements, liquidity, risk management, macro-prudential factors) Corporate governance practices (information disclosure, executive compens
Slide 5: Lessons from the crisis II
Lessons from the crisis II Macroeconomic policy Bubbles Leverage Countercyclical policies: macro only or macro-and-prudential? 5
Slide 6: Lessons from the crisis III
Lessons from the crisis III Global financial architecture Cooperation in regulation, bank resolution, systemic liquidity Improved surveillance, especially of systemically important countries IMF governance and mandate 6
Slide 7: What lessons matter for SE Europe? What have we learned from SE Europe?
What lessons matter for SE Europe? What have we learned from SE Europe? Procyclicality in policy and regulation Capital requirements, liquidity rules The importance of leverage Regional contagion, regional cooperation 7
Slide 8: International financial surveillance: What has the IMF learned?
International financial surveillance: What has the IMF learned? IMF surveillance instruments: Multilateral surveillance (WEO, GFSR) Bilateral surveillance (Article IV consultation) Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 8
Slide 9: Better tools, greater flexibility
Better tools, greater flexibility Greater focus on crisis preparedness crisis management frameworks Improved stress testing techniques Emphasize data gaps/caveats Focus on liquidity risks Capture cross-market, cross-country exposure More flexible FSAPs More focused “modular” stability
Slide 10: New forms of IMF engagement
New forms of IMF engagement European Bank Coordination Initiative Cooperation with FSB and financial sector standard-setters (EWE, revisions to standards) Input to FSB and G-20 “peer reviews” New forms of multilateralism? 10
Slide 11: Thank you
Thank you owt Ly, iy S FY % Et 7 cries Ded cA ae 1 s is os Apes
Slide 12: Standard capital inflow surge financing an investment and growth boom…
Standard capital inflow surge financing an investment and growth boom… Capital inflows ($ million), emerging Europe, 2003-2007 300000 Bank loans Portfolio investment: bonds Portfolio investment: equity 250000 Direct investment 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: IMF, Intern
Slide 13: … while macro policies were insufficiently countercyclical…
…while macro policies were insufficiently countercyclical… Government Balance/GDP for Emerging Europe Countries (in percent) 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -6.0 -8.0 -10.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 13
Slide 14: … and prudential rules were procyclical.
… and prudential rules were procyclical. Higher profitability: lower provisioning Higher growth: lower provisioning 14
Slide 15: The importance of capital and liquidity buffers
The importance of capital and liquidity buffers Croatia’s “unorthodox” measures 2003-07 Marginal reserve requirement on foreign borrowing by banks at 55% eliminated Reserve requirement at 17% reduced to 14% Fx liquid asset requirement at 32% reduced to 20% Credit controls …did not help s
Slide 16: The importance of leverage
The importance of leverage 16
Slide 17: Regional aspects of the crisis
Regional aspects of the crisis CESE: Asset share of foreign-owned banks, in percent 100 90 2000 2006 80 70 60 50 40 TSI 30 20 TMO 12 12 12 10 T-Com 0 BGR ROM RUS MNE MKD UKR EST CZE ALB B&H HRV HUN SRB SVK LTH LTA SVN POL Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and IMF staff calcul
Slide 18: Regional aspects of the crisis
Regional aspects of the crisis Share of Emerging Europe in total group assets and operating income 100% 90% Assets Operating income 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% OTP RAIF ERST UNIC KBC ISP SG Source: Annual reports of banking groups. Societe Generale: Net banking income. RAIF = Raiffeisen; ERST
Slide 19: European Bank Coordination Initiative
European Bank Coordination Initiative Changes in External Positions of Western Banks in Eastern European Countries (from September 2008 to March 2009; in percent) 1/ 25 25 20 EBCI Countries 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 -5 -5 -10 -10 -15 -15 -20 -20 M o n te n e g ro M a c e d o n ia -25 -25 L ith u a n ia