Slide 1: The Wrong Time, Wrong Process and Wrong Price
The Wrong Time, Wrong Process and Wrong Price BROADWOOD PARTNERS, L.P. INVESTOR PRESENT ATION Stockholders Should Vote Against Alcon’s Proposed Acquisition of STAAR Surgical www.LetSTAARShine.com CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 2: Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 01 Executive Summary PAGE 3 02 The Wrong Time PAGE 9 Part A: STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges PAGE 13 Part B: STAAR’s Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong PAGE 19 03 The Wrong Process PAGE 36 04 The Wrong Price PAGE 52 05 Conclusion PAG
Slide 3: Executive Summary
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 01 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 4: Overview of Broadwood Partners, L.P.
Overview of Broadwood Partners, L.P. Broadwood Partners, L.P. is an investment management firm based in New York We invest in companies that we believe have substantial long- We have been a committed investor in, and strong supporter of, STAAR Surgical term growth potential due to their strength
Slide 5: Overview of STAAR Surgical (NASDAQ: STAA)
Overview of STAAR Surgical (NASDAQ: STAA) STAAR Surgical is a leading developer, manufacturer and marketer of implantable lenses for refractive vision correction STAAR Surgical designs, develops, manufactures and sells Implantable Collamer® Lenses (ICLs) for refractive surgery to treat myopia (nea
Slide 6: Overview of Alcon (SIX/NYSE: ALC)
Overview of Alcon (SIX/NYSE: ALC) Alcon is a global leader in eye care with a broad portfolio of products Alcon develops, manufactures and distributes a full suite of eye care products within two business segments: Surgical and Vision Care — The Surgical segment is focused on ophthalmic products f
Slide 7: Overview of the Acquisition of STAAR by Alcon
Overview of the Acquisition of STAAR by Alcon Announcement Date August 5, 2025 Buyer Alcon Inc., a NYSE-listed, Swiss-American global leader in eye care, with ~$10 billion in revenue and a $40 billion market capitalization $28 per share in cash Consideration ~$1.5 billion in equity value; ~$1.3
Slide 8: Executive Summary
Executive Summary We urge stockholders to vote against the Proposed Merger using the GREEN Proxy Card The Wrong Time The Wrong Process The Wrong Price In our view, there is no need to sell the Company now, STAAR’s Board chose to engage with just one In our view, the purchase price of $28 per s
Slide 9: The Wrong Time
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 02 THE WRONG TIME CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 10: Now Is the Wrong Time to Sell STAAR
Now Is the Wrong Time to Sell STAAR STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary STAAR’s Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating A Tactical Challenges B and Its Prospects Remain Strong Over the last year, STAAR has been navigating temporary macroeconomic headwinds and Despite these near-term challenges, there is no
Slide 11: STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges…
STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges… Alcon is taking advantage of what has been a turbulent period for STAAR and a temporary dislocation in its stock price STAAR Stock Price $60.00 Apr 30, 2024 Oct 29, 2024 Feb 11, 2025 May 7, 2025 May 16, 2025 Aug 6, 2025 The Board meets to consider
Slide 12: … But STAAR's Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong
… But STAAR’s Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong After a brief and temporary disruption, management expects STAAR to grow quickly and become more profitable than ever Net Sales ($M) Adjusted EBITDA ($M) Temporary Temporary Return to Growth Return to Growth Headwinds Head
Slide 13: The Wrong Time – Part A: Temporary Tactical Challenges
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 02 THE WRONG TIME PART A Staar Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 14: STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges
A STAAR Has Been Facing Temporary Tactical Challenges Macroeconomic factors, such as higher interest rates, elevated inflation and tariffs, have weighed on consumer confidence Consumer Confidence and contributed to a decline in consumer spending 1 Has Deteriorated, Especially in China China – a
Slide 15: Consumer Confidence Has Deteriorated, Especially in China
A 1 Consumer Confidence Has Deteriorated, Especially in China Various economic factors – including higher interest rates, elevated inflation and tariffs – have weighed on consumer confidence Macroeconomic factors including higher interest rates, Consumer Confidence Index (Monthly)1 elevated inflat
Slide 16: Refractive Procedures Are Down Globally
A 2 Refractive Procedures Are Down Globally Weakened consumer confidence has negatively impacted demand for refractive surgeries around the world Refractive procedures – including for STAAR’s Year-Over-Year Growth in Number of Refractive Procedures Globally1 ICLs – are cash pay, discretionary and
Slide 17: Inventory Levels in China Grew Substantially, Causing Near-Term Disruption
A 3 Inventory Levels in China Grew Substantially, Causing Near-Term Disruption In February 2025, the Company reported significant excess inventory in China, which had several knock-on effects STAAR Dramatically Reduced Its Outlook The Stock Price Declined and Analysts The Board Initiated a CEO and B
Slide 18: As a Result of These Challenges, STAAR's Financial Results Have Temporarily Deteriorated
A 4 As a Result of These Challenges, STAAR’s Financial Results Have Temporarily Deteriorated Transitory demand and inventory challenges have negatively impacted STAAR’s revenue and profitability LTM Net Sales at End of Period ($M) LTM Adjusted EBITDA at End of Period ($M) Temporary $120 Temporary 20
Slide 19: The Wrong Time – Part B: Headwinds Are Abating
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 02 THE WRONG TIME PART B Staar’s Near-term Headwinds are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 20: STAAR's Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong
B STAAR’s Near-Term Headwinds Are Abating and Its Prospects Remain Strong The Company has only just begun to realize benefits of an “organizational reset” that included the appointment of a new CEO, a realigned leadership STAAR’s Recent Actions structure, significant cost reductions, optimized inv
Slide 21: The Company's Recent Financial Results Demonstrated Improvement
B 1 The Company’s Recent Financial Results Demonstrated Improvement STAAR worked off excess inventory in China, delivered strong sales in other markets and reduced expenses STAAR’s financial results for Q2 2025 were strong and indicate that the Company is turning a corner Gross Margin1 — Revenue b
Slide 22: The Company's Recent Financial Results Demonstrated Improvement (Continued)
B 1 The Company’s Recent Financial Results Demonstrated Improvement (Continued) The Company’s second quarter 2025 financial results exceeded analyst expectations 2Q25 Net Sales ($M) 2Q25 Adjusted EBITDA ($M) 2Q25 Gross Margin 74% $44.3 64% $40.9 ($14.9) ($24.2) Consensus Actual Consensus Actual Cons
Slide 23: STAAR's Recent Actions Have Strengthened the Company
B 1 STAAR’s Recent Actions Have Strengthened the Company The Company is in a much stronger position than it was a few months ago Milestone Date Announced What STAAR Said Potential Implications CEO Transition February 26, 2025 “I am excited to join STAAR as CEO at this critical time… We have a best-i
Slide 24: STAAR's Recent Actions Have Strengthened the Company (Continued)
B 1 STAAR’s Recent Actions Have Strengthened the Company (Continued) It is not surprising that Alcon would seek to purchase the Company before the benefits of these initiatives are fully realized Milestone Date Announced What STAAR Said Potential Implications Cost Reductions May 7, 2025 “The Company
Slide 25: Markets Outside China Remain Robust…
B 2 Markets Outside China Remain Robust… Sales in the Americas and EMEA have continued to grow consistently and show no signs of slowing While sales in China have been depressed as LTM Net Sales at End of Period ($M)1 distributors have been working off excess channel inventory, STAAR’s sales in th
Slide 26: …And ICLs Have Outpaced the Broader Refractive Market…
B 2 …And ICLs Have Outpaced the Broader Refractive Market… STAAR’s U.S. business is modest, but it is growing significantly faster than the U.S. refractive market overall STAAR believes, as we do, that the future of refractive surgery is U.S. ICL Unit vs. Refractive Market Growth1 lens-based (vs.
Slide 27: … And Are Expected to Continue to Take Market Share
B 2 … And Are Expected to Continue to Take Market Share ICLs are growing in popularity in the U.S., seemingly at the expense of other refractive procedures Data regarding laser vision correction indicates overall Share of U.S. Refractive Vision Corrective Procedures1 procedure volumes are dropping
Slide 28: The Total Addressable Market Is Expected to Continue to Grow
B 3 The Total Addressable Market Is Expected to Continue to Grow Myopia is the most common eye condition leading to visual impairment,1 and is growing rapidly “The myopia epidemic is just exploding,” with the number of Expected Cases of Myopia Worldwide (in Billions)2 candidates for STAAR’s EVO IC
Slide 29: ICLs Enjoy Significant Benefits Over Other Refractive Procedures…
B 4 ICLs Enjoy Significant Benefits Over Other Refractive Procedures… We believe ICLs are the clear choice in vision correction EVO / EVO+ ICL LASIK PRK SMILE Safety Features Reversible Treats eyes with thin cornea UV protection Long history of use Vision Quality Sharp and clear vision Ability to co
Slide 30: …And Recent Data Indicate that ICLs May Become the Dominant Choice
B 4 …And Recent Data Indicate that ICLs May Become the Dominant Choice We believe ICLs are superior to other refractive procedures and will continue to take market share Published data demonstrate that ICL patients Lines of Improvement on a Standard Eye Chart with EVO ICLs vs. Prior Corrective Sol
Slide 31: Management Is Forecasting a Quick Return to Growth and Profitability…
B 5 Management Is Forecasting a Quick Return to Growth and Profitability… Management expects revenue growth and profitability not just to recover, but to exceed historical levels Net Sales CAGR Average Adjusted EBITDA Margin 27% 29% 19% 14% 9% 11% 6% (10%) 2010-2019 2019-2023 2023-2025P 2025P-2030P
Slide 32: … And Has Previously Expressed Confidence in the Company's Future
B 5 … And Has Previously Expressed Confidence in the Company’s Future Management shares our enthusiasm for the Company’s prospects Global myopia rates are expected to I'm optimistic for the future and excited [W]e're well-positioned for a strong increase by almost 20 points to 50% of about being par
Slide 33: STAAR's Newfound Strategic Pessimism Is an Abrupt About-Face
B 5 STAAR’s Newfound Strategic Pessimism Is an Abrupt About-Face Management’s own remarks suggest STAAR’s challenges are abating and there is no imperative for the Company to be sold Topic What STAAR Is Saying in Its Proxy Materials1 What STAAR Has Said Recently Elsewhere “Our business is heavily ex
Slide 34: STAAR's Latest Remarks on China Are Disingenuous
B 5 STAAR’s Latest Remarks on China Are Disingenuous Management’s own prior statements demonstrate that China remains a promising market What STAAR Is Saying About China What STAAR Has Recently Said Topic in Its Latest Presentation1 Recently Elsewhere About China Net Sales in China ($M)1 “That's whe
Slide 35: We Agree with Management that STAAR Has a Bright Future
B We Agree with Management that STAAR Has a Bright Future As recently as a few months ago, management expressed the same level of enthusiasm we have for STAAR’s business Management recently confirmed that …touted the Company’s large and growing market opportunity… …and emphasized the STAAR’s short-t
Slide 36: The Wrong Process
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 03 THE WRONG PROCESS CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 37: We Believe the Board's Sale and Negotiation Process Was Flawed
We Believe the Board’s Sale and Negotiation Process Was Flawed The Board did not engage meaningfully with any potential acquirer other than Alcon and did not instruct its financial advisor, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“Citi”), to reach out to other parties The Board Did Not The Merger Agreeme
Slide 38: The Board Did Not Conduct Any Proactive Outreach
1 The Board Did Not Conduct Any Proactive Outreach The Board granted Alcon the privileged position of being the only party with access to diligence materials and management STAAR’s Board did not run a market check or direct the Company’s financial advisor to solicit interest from any potential Num
Slide 39: The Board's Rationale for Conducting a Limited Process Is Unavailing
1 The Board’s Rationale for Conducting a Limited Process Is Unavailing We believe the Board erred by not conducting a more fulsome process that stoked demand and maximized competitive tension STAAR’s Rationale for Not Conducting Outreach Broadwood’s Response In our view, the Board’s focus should h
Slide 40: A "Window Shop" Period Is Not a Substitute for a Fulsome Process
1 A “Window Shop” Period Is Not a Substitute for a Fulsome Process Go-shop and window shop provisions almost never lead to an alternative bid In the Company’s proxy statement, the Board touts the Merger Transactions Announced Since 2000 with Go-Shop or Window Shop Provision1 Agreement’s “window sh
Slide 41: The Process Was Rushed and Truncated
2 The Process Was Rushed and Truncated Negotiations with Alcon took place over just one month Once Alcon’s CEO contacted STAAR’s CEO in June 2025 Duration of Sale Process (Days)1 indicating that Alcon was interested in re-engaging in discussions regarding a potential transaction, the process 146 u
Slide 42: Management Abruptly Lowered Its Projections, Seemingly to Justify the Deal
3 Management Abruptly Lowered Its Projections, Seemingly to Justify the Deal Management produced a more conservative set of projections for the Company’s financial advisor to use in its fairness opinion In early July 2025, STAAR’s management team began working on Net Sales ($M)1 multi-year financi
Slide 43: Revised Projections Led to a "Perfect" DCF to Justify the Deal
3 Revised Projections Led to a “Perfect” DCF to Justify the Deal The revised, pessimistic projections resulted in a materially lower valuation range for STAAR The revised projections significantly reduce forward projections …which result in a substantially lower of STAAR’s unlevered free cash flow…
Slide 44: Citi Used an Unreasonable Discount Rate, Further Lowering Its View of Value
3 Citi Used an Unreasonable Discount Rate, Further Lowering Its View of Value STAAR’s financial advisor used a discount rate that is excessive by any objective measure In addition to relying on revised, pessimistic Weighted Average Cost of Capital projections, Citi also applied an extremely high d
Slide 45: The Fairness Opinion DCF Value Is Artificially Low…
3 The Fairness Opinion DCF Value Is Artificially Low… A more appropriate discount rate, and management’s original projections, would have yielded a significantly higher valuation range Implied per Share Equity Value Reference Range Based on DCF Analysis Reference Range Used by STAAR's Financial Advi
Slide 46: …As Is the Range of Analyst Price Targets
3 …As Is the Range of Analyst Price Targets Citi applied the same excessive discount rate to analyst price targets to produce another valuation range; the range of analyst price targets based on an appropriate control premium would have been much higher Implied per Share Equity Value Reference Range
Slide 47: Citi's Peer Analysis Is Also Flawed
3 Citi’s Peer Analysis Is Also Flawed STAAR’s financial advisor based a portion of its analysis on peers with much lower expected growth and margins CY 2025E – CY 2027E Revenue CAGR 2027E Adjusted EBITDA Margin 30% (~2,000 bps) 20% (~700 bps) 20% 17% 13% 11% STAAR¹ Broadwood's Comparable Citi's Comp
Slide 48: We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts
4 We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts Citi’s desire for a transaction may have led to a biased and flawed sale process STAAR’s financial advisor was highly incentivized to support Citi Fees for U.S. Public Company Sell-Side Transactions Announced in 2025 ($M)2 a transaction, in
Slide 49: We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts (Continued)
4 We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts (Continued) The Chair of STAAR’s Board, Dr. Elizabeth Yeu, appears to have an especially close relationship with Alcon The Chair of the Board, Dr. Elizabeth Yeu, had previously served as a paid consultant to Alcon; Dr. Yeu received hundreds
Slide 50: We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts (Continued)
4 We Believe the Process Was Rife with Material Conflicts (Continued) Several directors and advisors have close ties to Alcon that were seemingly not disclosed – to each other or stockholders It is unclear that STAAR’s independent directors knew of Dr. Yeu’s relationship with Alcon while negotiati
Slide 51: We Believe the Executives Were Incentivized to Support a Sale
5 We Believe the Executives Were Incentivized to Support a Sale STAAR’s CEO will earn approximately $24 million in compensation – for five months of work – as a result of the Merger Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, the NEOs’ equity awards vest upon the consummation of the Proposed Merger (
Slide 52: The Wrong Price
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 04 THE WRONG PRICE CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 53: We Believe the Price Is Inadequate and Not a Reflection of Fair Value
We Believe the Price Is Inadequate and Not a Reflection of Fair Value The Proposed Merger The Proposed Merger values STAAR below the median of a group of comparable medical technology companies 1 1 Values STAAR Below Comparable MedTech We believe that these companies are more appropriate peers f
Slide 54: The Proposed Merger Values STAAR Below Comparable MedTech Companies…
1 The Proposed Merger Values STAAR Below Comparable MedTech Companies… We believe STAAR warrants a materially higher valuation multiple, based on those of other comparable MedTech companies EV/Revenue Multiple¹ 6.0x 5.0x 4.9x 4.0x 4.1x 3.7x CY 2025E CY 2026E CY2027E Proposed Merger Comparable MedTec
Slide 55: …Below the Company's Historical Valuation Multiple…
2 …Below the Company’s Historical Valuation Multiple… It appears that Alcon took full advantage of STAAR’s recent – and, in our view, temporary – decline in valuation STAAR EV / Revenue Multiple 9.6x 7.7x 5.1x 4.3x 4.0x 3.7x FY+1 FY+2 Proposed Merger 3-Year Average 5-Year Average Broadwood Partners,
Slide 56: …Below STAAR's Historical Stock Price…
3 …Below STAAR’s Historical Stock Price… The Proposed Merger consideration reflects a temporary period of weakness for the business and a depressed stock price STAAR Stock Price $160.00 1-Year VWAP: $22.96 2-Year VWAP: $30.42 $140.00 3-Year VWAP $39.64 $120.00 4-Year VWAP: $46.45 $100.00 5-Year VWAP
Slide 57: …And Below Historical Analyst Price Targets
4 …And Below Historical Analyst Price Targets As recently as a few months ago, analysts valued STAAR more than 50% higher than the Proposed Merger price Mean Analyst Price Targets (Without Control Premium) for STAAR $160.00 1-Year Avg.: $32.37 2-Year Avg.: $40.75 $140.00 3-Year Avg.: $55.63 4-Year A
Slide 58: STAAR's Pre-Deal Trading and Expected Growth Should Have Inspired a Higher Premium
5 STAAR’s Pre-Deal Trading and Expected Growth Should Have Inspired a Higher Premium Alcon’s offer came when STAAR was trading near multi-year lows; we believe the Company deserved a higher premium STAAR’s total stockholder return during the one-year Median Premia Based on One-Year TSR of Target P
Slide 59: STAAR's Expected Growth Should Have Led to a Higher Multiple
5 STAAR’s Expected Growth Should Have Led to a Higher Multiple STAAR’s expected growth supports a significantly higher trading multiple, and therefore a much higher premium The Proposed Merger values STAAR at just 3.4x management’s CY 2025E – 2027E Revenue CAGR vs. EV / CY 2027E Revenue Multiple1
Slide 60: STAAR's Expected Margins Should Have Led to a Higher Multiple
5 STAAR’s Expected Margins Should Have Led to a Higher Multiple STAAR’s margins are expected to improve dramatically, which we believe also justifies a significantly higher valuation Based on management’s revised projections, STAAR is expected to CY 2027E Adjusted EBITDA Margin vs. EV / CY 2027E R
Slide 61: The Price Is Well Below Alcon's Prior Offers
6 The Price Is Well Below Alcon’s Prior Offers Just a year ago, Alcon was prepared to pay substantially more for STAAR Alcon first emerged as a potential suitor for STAAR in Per Share Value of Alcon Offers for STAAR April 2024, offering $58 per share in cash — At the time, the Board concluded that
Slide 62: The Price Is Well Below Alcon's Prior Offers (Continued)
6 The Price Is Well Below Alcon’s Prior Offers (Continued) The Board was convinced STAAR was worth more than $58 per share in April 2024, even though the Company’s prospects were not meaningfully different than they are today Alcon first emerged as a potential suitor for STAAR in Adjusted j EBITDA
Slide 63: The Price Is Well Below Alcon's Prior Offers (Continued)
6 The Price Is Well Below Alcon’s Prior Offers (Continued) Alcon reduced its offer by more than 50%, even though STAAR’s growth and margin profile had improved Revenue CAGR Adjusted EBITDA Margin 32% 30% 25% 24% 21% 20% 16% 16% 16% 15% Current FY to FY+2 CAGR Current FY to FY+3 CAGR FY+1 FY+2 FY+3 O
Slide 64: The Price Is Well Below Alcon's Prior Offers (Continued)
6 The Price Is Well Below Alcon’s Prior Offers (Continued) Alcon reduced its price by much more than STAAR’s prospects have changed, resulting in a dramatically lower multiple Implied EV / Consensus Revenue Multiple 8.0x 8.2x 8.0x 7.2x 6.9x (37%) (46%) 6.0x 5.9x (42%) 5.1x 5.1x (36%) 4.4x 4.0x 3.7x
Slide 65: We Believe Alcon Could Pay Significantly More for STAAR
We Believe Alcon Could Pay Significantly More for STAAR Alcon Can Accelerate the Adoption of Alcon Has Plenty of Dry Powder STAAR’s EVO Platform To Pay More I think the acquisition of STAAR represents an On the acquisition side, we have the opportunity for us to take STAAR places they capability of
Slide 66: Conclusion
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 05 CONCLUSION CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 67: Other Stockholders Have Publicly Criticized the Proposed Merger
Other Stockholders Have Publicly Criticized the Proposed Merger [B]ased on our analysis, the proposed sale at the current proposed terms “Short-term operational issues have not been separated from the long- materially undervalues the Company and does not reflect the term asset value of STAAR. The un
Slide 68: Better Alternatives Exist for Stockholders
Better Alternatives Exist for Stockholders Continue to execute strategic initiatives and return the Company to growth Ramp up production at the Company’s new Switzerland facility and continue working with partners in China to optimize inventory levels Continue the work of the Capital Stewardship
Slide 69: STAAR Has a Bright Future as a Standalone Company
STAAR Has a Bright Future as a Standalone Company There are many reasons to be optimistic about STAAR’s prospects as an independent company if the Proposed Merger is rejected STAAR’s EVO ICLs offer many advantages over competing treatments, including a lower likelihood of dry eye, a shorter recove
Slide 70: Conclusion
Conclusion We urge stockholders to vote against the Proposed Merger using the GREEN proxy card The Wrong Time The Wrong Process The Wrong Price In our view, there is no need to sell the Company now, STAAR’s Board chose to engage with just one In our view, the purchase price of $28 per share as
Slide 71: Appendix A: Overview of Refractive Surgery Technologies
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 06 APPENDIX A: Overview of Refractive Surgery Technologies CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 72: Comparison of Refractive Surgery Technologies
Comparison of Refractive Surgery Technologies EVO / EVO+ ICL LASIK PRK SMILE Implant placed in posterior chamber of Two-step procedure: a flap is created Top layer of cornea is ablated (i.e., Two-step procedure: a small, thin lenticule Description eye on the cornea, and the underlying abraded) and t
Slide 73: Comparison of Refractive Surgery Technologies (Continued)
Comparison of Refractive Surgery Technologies (Continued) EVO / EVO+ ICL LASIK PRK SMILE Quick recovery Higher patient awareness No flap-related complications Well-recognized in China No removal of corneal tissue Quick recovery Only requires one laser No flap-related complications
Slide 74: Appendix B: Trading Multiples of Comparable Medical Technology Companies
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 06 APPENDIX B: Trading Multiples of Comparable Medical Technology Companies CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 75: Trading Multiples of Comparable Medical Technology Companies
Trading Multiples of Comparable Medical Technology Companies EV / Revenue Multiple Implied Value of STAAR at EV / Revenue Multiple Company Name Enterprise Value ($M) CY 2025E CY 2026E CY 2027E CY 2025E CY 2026E CY 2027E Alcon AG $42,008 4.1x 3.8x 3.5x $23.27 $26.32 $26.83 Alphatec Holdings, Inc. $2,
Slide 76: Appendix C: Glossary of Key Terms
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 06 APPENDIX C: Glossary of Key Terms CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 77: Glossary of Key Terms
Glossary of Key Terms Term Definition Astigmatism A common eye condition where the cornea is irregularly shaped. The curvature causes light rays to focus unevenly on the retina, resulting in blurred or distorted vision Crystalline lens The natural lens that is present in the eye at birth, which is a
Slide 78: Appendix D: Important Information
I N V E S T O R P R E S E N T A T I O N 06 APPENDIX D: Important Information CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two Seas Capital LP
Slide 79: Important Information
Important Information CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS Broadwood Partners, Broadwood Capital, Inc., Neal C. Bradsher, Richard T. LeBuhn, Natalie R. Capasso, Raymond A. Myers and Jason J. Martin (collectively, the “Participants”) have filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (
Slide 80: Important Information (Continued)
Important Information (Continued) DISCLAIMER The information contained herein is provided for discussion and general informational purposes only and does not constitute an offering or the solicitation of an offer to purchase an interest in any investment. The views expressed herein are those of Broa
Slide 81: For Investors / For Media
For Investors For Media John Ferguson / Joseph Mills Scott Deveau / Jeremy Jacobs Saratoga Proxy Consulting LLC August Strategic Communications (212) 257-1311 / (888) 368-0379 (323) 805-8919 info@saratogaproxy.com broadwood@augustco.com www.LetSTAARShine.com CONFIDENTIAL © All rights reserved. Two S