Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration (17. IAR 2025 ENG. 0)

INTRODUCTION

This Annual Report on the Directors' Remuneration (the "Report") includes the Directors' Remuneration Policy of COLONIAL SFL SOCIMI, S.A., (hereinafter referred to either as "Colonial SFL", the "Company" and, along with its subsidiaries, as the "Group") to be applied in the current financial year 2026, and the one applied in the financial year 2025, approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting held on 15 June 2023.

This Report has been drawn up in a freely designed format in accordance with the regulatory authorisation contained in Circular 4/2013, although its contents observe the minimum standards established in the applicable regulations and is accompanied by the standard statistical Appendix.

Colonial SFL's Board of Directors approved at its meeting of 26 February 2026, according to a proposal submitted by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (hereinafter referred to either as the "Nomination and Remuneration Committee" or the "Committee" or the "NRC") and in accordance with applicable regulations, the present Report corresponding to the financial year 2025. It will be submitted to the next Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting, as a separate item on the agenda, for an advisory vote.

1. LETTER FROM THE CHAIR OF THE NOMINATION AND REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 2
2. REMUNERATION AT A GLANCE 4
3. 2026 REMUNERATION POLICY 6
4. 2025 REMUNERATION 12 17
5. CONSISTENCY WITH THE COMPANY'S STRATEGY, INTERESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE LONGTERM 18
6. COMPANY PROCEDURES AND BODIES INVOLVED IN DETERMINING, APPROVING AND APPLYING THE REMUNERATION POLICY AND ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Dear stakeholders,

I am pleased to address you as Chair of Colonial SFL's Nomination and Remuneration Committee, to present the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration for the financial year 2025.

This Report includes the Directors' Remuneration Policy1 for the current financial year 2026 (hereinafter referred to as either the "Policy" or the "Remuneration Policy"), and that applied for the closed financial year 2025.

The 2025 General Shareholders' Meeting

The General Shareholders' Meeting held in 2025 approved the Annual Report on the Directors' Remuneration for the financial year 2024 (advisory vote) and the modification of the Long-Term Incentive Plan (adjustment of the maximum number of shares to be delivered) with 96.05% and 96.78% of votes in favour, respectively.

In 2025, Colonial SFL as part of the regular consultation process with proxy advisors and institutional shareholders, held several contacts and meetings with the aim of actively listening to their comments and suggestions on the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration. During this process, the main recommendations focused on the degree of transparency of the variable compensation performance scales (ex-ante), particularly the multi-year remuneration. Transparency is a core principles of the Remuneration Policy and, therefore, once the performance period for each cycle of the Plan has ended, the NRC conducts an assessment in the first quarter of the following year, evaluating the achievement of each metric and the Plan as a whole, based on the information provided by the Company, and proposes the payouts associated with each metric's achievement, according to the performance scales established in the Plan. All of this is disclosed in the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration.

Outcomes and remuneration accrued in 2025 by the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")

The 2025 results reflect the strength of Colonial SFL's business model. Strong leasing momentum, driven by the quality of the portfolio and the diversification of activity across all geographies, combined with progress in pipeline execution and a commitment to urban transformation. These drivers consolidate Colonial SFL's growth and reinforce its leadership in the main European markets.

Specifically, in 2025, the increase in recurring net profit per share was

+1.8%, consolidating a three-year compound annual growth rate of +2.6%. This excellent result is explained by strong sustained revenue growth, driven by rental income growth (+4.7% like for like), particularly within the Paris portfolio, placing it among the highest in Europe, and further supported by project deliveries and a strong pricing strategy. Asset sales in the last three financial years have been carried out at a premium of +0.9% over their appraised value.

In terms of sustainability, Colonial SFL maintains its leading position, achieving top scores in various ESG ratings. According to Sustainalytics, Colonial SFL ranks as the leading company within the Ibex-35, with a score of 6 points, which places it in the top 0.2% of companies analysed globally. Colonial SFL has also received a 5-Star rating from GRESB and is recognized as one of the "Global Sector Leaders Listed". Furthermore, Colonial SFL has remained on CDP's "A List" for the fifth consecutive year, consolidating its position as one of the leading companies in sustainability at international level.

The total shareholder return (TSR) of Colonial SFL in 2025 has been

+11.4% (2025 share appreciation + dividend paid) and 4.1% in terms of Net Tangible Asset (NTA appreciation + dividend paid).

Based on the previous results:

• The annual bonus of the CEO generated in 2025 financial year amounts to €888,274, equivalent to 111% of his base salary and 83% of the maximum annual bonus. This result considers an individual performance evaluation of the Chief Executive Officer of 110% of the target.

  In 2025, the CEO strong leadership stands out, particularly in the areas of team management and cohesion, an aspect that became clearly evident after the merger with the French subsidiary Société Foncière Lyonnaise ("SFL"). The Board of Directors assessed his performance as exceptional, highlighting his ability to combine strategic ambition with excellence in execution and people leadership, laying the foundation for solid and sustained growth over time. Under his leadership, the Company achieved positive results in the financial, operational, and sustainability areas, with significant improvements in key performance indicators. During 2025, Colonial SFL successfully executed relevant strategic milestones, including: (i) the completion of two strategic projects in 2025, one of which is of high institutional importance in France; (ii) the formalization of an alliance with Stoneshield Capital to create a pan-European platform specialising in Science and Innovation assets, which promotes the urban transformation strategy and diversification towards high-growth sectors, combining financial profitability with strategic impact; (iii) the approval of the merger with the French subsidiary SFL, which has allowed the consolidation of a single leading pan-European real estate platform in the prime segment. As a result, the Company presents an attractive sustainable growth profile, supported by a portfolio of top-quality assets, new developments and strategic initiatives, along with a capital allocation geared towards taking advantage of the recovery in the European real estate cycle.

  The amount equivalent to the target annual bonus (800,000 euros) is paid in cash in 2026. The excess is deferred in shares (16,911 shares) and its effective delivery will be made in 2027, subject to the CEO remaining at Colonial SFL.

• The incentive accrued by the CEO in 2025, corresponding to the third cycle (2023-2025) of the Long-Term Incentive Plan, amounts to 197,398 shares (including shares corresponding to dividend equivalents), equivalent to 52.5% of the maximum incentive. This result demonstrates the flexibility of the variable remuneration and the alignment between shareholders' experience and the CEO's remuneration.

  The Remuneration Policy in 2026

• In 2023, with a view to proposing the Remuneration Policy for the period 2024-2026, the Colonial SFL's NRC carried out an in-depth analysis of all the remuneration elements of the CEO, as well as of the Directors in their capacity as such.

• During the years that the Policy has been in force, it has been reviewed to ensure it continues to comply with the recommendations of main shareholders, proxy advisors, and best practices in the European real estate sector. Based on this, the remuneration approach established for 2026 is consistent with that of the previous year and there are no exceptions to the current 2024-2026 Remuneration Policy. As a new feature, metrics related to Colonial SFL's growth strategy for the coming years are introduced into the annual and multi-year variable remuneration.

  1. Links to the Remuneration Policy:

     2024-2026 Policy: https://www.colonial-sfl.com/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/2023-05/21.-COL_JGO%202023_Directors%E2%80%99%20remuneration%20from%202024% 20%20to%202026_ENTR_1.pdf

     
     
     

     The 2026 General Shareholders' Meeting

     The Board of Directors plans to submit the following proposals relating to Board remuneration for approval at the next General Shareholders' Meeting in 2026 as separate items on the Agenda:

     • This Report, which includes a final section (Appendix II) with the Statistics of the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration, fulfilled according to the provisions in Circular 3/2021, of September 28, of the CNMV.

     • The Directors' Remuneration Policy for the period 2027-2029. This Policy will be a continuation of the current one, approved at the 2023 General Shareholders' Meeting, maintaining the basic principles that guide the Company's remuneration decisions, the remuneration structure, and the criteria for alignment with the Company's interests and long-term sustainability. For its proposal, various analyses of internal equity, external competitiveness, market practice and the recommendations of the main shareholders and proxy advisors have been evaluated. Details of the analyses considered will be included in the NRC's explanatory report on the Policy.

     • A new Long-Term Incentive Plan, starting in 2027, aimed at key employees of Colonial SFL, including the CEO, and which is a continuation of the Plan in force in 2026.

I would like to conclude by thanking the members of the Committee for their dedication and contribution. Finally, I would like to thank the recommendations and suggestions received from our shareholders and proxy advisors in our ongoing consultation process, as well as the commitment and support of all those who have collaborated with this Committee.

Signed: Ana Bolado Valle

On the date this Report was drawn up, Colonial SFL's Chief Executive Officer was the only Director with executive duties

1. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: fixed elements

   Base salary

Purpose

To attract and retain the Executive Director of the calibre required to deliver our strategic goals.

Opportunity

€800,000 in 2026, pursuant to the Remuneration Policy.

Operation

Unlike Non-Executive Directors, the Executive Director does not receive any specific remuneration in respect of his membership of the

Company's Board of Directors or its Committees.

It is fully paid in cash.

1. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: performance-related elements

1. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: performance-related elements

   Description	It consists of granting Company to the beneficiaries of the Plan by means of long-term variable remuneration, subject to achieving specific multi-annual objectives.
   Term of the Plan	1 January 2026 to 31 December 2028.
   Maximum number of shares	459,770 shares. The number of shares that the CEO will finally accrue will depend on achievement of the objectives to which the 2026-2028 cycle is linked and such number may be increased by a number of shares equivalent to the amount of the dividends per share paid out by Colonial SFL to its shareholders during the cycle. For such purpose, the reference value will be the weighted average of Colonial SFL's share on the dividends payment dates in each of the years of the cycle.
   Metrics	Peer group: Arima, Covivio, Gecina, Icade, Merlin Properties, Société Tour Eiffel and Vitura.
   Operation	At the Board of Directors' meeting held on 26 February 2026, according to a proposal made by the NRC, the metrics, weightings and objectives were agreed in order to determine the Chief Executive Officer's 2026-2028 cycle, pursuant to the criteria and limits stipulated in the Remuneration Policy. Specifically, to propose the calibration of the metrics, the NRC considered the targets approved in Colonial SFL's business plan for the financial year 2026 and the financial projections. The achievement scale for each objective includes (i) a minimum threshold below which no incentive is paid and its achievement will result in the award of 30%-50% of the theoretical number of granted shares(ii) a target level that will result in the award of 100% of the theoretical number of granted shares; and (iii) a maximum level that will imply an award of 150% of the theoretical number of granted shares (200% in the event of Total Shareholder Return). To determine the result of the peer group, each company is assigned a weighting, calculated according to its degree of comparability with respect to Colonial SFL based on its market capitalization in the last 3 months of 2025. For these purposes, the Board of Directors assigns a weighting to each company in the Index and determines the parameters for its calculation, and may even modify the companies included in the Index when circumstances so advise. Payout levels are determined by the Board of Directors, on the NRC's proposal, after the performance period ends, based on the level of achievement of the objectives, and may adjust the payout level to ensure a fair and balanced outcome in view of the Company's overall results and considering any associated risks. In this respect, any positive or negative economic impact arising from any extraordinary events which may introduce distortions into the results of the evaluation, may be removed upon proposing the level of achievement of the quantitative objectives. The evaluation of performance for some metrics could be done based upon the data and the results provided by external advisors. In any case, in the event of changes to the number of shares in Colonial SFL due to a decrease or increase in the nominal value of the shares or as a result of a transaction with an equivalent impact, such as a merger, consolidation or spin-off, the maximum number of shares to be awarded will be adjusted, when appropriate, in order to maintain the equivalence of the benefits under the Plan. Moreover, the Board of Directors is authorised, at the proposal of the Committee, to agree the full or partial cancellation (malus) or refund (clawback) of the shares to be awarded to the Plan's beneficiaries. The Chief Executive Officer must hold the earned shares, net of taxes, which, if applicable, derive from the incentive, for at least one year after its accrual, without prejudice to the shareholding requirement of 2 annuities of his base salary. In the event of termination without just cause, if the General Shareholders' Meeting does not extend his term of office, or if there is a substantial modification of his duties (including the loss of their position as CEO), the CEO will be entitled to the settlement of the Plan, receiving the target number of shares prorated by the number of days elapsed between the start date of the corresponding cycle and the effective date of termination, failure to extend their term of office, or substantial modification of their duties. In the event of dismissal for cause, except for objective reasons, termination of his contract for just cause, or resignation at their own initiative, as well as in the event of a breach of contract regarding confidentiality, prohibition of offering services, or competition, the CEO will forfeit any right to the accrued long-term incentive.

   Appendix I describes the 2024-2026 and 2025-2027 LTI cycles in place.

   3.3 THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
2. Malus and clawback provisions

   The Board of Directors, on the NRC's proposal, shall have the competence to agree the cancellation (malus) and/or refund (clawback) of the payment of the annual bonus and/or the long-term incentives in the following events:

   • Significant losses and the Committee considers there is reasonable evidence to prove such downturn arises from significant failure of risk management committed by the Company or by a business unit, to which the wilful misconduct or gross negligence of the Executive Director was a contributing factor;

   • Serious breach of the Company's internal regulations and policies by the relevant beneficiary;

   • Material restatements of the Company's financial statements, when determined by the external auditor, it is not due to a regulatory change or revision of the accounting legislation and provided that the restatement results in variable compensation to be settled that is lower than that initially accrued or no compensation should have been paid in accordance with the Company's variable compensation system;

   • The remuneration has been paid on the basis of data subsequently shown to be manifestly inaccurate and provided that the restatement results in variable compensation to be settled that is lower than that initially accrued or no compensation should have been paid in accordance with the Company's variable compensation system.

   The clawback clause can be applied by the Board up to 2 years after the corresponding payment.

3. Minimum shareholding requirement

   Our Executive Director is required to build and retain a personal shareholding in Colonial SFL (within five years from the date of appointment with extra time granted if requirements increase significantly) to align his interests with those of Colonial SFL's long-term shareholders. The requirement is equivalent to 2x base salary.

   The shareholding guidelines do not count unvested share-based incentives.

   The Committee will regularly review compliance with this requirement.

   As at 31 December 2025, the Chief Executive Officer holds 610,003 shares in the Company, equivalent to ~4 annuities of his base salary in 2025 (considering 5.22 euros, weighted average share price for the 20 sessions after 15 January 2026, inclusive).

4. Main terms and conditions of the contract

   The essential terms and conditions of the Executive Director's contract, in addition to those already set out in the Remuneration Policy, are as follows:

   It has been stipulated that the term of the contract will be subject to the term of his appointment as CEO. If the appointment of CEO is renewed, the contract will be

   Severance payments for termination of the contractual relationship

   Non-compete agreement

   The Executive Director will receive an additional special indemnity as severance payment in the event of unjustified removal or non-renewal of his terms, or a substantial reduction of his respective functions. The Executive Director will be also entitled to the severance payment (i) if he departs or resigns from his posts as a result of a change in control in the Company or a major change in the composition of the Board of Directors; (ii) in the event of an amendment to the conditions agreed in his contract without his consent; and (iii) in any other scenarios established by the Board of Directors.

   For the purposes of calculating this severance payment, consideration will be given to 2 times the annual base salary and target annual bonus, excluding any other remuneration and the rights derived from the long-term incentive at any given time. The contract does not provide for the delivery of the severance payment in shares..

   In the event of a change of control, significant change in the composition of the Board of Directors or a substantial amendment to the respective functions or amendment of the conditions agreed in the contract without his consent, the Executive Director will have a period (6 months in the event of a change of control and 3 months in the rest of cases), from the effective date of these resolutions or changes to notify the Board of Directors of his resignation or departure, in which case the Executive Director will be entitled to the aforementioned severance payment.

   For the purposes of applying the foregoing, the effective date of the change of control or a significant change in the composition of the Board of Directors, will be understood as the date on which such circumstances are published as a regulatory announcement on the CNMV website under the denomination "privileged information" or "relevant facts". In the event that the Board of Directors resolves to substantially reduce the duties of the beneficiary or amend the conditions agreed in his employment contract without the beneficiary's consent, the effective date will be the time when the party concerned receives due notice of the resolution.

   The Executive Director will be subject to a noncompete commitment for a period of 6 months from the date of termination of his relationship with Colonial SFL if such termination is voluntary without cause.

   The non-competition agreement will be remunerated with a gross amount equivalent to 6 months of the annual base salary, which will be paid on a pro-rata basis during the months of the non-competition agreement.

   In case the Executive Director notified his resignation or departure in the event of a change in control, a significant change in the composition of the Board of Directors or a substantial amendment to his functions or amendment of the conditions agreed in his contract without his consent, the remuneration for the non-competition agreement will be

   Term

   understood to have been automatically renewed for the period relating to such renewal of office, unless the Board of Directors resolves otherwise, in which case a new contract must be approved.

   considered absorbed (and therefore no additional payment

   will be made) by the amount of the severance payment received.

5. Other remuneration concepts

It is not planned that Colonial SFL's CEO will accrue: (i) any other additional remuneration for providing his services other than those inherent in his position; or (ii) remuneration arising from advances, loans or guarantees being granted.

Non-Executive Directors are rewarded with respect to their effective dedication, qualification and responsibility. As such, the amount of remuneration of Non-Executive Directors is calculated so that it offers incentives to dedication, but at the same time without constituting an impediment to their independence.

Pursuant the Spanish Capital Companies Law and Colonial SFL's Bylaws, the annual remuneration of the Company's Directors in respect of their membership of the Board of Directors and its committees will consist of (i) a fixed annual remuneration; and (ii) attendance fees for meetings of the Board of Directors and its committees. Non-Executive Directors do not participate in any incentive or social welfare systems. Only verified travel and overnight accommodation expense incurred in attending Board meetings and/or any Board committee meetings are reimbursed, upon request from the Director.

The fixed remuneration and attendance fees paid for being members on the Board of Directors and its Committees and for the attendance fees at their meetings, allotted as agreed by the Board of Directors for 2026:

The fixed remuneration items specified above are the only remuneration they receive for being members on Colonial SFL's Board of Directors and its Committees. Regarding this, there is no profit-sharing or bonuses or remuneration schemes or plans that include variable remuneration.

According to the provisions in the Remuneration Policy, the maximum amount of annual remuneration for all the Directors of Colonial in respect of their membership of the Company's Board of Directors and its Committees is established at 2,700,000 euros. If the number of members of the Board of Directors (13) increases, the above-mentioned maximum amount will be increased by 10% for each new member of the Board of Directors that implies an increase in the number of its members.

The Board of Directors, following a proposal by the NRC, is tasked with the distribution of fixed remuneration and attendance fees for the Board of Directors' meetings for each Director in respect of their membership of the Company's Board of Directors and of its Committees. For the purposes of estimating the fixed remuneration for each Director, consideration will be given to the functions and responsibilities assigned to each of the Directors, their membership of Committees of the Board of Directors and their engagement, in addition to any other objective circumstances that may be deemed relevant, ensuring that this is competitive with the remuneration at other similar companies in terms of their capitalisation, size and geographical breadth of its operations.

Non-Executive Directors, (as the Executive Director and other senior officers at the Company) are beneficiaries of a Directors and Officers liability insurance (D&O) policy underwritten by Colonial SFL that covers liability for the actions and conduct of members of the Board of Directors and executives of the Company as a result of the discharge of their duties, and any losses arising from cyber attacks or failures in cybersecurity.

The cost of this insurance policy is not included in the maximum amount of annual remuneration for all the Directors.

1. In accordance with the instructions of Circular 3/2021, of September 28, of the CNMV the contribution made to the social welfare system is considered non-consolidated and is included in the tables of Statistical Appendix II of the Annual Report on the Directors' Remuneration of listed companies as a long-term savings systems with non-consolidated economic rights. Therefore, the total remuneration accrued in 2025 included in table C.1.c). of Statistical Appendix II amounts to 2,684 thousand euros.

2. The total annual bonus generated in 2025 amounts to 888,274 euros (83% of the maximum). Of this total, 800,000 euros will be paid in cash in 2026. The excess is deferred in 16,911 shares, and their effective delivery will occur in 2027, subject to the CEO remaining in the Colonial SFL.

3. The total annual bonus generated in 2024 amounts to 1,057,373 euros (98.8% of the maximum). Of this total, 800,000 euros will be paid in cash in 2025. The excess is deferred in 48,197 shares, and their effective delivery will occur in 2026, subject to the CEO remaining in the Colonial SFL.

4. It includes the deferred shares corresponding to the 2021 variable remuneration that were consolidated in 2023 (21,912 shares valued at 5.97 euros) y 5,259 euros, a cash amount equivalent to the dividends generated during the deferral period (0.24 euros/share in 2022).

5. The economic value of the shares of the long-term incentive considers a share price of 5.22 euros , the weighted average price of the 20 trading sessions after 15 January 2026 (inclusive).

6. Other remuneration from 2020 to 2021 includes the remuneration items received for being members on management bodies of other companies in the Group, (specifically Société Foncière Lyonnaise - SFL), and the extraordinary remuneration for the takeover bid by Colonial of SFL's shares owned by minority shareholders.

   In the financial year 2025, the Chief Executive Officer did not accrue or receive any remuneration other than those specified above.

   CEO Pay Ratio

   The total remuneration accrued in 2025 by the Chief Executive Director amounted to 2,804 thousand euros. The average remuneration of the staff, taking into consideration the 226 employees in Colonial SFL, amounted to 122 thousand euros. Therefore, the ratio of the Chief Executive Officer's total remuneration is 23 times the average remuneration of the staff.

   The Statistics Appendix II included at the end of this Report provides a table that explains the development of the Chief Executive Officer's total remuneration, the Non-Executive Directors' total remuneration, the Company's consolidated results and the average remuneration of the staff, (excluding the Directors), over the last 5 financial years.

   4.2 2025 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER REMUNERATION
   1. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: fixed elements

      Base salary

The Chief Executive Officer's base salary in 2025 amounted to €800,000, according to the limit stipulated in the Directors' Remuneration Policy

This amount consists of the remuneration for all the duties he performs at Colonial SFL both in his executive capacity and as a member on the Company's

Board of Directors and attending its meetings.

The Chief Executive Officer was the beneficiary of a defined-contribution welfare scheme covering retirement, disability and death for an amount corresponding to 15% of his base salary, i.e. €120,000.

In the case of termination for just cause, the financial rights are not vested. In all other cases, financial rights will be recognised on the date of termination. In addition, this social welfare system is compatible with any severance package that, if applicable, may correspond.

The Company grants the Chief Executive Officer remuneration in kind, apart from the social welfare system referred to above, which are normal practice in the sector, such as Company car, a life insurance policy, family health, disability and accident medical insurance policy. In 2025, the amount of this remuneration in kind amounted to €53,769.

No advance, credit or guarantee has been granted by the Company.

Colonial SFL has taken out a group third-party liability insurance policy underwritten by Colonial SFL that covers liability for the actions and conduct of members of the Board of Directors and executives of the Company as a result of the discharge of his duties, and any losses arising from cyber attacks or failures in cybersecurity. The cost of this insurance policy is not included in the maximum amount of annual remuneration for all the Directors in their capacity as such.

1. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: performance-related elements

   Annual bonus

In 2025, the Chief Executive Officer was assigned an annual bonus equivalent to 100% of his annual base salary, in the event of 100% of achievement of the objectives predetermined by the Board of Directors at the beginning of the financial year, at the proposal of the Committee, which could reach up to a maximum of 133.75% of the annual bonus target.

At the Committee's meeting held on 24 February 2025, the metrics, weightings and performance scales were agreed for the financial year 2025, which would determine the Chief Executive Officer's annual bonus in such period. The Committee monitored the achievement of these objectives throughout the year and, once the financial year had ended and the annual accounts had been audited for the financial year in question, an evaluation process was conducted of the achievement of these objectives, for which it relied on the support of the executive team and the Sustainability Committee. In this evaluation, the Committee also considered the positive and negative economic effects of extraordinary events which might introduce distortions into the results of the evaluation and the associated risks. After a favourable recommendation of the Committee, the Board of Directors is allowed to adjust the payout level of the annual bonus to ensure that the result is fair and balanced in view of the Company's overall performance and the shareholders' experience.

The following table shows the metrics, their weightings, the results achieve and the achievement and payout level, after the evaluation by the Committee at its meeting held on 25 February 2026 to determine the amount of the annual bonus payable:

Regarding the financial objectives, the Committee has taken the following adjustments into account:

1. • Net rental income includes the income recognised in the subsidiary's profit and loss account, recorded in accordance with the equity method.

   • The LTV considers the pro forma LTV figure published in the annual report, adjusted for extraordinary cash outflows associated with the completion of the merger with SFL, corresponding to the repurchase of shares and acquisition of minority shareholders.

     Specifically, in relation to the non-financial objectives, the Committee has considered the following achievements:

   • Colonial SFL has achieved an excellent positioning in the following sustainability indices:

     • 5-star rating, with a score of 94/100 points from the Global Real Estate Sustainability Benchmark (GRESB) index for the property portfolio, improving by 2 points the rating of the previous year.

     • "A" rating in CDP, the highest category, for the fifth consecutive year, confirming Company's leadership in decarbonisation. This rating is becoming increasingly demanding, with very strict requirements for climate strategy. The list of companies with an A rating represents 4% of all participants.

     • The first Ibex-35 company with a score of 6 in the Sustainalytics ESG Risk rating. Colonial SFL ranks in the Top 4 of the 410 listed real estate companies analysed (European REITs), in the top 0.5% of covered real estate companies (5th position out of 950 companies) and, globally, in the top 0.2% of the companies analysed (top 22 out of 14,412 total companies).

     • The reduction of Scope 1&2 (like-for-like) emissions between 2018 and 2025 amounts to 76% (the 2030 target is 80%).

   • The aspects considered in the individual assessment of the Chief Executive Officer have been mentioned in the letter from the Chair of the NRC. We refer to it to avoid repetition.

     Based on the above, the Committee considered a weighted payout level for all the objectives of 111.03% of target. This payout is the result of applying the metrics, weightings and performance scales agreed at the beginning of financial year 2025, without applying any adjustments. Therefore, after a favourable recommendation of the Committee, the Board of Directors approved annual bonus for an amount of 888,274 euros (111.03 % of base salary and 83% of the maximum annual bonus).

     Of the total amount, €800,000 (equivalent to the target annual bonus) is paid in cash in 2026. The excess is deferred in shares (16,911 shares calculated at a price of €5.22*) and will be effectively delivered in 2027, subject to the CEO remaining in the Colonial SFL. The Chief Executive Officer will be entitled to receive on the same date of delivery of the deferred shares an amount equivalent in cash to the dividends generated on the deferred shares during the deferral period.

     The Board of Directors has agreed not to apply the malus and/or clawback clauses, considering that there are no circumstances that would justify doing so.

     * Weighted average share price of the 20 sessions after 15 January 2026 (inclusive).

     4.2 2025 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER REMUNERATION
2. Remuneration elements for performing executive duties: performance-related remuneration (cont.)

The 2023-2025 cycle ended during the 2025 financial year. This cycle consisted of the delivery of actions conditioned on the fulfillment of a set of objectives and on remaining in place during the measurement period of these objectives.

At the Comittee's meeting held on 20 February 2023, the metrics, weightings and performance scales were agreed, which would determine the Chief Executive Officer's long-term incentive in such period. The Committee monitored the achievement of these objectives throughout the year and, once the financial year had ended and the annual accounts had been audited for the financial year in question, an evaluation process was conducted of the achievement of these objectives, for which it relied on the support of the executive team. In this evaluation, the Committee also considered the positive and negative economic effects of extraordinary events which might introduce distortions into the results of the evaluation and the associated risks.

After a favourable recommendation of the Committee, the Board of Directors is allowed to adjust the payout level of the incentive to ensure that the result is fair and balanced in view of the Company's overall performance and the shareholders' experience.

To determine the level of achievement of the objectives and to calculate the exact number of shares to be awarded, a performance scale was set for each objective at the start of the cycle. This includes: (i) a minimum threshold below which no incentive is paid and its achievement will result in the award of 50% of the theoretical number of granted shares; (ii) a target level that will result in the award of 100% of the theoretical number of granted shares; and (iii) a maximum level that will imply an award of 150% of the theoretical number of granted shares.

The following table shows the metrics, their weightings, the results achieve and the achievement and payout level, after the evaluation by the Committee , to determine the amount of the long-term incentive payable:

1Regarding the relative NTA metric, four companies in the peer group (Gecina, Covivio, PSP Swiss Property and Icade) have published their results, while the remaining three (Merlin Properties, Aroundtown and Vitura) will do so after the publication date of this Report. Due to the lack of information, the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the NRC, has considered the results as of the end of 2025 for the four companies that have published their results and as of the end of June 2025 for the other three companies. As a contrast, an analysis was also carried out considering only the four companies that have published their results as of the end of 2025. The level of achievement obtained is similar. It should be noted that this metric has been eliminated for the 2026-2028 cycle.

Based on the results achieved, the Committee considered a preliminary weighted payout level of 68.62% of the target. This payout is the result of applying the metrics, weightings, and performance scales agreed upon at the beginning of financial year 2023, without adjustments (except for the adjustment indicated for the relative NTA metric). Therefore, after a favourable recommendation by the Committee, the Board of Directors approved a long-term incentive for the 2023-2025 cycle of 171,121 shares (equivalents to 45.7% of the maximum incentive).

According to the agreement approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting in 2021, this number of shares will be increased by a number of shares equivalent to the amount of dividends per share paid out by Colonial SFL to its shareholders during the accrual period of the cycle. For such purpose, the reference value will be the weighted average of Colonial SFL's share on the dividend payment dates in each of the years of the cycle.

As a result, the total number of shares accrued by the Chief Executive Officer is 197,398 shares. These shares, considering a share price of 5.22 euros, have a final value of 1,030,418 euros, 45.8% compared with the initial grant value. This result shows the flexibility of the variable remuneration and the alignment of the shareholders' experience with the CEO's remuneration. The Chief Executive Officer must hold the earned shares, net of taxes, for at least one year after they are awarded, irrespective of the minimum shareholding requirement equivalent to 2x his base salary.

The Board of Directors has agreed not to apply the malus and/or clawback clauses, considering that there are no circumstances that would justify doing so.

The overall remuneration of the Directors for being members on the Board of Directors and its committees amounted to 2,531 thousand euros in 2025, which is substantially below the maximum total annual remuneration of 2,700 thousand of euros, stipulated in the Directors' Remuneration Policy 2024-2026 for all the Directors in their capacity as such.

The amounts and items for the financial year 2025 are shown in the following table:

The remuneration accrued by the members of the Company's Board of Directors in the financial year 2025, in thousands of euros, individualised by Director, is

Notes:

• ACC: Audit and Control Committee

• NRC: Nomination and Remuneration Committee

• EC: Executive Committee

• SC: Sustainability Committee

• C: Chair

• M: Member

There is no additional remuneration accrued in favor of the Directors as consideration for services rendered other than those inherent to their position, nor any additional remuneration concept beyond those explained in the previous sections.

1. CONSISTENCY WITH THE COMPANY'S STRATEGY, INTERESTS AND

   SUSTAINABILITY IN THE LONG-TERM

   The Remuneration Policy has the following features that ensure consistency with the Company's strategy, interests and sustainability in the long term.

   • The total remuneration for the Executive Director mainly consists of the following components: fixed remuneration elements, annual bonus and long-term Incentive. For the Executive Director, this long-term component has a weight no less than 48% of total remuneration in a target scenario.

   • This long-term incentive is designed as multi-year scheme to ensure that the evaluation process is based on long-term results and that the underlying economic cycle of the Company is considered. This remuneration is mainly granted and delivered in the form of shares and based on the shareholders' value creation to align Executives' and shareholders' interests. Moreover, it consists of overlapping cycles which, as a general rule, are chained indefinitely, maintaining a permanent focus on the long-term in all decisions.

   • A suitable balance between the fixed and variable components of the remuneration. The Executive Director has a variable remuneration scheme that is fully flexible, which includes a minimum threshold below which no incentive is payable.

   • The metrics set out in both annual bonus and long-term variable remuneration are linked to the achievement of a combination of financial and non-financial measures, reflecting the Company's strategic priorities at any given time.

   • The shares delivered to the Executive Director are subject to a holding period of one year, notwithstanding the minimum shareholding requirement of 2 times his base salary.

   • There is no guaranteed variable remuneration.

     In addition, the Remuneration Policy has the following features to reduce exposure to excessive risk. The Committee periodically reviews HR and remuneration practices to make the corresponding proposals to the Board of Directors always in the best interest for the company, including:

   • How we integrate risk, controls and conduct considerations into key HR practices including performance development, remuneration, promotion and succession planning.

   • Measures designed to discourage imprudent risk-taking:

     • Caps to variable remuneration.

     • Possible deferral of the portion of bonus above the target award.

     • Multiple performance metrics, some of which may be adjusted by different risks.

     • Multi-year vesting periods.

     • Retention and minimum shareholding requirements.

     • Malus and clawback clauses.

     • Prohibition of hedging, pledging, short sales or derivative transactions in the Company shares received during the retention period.

   • Regulatory updates which have impacted or may impact HR practices in the future.

   • The Committee connects with other committees to ensure that the Colonial SFL's remuneration policies and practices achieve the right balance between appropriate incentives to reward performance and management of the risks linked to remuneration.

The Committee is also provided with information to monitor performance and a summary of risk, controls and conduct assessments.

The specific measures to identify and manage any potential conflict of interest are set in the Regulations of the Board of Directors. These also determine the code of conduct for the members of the Board of Directors.

Regarding the ratio of the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration with that of the rest of the employees, there is a clear alignment between the remuneration structures of the executives, including the Chief Executive Officer, and those of the other employees, in the manner the remuneration principles are followed, as well as in the mechanics of the pay review process along with the design of the incentives, which are substantially the consistent across the organisation.

The Chief Executive Officer's remuneration approach is coherent with the remuneration package of the members of the Management Team and other executives. In general, a much larger proportion of the Executive Director's remuneration is linked to the Company's results compared with the rest of the employees. Therefore, the remuneration will be increased or decreased depending on the business results and thus the Chief Executive Officer's interests will be in line with those of the shareholders and other stakeholders of Colonial SFL.

The type of metrics to which the annual bonus and the long-term incentive are linked is aligned for the executive team and the rest of the employees.

According to the Board of Directors' Regulations, the Directors of the Board and members of its Committees may request external advice on any matters they deem necessary to better perform their duties In this respect, the Committee has received advice from Towers Watson (WTW) in preparing this Report and in designing and implementing the variable remuneration plans.

This Appendix I includes the details of the current cycles, specifically the first Cycle 2024-2026 and the second Cycle 2025-2027 of the Long-Term Incentive Plan approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting on 13 June 2024.

REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS FOR LISTED COMPANIES (Circular

3/2021, of September 28, of the CNMV)

ISSUER IDENTIFICATION

Ending date of reference period: 31/12/2025

CIF: A-28027399

Corporate Name:

COLONIAL SFL, SOCIMI, S.A.

Registered Office:

1/12

PASEO DE LA CASTELLANA, 52 MADRID

ANNUAL REPORT ON REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES

1. OVERALL SUMMARY OF HOW REMUNERATION POLICY HAS BEEN APPLIED DURING THE YEAR ENDED

   2

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   B.4. Report on the result of the consultative vote at the general shareholders' meeting on remuneration in the previous year, indicating the number of votes against that may have been cast

   	Number	% of total
   Votes cast	524,735,841	83.64

   	Number	% of cast
   Votes against	12,959,950	2.47
   Votes in favour	504,030,539	96.05
   Blank ballots	250	0.00
   Abstentions	7,745,102	1.48

   3

2. ITEMISED INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION ACCRUED BY EACH DIRECTOR

   Name	Type	Period of accrual in the financial year 2025
   Ms. ELENA SALGADO MÉNDEZ	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Ms. ANA CRISTINA PERALTA MORENO	Independent Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Ms. SILVIA MÓNICA ALONSO- CASTRILLO ALLAIN	Independent Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Ms. MIRIAM GONZÁLEZ-AMÉZQUETA LÓPEZ	Independent Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ GONZÁLEZ	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. FELIPE MATÍAS CAVIEDES	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Ms. ANA LUCRECIA BOLADO VALLE	Independent Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	Chief Executive Officer	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. MANUEL PUIG ROCHA	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. JUAN JOSÉ BRUGERA CLAVERO	Chair Other External	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Ms. BEGOÑA ORGAMBIDE GARCÍA	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. SHEIKH ALI JASSIM M.J. AL-THANI	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
   Mr. GUILIANO ROTONDO	Proprietary Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025

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   1. Complete the following tables regarding the individual remuneration of each director (including the salary received for performing executive duties) accrued during the year.

      1. Remuneration from the reporting company:

         4

         1. Remuneration in cash (thousands of €)

            Name	Fixed Remuneration	Per diem allowances	Remuneration for membership of Board's committees	Salary	Short-term variable remuneration	Long-term variable remuneration	Severance payment	Other items	Total in 2025	Total in 2024
            Ms. ELENA SALGADO MÉNDEZ	50	82	25						157	75
            Ms. ANA CRISTINA PERALTA MORENO	50	131	71						252	240
            Ms. SILVIA MÓNICA ALONSO- CASTRILLO ALLAIN	50	116	67						233	192
            Ms. MIRIAM GONZÁLEZ-AMÉZQUETA LÓPEZ	50	124	50						224	206
            Mr. CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ GONZÁLEZ	50	55							105	105
            Mr. FELIPE MATÍAS CAVIEDES	50	60							110	150
            Ms. ANA LUCRECIA BOLADO VALLE	50	157	96						303	295
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA				800	800				1,600	1,600
            Mr. MANUEL PUIG ROCHA	50	60							110	105
            Mr. JUAN JOSÉ BRUGERA CLAVERO	550	90							640	640
            Ms. BEGOÑA ORGAMBIDE GARCÍA	50	102	25						177	183
            Mr. SHEIKH ALI JASSIM M.J. AL-THANI	50	60							110	110
            Mr. GUILIANO ROTONDO	50	60							110	105

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            ANNUAL REPORT ON REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES

            
            
            

         2. Table of changes in share-based remuneration schemes and gross profit from consolidated shares or financial instruments.

            Name	Name of Plan	Financial instruments at start of 2025		Financial instruments granted during 2025		Financial instruments consolidated during the year				Instruments matured but not exercised	Financial instruments at end of 2025
            		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares/ consolidated	Price of the consolidated shares	Gross profit from consolidated shares or financial instruments (thousands of €)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	2024 Deferred annual variable remuneration	48,197	48,197					0.00			48,197	48,197
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	2025 Deferred annual variable remuneration			16,911	16,911			0.00			16,911	16,911
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	2023-2025 Cycle	376,254	376,254			172,121	172,121	5.22	898	204,133
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	Dividend equivalents 2023-2025 Cycle			25,278	25,278	25,278	25,278	5.22	132
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	2025-2027 Cycle			449,438	449,438			0.00			449,438	449,438
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	2024-2026 Cycle	454,759	454,759					0.00			454,759	454,759

            5

         3. Long-term saving systems

            Name	Remuneration from consolidation of rights to savings system
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA

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            	Contribution over the year from the company (thousand €)				Amount of accumulated funds (thousand €)
            Name	Savings systems with consolidated economic rights		Savings systems with unconsolidated economic rights		Savings systems with consolidated economic rights		Savings systems with unconsolidated economic rights
            	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2024
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA			120	120			1,090	970

            ANNUAL REPORT ON REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES

            
            
            

         4. Details of other items

            Name	Item	Remuneration amount
            Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA	Remuneration in kind	54

      2. Remuneration of the company directors for seats on the boards of other group companies:

         6

         1. Remuneration in cash (thousands of €)

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